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ABSTRACT 
 
Currently most international investment disputes are settled through arbitration. The origin of 
this dispute settlement system can be associated with the recent proliferation of over 3000 
Bilateral Investment Treaties. Through this system disputes are settled by autonomous and 
differently constituted tribunals which have powers to render final and binding awards. The 
dissatisfied party has very limited opportunity to challenge the rendered award as there are no 
higher bodies in the hierarchy where a dissatisfied party can lodge an appeal, save for limited 
procedural challenges which are allowed under the system.  
 
These differently constituted tribunals at times reach diametrically opposed decisions on similar 
facts and those decisions stand side by side and all are considered valid. These inconsistent 
decisions are leading to lack of consistency and uniformity which in turn affects the legitimacy 
of the system as a whole. The rules of these institutions do not allow the proceedings to be held 
in public despite the fact that at times these tribunals question the regulatory powers of the state 
and state measures on service provision to its citizens. Another issue under the current system is 
that due to lack of coordination, arbitrators play dual roles: as counsels and arbitrators. This 
practice compromises the cherished principle of the rule of law. 
 
In the effort to address these concerns, stakeholders have suggested a number of possible 
solutions. The suggested solutions include: invoking res judicata and lis pendens principles; 
adopting the doctrine of precedent; applying the ‘fork in the road’ principle; adopting the margin 
 
 
 
 
xvii 
 
of appreciation standard in interpretation of BITs; creating an appellate structure at ICSID and 
creating a treaty to treaty appellate body. 
 
This research submits that, the suggested solutions singularly and cumulatively don not address 
the legitimacy issues adequately. The research therefore calls for the establishment of a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in order to address the legitimacy issues 
cumulatively. It is submitted that establishing a Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) which 
provides for creating a standing international investment court with an appellate court is the only 
solution which addresses all the issues haunting the international investment dispute settlement 
system. 
 
In addition, the research suggests interim solutions which will help to increase the legitimacy of 
the current system pending the establishment of the MAI and the courts.  The interim solutions 
include: establishment of the investor – state dispute adjudication Centre; effective utilisation of 
host state courts; mandatory publication of all awards; enhancing the effective use of member 
states interpretative statement; and forming a working commission to provide basic interpretation 
and the scope of the basic international investment law principles. These measures are only 
meant to improve the current system pending the establishment of the MAI and the courts. 
 
The research concludes that for the betterment of international investment law, the reform is 
inevitable and that the benefits would outweigh any demerits.  
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KEY WORDS 
 
International investment law, bilateral investment treaty, investor – state arbitration, 
transparency, independence and impartiality, State’s power to regulate, public interest disputes, 
international investment court, international investment appellate court.
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CHAPTER ONE: 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a background to the research. The chapter explains the research problem; 
sets out the scope of the research; explain the objectives and methodology of the research; and 
lastly outlines the chapters of the thesis. The chapter concludes that a study on reforming the 
international investment dispute settlement system is important and very timely. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
Currently most international investment disputes are settled through arbitration.
1
 Investment 
arbitration is not carried out by a single omnipotent body or court; rather, it is carried out by a 
number of different bodies, permanent and ad hoc. Most of the time these disputes are settled 
under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitration,
2
 or 
under the Additional Facility arbitration
3
 or the ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules.
4
 The 
                                                          
1
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Towards a New Generation of Investment 
Policies’ World Investment Report at p 86 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012_embargoed_en.pdf accessed on 21/02/2013. 
2
 Governed by the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and the Nationals of  Other 
Contracting States, 1965 ,  read together with the Rules of  Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and 
Arbitration Proceedings (hereinafter ICSID Rules)  available at  http://www.worldbank.org/icsid.htm   accessed on 
21/05/2013. 
3
 The Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 2006, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf  accessed on 21/02/2013. 
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dispute is settled at ICSID when it involves a member state and a national from another member 
state.
5
 Where one of the parties to the dispute is not a member, the dispute can then be settled 
under the ICSID Additional Facility rules.
6
  Where neither the host state nor the foreign investor 
home state is a convention member, the dispute is normally settled on an ad hoc basis under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration rules.
7
 In an ad hoc arbitration, parties may choose any arbitration 
institution to be the appointing authority for the purpose of their arbitration proceeding. 
Institutions, such as, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),
8
 the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce,
9
 and the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) formed in 1892,
10
 to 
name a few, are some of the well - established arbitration institutions.  
 
The UNCTAD 2013 World Investment Report indicates that ICSID constitutes 61% of all 
investor – state disputes while UNCITRAL constitutes 26% and the remaining 13% is left for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4
 See the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010, available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/arbitration/rules/arb-rules-
revised-2010 accessed on 15/02/2013. 
5
 See Art.25 of  the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and the Nationals of Other 
Contracting States, 1965,   
6
 See Art 2(a) of the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 2006, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf  accessed on 21/02/2013. 
7
 See Art. 1 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010, available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/arbitration/rules/arb-
rules-revised-2010 accessed on 15/02/2013. 
8
 See the Permanent Court of Arbitration Website, ‘About Us’ available at  http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1027 accessed on 28/04/2014; see also Mackenzie R et al The Manual on 
International Courts and Tribunals 2nd ed. (2010) at 102; also see UNCTAD ‘Permanent Court of Arbitration’ 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.26 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add26_en.pdf accessed on 
28/04/2014. 
9
 See Article 1 of the Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 2010, 
available at 
http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/3/35894/K4_Skiljedomsregler%20eng%20ARB%20TRYCK_1_100927.pdf  
accessed on 20/02/2013. 
10
 See Article 1 of the London Court of International Arbitration 2014, available at 
file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/LCIA%20Arbitration%20Rules%20effective%201%20October%202014.pdf 
accessed on 02/11/2014. 
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International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
11
 the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
12
 and 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
13
  
 
The problem of this research is that, as a result of the lack of a single omnipotent body 
responsible for supervising investment disputes, a number of issues have arisen. Under the 
current system there is no mechanism in place to avoid inconsistent decisions,
14
 there are no 
adequate rules to ensure an impartial and independent adjudication process, there are no rules to 
ensure transparency despite the fact that the disputes are public in nature, and there is no 
appellate system to rectify errors.
15
 In addition, these uncoordinated and unsupervised tribunals 
at times encroach on governments’ regulatory powers by rendering awards which challenge or 
illegalise legitimate laws passed by states. Recently the international community has witnessed a 
                                                          
11
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Latest Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, 2013’ World Investment Report,  at 1–2, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf  accessed on 23/07/2013. 
12
 Established by the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1899 available at http://www/pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1027 accessed on 18/07/2013.   
13
 See the Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 2010, available at 
http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/3/35894/K4_Skiljedomsregler%20eng%20ARB%20TRYCK_1_100927.pdf  
accessed on 20/02/2013. 
14
 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID ARB/01/13 (Decision on 
objection to jurisdiction) (hereinafter SGS v Pakistan) and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Republic of 
the Philippines, ICSID ARB/02/6 (Decision on objection to jurisdiction and separate declaration) (hereinafter SGS v 
Philippines); See also Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech 
Republic 9 ICSID Reports 121.  
15
 See Van Harten et al ‘Public Statement on the International Investment Regime’ Aug. 31, 2010 available at 
http://tinyurl.com/3qhnjwr (hereinafter Public statement) accessed 23rd January 2013; See also Brower C N et al 
‘The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System’ (2003) 19 Arbitration International 415 at 417; Mann H 
‘Civil Society Perspective: what Do Key Stakeholders Expect from the International Investment Regime?’ in 
Alvarez JE and Sauvant KP (eds.) The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations Realities, Options 
(2011) 22-29; Gaiger R ‘Multilateral Approach to Investment’ in Alvarez J and Sauvant K P (eds.) The Evolving 
International Investment Regime (2011) 153-173; Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Binder C et 
al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 – 
916; Van Harten G ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Schill S (ed.) 
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 627 – 658; Peterson L ‘Out of Order’ in Waibel 
et al (eds.) The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 483 – 488; Reinisch A ‘The 
Issues Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible Solutions’ in Waibel M et al (eds.)  The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 113- 126. 
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number of cases challenging the host state’s basic regulatory functions and sometimes the state’s 
duty to provide public services to its citizens.
16
 In some cases the main function of the state, viz, 
security and peace is put in jeopardy but still the standard of review applied by the tribunals does 
not take these factors into consideration.
17
 Furthermore, state regulatory measures on 
environmental issues, health and other service delivery to the citizens have been declared illegal 
in favour of foreign investors’ interests.18 
 
In reaction to the abovementioned flaws in the system, some stakeholders have started running 
away from the investor – state arbitration system. Latin America countries, viz, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela, have led the way by withdrawing from the ICSID Convention.
19
   
 
Australia, on the other hand, in an effort to seek more policy space in April 2011 issued a trade 
policy statement announcing that it would stop including investor – state dispute settlement 
clauses in its future International Investment Agreements (IIAs).
20
 However, it should be noted 
                                                          
16
 See Aguas del Tunari S A v Bolivia ICSID ARB/02/3 (2005) (decision on jurisdiction) and Azurix Corp v 
Argentina ICSID ARB/1/12 (2006) (final award) (all cases concerned governed measures to protect water services). 
17
 See CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8(2005) (final award), Sempra 
Energy International v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/02/16 (2005) (final award), and Enron Corporation and 
Ponderosa Assets L P v Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/3 (2007) (final award). 
18
 See Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12 in 
which the claimant is suing the government of Australia for enacting a legislation which require plain cigarette 
packaging on public health reasons; See  also Vattenfall v Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/12 (2012). The case is commenced by Vattenfall against Germany as a result of Germany’s nuclear opt-out 
decision to protect the environment and health. 
19
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Towards a New Generation of Investment 
Policies’ World Investment Report at p 84 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012_embargoed_en.pdf accessed on 21/02/2013. 
20
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity, April 2011 
available at www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.html accessed on 
25/01/ 2013. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
that with the change of government in 2013, the new Australia- Korea FTA which includes an 
investment chapter has incorporated investor-state arbitration.
21
 With the aim of addressing the 
host state policy making space, the new FTA comes with the ‘general exception’ to investment 
obligations which parallel WTO exception provisions such as GATT Article XX and GATS 
Article XIV.
22
 
 
The United States has also revised its model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in order to 
constrain the expansive interpretations by tribunals. The revised model BIT empowers the US 
government more to regulate on different issues, viz, health, safety, environment, and the 
promotion of internationally recognized labour rights without interference from the investor – 
state tribunals.
23
 In addition to that, the US 2012 model BIT mandates the Parties to ‘consider’ 
whether arbitral awards under the BIT should be subject to any new appellate mechanism to be 
introduced in the future.
24
  
 
                                                          
21
 Lester S ‘Improving Investment Treaties through General Exceptions Provisions: The Australian Example’ 
Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf accessed on 16/05/2014. 
22
 Lester S ‘Improving Investment Treaties through General Exceptions Provisions: The Australian Example’ 
Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf accessed on 16/05/2014. 
23
 The Office of the United States Trade Representative, US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012), Art.12 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_ 6897.pdf  
accessed on 23/02/ 2013. 
24
 See Article 28(10) of the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_ 6897.pdf  accessed on 
23/02/ 2013. 
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South Africa has also shown its dissatisfaction with the current dispute settlement system.
25
 The 
government in 2009 issued a policy statement with regard to BITs. In an effort to balance 
interests between host state and foreign investors, the government has denounced a number of 
BITs with European countries and is pushing for utilisation of host state courts in the event of 
any disputes between South Africa and foreign investors.
26
 In another move, the South African 
government in November 2013 published its draft Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 
2013 in the Government Gazette for public comment.
27
 The bill provides for domestic litigation, 
domestic arbitration and mediation of investment disputes.
28
  
 
In March 2014, Germany also announced its dissatisfaction with the investor – state arbitration 
system and is opposing the inclusion of the system in the EU – US trade pact which is currently 
under negotiation.
29
 Germany is taking the same stance on the recently concluded 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between EU and Canada.
30
  Germany 
is advancing the idea of adjudicating investor – state disputes in the host state courts. According 
                                                          
25
 See The Department of Trade and Industry ‘Republic of South Africa’s Government Position Paper on Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review’, June 2009, available at  http://www.thedti.gov.za/ads/bi-
lateral_policy.pdf  accessed on 7/02/2013.   
26
 See the Speech delivered by the Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa  Dr Rob Davies at the South 
African launch of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Investment Policy 
Framework for sustainable development at the University of The Witwatersrand on 26
th
 July 2012 available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=29391&tid=77861  accessed on 07/03/ 2013). 
 
27
 See the ‘Draft Bill on Promotion and Protection of Investment’, 2013 available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/11/Promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-2013-Invitation-for-public-
comment.pdf accessed on 07/03/2014. 
28
 See Article 11 of the ‘Draft Bill on Promotion and Protection of Investment’, 2013 available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/11/Promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-2013-Invitation-for-public-
comment.pdf accessed on 07/03/2014. 
29
 See the Germany Ministry Announcement in Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue  at 16 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf  
30
 See  the EU – Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf accessed on 11/11/2014. 
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to the Financial Times, the Junior Minister of Economy, Brigitte Zypries, believes that foreign 
investors ‘have sufficient legal protection in the national courts.’31 
 
Apart from countries, other stakeholders have also shown concern about the current dispute 
settlement mechanism. The Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament, on 22 
March 2011 issued a Report on the future of International Investment Policy of the European 
Union.
32
 The Report highlighted the problem relating to: different interpretations of investment 
principles by different tribunals which lead to conflict between private interests and the 
regulatory tasks of public authorities;
33
 the existence of BITs which focus on the interests of 
investors alone and disregard the host state interests in regulating for other development goals; 
34
and the lack of a model BIT for member states which can enhance certainty and consistency of 
interpretation.
35
 In addition, the Report raises concerns about the wide discretionary powers 
granted to arbitrators on interpretation of the investment principles.
36
 The Report raises further 
concerns about the lack of transparency in the current system, the lack of an appellate option and 
the absence of the requirement for exhaustion of local remedies before resorting to international 
arbitration.
37
 
 
                                                          
31
 Financial Times quoted in Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue  at 16 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf 
32
 European Union Parliament Report on the Future European International Investment Policy, A7-0070/2011 of  22 
March 2011 available at  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-
2011-0070+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN  (hereinafter European Parliament Report on investment) (accessed on 15
th
 
February 2013). 
33
 See the European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para G. 
34
 See the European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para J (1) and para 25. 
35
 See the European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para J (4) and (10). 
36
 The European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para 17. 
37
 The European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para 31. 
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Furthermore, the Law professors from different parts of the world in 2010 issued a public 
statement condemning the current investment arbitration system.
38
 Among the concerns raised in 
the public statement are: the need to have an independent judicial system responsible for 
investment disputes; recognition of the state’s fundamental right to regulate on behalf of public 
welfare; the need for arbitrators to consider the public interest in their interpretation of 
investment principles; and that the current adjudication system is not a fair, independent and 
balanced system for settlement of investment disputes.
39
 
 
From the stakeholders’ reactions noted above, it is submitted here that it is evident that the 
system is experiencing a legitimacy crisis. ‘Legitimacy’ is defined as the basis upon which 
people accept or are willing to accept the legal order as they find it and is premised upon the idea 
that law should be good for, and justly serve, the people.
40
 There is a need to assess the system as 
a whole and suggest the possible solutions before it loses the little remaining legitimacy it is 
currently enjoying. It is the purpose of this research to propose and critically analyse the type of 
reform required and make the necessary recommendations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 See Van Harten et al ‘Public Statement on the International Investment Regime’ Aug. 31, 2010 para 1 – 8 
available at http://tinyurl.com/3qhnjwr accessed 23rd January 2013. 
39
 Van Harten et al ‘Public Statement on the International Investment Regime’ Aug. 31, 2010 para 1 – 8 available at 
http://tinyurl.com/3qhnjwr accessed 23rd January 2013. 
40
 Hurst R ‘Problem of Legitimacy in the contemporary legal order’ (1971) 24 Oklahoma Law Review 224 at 225; 
see also Howse R ‘Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law:  The Early Years 
of WTO Jurisprudence’ in Weiler (ed.) Towards a Common Law of International Trade?:  EU, WTO and NAFTA 
(2000) 211 at 218;  
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1.3 Significance of the problem  
 
In the current globalised world where foreign investment plays a significant role in the world 
economy, it is important to have a legitimate and well organised dispute settlement system. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics indicates that in 
1982 the global total of FDI was only USD 27 billion.
41
 However, two and a half decades later 
the FDI stock steadily increased and reached a peak of USD 2.2 trillion by the year 2007.
42
 The 
2009 world economic meltdown affected FDI development as it dwindled by almost 50% and 
reached USD 1.2 trillion in 2010 followed by a modest recovery up to USD 1.35 trillion in 2012 
and the same figure for 2013.
43
 However, UNCTAD 2014 indicates that in 2013 the FDI stock 
grew to USD 1.45 trillion and is projecting that the stock will be USD 1.6 trillion by the end of 
2014.
44
  As the above statistical data indicate, the FDI stock as it stands contributes hugely to 
world development in a number of ways including but not limited to job creation, innovation, 
competition and technology transfer.
45
  Therefore it follows that the adjudicative system which is 
responsible to adjudicate on such huge amounts of money needs to adhere to basic principles of 
                                                          
41
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Transnational Corporations and the 
Infrastructure Challenge’ World Investment Report, 2008 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2008_en.pdf 
accessed on 22/05/2014. 
42
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Transnational Corporations and the 
Infrastructure Challenge’ World Investment Report, 2008 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2008_en.pdf 
accessed on 22/05/2014. 
43
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at ix available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
44
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at ix available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
45
 Amarasinha A & Kokott J ‘Multilateral investment rules revisited’ in Muschlinski P et al Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (2008). 
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public adjudicative system.
46
 The system amongst other things, needs to be coherent, 
accountable, fair, certain, predictable and reliable.
47
 Furthermore, the system must apply the law 
consistently.
48
 It is trite that consistency, certainty and predictability are very important in the 
process of building a legitimate adjudication system.
49
 In addition, the adjudicative system must 
be able to deliver on core components of fair process especially the demands for independence 
and impartiality of adjudicators.
50
 Lack of these key elements, puts the current investor – state 
dispute settlement system in a legitimacy crisis. 
 
A thorough study, therefore, on reforming the international investment dispute settlement 
system, is of significant academic value. To date, there has been no thorough and comprehensive 
research done on the subject; therefore this work becomes a valuable original contribution to the 
topic, advances the debate on the subject and furthers knowledge in this field. The few existing 
publications on the topic are not addressing the legitimacy concerns comprehensively. They tend 
to suggest reform but without proposing the way forward; in other words, they do not address the 
‘how’ part of the reform. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the current state of the 
international investment arbitration system and suggests how to reform it. 
                                                          
46
 Franck S ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521 at 1584; see also Kaufmann – Kohler G ‘Arbitral Precedent: 
Dream, Necessity of Excuse? – The 2006 Freshfield Lecture’ (2007) 23 (3) Arbitration International 374. 
47
 See Franck S ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521 at 1584; see also Van Harten  Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 164; see also Franck T M The Power of Legitimacy among Nations(1990) at 
24. 
48
 Kaufmann – Kohler G ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity of Excuse? – The 2006 Freshfield Lecture’ (2007) 
23 (3) Arbitration International 374 at 374. 
49
 
49
 Franck S ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521 at 1584. 
50
 Mann H et al ‘IISD Comments on ICSID Discussion Paper, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID 
Arbitration’ IISD 2004 at 4, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_icsid_response.pdf  accessed on 
15/02/2013. 
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More importantly, the current study provides a detailed analysis of all the possible solutions for 
reform and explores whether the suggested solutions can really remedy the situation. This work 
will therefore be of considerable value in terms of its contribution to academia and the ongoing 
debate concerning the state of the international investment dispute settlement system and its 
future. 
  
Furthermore, it is hoped that this work will act as a catalyst for discussions as to the practicalities 
of introducing reform. As noted earlier, a number of solutions have been suggested by experts, 
but not in a comprehensive manner. This work analyses the suggestions put forward by other 
stakeholders, such as: adopting the consolidation principle in investment disputes, adoption of 
the doctrine of precedent, establishing a treaty based appellate body; and establishing an 
appellate body at the ICSID. The pros and cons of each solution are also critically analysed. In 
addition to that, this research suggests its own solutions. The strengths and weaknesses of these 
new inputs are weighed as well. 
 
Last but not least, is that, considering the fact that some of these disputes cut across a range of 
issues, such as, human rights, environmental protection and the rights of states to regulate their 
internal affairs, which overlap with other areas of international law, it is important to have a 
study like this one which provides for a comprehensive analysis of the issues at stake and 
provides workable solutions to improve the system and enhance harmonious relationships 
between state parties. 
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1.4 Research questions 
 
The main question to be answered in this research is whether the current investor – state dispute 
settlement system is legitimate enough to settle investor – state disputes. An accurate and 
detailed answer to this core question requires a comprehensive examination of the current 
investor – state arbitration system. Therefore, the follow - up question is whether the basic tenets 
of a legitimate system are enshrined in the system. The study therefore seeks to find out whether 
transparency, consistency, predictability, certainty, timeliness, cost efficiency and independence 
and impartiality are upheld and cherished in the investor – state arbitration system. Considering 
that a number of suggestions for improvement have been made, the last question is to find out the 
extent to which the suggested solutions were able to improve and benefit the system as a whole. 
 
1.5 Research objectives 
 
This study has been motivated by the need to assess the legitimacy of the investor – state 
arbitration system. The aims of the study therefore are as follows: 
 
(i) To determine whether the investor – state system incorporates legitimacy values 
which are crucial to any adjudicative system.  
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(ii) To propose viable solutions for the current systemic problems in an effort to enhance 
stakeholders trust in the system. 
 
(iii) To identify and critically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the suggested 
solutions. 
 
(iv) To propose recommendations for the purpose of improving the legitimacy of the 
investor – state arbitration system. 
 
1.6 Literature review 
 
A number of options for improvement have been suggested by different stakeholders. Knahr, for 
example, proposes consolidation of related proceedings as a means of curbing inconsistent 
decisions.
51
 She argues that in order to avoid duplication of proceedings and conflicting 
outcomes parties should consolidate their proceeding in order to minimise costs and also avoid 
inconsistent decisions. Reinisch and Crivellaro also support this suggestion.
52
  
 
Another solution which has received a lot of consideration is the adoption of the doctrine of 
precedent. Kaufmann – Kohler and other authors suggest that in order to cure the problem of 
                                                          
51
 Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) Investment 
and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 2. 
52
 Reinisch A ‘The proliferation of international Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The threat of fragmentation vs. 
The promise of more effective system? Some reflections from the perspective of investment arbitration’ in  Buffard  
J et al (eds.) International Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation (2008)107 – 126; See also Crivellaro A 
‘Consolidation of Arbitral and Court Proceedings in Investment Disputes’  (2005) 4 Law & Practice of  
International Courts & Tribunals  371 at 371. 
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inconsistency in investor – state arbitration there is a need to adhere to the English common law 
doctrine of precedent.
53
 The doctrine requires the court to stand by its previous decisions.
54
 That 
is to say, when a matter before the court has facts similar to those of another matter previously 
decided, the court should be bound to follow the ruling of the previous case.
55
  
 
In addition to the above, others have suggested the introduction of an appellate facility under 
ICSID.
56
 Advocates for this argue that in order to avoid the requirement of amending the ICSID 
Convention, the appellate body can be established under the ICSID Appeals Facility Rules which 
can be easily adopted by the Administrative Council of ICSID without the requirement of 
approval from all member states.
57
 In line with this suggestion, others are proposing the 
establishment of the treaty based appellate body.
58
  
 
                                                          
53
 Kaufmann – Kohler G ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity of Excuse? – The 2006 Freshfield Lecture’ (2007) 
23 (3) Arbitration International 344 at 378; see also Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Binder C 
et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) at 
915; see also Spooreberg & Vinuales ‘conflicting decisions in International Arbitration’ Law & Practice of  
International Courts & Tribunals  (2009) 91 – 113; see also Dennis J ‘Interpretation and Application of the Civil 
Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent’ (1994) 54 Louisiana Law Review 1 at 3. 
54
 Kaufmann – Kohler G ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity of Excuse? – The 2006 Freshfield Lecture’ (2007) 
23 (3) Arbitration International 344 at 359; see also Dennis J ‘Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and 
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent’ (1994) 54 Louisiana Law Review 1 at 3. 
55
 Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 
21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) at 915; see also Kaufmann – Kohler G ‘Arbitral 
Precedent: Dream, Necessity of Excuse? – The 2006 Freshfield Lecture’ (2007) 23 (3) Arbitration International 344 
at 347. 
56See Gleason E ‘International Arbitral Appeal, What are we so afraid of?’ (2007) 7 Pepperdine Law Review 
Journal 269 at 285; see also; Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 at 1586; also see Mann H 
‘Civil Society Perspective: what Do Key Stakeholders Expect from the International Investment Regime?’ in 
Alvarez J and Sauvant K (eds.) The Evolving International Investment Regime (2011) at170; see also Reinisch A 
‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: 
Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) at 895. 
57
 Gaiger R ‘Multilateral Approach to Investment’ in Alvarez J and Sauvant K P (eds.) The Evolving International 
Investment Regime (2011) 153-173 at 170. 
58
 Gantz DA ‘An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor- State Disputes: Prospects and 
Challenges’ (2006)39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 39. 
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A number of authors have suggested the establishment of one independent investment court.
59
 It 
is suggested that this body should not be affiliated to any of the existing conventions. These 
previous authors rightly suggest that this single international investment court be created to 
review all investment arbitration awards for errors of law and legal interpretation.
60
  
 
This research builds its argument from those who call for the establishment of an independent 
court. The research submits that although this solution has been considered by others, none of the 
authors have addressed the issue comprehensively. None of the previous authors have discussed 
how the court should be formulated, why should it be established now, where should it be hosted 
and what will be its mandate. Furthermore, none of the previous authors have discussed how the 
current investor – state adjudicative system can be phased out without affecting the legitimacy of 
the future courts. In addition, no one has discussed and analysed the minimum content of the 
future Multilateral Agreement on Investment and how the MAI will address the issues haunting 
investor – state adjudicative system. This research addresses all the above mentioned issues. 
Therefore in comparison with previous authors, this research is more comprehensive and 
addresses the issues in a more scholarly way. 
  
While there is ample evidence to support the argument that the investor – state arbitration system 
is in crisis, there is literature which sees no need for reform. Walde argues that the current 
                                                          
59
 Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521at 1617; see also Knull W H & Rubins N D ‘Betting 
the Farm on International Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an Appeal Option?’ (2000) 11American Review of 
International Arbitration 531 at 531; also see Goldhaber MD ‘Wanted: A World Investment Court’ available at 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourtO4.html  accessed on 25/02/2013. 
60
 Van Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 180. 
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system is relatively working just fine when compared with other dispute settlement systems.
61
 He 
argues that inconsistency is a feature which cannot be avoided and that it is common even in 
international commercial arbitration. In support of objection to reform there are Brower & Schill, 
62
Tams
63
 and Franck.
64
 As regards the arbitrators’ lack of independence and impartiality, it is 
argued by Brower & Schill that the claim is unfounded because presiding arbitrators are people 
of integrity with enormous professional experience, and they are not motivated by money in 
accepting their role as arbitrators.
65
 With regard to establishment of an appellate facility, Tams 
argues that the appeal process will compromise the primary aims of arbitration which are finality 
of the award, cost efficiency and timeliness.
66
 According to these authors the current system 
needs no reform.  
 
This research submits that these authors miss the big picture in their analysis. It is stated here that 
international investment arbitration which deals with public law should not be compared with 
international commercial arbitration which deals with private law per se. Leaving the system to 
operate in the current manner will lead to it losing more legitimacy. Adopting their suggestion 
will lead to the withdrawal of more member states. What is required is to find comprehensive 
solutions which will be able to address the identified issues in the system. This research provides 
the comprehensive solutions. 
                                                          
61
 See Wälde T ‘Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation and Investment Disputes: Competition and 
Choice as the Path to Quality and Legitimacy’ (2009) Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 505 at 
506. 
62
 Brower C N & Schill S ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?’ 
(2009) 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 471. 
63
 Tams C ‘An appealing Option? The debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure’(2006) 57 Essays on 
Transnational Economic Law 1 
64
 Franck S ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2009) 50 Harvard International Law 
Journal 435 at 440. 
65
 Brower C N & Schill S ‘Is arbitration a threat’ at 491; see also Alvarez ‘A review on Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Public Law by Gus Van Harten’ (2008) The American Journal of International Law 909 at 914. 
66
 Tams C ‘An appealing Option? The debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure’ (2006) 57 Essays on 
Transnational Economic Law 1 at 12. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
In conclusion, it is hereby submitted that while this research is in support of reform, it does not 
agree with the earlier authors’ suggested solutions. This is due to the fact that most of the 
solutions suggested are narrow and do not address the problems comprehensively. They mostly 
address the problem of consistency but leave out other important legitimacy issues, such as: lack 
of transparency; costly adjudication process; lack of independence and impartiality of arbitrators; 
and tribunals’ encroachment on state regulatory powers.  In addition, each of the suggested 
solutions is accompanied by a number of obstacles. This research is important as it suggests new 
solutions which tackle all existing problems comprehensively. These new suggestions have not 
been discussed by earlier researchers or have received cursory consideration by others despite 
their potential.  
1.7 Research methodology 
 
As the nature of the subject matter requires, reliance is placed on primary and secondary sources 
of research. International instruments that include, but are not limited to, treaties, conventions, 
agreements, arbitral awards, and other international legal materials, will be extensively relied 
upon as primary sources. Relevant books, scholarly articles and working papers (both electronic 
and hard copies) are also consulted as secondary sources. Due to the fact that a number of 
scholars have written on the subject matter, this research is analytical in nature. The research 
critically analyses the existing literature and proposes its own recommendations and conclusions.  
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1.8 Thesis outline 
 
Chapter 1: This chapter contains: general background of the study; central research questions; 
research objectives; significance of the study; chapter outline; and the methodology employed in 
conducting the study. 
 
Chapter 2: This chapter focuses on the historical development of the investment arbitration 
system. The chapter discusses the international community’s efforts in developing a uniform 
foreign investment dispute settlement system alongside formulating ‘acceptable to all’ 
international investment law principles. The chapter further discusses the challenges and 
obstacles encountered in the efforts to achieve the two goals. The mechanisms used to settle 
international investment disputes prior to the current BITs regime are also discussed together 
with the reasons for such mechanisms being abandoned in favour of the current international 
arbitration system.  
 
Chapter 3:  the chapter discusses the current investment arbitration system. The discussion is 
centred on the ICSID arbitration system, additional Facility arbitration system and Ad hoc 
Arbitration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) conducted under UNCITRAL Rules.  A 
number of cases showing the extent of legitimacy issues in the system are extensively discussed 
in this chapter. The rules are extensively discussed, including finding out what causes 
inconsistency, lack of transparency, lack of independence and impartiality of arbitrators and 
tribunals’ encroachment on state regulatory powers. The chapter concludes that there is a need to 
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address the legitimacy issues as soon as possible before the system loses the little legitimacy it 
currently enjoys. 
 
Chapter 4:  The chapter focuses on ideal features of a legitimate adjudication system. The 
chapter contains a detailed discussion of the ideal features/ indicators of a legitimate adjudication 
system. The chapter further discusses the extent to which these indicators have been incorporated 
in investor – state arbitration and other international adjudicative bodies. The chapter concludes 
that the investor – state arbitration system needs to be improved by ensuring that all legitimacy 
values are given high priority and incorporated in the system. 
   
Chapter 5: This chapter explores and critically discusses the suggestions for improvement as 
proposed by stakeholders. The suggested solutions under discussion include: invoking res 
judicata and lis pendens principles; adopting the doctrine of precedent; applying the ‘fork in the 
road’ principle; adopting the margin of appreciation standard in interpretation of BITs; creating 
an appellate structure at ICSID and creating a treaty to treaty appellate body. The strength and 
weaknesses of each suggestion will be critically analysed under this part. 
 
Chapter 6: This chapter proposes the enactment of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI) which provides for the establishment of an international investment court and a 
permanent court of appeal for international investment disputes. The chapter further analyses the 
possible content of the MAI to be established and the courts to be established. The advantages of 
the reform is clearly analysed in this chapter. The chapter concludes that the reform is inevitable 
and that the time for the reform is long overdue. 
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Chapter 7: This chapter provides a summary of the whole thesis and states the general 
recommendations. The chapter recommends that the time is ripe for the establishment of a MAI 
which provides for the establishment of an international investment court with an international 
appellate court structure at the apex. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the historical development of international investment law generally and 
international investment law dispute settlement system specifically. The chapter is divided into 
five sections. The first section briefly discusses the history of international investment law 
generally. As it is clearly known, any dispute settlement system exists for the purpose of 
resolving disputes in a particular field of law. Therefore it is important to discuss the 
development of international investment law together with the international investment dispute 
settlement system as the two complement each other. In the second section, the chapter discusses 
the international community’s efforts in developing a uniform foreign investment dispute 
settlement system alongside formulating ‘acceptable to all’ international investment law 
principles. The section reveals that in each effort made by the international community to 
develop uniform international investment law principles or standards, there were always 
provisions addressing the dispute settlement system. The section further discusses the challenges 
and obstacles encountered in the efforts to achieve the two goals. The third section of the chapter 
discusses in detail the mechanisms used to settle international investment disputes prior to the 
current BITs regime. The mechanisms discussed in this section are: diplomatic protection, ad hoc 
claim commissions and the use of host state courts. The reasons for such mechanisms being 
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abandoned in favour of the current international arbitration system form part of the discussion in 
the section. The fourth section discusses the rise of the current investor – state arbitration system. 
The section reveals that BITs and the ICSID Convention are the cornerstone of the current 
system. The last part constitutes the conclusion and summarise the whole chapter. 
 
2.2 The historical development of international investment law 
 
Modern civilisation has experienced different economic activities crossing political borders 
within a continent and from one continent to another. For these cross border activities to operate 
smoothly, it becomes necessary to have a legal framework that governs such activities. For cross 
border investment activities, international investment law was developed for this same purpose.
1
 
During the colonial period, between the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, foreign investment did not need a 
specific legal regime due to the existence of imperial colonial laws which provided protection for 
all economic activities operating in the colonies, including investment activities.
2
 However, after 
the end of World War II many colonies attained their independence and demanded sovereignty 
over economic activities operating in their territories.
3
 At the same time, the developed world 
which now became capital exporters needed a stable legal regime to govern their investments 
                                                          
1
See Borchard E The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) at 33; see also Subedi S P International 
Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 7; see also Sornarajah M The International Law on 
Foreign Investment 3rd ed. (2010) at 19; see also Newcombe A &Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment 
Treaties (2009) at 4. 
2
 See Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3rd ed. (2010)  at 20; see also Newcombe A 
&Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties(2009) at 11and 62; see also Mosoti V ‘Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Investment Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor 
Economies Caught in Between?’ (2005) 26 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 95 at 106-107; 
see also Van Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) 14-15. 
3
 See Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3rd ed. (2010) at 20. 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
abroad.
4
 As a result, the need to develop a specific international investment legal regime to 
protect foreign investment emerged. A number of efforts were made to establish a multilateral 
investment legal regime but due to ideological and interest differences between the developed 
world and new nations, the efforts proved futile for a number of times.
5
 A thorough discussion of 
these efforts will follow at a later stage of this chapter.
6
 
 
As pointed out in the introduction above, the development of an investor – state disputes 
settlement system went hand in hand with the development of international investment law 
generally.
7
 International investment law as a general field influences the development of its 
dispute settlement system and vice versa. By the 1970s, international investment law was one of 
the least developed areas of international law and the same is true of the investor – state dispute 
settlement system.
8
 The International Court of Justice (hereinafter the ICJ) in Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd (Belgium. v. Spain)
9
 made the following remarks with 
regard to the slow development of investment law: 
 
‘Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the growth of foreign 
investments and the expansion of the international activities of corporations, in particular of 
holding companies, which are often multinational, and considering the way in which the 
economic interests of states have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the 
                                                          
4
 See Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3rd ed. (2010) at 22. 
5
Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law(2007) at 20–21; see also Schill S W Multilateralisation of 
International Investment Law (2009) at 34; see also Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment 
Treaties(2009) at 20; see also Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 
20; see also OECD Directorate of Finance and Enterprise Affairs, Relationship between International Investment 
Agreement (2004) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/43/31784519.pdf;  accessed on 10/06/2013.  
6
 See subheading 2.3 below. 
7
 See the introduction above. 
8
 Salacuse J W ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment 
in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 International Law 655 at 656. 
9
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain) (1970) ICJ Reports 3. 
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evolution of law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have 
crystallized on the international plane.’
10
 
 
Despite the above statement, international investment law continued to develop at a slow pace.
11
 
It was not until the early 1990s that the field of international investment law rapidly developed 
and received worldwide recognition as the fastest growing field of international law.
12
 The 
growth has been made possible by the coming into existence of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) and International Investment Agreements (IIA).
13
 BITs or IIAs are agreements made 
between two or more countries that safeguard investments made in the territories of the signatory 
countries.
14
 While the first BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, the BIT 
regime did not have great impact until the early 1990s.
15
 Prior to this rapid growth of the BIT 
regime, international investment law was mainly governed by customary international law 
principles and general principles of law as found in the domestic law of the host state.
16
 In many 
developing states national treatment was the dominant view and accepted as a principle of 
international law. The principle demanded that foreign investors’ properties be accorded the 
                                                          
10
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain) (1970) ICJ Reports 3 para46 - 47. 
11
 See Salacuse J W ‘Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand Bargain’ in Horn N 
(ed.) Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (2004) 51 – 88 at 55. 
12See the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) Bilateral Investment Treaties in the 
Mid-1990s (1998) U N Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U N Sales No E 98 II D 8.   
13
See Salacuse J W ‘Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand Bargain’ in Horn N 
(ed.) Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (2004) 51 – 88 at 54; see 
also Franck S ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 at 1524.   
14
See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Bilateral Investment Treaties in 
the Mid-1990s (1998) U N Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U N Sales No E 98 II D 8. 
15
 See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) Bilateral Investment Treaties 
in the Mid-1990s (1998) U N Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U N Sales No E 98 II D 8. 
16
 Salacuse J W ‘Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand Bargain’ in Horn N (ed.) 
Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (2004) 51 – 88 at 52 – 53. 
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same treatment that local investors enjoy.
17
 This international law principle was deficient in 
several respects.
18
 The first deficiency was that it failed to take into account important issues of 
concern to foreign investors.
19
 For example, it did not provide a foreign investor with the right to 
make monetary transfers from the host state to their home country.
20
 Secondly, the rules were 
vague and subject to different interpretations. Thirdly, the national treatment principle was not 
accepted in some parts of the world especially developed countries.
21
 The last deficiency was 
that it failed to give the foreign investor an effective enforcement mechanism whenever they had 
a claim against the host state.
22
 The enforcement mechanisms available were to file a claim in the 
local court or seek espousal of the claim by their home country government.
23
  
 
These uncertainties in the law created a tug of war between developed and developing countries 
with regard to the standard of protection foreign investors should expect from the host state.
24
 
                                                          
17
 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) at 11; see also Kronfol Z A Protection 
of Foreign Investment: A study in International Law (1972) at 14; see also Wenhua S ‘Is Calvo Dead’ (2007) 55 
American Journal of Comparative Law 123 at 127. 
18
 See Vandevelde K J ‘A brief history of international investment agreements’ (2005) 12 University of California 
Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157; see also Salacuse J W ‘Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign 
Investment: The Search for a Grand Bargain’ in Horn N (ed.) Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural 
and Substantive Legal Aspects (2004) 51 – 88 at 52 – 53; see also  Salacuse J W ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 
International  Law  655 at  659; see also Dodge W ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed 
Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1 at 5-8; also see Cosmas J ‘Investor – state international arbitration system: is ICSID the 
appropriate forum for developing countries like Tanzania?’ (2014) 5 (1) Open University Law Journal 25 – 36. 
19
 Salacuse J W ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment 
in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 International Law 655 at 659. 
20
 Salacuse J W ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment 
in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 International Law 655 at 659. 
21
 Vandevelde K J ‘A brief history of international investment agreements’ (2005) 12 University of California Davis 
Journal of International Law and Policy 157 
22
 Dodge W ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United 
States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1 at 5-8.  
23
 See Cosmas J ‘Investor – state international arbitration system: is ICSID the appropriate forum for developing 
countries like Tanzania?’ (2014) 5 (1) Open University Law Journal 25 – 36 at 30. 
24
See Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 7; see also Newcombe A 
&Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties(2009) at 13; see also Salacuse J ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 
International Law  655 at  659; see also Dodge W ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed 
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While developed states claimed that international law imposed an obligation on host states to 
treat foreign investors in accordance with the international minimum standard of protection 
principle, developing countries had a contrary view and demanded equal treatment between 
foreign investors and local ones.
25
 New nations coming out of colonialism found that the 
international minimum standard of protection principle interfered with their sovereignty and 
vehemently rejected its application in their territories and favoured national treatment instead.
26
 
New nations pushed for full and equal sovereignty among nations. They argued that application 
of the international minimum standard of protection principle would afford foreign investors 
more protection than their own citizens.
27
 The squabble between these two camps led to the 
development of two doctrines: the Calvo doctrine and the Hull doctrine.
28
 The Calvo doctrine 
supported the developing countries’ point of view while the Hull Doctrine supported the 
developed countries’ point of view.29  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of 
International Law 1 at 5-8; see also Van Harten G  Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) 14-15; also 
see Cosmas J ‘Investor – state international arbitration system: is ICSID the appropriate forum for developing 
countries like Tanzania?’ (2014) 5 (1) Open University Law Journal 25 – 36. 
25
Brownlie I Principles of Public International Law7th ed. (2008) at 519; see also Newcombe A & Paradell L Law 
and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 5; see also Kronfol Z A Protection of Foreign Investment: A study in 
International Law (1972) at 14; see also Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle 
(2008) at 8; see also Salacuse J W ‘Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand 
Bargain’ in Horn N (ed.) Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects 
(2004) 51 – 88 at 52 – 53; see also Vandevelde K J ‘A brief history of international investment agreements’ (2005) 
12 University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157; see also Salacuse J ‘BIT by BIT: 
The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ 
(1990) 24 International  Law  655 at  660. 
26Kauschal A ‘Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign 
Investment Regime’ (2009) 50 Harvard International Law Journal 491 at 500; see also Borchard E, ‘The minimum 
international standard in the protection of aliens’ (1939) American Society of International Law Proceedings 33.  
27
Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 8. 
28
See Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 13. 
29
See Newcombe A and Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 13. The Calvo doctrine 
originates from the Argentina jurists Carlos Calvo while the Hull doctrine originates from the US Secretary of State 
Cordel Hull. 
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2.2.1 The Calvo doctrine 
 
The Calvo doctrine advocated equal treatment between foreign investment and local investment. 
The doctrine required aggrieved foreign investors to file their cases with the host state courts and 
the matters be adjudicated in accordance with the host state laws.
30
 Furthermore, it required the 
exclusive subjection of foreigners and their property to the laws and juridical regimes of the state 
in which they reside or invest. Lastly, the doctrine required strict abstention from interference by 
other governments, notably the governments of the States of which the foreigners are nationals, 
in disputes over the treatment of foreigners or their property.
31
 In other words, one can say that 
the Calvo doctrine demanded foreign investors to exhaust local remedies before seeking 
assistance from international fora. That is to say, whenever there was expropriation of foreign 
property the appropriate court to determine the legality of the expropriation will be the host state 
court using the host state laws.
32
 The Calvo doctrine or national treatment principle received a lot 
of criticism from the developed world. Worth mentioning is the US Secretary of State who 
argued that the Calvo doctrine was contrary to international justice as it advocated  confiscation 
of foreign properties.
33
 
 
                                                          
30
 Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) at 11; see also Kronfol Z A Protection 
of Foreign Investment: A study in International Law (1972) at 14; see also Wenhua S ‘Is Calvo Dead’ (2007) 55 
American Journal of Comparative Law 123 at 127. 
31
See  Wenhua S ‘Is Calvo Dead’ (2007) 55 American Journal of Comparative Law 123 at 127 see also Verwey W 
D & Schrijver N J ‘The Taking of Foreign Property under International Law: A New Legal Perspective?’ (1984) XV 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3–96 at 23; see also Kronfol Z A Protection of Foreign Investment: A 
study in International Law (1972) at 128. 
32Verwey W D & Schrijver N J ‘The Taking of Foreign Property under International Law: A New Legal 
Perspective?’ (1984) XV Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3–96 at 24. 
33
See the Letter of the US Secretary of State to Mexican Ambassador to the United States, 21 July 1938, as cited in 
Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 16. 
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2.2.2 The Hull doctrine 
 
The Hull doctrine, on the other hand, advocated for the foreign investor to be treated in 
accordance with an international law minimum standard of protection.
34
 The minimum standard 
of protection principle required prompt, adequate and effective compensation in case of 
expropriation of foreign property by the host state. The Hull doctrine received a lot of support 
from developed countries including international tribunals and courts.
35
 By the end of the 1940’s 
the Hull doctrine or minimum standard of protection became so strong that it swept away the 
Calvo doctrine. It became a rule that once the foreign property is expropriated then prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation must be paid.
36
 In 1922 the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) in the Norwegian Ship - owners Claims (Norway v. United States) case ruled that foreign 
properties can only be expropriated for public use and after due compensation is promptly paid.
37
 
Twenty - two years later, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Company, Ltd (Belgium. v. Spain)
38
 ruled as follows regarding the minimum standard 
of protection of foreigners: 
 
                                                          
34
Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 9; see also Dolzer R & 
Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) at 11; see also Kronfol Z A Protection of Foreign 
Investment: A study in International Law (1972) at 14; see also Wenhua S ‘Is Calvo Dead’ (2007) 55 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 123 at 127. 
35
Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) at 13; see also Kronfol Z A Protection 
of Foreign Investment: A study in International Law (1972) at 15. 
36
Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 18.   
37
 (1948) UNRLAA 307 at 334. 
38
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970 para3. 
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‘A state once it has allowed a foreigner or foreign investment in its territory whether natural or 
juristic persons, it becomes under duty to accord them legal protection and bears obligations with 
regards to treatment to be accorded to them’.
39
 
 
As a result of the above court decisions and many more others, international investment law 
started to crystallise. The state duty to protect foreign investment as per the minimum standard of 
protection principle was branded as the ‘The Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens.’40 
The Hull doctrine dominated the sphere of international investment law for quite some time. 
However, the doctrine did not crystallise into a customary rule of international law as newly 
independent states continued to oppose it.
41
 The developing world joined efforts against the Hull 
doctrine and on 1 May 1974 they managed to persuade the UN to adopt the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) which principally was against the Hull doctrine.
42
 A discussion of this 
resolution and other efforts is undertaken in the section that follows immediately hereunder.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, 3, para 33. 
40
 Nicholson F ‘The Protection of Foreign Investment under Customary International Law’(1965) Boston College 
Law Review 391 at 391. 
41Guzman A ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ 
(1998) 38 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 639 at 646. 
42
 UN Resolution 3202 (S – VI). 
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2.3 International community efforts to create uniform international investment law 
      principles and an investor – state dispute settlement system 
 
 
For decades the world community, through the League of Nations, the United Nations, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter the OECD), the World 
Bank and recently the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter the WTO), have been involved in 
efforts to establish a multilateral investment regulating body. These efforts aim at developing 
uniform international investment law principles together with establishing a uniform 
international investor – state dispute settlement system. To date these efforts have not been able 
to achieve that goal. As pointed out earlier, the major reason behind the failure has been the 
conflict of interests between developed countries and the developing world. On a number of 
occasions, these conflicting interests have resulted in the stalling of the multilateralisation 
process. Following hereunder is a discussion of the efforts made by different institutions for a 
number of decades to create an international investment protection regime. 
 
2.3.1 League of Nations efforts 1920 – 1930s 
 
The League of Nations was established in 1920 after the end of World War I (WWI). It was 
established as an international organisation whose role was to maintain world peace and ensure 
that war does not break out again.
43
 The Covenant establishing the League also encouraged 
settlement of international disputes through negotiations and arbitration.
44
 In 1924 the League 
                                                          
43
 See the preamble to the League of Nations Covenant, 1924 available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6CB59816195E58350525654F007624BF accessed on 06/06/2013. 
44
 See Article 12 and 13 of the League of Nations Covenant. 
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formed a committee of experts and tasked it to codify international law principles.
45
 The 
committee, among other things, was supposed to codify the responsibility of states for damage 
done to aliens and their properties. The codification conference was held at The Hague in 1930. 
A renowned jurist and expert in international law, Edwin Borchard, were tasked by the 
committee to prepare a draft convention on responsibility of states for damage done in their 
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners.
46
  
 
Regarding dispute settlement, the draft convention provisions demanded foreign investors to be 
treated in accordance with the minimum standard of treatment provided for by international 
law.
47
 The final draft, however, could not be adopted as a result of disagreement among the 
nations. Developing countries wanted foreign investors to receive the same treatment as 
nationals while developed countries demanded that foreign investors should be treated in 
accordance with the minimum standard principle of international law.
48
 Out of 38 states present 
at the conference, 17, (mainly developing states) voted against the minimum standard of 
protection while the remaining twenty one states (developed states) voted in favour of minimum 
standard of protection. As a two - third majority was the requisite support required and was not 
obtained, the draft convention was shelved.
49
 
 
 
                                                          
45
 See Dodge W ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 1, at 5-8; also see 
Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 16. 
46
 See Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 17. 
47
 Dodge W ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United 
States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 1, at 5-8; also see Newcombe A & 
Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 16. 
48
 See Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 16. 
49
 See Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 16. 
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2.3.2 League of Nations efforts through the Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners, 
            1929  
 
This was another effort under the auspices of the League of Nations. Article 23 of the League of 
Nations Covenant empowered the league to make rules in order to ensure equitable treatment for 
the commerce of all members of the League.
50
 The League through the mandate given under this 
Article, prepared a conference on the treatment of foreigners which was held in Paris in 1929. 
The Council of the League tasked the Economic Committee to prepare a draft convention. The 
Committee prepared the draft convention on the Treatment of Foreigners. The draft convention 
provided for equal protection of foreign investors and nationals. However, it went beyond the 
normal principles of equality as it guaranteed foreigners the rights to exercise civil, judicial and 
succession rights. The draft convention also empowered foreigners to establish themselves in the 
host state, engage in any business and pursue any occupation.
51
  
 
With regard to dispute settlement, the draft convention required the disputes to be settled in the 
host state courts by applying the host state law. In the end, developed countries did not sign the 
draft convention on the ground that it was far behind the position of the law at the time as it 
failed to recognise the minimum standard principle.
52
  
 
 
 
                                                          
50
 See Article 23(e) of the League of Nations Covenant, 1924 available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6CB59816195E58350525654F007624BF accessed on 06/06/2013. 
51Dodge W ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United 
States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 1, at 5-8; see also Newcombe A & 
Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 17. 
52
 See Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 17. 
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2.3.3 The United Nations Havana Charter, 1948  
 
After WWII, the world community, through the newly established UN, was eager to join hands 
and work together again.
53
 The UN organised a Conference on Trade and Employment in 
Havana, Cuba, from 21 November 1947 to 24 March 1948. The conference resulted in the 
Havana Charter which provided for the establishment of the International Trade Organisation 
(ITO).
54
 It was expected that the Havana charter would be enforced through the ITO.
55
 The ITO 
was intended for the purpose of promoting bilateral and multilateral agreements on trade.  
The draft of the Charter contained Articles 11 and 12 which provided for foreign investment 
protection.
56
 Article 11 required member countries to respect and protect other member states’ 
enterprises, skills and capital which existed in their territories.
57
 Articles 12 (a) and (b) provided 
for the need of host states to receive capital flow from other member states for the purposes of 
stimulating local economic growth. However, the provision left the mandate to the host state to 
determine the type of investment it would allow in its territory and warned foreign investors not 
to use their investment to interfere with the internal affairs of the host state.
58
 Those were the 
only provisions providing for foreign investment protection in the Charter. One can see that with 
such scanty provisions on international investment, it tells it all that the Charter had less interest 
on unification of international investment law. 
                                                          
53
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Regarding investor – state dispute settlement, disputes were left to be settled through the host 
state courts. Host states were urged to avoid discrimination against foreign investments.
59
 That is 
to say, foreign investments were to be accorded the same treatment as local investments in local 
courts.
60
 
 
The Charter and the ITO did not come into operation as they lacked support from the US and its 
allies.
61
 Therefore to date the Charter remains as one of the many historical documents of the 
efforts towards creating a unified international investment law. The only tangible outcome of the 
Havana Conference was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
62
 The GATT 
provides for contracting member state obligations regarding trade.
63
 It essentially provided for 
Most Favoured Nation treatment (MFN),
64
 National Treatment on internal taxation and 
regulation (NT),
65
 Anti - Dumping and Countervailing measures,
66
 and other trade obligations.
67
 
The GATT however did not provide anything substantial on foreign investment protection. The 
GATT was crucial in the formation of the current WTO as it became the framework within 
which the negotiations were based.
68
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In conclusion, it can be said here that the failure of the Charter exemplified the existing tension 
between the developed and the developing world. The failure was another blow to the efforts to 
have agreed clear rules for regulating foreign investment and to formulate a uniform dispute 
settlement system for foreign investments.  
 
2.3.4 The Abs – Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad, 1959 
 
A decade after abandoning the Havana charter, developed nations made another effort to create a 
convention on investment abroad famously known as the Abs – Shawcross Draft Convention.69  
The Draft emanated from the initiatives of European business people and lawyers under the 
leadership of two prominent figures, Herman Abs the Chairman of Deutsche Bank in Germany 
and Lord Shawcross a former British Attorney General at the time.
70
 The Draft had foreign 
investors’ best interest at heart. It introduced provisions which provided for maximum protection 
of investment abroad.
71
 Article II of the Draft Convention, in particular, introduced the umbrella 
clause for the first time in international investment protection regime.
72
 The Article required each 
state party ‘at all times’ to ensure the observance of ‘any undertakings’ which it may have given 
in relation to investments made by nationals of any other Party. The phrase ‘at all times’, 
intended to signify that the state will always be bound to protect foreign property without any 
                                                          
69
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exceptions.
73
 On the other hand, the words ‘any undertaking’ were intended to be interpreted 
widely so as to even include the state’s general promises in legislative form.74 The Article was 
meant to ensure that at all times the host state will be held liable for its measures which have 
affected the foreign property regardless of the motive for such measure.
75
 
 
With regard to dispute settlement, the Draft Convention dispensed with the requirement of 
exhaustion of local remedies.
76
 Investors were given an opportunity to institute their claim in a 
neutral forum to be established by the parties as long as the state party in question had given 
consent to the established tribunal.
77
 In the absence of an agreement, state parties were given an 
option to institute their claim with the International Court of Justice.
78
 The draft also empowered 
the injured national of another state to sue the host state in a tribunal to be established in 
accordance with Article VII (i).
79
 The Draft Convention was viewed by many as being too 
ambitious to protect investors and that the political price to be paid once a state joined was too 
high. In the end it failed to garner support not only from developing countries but some 
developed nations were also sceptical of the draft.
80
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2.3.5 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Draft Convention on 
          the Protection of Foreign Property, 1967   
 
After the failure of the Abs – Shawcross efforts, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Council meeting held in April 1960 tasked the OECD Committee to 
prepare a Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.
81
 The Draft Convention was 
more or less similar in content to the Abs – Shawcross Draft Convention. It also provided the 
highest standard of foreign investment protection. Article 2 imposed an obligation on all member 
states to observe any undertaking it had previously committed in relation to property of nationals 
of any other state party. The wording of this clause was similar to the Abs – Shawcross Draft 
Convention and intended to serve the same purpose.
82
 The word ‘property’ was intended to be 
interpreted in its widest sense to include direct and indirect interests.
83
 The word ‘undertaking’ 
was to be interpreted widely also to include even unilateral engagement of the host state.
84
 
 
Article 7 provided for dispute settlement. The Article provided for state to state dispute 
settlement in an international adjudication forum to be established upon the agreement of the 
parties.
85
 Furthermore the provision empowered the injured national of another state to institute 
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proceeding against the host state when the home state decided not to pursue the claim in the state 
– state forum.86  
 
The draft however failed to garner enough support within the OECD member states and as a 
result it was not opened for signature to the rest of the world.
87
 The reason for this early failure 
was that the Draft Convention did set very high standards of protection, which worried even 
OECD member states. Another contributing factor to the failure was the usual North – South 
divide on the level of protection foreign investment should be accorded.
88
 
 
2.3.6 The Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR), 1962 
 
Developing countries’ efforts towards gaining sovereignty over their natural resources started in 
the early 1950s. Latin American countries spearheaded the move and later it gained support from 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Asian and African countries.
89
 In 1952 they 
influenced the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 523 (VI).
90
 In this Resolution it was 
clearly stated that trading between developing countries and developed countries is permissible 
as long as there are no conditions attached which violate the sovereignty of the states involved.
91
 
The ideas behind the Resolution were further clarified in General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII) 
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which emphasised national economic self - determination.
92
 The economic self- determination 
Resolution was strongly rejected by the US and other developed countries on the ground that it 
ignored the foreign investor’s rights and placed no obligation on the host state to honour treaties 
and other international agreements.
93
  The resistance from developed countries did not deter 
developing countries from pursuing their goal through the UN. In 1958 developing countries 
again managed to facilitate the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1314 (XIII) which 
specifically states that the right to self - determination includes permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.
94
 It is through this Resolution that the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources was formed.
95
 The Commission was composed of members from 
developed and developing countries and was tasked to evaluate the relationship between PSNR 
and the right to self - determination.
96
 As a result of the Commission’s work, on 14 December 
1962 the UN passed the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
(PSNR).
97
 
 
Although there were clear differences between developed and developing countries on the level 
of protection needed to protect foreign property, as discussed above, the two camps reached a 
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consensus at the UN on sovereignty over natural resources. The Declaration is the leading UN 
document in garnering support from both camps: developed and developing countries.
98
It 
recognises sovereign equality among states and each state’s sovereignty over natural resources in 
its territory. The Declaration received overwhelming support because it created a balance 
between host state interests and foreign investor interests.
99
 Newly independent countries hailed 
it for empowering them to control foreign activities in their territories. Before its adoption, due to 
the existence of inherited old agreements between foreign investors and colonial masters, host 
states were prevented by such agreements from interfering in the foreign investments affairs. 
Therefore, despite the acquired political independence, many states lacked control over the major 
means of the economy, including natural resources, due to the inherited old agreements and 
concessions. The Declaration, however, mandated them to expropriate foreign properties in 
certain circumstances as long as appropriate compensation was paid.
100
 It further demanded the 
compensation to be governed by the laws of the host state by taking into account reasons of 
public utility, security or national interests which override individual interests both domestic and 
foreign.
101
 
 
Developed countries, on the other hand, found the Declaration fulfilling as it required host states 
to pay appropriate compensation in case of expropriation.
102
 Article 8 insisted on the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda. It required the host states to respect commitments and concessions it entered 
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into with foreigners.
103
 Through the Hull doctrine, compensation upon expropriation and respect 
for concessions and treaties had been the developed states’ demand for a long time and had been 
a point of departure with developing countries.
104
 Through this Declaration a customary law 
principle requiring compensation after expropriation was born with unanimous support from 
both camps. By and large developed countries won the argument of the day as most of their 
demands were met.
105
 
 
With regard to dispute settlement, the Declaration required the national jurisdiction of the state 
taking such measure to be exhausted before the matter could be taken to an international forum. 
However, in the presence of an agreement between national states and any other party concerned, 
the dispute could be settled through arbitration or international adjudication.
106
 The Declaration 
did not give the injured foreign investor the capacity to institute a claim against the host state 
directly but provided for a state – state dispute resolution system. To date the PSNR declaration 
still stands as one of the strongest pillars of the UN.
107
 
 
2.3.7 The New International Economic Order (NIEO), 1974 
 
After the successful passing the declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 
and having also being encouraged by the success of oil producing countries in raising petroleum 
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prices in 1973, developing countries decided to push for more systemic changes.
108
 With their 
majority in the United Nations Assembly they were now eager to introduce major reforms to the 
legal regime governing major means of production.
109
 They introduced an agenda demanding a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO). The agenda had a number of aspects but the most 
relevant one for this work is an item on regulation of foreign investment. It was a concern for 
developing countries that despite the existence of the declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, Trans National Corporations (TNC) were still controlling the major means of 
production in their territories and sometimes interfering with the running of the internal affairs of 
host states. Therefore, in an effort to solidify their sovereignty, developing countries pushed for a 
NIEO which was adopted by the UN on the 1 May1974.
110
 The most important Articles of the 
NIEO to developing countries were Articles IV and V which in essence emphasised what was 
provided for in the PSNR Declaration. Article IV (e) provided that: 
 
‘In order to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to exercise effective control over 
them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including the right to 
nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full 
permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to economic, political or any other 
type of coercion to prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable right.’111 
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The Article emphasised sovereignty over natural resources and mandated states to deal with their 
resources in accordance with their own laws and to ensure that the resources benefit the country 
and its people.
112
 
 
Article V, on the other hand, provided for the establishment of a mechanism which would help to 
control TNCs. It provided for the requirement of establishing a Code of Conduct for 
TNCs.
113
The Article demanded that TNCs be prevented from interfering with the internal affairs 
of the host states and barred from cooperating with colonial administrators and racist regimes.
114
 
Furthermore the provision required host states to ensure that TNCs conform to their national 
development plan and objectives.
115
 In addition TNCs were required to cooperate with host states 
in the revision of previously concluded agreements which were found to be unfavourable to the 
host states’ plans and objectives. Apart from that, the provision required TNCs to assist host 
states to acquire relevant technology and management skills which are relevant for economic 
development, and that in the case of repatriation of profits TNCs must consider the interests of 
all parties including those of the host state.
116
 Lastly, the provision required TNCs to promote re-
investment of their profits in developing countries.
117
 In essence Article V demanded that foreign 
investment should be for mutual benefit.
118
 The NIEO, despite being similar with the PSNR, 
differed from the PSNR in one important aspect. The NIEO empowered states to nationalise and 
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expropriate without obligating the host state to pay appropriate compensation. There was no 
mention of international law or the minimum standard principle.  
In as far as dispute settlement is concerned, the NIEO empowers the host state courts to deal with 
investor – state disputes.119 As stated above, Article IV emphasises host state sovereignty over 
natural resources and mandates states to deal with their resources in accordance with their own 
laws and ensure that the resources benefit the country and its people.
120
 As a result, the NIEO 
was seen by foreign investors as nothing but a tool to deprive them of their rights to property 
when operating in host states.  
 
The resolution triggered hot debates in different fora and was condemned by many developed 
countries for trying to abolish a rule of customary international law approved in PSNR by both 
camps.
121
 The Declaration, as expected, did not receive support from the developed world; 
instead, the PSNR has been, on a number of occasions, declared to be the appropriate reflection 
of customary international law.
122
  
 
To date the two Declarations stand side by side as resolutions of the same UN despite the fact 
that they differ substantially with regard to host state sovereignty over foreign investors’ assets. 
Six months after the adoption of the NIEO adoption, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
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of States (CERD) was adopted by the UN as part of the restructuring programme of the 
international economic legal order.
123
 
 
2.3.8 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERD), 1974 
 
As stated above, six months after the adoption of the NIEO, the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States was adopted.
124
 The Charter is said to be the most comprehensive UN 
instrument with clear stipulations on the rights and duties of states on economic matters.
125
 A 
provision which is relevant to the foregoing discussion is Article 2 of the Charter. The Article 
affirms state sovereignty over its natural resources. It further provides that the state has the right 
to possess, use and dispose of its wealth without interference from other states.  
 
The Article further provides for state powers to regulate and exercise authority over foreign 
investment operating in its territory. TNCs operating in the host state territory are required to 
operate without interfering in the host state’s internal affairs and must respect the sovereignty of 
the host state.
126
 In essence Article 2 intended to revive the Calvo doctrine. It was incorporated in 
the Charter after being recommended by Latin American countries which had been for a long 
time in favour of the Calvo doctrine. The newly independent states from Africa and Asia joined 
hands with the Latin American countries and supported Article 2. That is to say, developing 
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countries favoured application of national law over international law. With regard to 
expropriation, the Charter empowered the host state to nationalise, expropriate or transfer 
ownership of foreign property as long as appropriate compensation is paid.  
 
Regarding dispute settlement, the Charter demanded any dispute emanating from a host state 
measure to be settled in the host state courts in accordance with the host state laws.
127
 No single 
provision of the Charter referred to the need to apply international law in case of dispute. The 
role of international law was insignificant in the Charter. 
 
It can be concluded here that the Charter was a continuation of developing countries’ efforts to 
control the UN and establish laws which were favourable to their interests. The Charter reflects 
in many ways the NIEO and to some extent the PSNR. The language of the Charter is one - sided 
as it only provides for protection of host state national interests and leaves out foreign investors’ 
interests. In the end, the Charter received less support from developed countries due to its 
insistence on national laws over international law. As a result of lack of support from the 
developed world, the charter, just like the NIEO, remains a resolution on paper with little 
influence on the operation of foreign investment and world economy generally. 
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2.3.9 The United Nations Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations 
 
The United Nations Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations was developed to 
fulfil the requirement of Article 4 of the NIEO. The NIEO provided for the need to establish two 
codes of conducts: (1) a code of conduct on technology transfer and (2) a code of conduct for 
Transnational Corporations.
128
 Therefore in 1974, the Economic and Social Council of the UN 
(ECOSOC) established the Commission on Transnational Corporations (CTC) which was 
responsible to draft a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations (TNCs).
129
 The Code was 
forwarded to the UN ECOSOC on 31
st
 May1990 for approval.
130
 Again, there were areas of 
disagreement between developing and developed countries. 
 
Paragraph 48 of the Draft Code provided for host state powers over TNCs.
131
 It affirmed the 
state’s right to regulate the entry and establishment of transnational corporations including 
determining the role that such corporations may play in the economic and social development of 
the host state.
132
 The Code demanded the host state to accord TNCs fair and equitable treatment 
and to treat TNCs in the same manner as domestic enterprises. In addition, the Code recognised 
the need for appropriate compensation to be paid in case of expropriation.
133
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Dispute settlement was left to the national court or authorities in the host state and the Code 
demanded exhaustion of local remedies before the matter could be forwarded to an international 
tribunal.
134
 
 
The use of host state courts to settle disputes between TNCs and host states was one of the areas 
of disagreement between member states. Another disagreement was on whether the Code should 
be mandatory or voluntary.
135
 Countries which are the home state to many TNCs wanted the 
Code to be voluntary while developing counties wanted the Code to have mandatory force.
136
 
The disagreement led into the failure of the efforts for another time. As a result, the CTC was 
disbanded in 1993 for its failure to establish the Code of Conduct for TNCs.
137
 
 
It can be concluded here that, the Code of Conduct marked the end of the developing countries’ 
efforts to control foreign investment under the auspices of the UN. Most of the UN efforts which 
started in the1960s – 1980s did not achieve substantive rules on control of foreign investments 
and a dispute settlement framework. As pointed out earlier, this was due to a conflict of interests 
between the developed and the developing worlds. A little was achieved through the PSNR. 
However, PSNR fruits could not be realised due to the fact that developing states became too 
ambitious by pushing for more sovereignty and control through the NIEO and the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States. As a result, the door was once again open for other 
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stakeholders to try their luck. The OECD once more engaged in the efforts. The WTO also as a 
new body on trade regulation was involved. A discussion of these two bodies follows hereunder. 
 
2.3.10 The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 1998 
 
In another attempt, the OECD in 1995 introduced the negotiations on a Multilateral Investment 
Agreement (MAI).
138
 The negotiations were launched on May 1995 by the Ministerial Council 
and started four months later in September the same year. The objectives of the MAI were to 
reach a broad investment framework with an effective dispute settlement system.
139
  
 
The MAI Draft received unprecedented protests from NGOs, civil societies and other 
stakeholders from different parts of the world.
140
 The protestors argued that the MAI created 
rights for foreign investors without obligations. They labelled MAI as the global bill of rights for 
foreign investors.
141
 Furthermore they argued that the coming into force of MAI will affect 
sovereignty of developing countries and make the realisation of development goals difficult due 
to the fact that MAI were prepared for investors’ interests and not host state interests.142 All 
obligations were to be borne by the host state while the investor enjoyed an unlimited bundle of 
rights.  
                                                          
138
 The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment Draft available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng971r2e.pdf accessed on 24th May 2013. 
139
 See the Preamble to the MAI; see also part III and IV of the Draft MAI, 1998 available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng971r2e.pdf accessed on 24th May 2013. 
140
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In as far as dispute settlement is concerned; foreign investors were given an option to institute a 
dispute in the host state court or in an internationally organised arbitral tribunal.
143
 The dispute 
could be settled through a three tier procedure: consultation, mediation and arbitration.
144
 The 
foreign investor could decide to skip the host state court and institute his claim in an international 
forum where the parties agreed.
145
  
 
After the protests the OECD abandoned the MAI and decided to adopt the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises in 2000. The Guidelines are soft law rules.
146
 To a large extent the 
Guidelines are more balanced as they provide for host state powers to control the TNCs and 
require TNCs to operate in accordance to the laws of the host state.
147
 In addition the Guidelines 
have provisions which promote human rights, environmental protection and sustainable 
development in general.
148
 
 
The limitation is that the Guidelines are not binding; hence they do not help much in creating a 
multilateral investment regime. An important role of soft law, however, is the ability to influence 
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 See Part V (d) (2) of the Draft MIA available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf accessed on 
24/05/ 2013. 
144
 See Part V of the Draft MIA available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf accessed on 24/05/ 
2013. 
145
 See Part V (d) (2) of the Draft MIA available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf accessed on 
24/05/ 2013. 
146
 The limitation is that soft laws are not binding hence they do not help much in creating a multilateral investment 
regime. 
147
See the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 27 June 2000 available at 
www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/mnetext.htm accessed on 13/05/2013. 
148
See the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 27 June 2000 available at 
www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/mnetext.htm accessed on 13/05/2013. 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
the future development of hard law commitments.
149
 This useful and innovative aspect of soft 
law can be a bridge between non-commitment and legally binding commitments.
150
 
 
2.3.11 Efforts of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
 
Apart from the OECD and the UN, the World Bank (WB) has made a number of efforts towards 
multilateralisation of foreign investment law. When compared with OECD and UN, the World 
Bank has been successful in its initiatives. Its initiatives have resulted in the Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and the Nationals of Other States (The ICSID 
Convention).
151
 The ICSID Convention establishes the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes famously known as the ICSID Centre. The World Bank has also managed 
to create the guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment in 1992. Therefore the 
World Bank has surpassed the OECD and the UN by far. One good reason behind such success 
is that the bodies created by the World Bank are voluntary and only become binding upon 
ratification. Following hereunder is a discussion on the ICSID Convention and the Guidelines on 
the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investments.  
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2.3.11.1 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
               Nationals of Other Contracting States (ICSID), 1965 
    
 
This Convention was drafted between 1961 and 1965 by the World Bank’s Legal Department. 
Aaron Broches - the General Counsel of the World Bank at the time - was behind the whole 
idea.
152
 Eighty six countries’ experts from different parts of the world were involved in the 
process of drafting the Convention. It was adopted by the World Bank executive directors on the 
18 March 1965. The Convention came into force the following year on 14 October 1966 after 
being ratified by twenty nations as required.
153
 To date the Convention has been signed by 158 
states of which 150 have ratified it.
154
 It is one of the most popular international instruments as it 
enjoys signatures from almost all the countries of the world.
155
 For avoidance of repetition the 
content of the convention is not discussed here but in 2.5.1 below. 
The ICSID Convention has played a significant role in creating the current investor – state 
dispute settlement system. In recent years, however, the ICSID dispute settlement system has 
been questioned by its users and some countries have decided to get rid of it. It is said that the 
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system is lacking on a number of issues.
156
 This convention and its dispute settlement process 
will be the centre of discussion in chapter three of this work. 
 
2.3.11.2 The Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investments, 1992. 
 
In their continued efforts to promote and protect foreign investment, the Joint Committee of the 
WB and IMF in 1991 requested the assistance of MIGA to prepare the Draft Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. Accordingly in 1992 MIGA submitted to the Joint 
Committee the draft guidelines as requested. The Development Committee of the World Bank 
and IMF adopted the guidelines in the year 1992.
157
 The guidelines are not binding as the WB 
and IMF have no competence to adopt or modify international law principles. Despite that, the 
rules are so influential and do carry weight as they come from two powerful international 
financial institutions.
158
 These Guidelines were passed almost at the same time when the 
international community was struggling to pass the Code of Conduct for TNCs. While the UN 
failed to achieve that goal the WB and IMF on the other hand managed to pass the Guidelines. 
 
Guideline II empowers the host state to allow or reject admission of foreign investment. The 
Guideline urges host states to be as open as possible to the foreign investors.
159
 However the 
Guideline empowers the host state to reject the admission of foreign of investment on the 
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grounds of national security, public health, protection of the environment and public policy 
issues.
160
 
 
Guideline III provides for the general investment protection principles. It requires states to grant 
foreign investment fair and equitable treatment, and the ability to transfer funds from the 
territory, provide full protection and security and to avoid discrimination against foreign 
investments.
161
 Guideline IV provides for instances which may amount to expropriation. The 
provision is very extensive and includes instances which according to international customary 
law principles would not amount to expropriation.
162
 
 
With regards to dispute settlement the Guideline encourages parties to settle their dispute by 
using national courts of the host state or by way of independent arbitration.  In the case of 
arbitration, parties are encouraged to use ICSID where both are members or the Additional 
Facility when one party is not a member to the Convention.
163
 
 
The Guidelines in principle demand host states to facilitate the admission of foreign investment 
in their territories. The Guidelines demand the host state to conduct itself well in the treatment of 
foreign investment but do not impose any obligation on the part of the foreign investor.
164
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The Guidelines are criticised for being unbalanced as they impose obligations on the host state 
but do not do the same to foreign investors.
165
 Although the primary aim of passing the 
Guidelines was to promote investments, the Guidelines ended up with provisions which aim at 
protecting investment at the expense of the host state and not merely promoting it. 
 
2.3.12 The World Trade Organisation efforts 
 
The WTO has also made some efforts with regards to regulation of foreign investment.
166
 The 
Uruguay Round negotiations on multilateral trade addressed the issue of foreign investment 
through the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measure (TRIMS).
167
 The Agreement deals 
with the regulation of foreign investment trade related issues. It prohibits member countries from 
applying any measure that contravenes the national treatment principle. The TRIMS was meant 
to give foreign investors the freedom to decide on whether to purchase local raw materials for 
their investment or not. Furthermore, it intended to give the foreign investor the market freedom 
such as to be able to export without any quantitative restrictions from the host state.
168
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While the US was not happy with the TRIMS arguing that it was narrow and restrictive on trade, 
developing countries found that the TRIMS was interfering with the internal affairs of the host 
state. They argued that the admission and regulation of foreign investors was an issue required to 
be administered through the host state laws and not TRIMS. The TRIMS was later adopted; 
hence it is one of the items regulated by the WTO today.
169
 
 
Apart from TRIMS there are other two WTO agreements which address foreign investment. The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The GATS in essence requires that once a commercial 
establishment is established in the foreign country that foreign establishment is supposed to be 
accorded the same treatment as local establishments as per the National Treatment principle 
requirement.
170
 The TRIPS, on the other hand, obliges WTO members to provide national 
treatment and MFN treatment to rights holders of other countries.
171
 
Apart from these efforts through individual agreements, the WTO had previously initiated efforts 
towards creating a multilateral investment treaty. In 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference of 
the WTO, it was agreed to introduce new negotiations for the purposes of establishment of a 
multilateral investment treaty.
172
 The negotiations were initiated but encountered the stiff 
competition between the developed and developing worlds. As usual, these two camps were 
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unable to agree on almost everything. The negotiations were officially buried in 2004 and the 
issue has never been the WTO priority ever since.
173
 
 
With regard to dispute settlement, the TRIMS and GATS both advocates for the Most Favoured 
Nation treatment of foreign investments. That is to say, all foreign investments have to be 
accorded equal treatment.
174
 
 
It can be concluded here that the international community’s efforts to create uniform 
international investment law principles went hand in hand with the efforts to establish the 
manner in which disputes could be settled. It is clear that developed countries advocated for 
dispute settlement mechanisms which would properly address foreign investors’ concerns, while 
developing countries, on the other hand, strongly stood to defend their sovereignty and 
advocated for the use of host state courts. As a result most of the efforts failed to yield the 
anticipated fruits. In the following section, the mechanisms used to settle investor – state disputes 
during that era are discussed. Their strengths and weaknesses are pointed out as well. The 
reasons as to why the current system was adopted to replace the former are also discussed in the 
following part.  
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2.4 Investor – state dispute settlement mechanisms prior to the current system  
 
Before and during the first half of the 20
th
 century, an aggrieved foreign investor had very few 
options to redress wrongs committed by a host state. The options were: (1) sue the host state in 
the local courts, or (2) ask for the diplomatic intervention of the home government or (3) lobby 
the home government to espouse a claim at the ICJ or the formation of an ad hoc claim 
commission.
175
  These mechanisms are discussed herein below. 
 
2.4.1 Diplomatic protection 
 
The PCIJ in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.),
176
 explained the concept of 
diplomatic protection in the following words: 
 
‘It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subject, 
when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they 
have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of 
one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on 
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his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights- its right to ensure, in the person of its 
subjects, respect for the rules of international law.’177 
 
In other words the state intervenes for the purpose of ensuring that its citizens abroad receive the 
treatment which is not less than the international minimum standard of protection. A prominent 
author, Vattel, states that 
 
‘…anyone who mistreats a citizen directly offends the state. The sovereign of that State must 
avenge its injury, and if it can, force the aggressor to make full repatriation or punish him, since 
otherwise the citizen would simply not attain the goal of civil association, namely security.’178 
 
Diplomatic protection is known for being one of the traditional means of recourse used by 
foreign investors once harmed by the host state’s act or omission. In the course of exercising the 
diplomatic protection the state may employ a number of mechanisms including, but not limited 
to consular action, negotiation, mediation, severance of diplomatic relations, economic pressure 
and, were necessary, the use of force.
179
 Regardless of the form the state decides to use, the 
application of diplomatic protection normally comes after the other means of protection have 
failed. Before invoking diplomatic protection, the aggrieved foreign citizen must prove that 
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he/she has exhausted local remedies in the host state.
180
 Furthermore, the aggrieved citizen must 
prove that he remained a citizen of the espousing state from the time of the injury up to the time 
when the claim is presented.
181
 
 
The use of diplomatic protection in investment disputes was however very ineffective, to say the 
least. There were a number of practical difficulties associated with this route. The first deficiency 
was that, once the aggrieved investor had asked the home state to espouse the dispute, it became 
a dispute of states concerned. The investor lost control over the dispute and the state could 
decide not to pursue it any further.
182
 Secondly, as the home state had exclusive rights over its 
nationals’ claims in the international sphere, and as it was within its mandate to settle, waive or 
pursue them by agreement with the host state, the state discretionally could discontinue the 
dispute at any time.
183
 Thirdly, even where the home state decided to pursue the claim and 
secured an award, it still had the discretion to either compensate the investor from the proceeds 
or not. The ICJ in Barcelona Traction, (Belgium v Spain)
184
 held:  
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‘The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to 
what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this respect a discretionary power the 
exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to 
the particular case.’185 
 
The fourth deficiency was that the home state decision to pursue the claim against the host state 
was not in itself an assurance that the matter was going to be heard by an international body. It 
was only when the host state had given its consent to an international adjudication process that 
the matter could be heard. This is due to the fact that under international law, states have the 
right to plead sovereign immunity from prosecution where they have not given their consent to 
an international adjudication body.
186
 The sovereign immunity defence is readily available to the 
host state because in dealing with foreigners, the state most of the time acts in the exercise of its 
sovereign powers (jure imperii) and not in its commercial capacity (jure gestionis). Under such 
circumstances, the doctrine of restrictive immunity will not apply and the state can successfully 
invoke absolute immunity. Lastly, diplomatic protection was not a home state’s favourite 
recourse to take because if not carefully handled it could disrupt the international relations with 
the host state and at times lead to protracted disputes.
187
 Therefore, considering the possibilities 
of the above discussed obstacles, diplomatic protection lost popularity in investment disputes and 
paved the way for the proliferation of the current arbitration system.
188
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2.4.2 The host state court mechanism 
 
It is a well - established principle under customary international law that the injured party before 
instituting any claim in an international forum/court must first exhaust all local remedies 
available.
189
 Therefore foreign investors were also obligated to follow this rule. In the 
Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.),
190
 the ICJ held: 
 
‘Before resort may be made to an international court in such a situation, it has been considered 
necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by 
its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system.’ 
 
In the Norwegian Loans Case it was also insisted that 
 
‘..it is important to obtain the ruling of the local courts with regard to the issues of fact and law 
involved, before the international aspects are dealt with by an international tribunal. It is also 
important that the respondent State which is being charged with breach of international law 
should have an opportunity to rectify the position through its own tribunals.’191 
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In addition to the court decisions cited above, different authors have written about the 
importance of exhausting local remedies before resorting to international adjudication.
192
 
Borchard submits that the rule on exhaustion of local remedies aimed at among other things, 
relieving the home state from espousing claims that could be resolved at a lower level or which 
were unfounded and frivolous.
193
 Another purpose of the rule was to reduce the unwanted 
relation interference between the host state and the aliens.
194
 Lastly, the rule aimed at giving the 
sovereign state an opportunity to resolve a dispute with aliens in its own regular way before it 
could be condemned at an international level.
195
 The rule had several advantages. The first 
advantage is that the host state was given an opportunity to redress violations by individuals or 
its low level official misconducts.
196
 Secondly, the rule reduced costs as disputes at local court 
could be settled at lower costs when compared with international bodies. The third advantage 
was that it relieved the host state from the unnecessary publicity involved in international 
adjudication.
197
 
 
Although the rule seemed to have the host states’ best interest at heart, it was of little assistance 
to aliens. There were a number of issues which worried foreign investors. In local courts, foreign 
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investors were worried about the efficiency and the impartiality of the local judges.
198
 Most of 
the time foreign investors hailed from developed countries and invested in less developed 
countries. They were worried that judges would be biased and protect the interest of the state as a 
gesture of showing loyalty to their home government. Furthermore, investors were worried that 
local judges could be lacking expertise in the field of international investment law.
199
 Courts of 
investors’ home states were not a viable option as they lacked territorial jurisdiction for the 
dispute which emanated in the host state. Therefore with this range of obstacles host state courts 
were not considered a satisfying option by foreign investors. 
 
2.4.3 Ad hoc claim commissions 
 
In addition to the use of diplomatic protection and host state courts for solving investment 
disputes, states at times established ad hoc commissions for the purposes of settling aliens’ 
claims.
200
 This mechanism was normally used in situations of national revolutions and any other 
situation which involved mass destruction, confiscation or nationalisation of aliens’ properties.201 
The home government negotiated with the host state and entered into a treaty for the purposes of 
determining compensation for the injured aliens. States liked to use this mechanism due to a 
number of reasons. The first reason was that, by using this mechanism the respective states 
avoided the complications associated with the use of diplomatic protection for each case as a 
lump sum settlement was used. The second reason was that disputes at these commissions did 
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not take long as the only issue to be determined was whether the claimant whose home state is 
espousing his claim has a right to be compensated. The third and most important reason was that 
these lump sum claims ended any possibility of diplomatic wrangling between the states 
involved.
202
  
 
The first commission of this kind was formed by the United States (US) and United Kingdom 
(UK) on claims relating to the treatment of UK and US nationals after the American Revolution. 
The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the UK and the US, famously referred 
to as the Jay Treaty, of 1794 introduced the claim commission system.
203
 Parties to the disputes 
were the states concerned. States espoused the claims on behalf of their investors. The 
commission was very successful and rendered over 500 awards.
204
 
 
In 1899, a century after the success of the Jay Treaty, the Hague Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes was signed.
205
 The Convention, among other things, 
provides for the establishment of inquiry commissions as a means of settling disputes between 
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states and aliens.
206
 Article 6 provided for the mandate of the commission.
207
 The Commission 
was utilised on a number of disputes and provided a good alternative to dispute settlement 
mechanisms. For over a century, between 1840 and 1940, this mechanism was frequently utilised 
by states.
208
 Over 60 Commissions were formed to adjudicate disputes involving foreign 
nationals.
209
 States preferred this mechanism because they retained control of the proceedings 
and only states were allowed to be parties to the claims. The recommendations rendered by the 
commission were not binding hence the state concerned was not obligated to adhere to it.
210
 As 
can be expected, investors did not like this system because it lacked mandatory force. The fact 
that the commission could not be formed unless the states agreed was another limitation of this 
mechanism. Foreign investors had to depend on their state for the setting up of the dispute 
settlement commission. As a result of these limitations, ad hoc claim commissions were 
abandoned.
211
 The decisions of these commissions however were important in creating the early 
jurisprudence on the duty owed by the state to aliens.
212
  
 
In conclusion it can be said that lack of effective and well balanced dispute settlement system 
was the major failure of customary international law in relation to foreign investment.
213
 The 
system failed to give the foreign investor an effective enforcement mechanism whenever they 
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had a claim against the host state. The enforcement mechanisms available were to file a claim in 
the local court or seek espousal of their claim by their home country government. Through 
diplomatic protection and ad hoc commissions, investment claims were pursued by government 
bureaucrats who had no interest in the respective claim. The second possible option was to 
institute a claim in the host state court where impartiality was not guaranteed. These options 
were not providing satisfactory protection of foreign investments. As a result of the limitations, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS) were developed to remedy the situation. With BITs one can 
say that foreign investors’ concerns are addressed but, on the other hand, the BIT regime leaves 
host states with a lot of concerns. The host states’ concerns form part of chapter three of this 
work. In the following section, the sources of and the reasons for the rise of the BIT regime are 
discussed.  
 
2.5 The current system: investor – state arbitration 
 
The use of international arbitration in resolving investment disputes can be traced back to The 
Hague Peace Conference of 1899.
214
 The Conference unanimously declared arbitration to be one 
of the available means for settling disputes between states.
215
 Arbitration involves settlement of 
dispute between parties through the intervention of a third party whose decision (called award) is 
binding upon the parties.
216
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As discussed above, the major failure of customary international law in the field of international 
investment law necessitated the need for a new system which would provide satisfactory 
protection to foreign investments.
217
 International arbitration was found to be the fulfilling 
option. In the early days, however, international arbitration was used to settle disputes between 
states only.
218
 This was due to the fact that under international law individuals or corporations 
lacked the status to appear in international fora.
219
 However, after the end of WW II international 
commercial arbitration flourished and paved a new path for individuals to institute claims in the 
private law sphere.
220
 As a result, the demand for a hybrid international arbitration under which 
dispute could involve a state party and an individual emerged. International investment 
arbitration is one of the hybrid forms of arbitration as it always involves a State and a private 
investor.
221
  
 
Despite the fact that the hybrid efforts date back to WWII, investor - state arbitration was 
unpopular until the 1990s when BITs started to proliferate.
222
 In fact, the first BIT in the world 
which was signed between Germany – Pakistan in 1959, did not provide for investor – state 
procedure but state – state arbitration procedure.223 Later years BITs however started providing 
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for arbitration as a means of settling disputes between the host state and the respective foreign 
investor.
224
  It is through BITs that international arbitration grew and became as popular as it is 
today. Another reason for the rise of arbitration in investment disputes is the ICSID Convention, 
which provides for arbitration and conciliation as the available means for resolving investment 
disputes. Following hereunder is a brief discussion of the role played by ICSID and BITs in the 
rise of the current investor – state arbitration system. 
 
2.5.1 The role of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States  
           and Nationals of Other Contracting States 
 
As discussed above,
225
 the Convention was adopted by the World Bank executive directors on 
the 18 March 1965. The Convention came into force the following year on 14 October 1966 after 
being ratified by twenty nations as required.
226
 The Convention was drafted to address the 
concerns about the traditional investor – state dispute settlement mechanisms. The convention is 
hailed for being self - contained and a depoliticised forum. It provides the most favourable 
dispute settlement system to foreign investors. The investor is entitled to institute the dispute 
settlement process without being required to exhaust local remedies.
227
 Another revolution 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment of 30/01/1965  (hereinafter Tanzania – Germany BIT) 
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brought by this Convention is that the foreign investor no longer needs the assistance of the 
home state to sue the host state.
228
 The foreign investor has been given the locus standi to sue the 
host state directly. The Convention has also barred contracting states from using diplomatic 
protection.
229
 The Convention requires the tribunals to apply the law chosen by the parties.
230
 
Where the parties have not made any choice the tribunal will be required to apply the host state 
law and principles of international law.
231
 
 
The Convention provide for the establishment of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) which is responsible for settlement of investment disputes between 
states and Nationals from other contracting states.
232
 The Centre also facilitates settlement of 
disputes which involve a member state and a national of another state which is not a member to 
the ICSID Convention through the Additional Facility Rules.
233
  
 
In its first 25 years the Convention was not that popular and disputes continued to be settled 
through the traditional means. ICSID registered its first case in 1972 six years after its 
establishment.
234
 By the end of the 1970s only 9 cases were registered but a slight increase was 
                                                          
228
See Article 25 (1) of the Convention. 
229
 See Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
230
 See Article 42 of the Convention. 
231
 See Article 42 of the Convention. 
232
 See Article 25 of the Convention. 
233
 Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2006 available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf . Hereinafter “ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules, 2006” accessed on 21/05/2013. 
234
 Holiday Inn v Morocco ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1. 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
witnessed in the 1980s as 23 cases were registered in that decade.
235
 However, after the 
proliferation of BITs in the 1990s the popularity of the ICSID dispute settlement system 
increased tremendously.
236
 UNCTAD 2010 World Investment Report indicates that at least 2000 
BITs have a clause providing for dispute settlement at ICSID arbitral system.
237
According to 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014, by the end of 2013, the total number of known treaty 
based ICSID cases had reached 568 in which 98 countries were involved. Out of the total, 257 
cases have been concluded.
238
 The year 2013 recorded the second highest number of investor – 
state dispute by registering 56 new cases just 2 cases behind year 2012 which recorded 58 new 
cases.
239
  
 
2.5.2 The role of Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Investment Agreements 
 
Multiple failures in developing a multilateral investment treaty prompted developed countries to 
initiate efforts by negotiating BITs with individual developing countries.
240
 Investment treaties 
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often referred to as (BITs) or international investment agreements (IIAs) are agreements made 
between two or more countries that safeguards investments made in the territories of the 
signatory countries.
241
 
 
Western capital exporting countries sought to conclude bilateral treaties with individual 
developing states to establish specific legal rules to govern investment and economic activities 
by their nationals in the territories of other states.
242
 For their part, many Third World countries, 
with the decline in lending from commercial banks and official aid programs during the 1980s 
and 1990s, have seen such bilateral agreements as a way to promote foreign investment in their 
territories and have therefore negotiated and ratified them in bulk.
243
 As stated earlier, the first 
BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959.
244
 The signing of this first BIT 
awakened other developed countries especially in Europe. They were surprised to see that 
developing countries agreed to BIT arrangement despite their continued resistance against 
minimum standard principle at the UN.
245
 Switzerland was the second to sign a BIT with Tunisia 
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in 1961.
246
 Italy followed suit by signing a BIT with Guinea in 1964.
247
 The United Kingdom 
joined the BIT system in 1975 followed by Japan and the United States in 1977.
248
 The BIT 
signing intensified in the early 1990s.
249
 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014 indicates that 
by the end of 2013, the overall IIA universe consisted 3240 BITs and IIAs.
250
 
 
There are mainly three reasons which motivate states to sign BITs.
251
 First of all, states sign BITs 
for the purpose of protecting their nationals’ interests in the territories of other states. The second 
reason is that states sign BITs as an initiative to liberalise the market which is crucial in the 
current globalised world. The third and most important reason is to promote and attract inward 
investments. BITs have received a worldwide acceptance due to the fact that they come with a 
number of advantages to foreign investors.
252
 Through BITs, foreign investors are guaranteed 
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different rights, including but not limited to; the right to compensation in case the investment is 
expropriated,
253
 the right for the foreign investment to receive fair and equitable treatment,
254
 
right for the investment to be accorded protection and security
255
 and the  foreign investors’ right 
to move capital and currency from one country to another.
256
 Apart from these rights, BITs also 
provide for procedural rights which entitle foreign investors to sue the host state without seeking 
prior consent from their home governments.
257
 In other words, one can say, foreign investors 
acquire locus standi to be subjects of international law for purposes of investment arbitration 
alone. This is said to be the most important innovation brought about by BITs.
258
 This 
characteristic of BITs serves as an exception to the principle of customary international law 
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which requires states to represent their nationals in case the latter have a claim against another 
state.
259
 Through BITs, however, foreign investors are exonerated from applying this 
cumbersome route and institute their claims directly. Furthermore, BITs provide for different 
mechanisms for settling investment disputes. The most common mechanisms provided for 
include: arbitration under the auspices of ICSID, Additional Facility arbitration, and ad hoc 
arbitration under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
arbitration rules.
260
 It is through BITs that the current international investment arbitration system 
was born. A discussion on the current dispute settlement system will be done in the following 
chapter of this work. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Despite different efforts being taken by the world community, especially the UN and OECD, it 
was always difficult to reach a consensus between developed and developing countries. Their 
interests most of the time were overlapping. Developing countries always wanted to protect their 
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sovereignty and natural resources while developed nations wanted maximum protection of their 
investments abroad.
261
 
 
While efforts to create a multilateral investment regulatory treaty failed, BITs continued to 
proliferate on an annual basis. The developed countries’ goal of ensuring that foreign properties 
receive protection abroad has been achieved through protective provisions found in the 
resembling BITs. Their second goal of ensuring that foreign investment receives a neutral 
dispute settlement forum has been achieved as well, as BITs provide three forums to choose 
from: ICSID arbitration, Additional Facility arbitration and Ad hoc arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL Rules. 
 
It can be concluded here that the long fought battle between developed and developing countries 
from the League of Nations efforts to the Abs –Shawcross Draft to MAI 1998 has ended by 
creating an international investment arbitration system through BITs. Developing countries 
in their desire to attract foreign investments have joined the West in creating the new system. 
BITs provide maximum protection of foreign investors’ interests which goes beyond the 
customary international law principles. The collapse of the USSR and economic difficulties in 
the 1990s necessitated the proliferation of BITs which are essentially creatures of the developed 
world.  
 
                                                          
261
 See the discussion under 2.3.1 – 2.3.11 above. 
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As a result, developing countries and some other developed countries have started complaining 
about the current system as they feel that BITs just create rights to investors without obligations. 
They are further concerned that the current system lacks the basic tenets of a legitimate 
adjudication system. It is the purpose of this research to analyse the current investment dispute 
settlement system in the next chapter. 
 
The following chapter will discuss the current dispute settlement system in a detailed manner. 
The Dispute settlement system under ICSID, Additional Facility and Ad hoc arbitration under 
the UNCITRAL Rules will be extensively discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of each 
system will also be analysed. In addition, the chapter is going to discuss the issues arising as a 
result of the current systemic flaws. Furthermore there will be a discussion as to whether the 
current system is appropriate for investor – state disputes which most of the time involves public 
interests disputes. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT INVESTOR – STATE ARBITRATION SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes and analyses the existing investor – state arbitration system. Arbitration, 
as pointed out in the previous chapter, is currently the most utilised mechanism in settling 
international investment disputes.
1
 These disputes are either settled at the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in accordance with the ICSID Convention,
2
 or in 
accordance with Additional Facility Rules,
3
 or by ad hoc arbitrations established in accordance 
with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010.
4
 Under ad hoc arbitration, parties may choose any 
arbitration institution to be the appointing authority for the purpose of their arbitration 
proceeding. The UNCTAD 2014 World Investment Report indicates that ICSID registered 62% 
of all investor – state disputes, UNCITRAL 28%, and the remaining 10% is managed by the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA),  and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
5
 
                                                          
1
 See subheading 2.5.2 of Chapter two above. 
2
 Governed by the Washington Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and the Nationals 
of  Other Contracting States, 1965 hereinafter referred as  “the ICSID Convention”  read together with the Rules of  
Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings (hereinafter ICSID Rules)  available at  
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid.htm   accessed on 21/05/2013. 
3
 Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2006 available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf  accessed on 21/05/2013. 
4
 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010 available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/arbitration/rules/arb-rules-revised-2010 
accessed on 15/07/2013. 
5
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report ‘Investing in the 
SDGs: An Action Plan’ [2014] IIA Monitor, No. 1, at 125, U.N.Doc.UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2014/3 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf  accessed on 23/07/2014. 
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In the analysis, the chapter assesses the current system to see whether it is effective and 
appropriate for settling investor – state disputes which involves public interests disputes. 
 
The overall argument of this chapter is that investor – state arbitration which is an adjudicative 
system in public international law, is supposed to be grounded upon public international law 
values.
6
 The system, among other things, needs to be transparent, presided over by independent 
and impartial adjudicators, accountable and consistent. However, it is submitted in this chapter 
that the current system is not living up to the public international law values. The specific 
analysis of the rules shows: that the system operates under a great deal of confidentiality; that 
there is no guarantee of the independence and impartiality of the process; that tribunals are 
presided over by ad hoc arbitrators with no security of tenure; that the adjudication process is 
overly expensive; and that the process has produced inconsistent decisions which have created 
the uncertainty and unpredictability of investor – state jurisprudence.  
 
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the ICSID arbitration system by 
looking at its design, structure, strength and weaknesses. It is concluded that despite the efforts 
made in 2006 to improve the ICSID system, more changes are required. The second part 
                                                          
6
 For an insightful discussion on this argument see Van Harten G ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law’ 
(2007) at 46 – 71; see also Schill S ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law: Ways out of the 
Legitimacy Crisis’ available at http://www.iilj.org/research/documents/if2010-11.schill.pdf  accessed on 
09/09/2013; see also Schill S ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and 
Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’(2011) Virginia Journal of  International Law 57 at 
59; also see Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law’ (2006) European Journal of International Law 121 at 122; see also Mann H ‘Civil Society Perspective: what 
Do Key Stakeholders Expect from the International Investment Regime?’ in Alvarez JE &Sauvant KP (eds.) The 
Evolving International Investment Regime (2011) 22 – 29 at 23; also see Van Harten G ‘Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Stephan Schill (ed.) International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (2010) 627 – 657 at 630; also see Brower CN & Schill S ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon 
to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?’ (2009) 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 471. 
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discusses the rules applicable to the ICSID Additional Facility system. The third part discusses 
the ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In this part, the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA) arbitral system will also be discussed. It is concluded that the UNCITRAL 
2010 rules are the most confidential, and that changes need to be effected for betterment of the 
investor – state system. The last part analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the whole investor 
– state arbitration system. The part concludes that despite several strengths of the system, there 
are a number of legitimacy issues which need to be addressed.  
 
3.2 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
 
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
Contracting States (hereinafter ‘the Convention’) was adopted in 1965 and came into force on 
14
th
 October 1966. The main purpose of the Convention is to facilitate dispute settlement by way 
of conciliation and arbitration.
7
 Currently, the Convention is signed by 158 and ratified by 149 
states.
8
 The Convention establishes a specialised autonomous and self – contained arbitration 
system through the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter ‘the 
ICSID’).9 The ICSID is responsible for the registration and administration of Convention cases. 
 
                                                          
7
 See Article 1(2) of the ICSID Convention, 1965; see also Lamm CB ‘Jurisdiction of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes’ (1991) 6 ICSID Rev -Foreign Investment LJ 462 at 463. 
8
 See ICSID List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention as of 20
th
 May 2013 available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Contractingstates&ReqFr
om=Main accessed on 18/06/2013.    
9
 See Article 1 (1) of the Convention; see also Broches A ‘Arbitration under the ICSID Convention’ News from 
ICSID No 1 (1991) 1. 
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The ICSID case profile has increased tremendously in the last two decades.
10
 The World 
Investment Report 2013 indicates that the ICSID is gaining more popularity over other arbitral 
institutions and rules. Out of 58 investor – state cases filed in 2012, 39 cases were filed with 
ICSID and 7 of them were filed under the Additional Facility Rules.
11
 When combined with the 
Additional Facility cases, the Centre registered 67% of all new cases filed in the year 2012 
alone.
12
 The statistical data for the last three years reveals that two – thirds of all investment 
cases are settled at the Centre.
13
 It is clear therefore, that ICSID plays a significant and central 
role in the development of international investment law.  
 
3.2.1 Organisational structure of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes  
 
The ICSID is comprised of two main organs: the administrative Council and the Secretariat. The 
Council is the top governing body made up of one member from each contracting state.
14
 The 
Council reaches its decisions by way of voting and each member state has equal voting power.
15
 
                                                          
10
 Out of the 514 known Investor – State Disputes by the end of 2012, ICSID has been involved in more than 70% of 
all cases, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Latest Developments in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement’, [2013] IIA Monitor, No. 1, at 1–2, U.N.Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2013/3  
11
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘Latest Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement’, [2013] IIA Monitor, No. 1, at 1–2, U.N.Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2013/3. 
12
 The UNCTAD 2013 World Investment Report indicates further that UNCITRAL Rules were selected in 7 new 
cases (12%), 5 other cases (8.6%) were filed in the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce while the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Cairo Centre for International Commercial Arbitration received 1 case each 
(1.7%). 
13
 See also the UNCTAD World Investment Report for 2012 which indicates that 34 cases out of 46 cases (73%) 
registered in that year were registered at ICSID Centre, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012_embargoed_en.pdf;  See also the UNCTAD Report for 2011 
which indicates that 25 cases were registered out of which 18 (72%) of them were registered at ICSID, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir2011_embargoed_en.pdf accessed on 08/08/2013.  
14
 See Article 4 of the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention).  
15
 See Article 7(2) of the ICSID Convention. 
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The Council elects the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General of the Secretariat. 
The Council is also responsible for the adoption of rules for the institution and conduct of ICSID 
proceedings, budget approval and adoption, and deliberation of the ICSID annual reports.
16
 The 
Council meets once a year but in case of an urgent matter, the Council Chairman or General 
Secretary to the Secretariat is mandated to convene the meeting at any time.
17
 
 
The Secretariat is composed of the Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General and the 
staff.
18
 The Secretary General acts as the lead legal counsel of the centre, the registrar of the 
ICSID proceedings and the Chief Executive Officer of the Centre. The Deputy Secretary 
General, on the other hand, is responsible for the day to day activities of the Centre.
19
 
 
The Secretariat plays a very crucial role in the ICSID arbitration system. It is the duty of the 
Secretariat to provide institutional support for the filing and conduct of ICSID proceedings. The 
Secretariat is also responsible to provide assistance in constituting Conciliation Commissions, 
Arbitral Tribunals and Ad hoc Committees. In addition, the Secretariat provides support by 
maintaining a panel of conciliators and arbitrators from which member states may choose in case 
of any dispute.
20
 In situations where the parties to the dispute do not agree on the appointment of 
arbitrators, the Chair of the ICSID Council or the Secretary General is empowered to appoint the 
presiding tribunal.
21
 The Chair or the Secretary General is obligated to choose arbitrators from 
                                                          
16
See Article 6 of the ICSID Convention. 
17
 See Article 7 of the ICSID Convention. 
18
 See Article 10 of the ICSID Convention. 
19
 See Article 11 of the ICSID Convention. 
20
 See Article 3 and 12 of the ICSID Convention. 
21
 See Article 38 of the ICSID Convention. 
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the panel.
22
 The purpose of empowering the Chair to appoint arbitrators in case of parties’ 
default or disagreement is to ensure that the proceedings do not stall for failure of constituting 
the tribunal. 
 
3.2.2 The jurisdictional requirement of the International Centre for Settlement of  
         Investment Disputes 
 
The Preamble to the ICSID Convention clearly provides that the submission of disputes to the 
ICSID is voluntary and no contracting state shall be under any obligation by mere ratification, 
acceptance or approval of the Convention to appear at the Centre.
23
 In other words, the 
ratification of the convention does not in itself entitle foreign investors to institute proceedings 
against the host state at ICSID.
24
 Article 25 (1) provides for the four requirements which need to 
be fulfilled before the matter can be heard at ICSID. Article 25(1) provides: 
 
‘The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. 
When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.’ 
 
                                                          
22
 See 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=RightFrame&FromPage=Org
anization%20and%20Structure&pageName=Organization accessed on 18/06/2013. 
23
 See the last paragraph of the Preamble to the ICSID Convention. 
24
 See Tuck AP ‘Investor – State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms to 
the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (2007) Law and Business Review of the Americas 885. 
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It can be deduced from Article 25(1) that for the Centre to have jurisdiction there must be: (1) a 
legal dispute, (2) which has arisen out of an investment, (3) the contracting parties must give 
consent in writing, and lastly (4) the state must be a contracting state and the foreign investor 
must be a national of another contracting state. The section below discusses the four 
jurisdictional elements as provided under Article 25(1). The section reveals that there are 
contradicting decisions on the jurisdictional requirements. These contradictory decisions are left 
to exist in parallel as there is no higher court to state the true position of the law. 
 
3.2.2.1 Consent 
 
Consent is an indispensable condition for the jurisdiction of the Centre.
25
 The Convention 
requires the contracting state to give its consent in writing.
26
 The provision aims at avoiding 
dragging the parties, especially the state, to a forum it has not consented to. The consent to 
ICSID arbitration entails waiver of other means of dispute settlement and once given it cannot be 
vitiated.
27
  
 
                                                          
25
 Schreuer C The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001) at 191; see also Schreuer C ‘The World Bank/ICSID 
Dispute Settlement Procedures’ in Lang & Zuger (eds.) Settlement of Dispute in Tax Treaty Law (2002) 579 -582 
available at http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/66_icsid.pdfaccessed accessed on 12/07/2013; see also 
Akyuz SA ‘The Jurisdiction of ICSID: The Application of the Article 25 of the Convention on the Settlement of  
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other Contracting States’ available at 
http://auhf.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/auhfd-arsiv/AUHF-2003-52-03/AUHF-2003-52-03-Akyuz.pdf  accessed on 
7/7/2013; also see Mortenson JD ‘The Meaning of Investment: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International 
Investment Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 257 at 268; see also Van Harten G & Loughlin M 
‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’(2006) European Journal of 
International Law 121 at 126. 
26
 See Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
27
 See Article 26 of the ICSID Convention. 
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The ICSID consent can be obtained in a number of ways. A report of the Executive Directors of 
the World Bank on ICSID provides for the ways in which the consent could be given.
28
 The 
report states that the first possible way of obtaining consent is by a consent clause in the parties’ 
agreement. The parties when entering into a contract would have included a clause which 
specifically name ICSID as the organ responsible for settling their disputes.
29
 The second 
possible way is by having a provision in the host state investment law which names ICSID as 
one of the means of settling an investment dispute between the host state and foreign investors.
30
 
The third and most common way is through a treaty between the host state and the home state of 
the respective foreign investor.
31
 Currently, over 2000 BITs have a clause providing for dispute 
settlement through the ICSID arbitral system.
32
 The investor’s consent, on the other hand, can be 
                                                          
28
 Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 18
th
 March 
1965 available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB-section01.htm accessed on 
18/06/2013. 
29
 See Mortenson JD ‘The Meaning of Investment: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment 
Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 257 at 268; see also Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment 
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) European Journal of International Law 121 at 
126. 
30
 Mortenson JD ‘The Meaning of Investment: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law’ 
(2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 257 at 268; see also Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty 
Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) European Journal of International Law 121 at 126. 
31
 By the end of the year 2012 over 63% of all disputes filed at ICSID originated from BITs, see The Basis of 
Consent Invoked to Establish ICSID Jurisdiction as of 31
st
 December 2012 available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&icsidOve
rview=true&language=English  accessed on 21/06/2013. 
32
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report: ‘Non-Equity 
Modes of International Production and Development’ UN Pub. Sales No.E.11.II.D.2, 2011 at 100; For cases on 
which jurisdiction was based on BIT see AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 1990, ICSID Reports, 4 (1997); See 
also SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID ARB/01/13 (2003) (Decision 
on  objection to jurisdiction) (hereinafter SGS v Pakistan)and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Republic 
of the Philippines, ICSID ARB/02/6 (2004) (Decision on objection to jurisdiction and separate declaration) 
(hereinafter SGS v Philippines); See also Lauder v The Czech Republic 9 ICSID Reports 66 (2003);and CME Czech 
Republic BV v The Czech Republic  9 ICSID Reports 121(2003); see also Aguas del Tunari S A v Bolivia ICSID 
ARB/02/3 (2005) (decision on jurisdiction) and  Azurix Corp v Argentina ICSID ARB/1/12 (2006) (final award) (all 
cases concerned governed measures to protect water services); See CMS Gas Transmission Company v The 
Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8(2005) (final award ), Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic 
ICSID ARB/02/16 (2005) (final award)  and  Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L P v Argentine Republic  
ICSID ARB/01/3 (2007) (final  award). 
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derived from his conduct. Instituting a claim at ICSID would bring about a presumption that the 
parties have consented to the ICSID system. 
 
Article 44 provides that consent to the ICSID system entails also consent to the use of ICSID 
rules for conciliation or arbitration.
33
 The state becomes bound to adhere to the ICSID dispute 
system to the exclusion of its own courts and other remedies. Therefore, by giving their consent 
to the ICSID system, states waive their sovereignty to a limited extent. In addition, the state 
waives the right to use diplomatic protection and cannot bring a diplomatic claim on behalf of its 
citizens.
34
  
It is worth noting here however that the consent given by a particular state could be a limited 
one. The respective states may limit the jurisdiction of the Centre by expressly stating this in its 
consent. Article 25 (4) provides as follows: 
            ‘Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention 
or at any    time thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would or 
would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Secretary- General shall 
forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting States. Such notification shall not constitute 
the consent required by paragraph (1).’ 
 
Under such circumstances, the Centre will have jurisdiction over disputes which are within the 
scope provided by that contracting state. Furthermore, Article 26 provides that states could 
impose a condition that the jurisdiction of the ICSID shall be subject to exhaustion of local 
                                                          
33
 See Article 44 of the ICSID Convention. 
34
 See Article 27 of the ICSID Convention. 
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remedies and after expiration of waiting period stated in the particular BIT. ICSID in such 
circumstances shall only have jurisdiction after the local remedies have failed to resolve the 
dispute and the waiting period have expired.
35
  
 
In practice, tribunals have produced conflicting decisions with regard to the consent limitation 
set out under Article 26. In Emilio Augustin Maffezini v the Kingdom of Spain, the BIT between 
Spain and Argentina provided for a waiting period of 18 months before the foreign investor can 
initiate international arbitration.
36
 During the stipulated 18 months, the foreign investor was 
required to exhaust the local remedies available. Mr Maffezini contested the waiting period as 
being long and argued before the tribunal that Spain had another BIT with Chile which provides 
for only a six month’s waiting period. Therefore, he invoked the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
principle that obliges equal treatment to third parties.
37
 The issue before the Tribunal was 
whether the MFN principle can be invoked to bypass consent limitations set by the contracting 
parties in a treaty by using another BIT involving the respondent state and a third party. The 
Maffezini Tribunal ruled in the affirmative and stated that jurisdictional matters constitute a part 
of the package of the investor’s protection guarantees; hence MFN can be invoked to grant 
jurisdiction if that other BIT provides for a more favourable dispute settlement procedure.
38
 
 
                                                          
35
 See Article 26 of the Convention. 
36
 See Emilio Augustin Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, IIC 85 
(2000). 
37
 See Emilio Augustin Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, IIC 85 
(2000) para 480 – 481. 
38
 For similar opinion see Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/10 (2005) (Decision on 
Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction),; Camuzzi International S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/2 (2005) (Decision on Jurisdiction),; National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL (2006) 
(Decision on Jurisdiction); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19 (2006) and AWG Group Ltd. v The Argentine Republic, 
UNCITRAL (2006) (Decision on Jurisdiction). 
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However, in another case, Plama v Bulgaria,
39
 on the same grounds and argument as in the 
Maffezini case, the Tribunal rejected the reasoning and conclusion drawn in the former case. The 
Tribunal ruled:  
 
‘an MFN clause in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute settlement provisions 
in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves 
no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them.’40 
 
Therefore, due to the fact that the doctrine of precedent is not recognised at ICSID, to date both 
decisions are valid and more contradictions can be expected.
41
 It is unclear therefore, whether the 
waiting period needs to expire before one can proceed to institute a case with ICSID. It is 
submitted that, for the sake of certainty and respect for the BIT provisions, the time period 
stipulated in a BIT should be respected and followed. Any disregard of what the parties agreed to 
is unnecessarily creating legitimacy concerns for the system which already has a lot of issues to 
address. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24 (2005) (Decision on Jurisdiction), 
para. 223; see also Telenor Mobile Communications AS v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/04/15,(2006) 
(Award); see also Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/13 (2004) (Decision on Jurisdiction). 
40
 See Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24 (2005) (Decision on 
Jurisdiction), para. 143. 
41
 Reinisch A.  ‘How Narrow are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment Treaties?’ Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement (2011) 2(1) 115 at 133; see also Douglas Z ‘The MFN Clause in Investment 
Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation off the Rail’ Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2011) 2(1) 97 at 97. 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
3.2.2.2 Parties to the dispute  
 
Article 25(1) provides for the eligible parties to the ICSID arbitration. Contracting states and 
nationals of other contracting states are the principal parties to the ICSID arbitration.
42
 However, 
under special circumstances, a state party may endorse its subsidiary company to be a party to 
the dispute.
43
 A national of other contracting state could either be a natural person or a juridical 
person. The Convention requires the citizen of the other state to have the nationality of the other 
contracting party at the time of consent and at the time when the dispute arises.
44
 In both 
circumstances, the national of other contracting states should not be a national of the contracting 
state which is a party to the underlying dispute. This conforms to the international law principle 
that a national of a particular state cannot sue their own state in an international forum. 
 
Therefore, where the juridical person has been incorporated in the host state it will be considered 
a national of that state and lose the locus standi to sue it at ICSID.
45
 In contemplation of 
difficulties which can be caused by the rule, the ICSID Convention provides an exception to the 
rule. Article 25(2) (b) permits the locally incorporated juridical person to be treated as a foreign 
national as long as it is foreign - controlled and the parties have expressly agreed to treat it as 
such. Both requirements must be met. It is imperative that the parties expressly agree to that, and 
                                                          
42
 For insightful discussion see Amerasinghe CF ‘Jurisdiction Ratione Personae under the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States’(1974/75) British Year Book of 
International Law 233; see also Sloane RD ‘Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal 
Regulation of Nationality’ (2009)  50 Harvard International Law Journal 1- 60 at 37; see also United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Requirement Ratione Personae (2003) 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.3 at 7 - 22 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add3_en.pdf  accessed 
on 07/07/2013; see also Nerets V ‘Nationality of Investors in ICSID Arbitration’ Research Paper Series (2011) Riga 
Graduate School of Law  at 20 available at http://www.rgsl.edu.lv/images/stories/publications/2_nerets_final.pdf. 
43
 See Article 25(3) of the Convention. For a case in which a subsidiary company instituted a case upon receiving 
approval of the state party see Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited v Independent Power Tanzania Limited, 
ICSID Case No ARB/98/8. 
44
 See Article 25(2) (a). 
45
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain) (1970) ICJ Reports 3. 
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the juridical person should be under foreign control.
46
 In Holiday Inns v Morocco
47
 the 
respondent state objected to the ICSID jurisdiction on the ground that the four Moroccan 
subsidiaries of Holiday Inns were not foreign nationals and that no agreement was entered to 
treat them as such. The Tribunal concurred with the Moroccan argument and stated that for 
Article 25(2) (b) to apply, the parties must have expressly agreed to treat the locally incorporated 
company as foreign.
48
  
 
It follows therefore that lack of parties’ agreement renders invocation of Article 25(2) (b) 
unacceptable as it lacks the parties will. The Holiday Inns position was upheld in Vacuum Salt 
Product v Ghana.
49
 In this case, Vacuum Salt, a Ghanaian company, entered into a 30 years 
contract with Ghana to develop and mine salt. The contract had an ICSID arbitration clause. 
When the dispute arose the claimant instituted a claim with ICSID. The respondent state 
contested the claim arguing that Vacuum Salt was not a foreign company and there was no 
explicit agreement to treat it as such. The Tribunal held in favour of the respondent state and 
insisted that Article 25(2) (b) requires explicit agreement of the parties to treat a locally 
incorporated company as foreign.  It further held that the existence of foreign control in itself is 
                                                          
46
 See Sornarajah M The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (2000) at 211. 
47
 Holiday Inns SA and others v Morocco ICSID Case No ARB/72/1(1972). 
48
 For more discussion see Wisner R & Gallus N ‘Nationality Requirement in Investor – State Arbitration’ (2003) 
The Journal of World Investment &Trade 927 at 933- 936; see also United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD)  Requirement Ratione Personae (2003) UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.3 at 19 - 22 
available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add3_en.pdf  accessed on 07/07/2013; see also Akyuz SA ‘The 
Jurisdiction of ICSID: The Application of the Article 25 of the Convention on the Settlement of  Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other Contracting States’ available at 
http://auhf.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/auhfd-arsiv/AUHF-2003-52-03/AUHF-2003-52-03-Akyuz.pdf  accessed on 
7/7/2013; also see Nerets V ‘Nationality of Investors in ICSID Arbitration’ Research Paper Series (2011) Riga 
Graduate School of Law  at 28 available at http://www.rgsl.edu.lv/images/stories/publications/2_nerets_final.pdf .  
49
 ICSID Case No ARB/92/1 (1997). 
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not sufficient but a conditional requirement to be met. In support of the same position, the 
Tribunal in Letco v Liberia
50
 held that: 
 
‘…it must be presumed that where there exists foreign control, the agreement to treat the 
company in question as a foreign national is ‘because’ of this foreign control.’51 
 
Therefore, in a normal situation, a locally incorporated company has no locus standi to institute 
proceedings at ICSID.  
 
Other Tribunals, however, have adopted a different position and ruled that there is no need for 
parties’ express agreement. In Amco Asia v Indonesia,52  the presiding tribunal widened the 
scope of interpretation of Article 25(2) (b) by holding that the parties’ agreement to treat a 
locally incorporated company as foreign can be implied from their conduct. The facts were that 
the respondent, Indonesia, objected to the ICSID jurisdiction on the ground that Amco Asia was 
locally incorporated and there was no agreement between the parties to treat Amco Asia as a 
foreign company. The claimant, on the other hand, argued that Amco Asia was controlled by PT 
Amco, a foreign company, and that the respondent state knew about the foreign control as it was 
indicated during the registration of the company. The Tribunal agreed with the claimant’s 
assertion and held that the respondent state knew about the foreign control of Amco Asia as the 
registration documents indicated such control. Therefore, according to the Tribunal, agreement to 
treat a local company as foreign can be inferred from the conduct of the parties and in some 
instances there is no need for express agreement.  
                                                          
50
 Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. Liberia, ICSID Case No.ARB/83/2 (1994). 
51
 See Letco v Liberia para 516. 
52
Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia ICSID Case No.ARB/81/1 (1984). 
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The same expansive approach was taken in Klockner v Cameroon.
53
 In this case the respondent 
argued against the ICSID jurisdiction on the ground that the corporation in question was 
incorporated in Cameroon and there was no agreement by the parties to treat it as foreign. It 
further argued that the corporation could not qualify for foreign control as it was jointly owned 
and controlled by the Cameroon government. The claimant, on the other hand, argued that due to 
the existence of an arbitration clause in their agreement which provided for ICSID arbitration, 
the ICSID had the jurisdiction to hear the claim. The Tribunal agreed with the claimant and ruled 
that the arbitration agreement in the contract suffices to give ICSID the jurisdiction to settle the 
dispute. It further said that the arbitration clause was conclusive proof that the host state has 
agreed to treat its own juridical person as foreign.
54
 
 
Again, the above discussed awards contradict each other despite the fact that they are 
interpreting the same provision of the ICSID Convention. It is submitted here that the wide 
interpretation of Article 25(2) (b) given by the Amco Asia and Klockner Tribunals was beyond 
the member state parties’ contemplation. The Article clearly stipulates for the two conditions to 
be met. To use a purposive interpretation where the wording of the Article is clear is uncalled 
for, to say the least. The two Tribunals created unnecessary uncertainty in the jurisprudence of 
international investment law. It is submitted here that the strict interpretation of Article 25(2) (b) 
                                                          
53
 Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des 
Engrais ICSID Case No ARB/81/2 (1983). 
54
 Akyuz SA ‘The Jurisdiction of ICSID: The Application of the Article 25 of the Convention on the Settlement of  
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other Contracting States’ available at 
http://auhf.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/auhfd-arsiv/AUHF-2003-52-03/AUHF-2003-52-03-Akyuz.pdf  accessed on 
7/7/2013 
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is more appropriate one, as otherwise state parties may lose confidence in the system which will 
be considered as interfering too much with states’ sovereignty. 
 
3.2.2.3 Legal dispute 
 
Existence of a legal dispute is another requirement which needs to be met for the ICSID tribunal 
to assume jurisdiction.
55
 The Convention does not define what constitutes a legal dispute hence it 
is for the presiding tribunal to determine that. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions defined a dispute as ‘a disagreement on a point of law or 
fact, conflict of legal views or interests between parties’.56 This definition has been frequently 
adopted by the ICSID tribunals.
57
  
 
Schreuer defines a legal dispute as a dispute which involves parties’ legal rights and in which the 
remedies sought are damages and restitution.
58
 Amerasinghe, on the other hand, suggests that for 
the legal dispute to exist, the parties must have reached a disagreement which have escalated to a 
level of confrontation and should be of interest to the parties involved.
59
  
                                                          
55
 See Schreuer C ‘What is a Legal Dispute?’ (2009) 1 TDM 960; see also Kryvoi Y International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (2013) at 56; see also Akyuz SA ‘The Jurisdiction of ICSID: The Application of 
the Article 25 of the Convention on the Settlement of  Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
Contracting States’ available at http://auhf.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/auhfd-arsiv/AUHF-2003-52-03/AUHF-2003-52-
03-Akyuz.pdf  accessed on 7/7/2013; see also  Boddicker JM ‘Whose Dictionary Controls: Recent Challenges to the 
Term Investment in ICSID Arbitration’ (2010) American University International Law Review 1033; also see Nerets 
V ‘Nationality of Investors in ICSID Arbitration’ Research Paper Series (2011) Riga Graduate School of Law at 10. 
56
 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgement No 2 1924 PCIJ Series A No 2 at p 11. 
57
 See for example Emilio August Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain Case No ARB/97/7 Decision on Jurisdiction (2000) 
paras 93 – 94; see also Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine Case No ARB/02/18 Decision on Jurisdiction (2004) paras 106 – 
107; see also El Paso  Energy International Company v Argentine Republic Case No ARB/03/15 Decision on 
Jurisdiction (2006) 
58
 Schreuer C et al The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2009) at 102. 
59
 Amerasinghe C F ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’ 19 
Indian Journal of International Law 166 (1979), pp.169-171at 176. 
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The Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States requires that the dispute must concern the existence or scope of a legal 
right or obligation or the nature or the extent of the reparation to be made for a breach of a legal 
obligation.
60
  
 
A number of tribunals have also provided guidance on how to identify a legal dispute. It has been 
held that a legal dispute exists when the claimant asserts rights, relies on legal arguments and 
seeks legal remedies. In Continental Casualty v Argentine
61
, the Tribunal held: 
 
‘In this case, the claimant invokes specific legal acts and provisions as the foundation of its claim: 
it indicates that certain measures by Argentine have affected its legal rights stemming from 
contracts, legislation and the BIT. The claimant further indicate specific provisions of the BIT 
granting various types of legal protection to its investments in Argentina, that in its view have 
been breached by those measures.’62 
 
Taking the same position, in Suez v Argentina
63
, when called on to decide whether the Argentina 
measures which affected the claimant’s investment could result in a legal dispute, the Tribunal 
observed:  
 
                                                          
60
 Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 18
th
 March 
1965 available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB-section01.htm accessed on 
18/06/2013, para 44 - 46. 
61
 Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic Case No ARB/03/9 Decision on Jurisdiction (2006) 
62
 Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic Case No ARB/03/9 Decision on Jurisdiction (2006), para 
67. 
63
 Suez Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (2006).  
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‘A legal dispute, in the ordinary meaning of the term, is a disagreement about legal rights or 
obligations …In the present case, the claimant clearly base their case on legal rights which they 
allege have been granted to them under the BITs that Argentina has concluded with France and 
Spain. In their written pleadings and oral arguments, the Claimants have consistently presented 
their case in legal terms…the dispute as presented by the Claimant is legal in nature.’64 
 
In addition to the above stated requirements, it has been held that the dispute needs to arise from 
lawful and bona fide activities. In Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L v Republic of El Salvador it was 
observed that the investor will be able to rely on ICSID protection only if the transaction creating 
their rights is legal.
65
 Where the transactions surrounding the claim are illegal, the investor will 
not be able to institute his claim at ICSID. The same position was taken in World Duty Free v 
Kenya.
66
 Declining jurisdiction, the Tribunal held that claims based on corrupt conducts cannot 
be upheld by ICSID tribunals as that would be going contrary to international public policy.
67
 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the meaning of a legal dispute has not generated as many 
controversy as other ICSID jurisdictional requirements. The tribunals have been in agreement 
that the legal nature of a dispute is determined by the way the claimant asserts their claim. If the 
claimant asserts violation of the legal rights, bases the claims on legal argument, and is seeking 
legal remedies, then the ICSID tribunal would have jurisdiction on the matter. 
 
                                                          
64
 Suez Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (2006), paras 34 and 37. 
65
 Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L v Republic of El Salvador ICSID Case No. ARB 03/26 (2006) 
66
 World Duty Free Co Ltd. V The Republic of Kenya ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 (2006). 
67
 World Duty Free Co Ltd. V The Republic of Kenya ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 (2006). 
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3.2.2.4 Arising directly out of an investment 
 
The last ICSID jurisdictional requirement is that the dispute must have arisen directly from 
investment.
68
 The Convention does not define what an ‘investment’ is. It is submitted that the 
omission was intentional so as to allow parties to dictate the scope of their intended investment 
venture.
69
 However, many BITs define what amounts to ‘investment’ followed by a non-
exhaustive list of categories of covered investments.
70
  
 
In the course of adjudicating investment disputes, ICSID tribunals have tried to define the term 
investment as they see fit. At times the definitions given by these tribunals have been 
controversial and tend to contradict each other.
71
 The most cited definition was given in Salini v 
The Kingdom of Morocco.
72
 The Tribunal, denying the Moroccan submission that the transaction 
was not an investment and did not meet the requirement of Article 25, observed: 
 
                                                          
68
 See Article 25(1) (a) of the ICSID Convention; see also Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela ICSID Case No 
ARB/96/3 (1998). For more discussion on investment see Boddicker JM ‘Whose Dictionary Controls?: Recent 
Challenges to the Term Investment in ICSID Arbitration’ (2010) American University International Law Review 
1033 at 1045; see also Hiscock ME ‘The Emerging Legal Concept of Investment’ (2009) Penn State 
International Law Review 765 at 769; see also Mortenson JD ‘The Meaning of Investment: ICSID’s Travaux and the 
Domain of International Investment Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 257 at 261. 
69
 See Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 18
th
 March 
1965 available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partB-section01.htm accessed on 
18/06/2013, para 44; see also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Requirement 
Ratione Materiae (2003) UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.4 at 13 - 25 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add3_en.pdf  accessed on 07/07/2013 
70
 See for example Art 1 of the  Asian-African Consultative Committee: Model Bilateral Agreements on Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (1984) 23 ILM 237 at  242; See also article 1 of An Agreement between the Kingdom 
of Netherlands and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments of 31/07/2001 ( Hereinafter Tanzania – Netherlands BIT)  available at  
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/tanzania_netherlands.pdf. 
71
 See Gaillard E ‘Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment in ICSID Practice’ 
available at http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/2319107f-1ed6-4dc1-80a6-
16b4e6e24c29/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4f72560e-8704-4a9a-a0df-1f7ca98d8fdd/IA-2009-Identify-or-
define--Reflection-on-evolution-concept-of-investment-in-ICSID-pra.pdf accessed on 29/07/2013. 
72
 Salini Costruttori SpA v Kingdom of Morocco ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 (2001). 
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‘The doctrine generally considers that investment infers: contributions, certain duration of 
performance of the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction. In reading the 
Convention's Preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic development of the host 
State of the investment as an additional condition. In reality, these various elements may be 
interdependent. Thus, the risks of the transaction may depend on the contributions and the 
duration of performance of the contract. As a result, these various criteria should be assessed 
globally even if, for the sake of reasoning, the Tribunal considers them individually here.’73 
 
The Tribunal in this case opined that for a venture to be considered or qualify as investment, the 
following four criteria must be met: (1) there should be a contribution of money or other assets 
of economic value; (2) the venture should take a certain duration of time; (3) there should be an 
element of risk involved; and (4) it should contribute to the host state’s development.74 The 
Tribunal further stated that these factors are interdependent and should be assessed globally.
75
 
 
The same position was taken in Jan de Nul NV v Egypt
76
 where the Tribunal ruled that the Salini 
factors should be considered collectively as indicative of existence of investment.
77
 In another 
case, Mitchell v Congo,
78
 the Annulment Panel ruled that each of the Salini tests has to be 
established before a venture can be treated as investment. It therefore concluded that the law firm 
was not an investment envisaged under the ICSID Convention as it had not contributed to the 
economic development of the host state.
79
 The same position was upheld in Malaysian Historical 
                                                          
73
 Salini Costruttori SpA v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 (2001), para 52. 
74
 See also Schreuer C et al The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2009) at 122. 
75
 See Salini Costruttori SpA v Kingdom of Morocco ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 (2001) para 52. 
76
 Jan de Nul NV v Islamic Republic of Egypt ICSID Case ARB/04/13 (2006). 
77
 Jan de Nul NV v Islamic Republic of Egypt ICSID Case ARB/04/13(2006) para 91. 
78
 ICSID Case No. ARB 99/7 (2007) Decision on Annulment.  
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 See Mitchell v Congo, Decision on Annulment, para 39. 
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Salvors v Malaysia
80
 where the Tribunal ruled that ‘if any of the Salini factors are absent, the 
tribunal will hesitate and probably decline to make a finding of investment’.81 
 
Other tribunals, however, have disregarded the criteria set by Salini and have ruled that as long 
as the underlying consent to the arbitration recognises the activity as investment, the ICSID 
tribunal should not hesitate to exercise jurisdiction.
82
 Considering the Salini tests, the Tribunal in 
Biwater Gauff v Tanzania held as follows: 
 
‘In the Tribunals’ view, there is no basis for a rote, or overly strict, application of the five Salini 
criteria in every case. These criteria are not fixed or mandatory as a matter of law. They do not 
appear in the ICSID Convention. On the contrary, it is clear from the travaux préparatoires of the 
Convention that several attempts to incorporate a definition of 'investment' were made, but 
ultimately did not succeed. In the end, the term was left intentionally undefined, with the 
expectation (inter alia) that a definition could be the subject of agreement as between Contracting 
States.’83 
 
In another case, MCI v Ecuador,
84
 responding to Ecuador’s submission that the transaction did 
not meet the criteria set by Salini, the Tribunal observed that the Salini tests should be 
considered as mere examples and not as mandatory elements.85 
 
                                                          
80
 Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia ICSID Case No ARB/05/10 (2007) Award on Jurisdiction. 
81
 Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia, para 106(e). 
82
 See CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic Annulment Committee (2007) para 71 – 72; see 
also Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (2008) where the 
Tribunal ruled that Salini tests can be dispensed with and they are not binding upon other tribunals. 
83
 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, 
84
 MCI Power Group, LCand New Turbine, Incv Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award, 31 July 2007. 
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In a most recent case, Abaclat et al v. Argentina,
86
  the issue was whether the claimants’ 
purchase of security entitlements in Argentinean bonds constituted a contribution to the host 
state which qualifies as investment under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. The majority 
refused to follow the Salini tests and held: 
 
‘Considering that these criteria were never included in the ICSID Convention, while being 
controversial and having been applied by tribunals in varying manners and degrees, the tribunal 
does not see any merit in following and copying the Salini criteria. The Salini criteria may be 
useful to further describe what characteristics contributions may or should have. They should, 
however, not serve to create a limit, which [neither] the Convention itself nor the Contracting 
Parties to a specific BIT intended to create.’87 
 
However, one dissenting arbitrator stated that ‘a contribution to the host State’s economic 
development forms part of the “hard core” of the ICSID Article 25 investment definition’.88 
 
Therefore, to date there are two conflicting positions with regard to what constitute investment as 
per the ICSID Convention. The Salini tests have received recognition from numerous tribunals 
while at the same time, the opposing view has also been approved by a number of tribunals. At 
times tribunals have arrived at contradictory conclusions on the meaning of the term 
‘investment’ when interpreting the same BIT.89 As discussed above, in Mitchell v Congo, the 
Tribunal held that a law firm was an investment in accordance with the US – Congo BIT while 
                                                          
86
 Giovanna a Beccara and Others v Argentine Republic, (also known as Abaclat et al v. Argentina), ICSID Case 
No.ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 4 August 2011 
87
 Abaclat et al v Argentina para 364. 
88
 Abaclat et al v. Argentina, Dissenting Opinion, paras. 47-51. 
89
 See Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Award, November 30, 2004, 20 ICSID Rev. 587 
(2005); but also see Mitchell v Congo ICSID Case No ARB 99/7 (2007) Decision on Annulment. 
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the Annulment Committee held that a law firm established by a US national in Congo does not 
qualify to receive protection as an investment.
90
 
 
In conclusion it can be said that the ICSID Tribunal will only exercise jurisdiction in a dispute 
which has met the jurisdictional requirements of Article 25.
91
 As evidenced above, the tribunals 
have produced contradictory interpretations on the jurisdictional requirements. The contradictory 
decisions stand in parallel and are all considered valid. There is no doctrine of precedent and no 
higher court in a hierarchy to state the true position of the law. This is one of the issues which 
bring about the legitimacy concerns of the system as a whole. Chapter five of this work deals 
with the possible solutions for addressing these concerns.  Following hereunder is a discussion of 
the ICSID dispute settlement mechanisms.  
 
3.2.3 Dispute settlement mechanisms at the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes  
 
The ICSID system provides for two alternate mechanisms for settlement of investor – state 
disputes.
92
 The dispute can be settled by way of conciliation or arbitration.
93
 The convention 
leaves the parties with the choice of the mechanism they wish to employ in settling their 
                                                          
90
 See Mitchell v Congo, Decision on Annulment, para 39. 
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 Investment disputes which fail to meet the requirements of Article 25 are meant to be settled through the 
Additional Facility Rules. The discussion on Additional Facility follows immediately hereafter. 
92
 See Article 1(2) of the ICSID Convention. 
93
 Articles 28 – 35 of the ICSID Convention provides for conciliation proceedings while Article 36 – 55 provide for 
arbitration proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
disputes. Therefore, it is for the parties filing the claim to indicate the mechanism preferred.
94
 
The choice must be made at the time of filing the claim at the ICSID. In SPP v Egypt, it was held 
that it is the duty of the parties to indicate the mechanism they prefer between the two 
alternatives.95 
 
3.2.3.1 Conciliation mechanism 
 
Conciliation is an informal way of resolving disputes by involving a third party who suggest a 
solution for the dispute. The suggestion by the third party/ conciliator is not binding on the 
parties unless the parties mutually agree to the solution suggested.
96
 A party seeking conciliation 
is required to address the request for conciliation to the Secretary General of the ICSID who shall 
be required to register it, unless it falls short of the jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID.
97
 
Article 33 provides for the establishment of ICSID conciliation rules. Currently the rules in place 
are the Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings 
(Institutional Rules) and the Rules of Procedure for Conciliation Proceedings (Conciliation 
Rules) as amended in 2006. 
 
Conciliation is rarely used in investment disputes. For the past 20 years only seven cases have 
been resolved through conciliation.
98
 This is due to the fact that the mechanism lacks mandatory 
                                                          
94
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  Dispute Settlement - International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes: selecting the Appropriate Forum 2003 UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.1 at 13. 
95
 SPP v. Egypt, 3 ICSID Reports 156 (1988) (Decision on Jurisdiction II). 
96
 See Article 34(1) of the Convention. 
97
 See Article 28 of the Convention. 
98
 Between 1982 and 2011 see the Background Information on the ICSID, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&icsidOve
rview=true&language=English accessed on 11/07/2013. 
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force and is mostly considered as informal.
99
 The conciliation process will not be discussed 
further as it lies outside the scope of this research.  
3.2.3.2 Arbitration mechanism  
 
Arbitration has been the cornerstone of ICSID system and for the past two decades it has been 
the most utilised dispute settlement system.
100
 Before the institution of arbitration proceedings at 
ICSID, some BITs required the investor to exhaust the local remedies, which includes submitting 
a notice of dispute to the sovereign and complying with the applicable waiting period stipulated 
in the BIT.
101
 These two processes allow the parties an opportunity to resolve the dispute 
amicably by way of negotiation. 
Where negotiations fail, the investor is at liberty to institute arbitration proceedings with ICSID 
as articulated in the investment treaty. The procedure for adjudicating the dispute is provided in 
the Rules of Procedure for Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings of the ICSID 
and the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (hereinafter the Rules).
102
 In the 
                                                          
99
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Dispute Settlement - International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes: selecting the Appropriate Forum 2003 UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.1 at 13. 
100
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101
 See An Agreement between the Government of UK and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United 
Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investment of  07/01/1994,  ( Hereinafter Tanzania – UK 
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Investment and Trade 231 at 232. 
102
 ICSID Rules. For a detailed discussion on ICSID arbitration process see Jagusch S & Sullivan J ‘A Comparison 
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following part of this chapter a discussion on the steps involved in dispute adjudication is 
undertaken. 
3.2.3.2.1 Steps involved in dispute settlement 
 
Whenever an investor is aggrieved by the actor omission of the host state and wishes to bring an 
arbitration claim against such act or omission, Article 36 of the Convention requires the investor 
to submit a request for arbitration to the Secretary General of the ICSID.
103
 The request must 
state the issues in dispute, identify the parties and indicate their consent to ICSID arbitration.
104
 
The Rules requires the request to be drawn up in an official language of the Centre, dated and 
signed by the party requesting arbitration.
105
 
 
Upon receipt of the request, the Secretary General is required to register the request and the 
proceedings will be considered instituted upon such registration. However, where the Secretary 
General is of the opinion that the request does not fall within the ICSID jurisdiction, he has the 
power to reject such request and notify the parties accordingly.
106
  
 
The second step is the constitution of the tribunal. Article 37(1) of the Convention, when read 
together with the Rules, requires the constitution of the tribunal to be done as soon as possible.
107
 
Rule 2(1) empowers the parties to suggest the number of arbitrators to preside over their dispute. 
Where there is no such agreement, the requesting party, within 10 days after registration of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.goldreserveinc.com/documents/ICSID%20arbitration%20%20How%20long%20does%20it%20take.pdf  
accessed on 20/09/2013. 
103
 See Article 36(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
104
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105
 See the Institution Rules r.1 (1). 
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 See Article 36(3) of the ICSID Convention; see also Rule 6(1) (b) of the Institution Rules. 
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request, will be required to communicate to the other party his proposal on the number of 
arbitrators and the method to be employed in appointing arbitrators.
108
 The other party, after 
receiving the proposal, will be required to respond to such proposal within 20 days indicating his 
agreement or making amendment to the proposal.
109
  The requesting party is given another 20 
days to scrutinise the proposal from the other party and make a decision whether to accept or 
reject that proposal.
110
  Upon agreement the parties will be required to notify the Secretary 
General. 
  
Where the parties fail to agree on the appointment of the arbitrators, either party will be required 
to notify the Secretary General about the failure, after which the tribunal shall be constituted in 
accordance with Article 37(2) (b). Article 37(2) (1) (b) covers situations where the parties are 
unable to agree on the number of arbitrators and the method of their appointment. The provision 
empowers each party to appoint one arbitrator while the third arbitrator (Chairperson) is to be 
appointed by the agreement of the parties.
111
 Either party will be required to name two persons: 
one name proposed for the post of arbitrator and the other name for the post of the President of 
the Tribunal. The other party shall have to indicate his acceptance to the proposed name for the 
post of the President of the Tribunal or suggest another name. Upon agreement the parties shall 
communicate such development to the Secretary General.
112
  
 
In situations where the parties fails to agree on the appointment of the President of the Tribunal 
or any other arbitrators, either party may request the Chairman of the Administrative Council to 
                                                          
108
 See Rule 2(1) (a) of the Arbitration Rules. 
109
 See Rule 2(1) (b) of the Arbitration Rules. 
110
 See Rule 2(1) (c) of the Arbitration Rules. 
111
 See Article 37(2) (b) of the Arbitration Rules. 
112
 See Rule 3 (1) (a) – (c) of the Arbitration Rules. 
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appoint the remaining number of arbitrators. This request may be lodged within 90 days after the 
registration of the dispute.
113
 The chairman shall have 30 days to make the appointment. 
Upon the arbitrators’ acceptance to the appointment, the Secretary General will be required to 
notify the parties of such development and the tribunal shall be considered constituted.
114
 
 
Article 39 of the Convention requires the majority of the arbitrators to have nationalities different 
to those of the parties to a dispute. This provision aims at ensuring that the Tribunal is 
constituted with neutral arbitrators.
115
 
 
After the tribunal is dully constituted, the next step is for the tribunal to convene for the purposes 
of adjudicating the dispute. The Rules requires the tribunal to hold its first session within 60 days 
of its appointment.
116
 The meetings of the tribunal are supposed to be held at the seat of the 
Centre or any other place chosen by the parties to the dispute.
117
  
 
Once the matter has been determined by the ICSID tribunal and the parties are satisfied with the 
process, the next step is for the award to be filed in the court of the country where the 
enforcement is to be sought. The ICSID awards enjoy global recognition and they are enforced 
as national court judgments save for procedural challenges which may allow annulment.
118
 This 
enforceability and finality provision gives the ICSID award the edge that investors lacked in 
                                                          
113
 See Rule 4(1) of the Arbitration Rules. 
114
 See Rule 6 (1) of the Arbitration Rules.  
115
 Alvarez GM ‘The ICSID Procedure: Mind the Gap’ (2011) 10 e – Mercatoria 171 available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987236 accessed on 23/06/2013. 
116
 See Rule 13(1) of the Arbitration Rules. 
117
 See Rule 13(3) of the Arbitration Rules.  
118
 See Art 52(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
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other dispute settlement mechanisms.
119
 One can say that the ICSID award is universal except 
that the decree holder cannot enforce it where the host state successfully pleads immunity under 
any law in force.
120
 The court of the place where enforcement is sought has an obligation to 
recognise and enforce the award. The court has no mandate to scrutinise the award but must 
enforce it.
121
 Failure by a state party to honour and enforce the award revives diplomatic 
protection as provided under Article 27(1) of the Convention.
122
 
In cases where either party is not satisfied with the award, there are four remedies available to 
such a party. The first remedy is to apply for supplementation and rectification.
123
 This remedy 
empowers the tribunal to correct minor omissions and technical mistakes only. The second 
remedy is for a party to seek interpretation of the award if there is any ambiguity regarding its 
meaning.
124
 The objective of this remedy is to clear up any misunderstanding on the meaning of 
the award.
125
 The third remedy is to request a revision of the award where there are new decisive 
facts which were unknown to the tribunal at the time of making its decision.
126
 For this remedy 
to be granted, the discovered facts must be relevant and capable of changing the decision. 
  
                                                          
119
 Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 
The European Journal of International Law 121 – 150 at 135; see also Reinisch A ‘The proliferation of international 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The threat of fragmentation vs. The promise of more effective system? Some 
reflections from the perspective of investment arbitration’ in Buffard E et al (eds.) International Law Between 
Universalism and Fragmentation (2008) at 112; see also Jagusch S & Sullivan J ‘A Comparison of ICSID and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and Concern’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) The Backlash against 
Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 79 – 110 at 99. 
120
 See Art. 54 of the ICSID Convention 
121
 See Article 54 of the Convention; see also Reed L et al Guide to ICSID Arbitration (2006) at 13.   
122
 Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 
The European Journal of International Law 121 – 150 at 125. 
123
 See Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention. 
124
 See Art 50(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
125
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Post Award Remedies and Procedures, 
Course on Dispute Settlement in International Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property, available on 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add7_en.pdf  accessed on 23/07/2013. 
126
 See Art 51(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
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The fourth and major remedy is annulment of the award. This remedy is granted only where the 
party can prove either of the following: (1) that the tribunal was not properly constituted; or (2) 
the arbitral tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers; or (3) a tribunal member was corrupt; or (4) 
there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (5) the award does not 
state the reasons upon which it was based.
127
 These are the only grounds upon which an 
annulment of the award can be sought. The dissatisfied party has 120 days after the award was 
rendered, to seek an annulment.
128
 The party is required to submit the request to the Secretary 
General of the Centre. Upon receipt of the request the chairman of the Administrative Council 
will be required to appoint an ad hoc committee constituting of three members from the panel of 
arbitrators.
129
 
 
The annulment remedy is one of the unique features of the ICSID arbitration system. Proponents 
argue that this process is advantageous as it helps to encourage arbitrators to arrive at well-
reasoned awards.
130
 It is further argued in favour that the newly constituted ad hoc annulment 
committee is better placed to reach an error free decision as it consist new members. 
Furthermore, defenders of this process, argue that the process ensures justice to the parties as the 
ad hoc committee is bound to follow the pre - set grounds of annulments.
131
 
 
The ad hoc committee has the mandate to produce three possible outcomes. It can (1) refuse the 
annulment application, or (2) annul the outcome partially, or lastly (3) annul the award totally. 
                                                          
127
 See Art 52(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
128
 See Article 52(2) of the Convention. 
129
 See Article 52(3) of the Convention. 
130
 Caron DD et al ‘Birth of an ICSID Case- Act I, Scene I’ (2008) 24/1 available at 
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/document.aspx?id=ipn28345  accessed on 7 /07/2013   
131
  Caron DD et al ‘Birth of an ICSID Case- Act I, Scene I’ (2008) 24/1 available at 
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/document.aspx?id=ipn28345  accessed on 7 /07/2013   
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Where the award is annulled totally, a new tribunal will be constituted to rehear the case 
afresh.
132
 
 
3.2.3.2.2 Confidentiality of the proceedings 
 
It is a fact that ICSID arbitration has inherited a lot of principles from private international 
commercial arbitration. The latter has impacted on the ICSID arbitration process in many 
ways.
133
 One such impact is confidentiality of the proceedings.
134
 Article 48(5) of the 
Convention forbids publication of the award without consent of the parties. With regard to 
deliberations, the tribunal is required to deliberate in private and the members are required to 
keep the deliberations confidential.
135
  
 
The restriction applies to the Centre and the arbitrators involved in the proceedings. Furthermore, 
Rule 6(2) requires arbitrators to sign a confidentiality agreement.
136
 In addition, Rule 22(2) of the 
Administrative and Financial Regulations restrict the publication of the minutes, award and other 
records unless both parties agree otherwise.
137
 However, the Centre can publish general 
information regarding its operation.
138
  
 
                                                          
132
 See Article 52(6) of the Convention. 
133
 See Van Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 54; see also Van Harten G & 
Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) The European 
Journal of International Law 121 – 150 at 125.  
134
 Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 at 1544. 
135
 See Rule 15 of the Arbitration Rules. 
136
 See Rule 6(2) of the Arbitration Rules, 2006. 
137
 See Rule 22(2) of the Administrative and Financial Regulations of the ICSID, 2006. 
138
 See Rule 22(1) of the Administrative and Financial Regulations of the ICSID, 2006. 
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The Rules, as amended in 2006, also allow the publication of excerpts of the legal reasoning of 
the tribunal.
139
 The amendment also allows submissions from non – disputing parties.140 The 
Rule, however, still maintain confidentiality of the hearing. The non – disputing party and any 
other third party cannot attend the hearing where either party objects.
141
 
 
3.2.3.2.3 The applicable law 
 
The ICSID Convention only provides for the procedural framework for the settlement of 
investment disputes involving the host state and nationals of other contracting state.
142
 As a 
result, there is no single provision in the Convention which provides for the substantive rules to 
be applied in an investment dispute. Article 42(1) of the Convention, however, provides for the 
guidance to be employed by the tribunal in ascertaining the applicable substantive law. The 
Article refers the tribunal to the parties’ agreement. Where there is no such agreement the 
tribunal is required to apply the law of the contracting state and the rules of international law.  
The Article was designed to give the parties to the dispute autonomy over their dispute.
143
 It is 
open to the parties to agree on the substantive law to be applied in settling their dispute. The 
parties’ autonomy is limited to the choice of substantive law as the procedural law is already 
                                                          
139
 See Rule 48(4) of the Arbitration Rules and Article 48(5) of the Convention. 
140
 See Rule 37(2) of the Arbitration Rules. 
141
 See Rule 37(2) of the Rules; see also Jagusch S & Sullivan J ‘A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL 
Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and Concern’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) The Backlash against Investment 
Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 79 – 110 at 94. 
142
 Schreuer C ‘International and Domestic Law in Investment Disputes: The Case of ICSID’ (1996) Austrian 
Review of International & European Law 89. 
143
 Shihata I& Para A ‘Applicable Substantive Law in Disputes Between States and Private Foreign Parties: The 
Case of Arbitration under the ICSID Convention’ (1994) 9 ICSID Rev- Foreign Investment Law Journal at 188; see 
also Gaillard E & Bonifatemi Y ‘The Meaning of "and" in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of the Washington 
Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process’(2003) ICSID Review Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 375 at 375; see also Schreuer C ‘International and Domestic Law in Investment Disputes: 
The Case of ICSID’(1996) Austrian Review of  International & European  Law 89 at 90; see also Leeks A ‘The 
Relationship between Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Wider Corpus of International Law: The 
ICSID Approach’(2007) University of Toronto Faculty of  Law Review 1 at 10. 
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provided for in the ICSID Convention and the Arbitration Rules. In the absence of parties’ 
choice, the tribunal will be required to ascertain the applicable law at its first meeting.
144
  
 
Despite the clarity of Article 42 of the ICSID Convention, tribunals have produced different 
interpretations regarding the applicability of host state law and international law. Some tribunals 
have concluded that international law principles supplement the host state law and are only 
meant to apply when there is a gap in the host state law or where there is inconsistency between 
international law and the host state law.
145
 In Amco v Indonesia,
146
 the Tribunal ruled that: 
 
‘…the second sentence of Article 42(1) authorizes an ICSID tribunal to apply rules of 
international law only to fill up lacunae in the applicable domestic law and to ensure precedence 
to international law norms where the rules of the applicable domestic law are in collision with 
such norms.’147 
 
However, in newer cases, tribunals have rejected the notion that international law is 
supplemental to the host state law. The Tribunal in Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic held that: 
 
                                                          
144
 Schreuer C ‘International and Domestic Law in Investment Disputes: The Case of ICSID’ (1996) Austrian 
Review of International & European Law 89 at 90. 
145
 Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ad hoc committee decision of May 16, 1986, 1 ICSID Rep. 509 at 515 
(1993); see also Kloeckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon, ad hoc committee decision of 
May 3, 1985, 2 ICSID Rep. 95 at 122 (1994) see also Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of  Indonesia, award of May 31, 
1990, 1 ICSID Rep. 569, 580 (1993) and  Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, award of Mar. 31, 
1986, 2 ICSID Rep. 343 at 358-59 (1994). 
146
 Award 20 November 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 452. 
147
 See Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ad hoc committee decision of May 16, 1986, 1 ICSID Rep. 509 at 
515 
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‘the Tribunal’s inquiry is governed by the [ICSID] Convention, by the [BIT] and by applicable 
international law. Argentina’s domestic law constitutes evidence of the measures taken by 
Argentina and of Argentina’s conduct in relation to its commitments under the [BIT].’148 
 
Similarly, other tribunals have taken a more extreme stance against the host state law by 
declaring that a dispute under a BIT has to be decided in accordance with international law 
principles without any regard to the host state law. The MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v. Republic of 
Chile
149
 and Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic
150
 Tribunals are some of them. The Azurix Corp. 
v. Argentine Republic Tribunal held that: 
 
‘the Tribunal’s inquiry is governed by the ICSID Convention, by the BIT and by applicable 
international law, with the law of Argentina being “an element of the inquiry,” though no more 
than that because of the treaty nature of the claims under consideration.’151 
 
However, other tribunals have maintained the relevancy of both host state law and international 
law. In AIG Capital Partners Inc. v. Republic of Kazakhstan,
152
 the Tribunal insisted on the 
relevancy of both sets of laws. It maintained that the host state law was the applicable one but 
needed to be read with and controlled by the provisions of the relevant BIT.
153
 A clearer position 
on the relationship between domestic law and international law was pronounced in CMS Gas 
                                                          
148
 Siemens AG v Argentine Republic, award of Feb. 6, 2007 para 78, available at 
www.investmentclaims.com/oal.htm/ accessed on 27/07/2013. 
149
 MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v Republic of Chile, award of May 25, 2004 12 ICSID Rep. 6 (2007). 
150
 Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, award of July 14, 2006, www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm 
accessed on 23/07/2013. 
151
 See Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, para 67. 
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 AIG Capital Partners Inc. v Republic of Kazakhstan, award of Oct. 7, 2003 11 ICSID Rep. 7 (2007). 
153
 See AIG Capital Partners Inc. v Republic of Kazakhstan at para 10.1.4. 
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Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic
154
 where the Tribunal stated that both laws are equally 
applicable.
155
 The Tribunal stated further that the BIT, the customary international law and the 
host state law are all to be applied, each to its justifiable extent.
156
 
 
Conclusively it can be said that there are conflicting positions regarding the applicable law in 
investor – state disputes, especially when the parties have not indicated their preference.  As 
discussed above, in some instances the tribunals apply both host state law and international law 
while in others tribunals rejected the application of host state law. It is as yet unclear whether 
international law is meant to fill the lacunae in the host state law or has to be applied in 
replacement of host state law as some tribunals have suggested. It seems that these conflicting 
positions are to remain as there is no higher court in a hierarchy to resolve the issue. It is 
submitted here that where the dispute emanates from a contractual arrangement the host state law 
should be applied as the main law to the dispute. However, where the dispute emanates from a 
BIT, international law principles should override the host state law. 
 
3.2.3.3 Advantages of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes  
               arbitration system 
 
One of the major advantages of the ICSID arbitration system is that it provides a self - contained 
neutral forum for settling investment disputes. The parties are not subjected to a host state’s 
                                                          
154
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8 of 20
th
 April 2005 final award 
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0184.pdf accessed on 23/07/2013. 
155
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adjudication machinery and bureaucracy.
157
 The ICSID arbitration relieves the foreign investor 
from using the cumbersome route of asking the home state to espouse a claim on his behalf.
158
 
On the host state side, the ICSID system guarantees more foreign investment because the system 
itself is considered to be ‘an improved investment climate’.159 In addition, the host state by 
ratifying the Convention shields itself from diplomatic protection by the home state of the 
foreign investor.
160
  
 
The second advantage of ICSID arbitration is that it is international in character and enjoys 
worldwide recognition with over 150 member states all over the world and nearly 56 new cases 
registered annually.
161
 In addition to the wide range of member states, the ICSID arbitration 
takes place in accordance with international rules which are independent of the control and 
bureaucracy of the host state.
162
  
 
 The third advantage is that ICSID arbitration provides the necessary facilities required for the 
arbitration process. The venue and other necessary tools are arranged by the Centre and paid for 
by the Centre. Article 63 and Rule 13(3) of the Arbitration rules provides that the tribunal shall 
meet at the seat of the Centre or any other place chosen by the parties. 
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 See Article 54 of the ICSID Convention. 
158
 Myjer EPJ ‘ICSID and the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Poland’ (1989) 18 Polish Year Book of 
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 See Article 27 of the Convention. 
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Another advantage is that the ICSID procedural framework which has already been tested in a 
number of cases makes the administration of the dispute easier and keeps it within the agreed 
timeframe. The President of the tribunal is empowered by Rule 26 to set a timeframe within 
which the dispute can be resolved. In addition, the Centre keeps a list of potential arbitrators. The 
parties, therefore, are in a good position to choose from the available list or suggest other names 
to adjudicate on their dispute.
163
 This means that a dispute at the Centre cannot be stalled on the 
ground of lack of potential suitable arbitrators. Where the parties are unable to agree on the 
appointment of arbitrators, the chairman of the ICSID Council is empowered to appoint the 
remaining number of arbitrators on behalf of the parties.
164
 This is important as investment 
disputes need to be sorted timeously as they involve huge economic interests. 
 
The last advantage relate to the recognition and enforcement of the award. The Convention 
requires the state parties to recognise ICSID awards and enforce them as if they were final 
judgements of their own court. This gives the ICSID award an edge over those of other dispute 
settlement systems.
165
 In other systems, the awards are subjected to the New York Convention it 
terms of which the dissatisfied party can invoke Article V (2) that empowers the state to deny 
recognition to the award if the recognition would be contrary to public policy of the state in 
question.
166
 This cannot happen with ICSID awards as the Convention states clearly that the 
place of arbitration shall not have any impact on the award or the proceedings. The only possible 
remedies are the internal ones stipulated under Articles 49 – 52 of the Convention.167 
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 See Article 38 of the Convention. 
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 See Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ 
(2006) European Journal of International Law 121 at 134. 
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3.2.3.4 Disadvantages of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes  
               arbitration system. 
 
One of the main critiques of the ICSID arbitration is that the proceedings take a long time before 
being put to rest.
168
 The process is referred as ‘an indisputably slow process, with many arbitrations 
taking 4-5 years or longer before a decision is delivered’.169 A lot of stakeholders have written on the 
length of the ICSID dispute settlement process.170 A recent study indicates that a dispute at the 
ICSID takes an average of 4-5 years.
171
 The table below shows a sample of ICSID cases resolved 
in 2012 and the time taken to resolve them. 
 
Case Date Commenced Date of Award Duration 
Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Turkey
172
  27/08/ 2008 16/07/ 2012 47 Months 
Bosh International, Inc. v. 
Ukraine
173
 
3/12/ 2007  25/10/ 2012 58 Months  
Daimler Financial Services AG v. 
Argentina
174
 
 2/08/ 2004 22/08/ 2012 97 Months 
EDF International S.A. v. 16/06/ 2003 11/06/2012 108 Months 
                                                          
168
 Raviv A ‘Achieving a Faster ICSID’ (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute Management available at 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2066  accessed on 26/03/2014. 
169
 Raviv A ‘Achieving a Faster ICSID’ (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute Management at 1. 
170
 See Parra AR The History of ICSID (2012) at 187; see also Kapoor VJ ‘Wearing Hats and Walking the Line: 
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626; see also Sinclair A et al ‘ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?’ (2009) Global Arbitration Review at 5. 
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Argentina
175
 
Antoine Goetz v. Burundi
176
 5/12/ 2000 21/06/ 2012 138 months 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. 
Ecuador
177
 
17/05/ 2006 5/10/ 2012 77 Months 
 SOURCE: ICSID: List of ICSID Cases 2013, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome
&pageName=-Cases_Home . 
 
It can be learnt from this graph that the ICSID system lacks a timeframe within which a dispute 
has to be disposed of. The time ranges from 47 months (almost 4 years) to 138 months (over 11 
years). This is a long time for a poor country to endure in as far as costs and time spent in 
litigation are concerned. 
 
Another critique is that the annulment process prolongs the dispute; hence defeating the very aim 
of arbitration, viz finality of a dispute.
178
 The annulment process takes up to six years before it is 
put to rest.
179
 Even worse, the parties are not limited to one annulment application; some cases 
                                                          
175
 ICSID Case No ARB/03/23. 
176
 ICSID Case No ARB/01/2. 
177
 ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11). 
178
 See Kalb J ‘Creating an ICSID Appellate Body’(2005) UCLA Journal International Law & Foreign Affairs 179 
at 192; see also Garcia C ‘All the other dirty little secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America and the necessary evil 
of investor state arbitration’(2004) 16 Florida  Journal of  International Law 301; see also Jagusch S & Sullivan J 
‘A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and Concern’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) 
The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 79 – 110; see also Sinclair A et al 
‘ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?’ Global Arbitration Review available at 
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accessed on 18/07/2013. 
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have gone through several annulment processes.
180
 The annulment process is prone to be used by 
an unscrupulous judgement debtor as a technique to lengthen the duration of the dispute 
settlement process. 
 
Another disadvantage is that the Convention and the Rules place a higher burden of proof on a 
party challenging the impartiality of the arbitrator when compared to other arbitration 
institutional rules. It is almost impossible for the challenging party to succeed in their 
application. Article 57 empowers either party to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator. A 
party can challenge the appointed arbitrator on the basis of any fact indicating a manifest lack of 
the qualities stipulated under Article 14(1).
181
 The demand for ‘manifest lack of quality’ puts the 
challenging party in a very difficult position as he needs to prove or provide a clear doubt about 
the appearance of impartiality against the respective arbitrator.
182
 Other institutional rules just 
require such a challenging party to raise justifiable doubts.
183
 The threshold is considered too 
high, to the extent that many challenges fail because the challenging party is normally unable to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
No. ARB/81/2 award rendered in 1983 and the last decision on Annulment was issued in 1990; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. 
Arab Republic of Egypt Case No. ARB/98/4 award rendered in 2000 and the final annulment order issued in 2005 
180
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181
 See Article 57 of the Convention. 
182
 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17) (2008) para. 29; see also Compana de Aguas del Aconquija & Vivendi Universal v. 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) (2001) para. 25; also see Sheppard A ‘Arbitrator Independence in 
ICSID Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of 
Christopher Schreuer (2009) 132 at 133 – 134; see also Bernasconi – Osterwalder N et al ‘Arbitrator Independence 
and Impartiality: Examining the dual role of arbitrator and counsel’ (2010) International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) at 12. 
183
 See Article 11 and 12 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010; see also Article 15 of the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce Arbitration Rules, 2010 available at 
http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/3/35894/K4_Skiljedomsregler%20eng%20ARB%20TRYCK_1_100927.pdf  
accessed on 12/08/2013; see also General Standard 2(a)& (c) of  the International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines 
on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration, available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#conflictsofinterest accessed 
on 12/08/2013. 
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provide facts which can meet the manifest lack of qualities requirement.
184
 It has been held that 
‘manifest lack of qualities’ requires more than mere speculation or inference of partiality and the 
relationship challenged must be more than trivial or de minimis.
185
 
 
With regards to impartiality of arbitrators there is no provision which imposes an obligation on 
the arbitrator to be impartial. Impartiality is one of the cornerstones of a just and fair adjudication 
process.
186
 It is argued here that the omission is fatal as a person who is capable of exercising 
independent judgement may not necessarily be impartial to a dispute in which he has an interest. 
Therefore there is a need to include, in addition to the requirement of independent judgement; the 
requirement of impartiality of arbitrators as stipulated in other arbitration rules.
187
 
 
Other general disadvantages which are found in both the ICSID and the UNCITRAL systems are 
discussed later under the subheading ‘General Weaknesses of the Current Investor – State 
                                                          
184
 For more insightful argument on this see also Sheppard A ‘ Arbitrator Independence in ICSID Arbitration’ in 
Binder C et al eds. International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christopher Schreuer  
(2009) 132 at 133 – 134; see also Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A commentary (2001) 1200 para 16; See also 
Bernasconi – Osterwalder N et al ‘Arbitrator Independence and Impartiality: Examining the dual role of arbitrator 
and counsel (2010) ’ International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) at 11.   
185
 See EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23 (2003) paras 132 – 133.    
186
 For a thorough discussion on this principle see Herling D& Lyon A The Briefcase on Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 4ed. (2004) at 149; see also Stott D& Felix A Principles of Administrative Law (1997) at 142; 
see also Barnet H Constitutional and Administrative Law 4ed. (2002) at 898; also see Alder J General Principles of 
Constitutional and Administrative Law 4ed.(2002) at 393; see also Hawke N & Parpworth N Introduction to 
Administrative Law (1998) at 165. 
187
 See Article 11 & 12 of the UNCITRAL Rules, 2010; see also Article 14(1) of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration Rules; see also General Standard 1 of the International Bar Association (IBA) Guidelines on 
Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration. For more discussion see also Sheppard A ‘ Arbitrator Independence 
in ICSID Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour 
of Christopher Schreuer  (2009) 132 at 135 – 136. 
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Arbitration System’.188 In the following section the Additional Facility dispute settlement 
process is discussed. 
3.3 The Additional Facility arbitration system 
 
The Additional Facility Rules were approved on 27 September 1978 at the 12
th
 meeting of the 
Administrative Council of ICSID.
189
 The Rules were created to address the request repeatedly 
submitted to the Centre by capital exporting states and foreign investors who were unable to use 
the service of the Centre for lack of jurisdictional requirements stipulated under Article 25 of 
ICSID.
190
 In particular, the ICSID Convention does not apply where one of the parties to the 
dispute is not a national of a member state of the ICSID Convention. It is in such situations that 
the Additional Facility Rules could be used.
191
 
 
Many BITs and Free Trade Agreements have included the use of the Additional Facility Rules in 
disputes which may arise with foreign investors. South Africa, for example, is not a member of 
the ICSID Convention hence its BITs provide for this option in case of an international 
arbitration between South Africa and nationals of other states. Article 9 (2) (a) of the South 
Africa and the Kingdom of Netherlands BIT and Article XIII (4) (b) of Canada – South Africa 
                                                          
188
  See sub heading 3.6 below. 
189
 Toriello P ‘The Additional Facility of the ICSID’ (1978) 4 Italian Yearbook of International Law 59 at 61. 
190
 Toriello P ‘The Additional Facility of the ICSID’ (1978) 4 Italian Yearbook of International Law 59 at 61; see 
also Schreuer C et al The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 2 nd.ed (2009) at 141 para 202 - 205. 
191
 The Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ICSID/11April 2006available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf  (hereinafter   ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules) (accessed on 21/06/2013). 
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BIT, respectively, provides for Additional Facility arbitration as an option available to the 
parties.
192
 
The Additional Facility cases constitute almost 8% of all cases filed at the ICSID Centre. Out of 
514 cases filed at the Centre by the end of 2013, 41 cases were filed under the Additional 
Facility Rules.
193
 In the year 2012, Additional Facility cases constituted 12% of all investor – 
state disputes, which in turn constituted 18% of all cases filed at the ICSID Centre.
194
 
 
The Rules are often used by foreign investors and State parties to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).
195
 The NAFTA consists of the US, Canada and Mexico. Among the three 
member states, it is only the US which has ratified the ICSID Convention.
196
 Therefore, 
whenever there is a dispute between either of them, the ICSID Convention cannot apply as it 
requires membership of both parties involved in a dispute. Due to that limitation, disputes 
involving the US or a US investor and Canada or Mexico can only be settled through the 
                                                          
192
 South Africa – Netherland BIT the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments 
between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of the Netherlands of  09/05/1995 available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/southafrica_netherlands.pdf    ( hereinafter South Africa – Netherland 
BIT).; see also the BIT between South Africa and Canada available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_south africa.pdf  accessed on 16/08/2013.   
193
 See Background Information on ICSID – Number of Cases Registered under the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules by Calendar Year 1972 – 31st December 2012, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&icsidOve
rview=true&language=English accessed on 11/07/2013. 
194
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Latest Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, [2013] IIA Monitor, No. 1, at 1–2, U.N.Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2013/3 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf  accessed on 23/07/2013. 
195
 The NAFTA (1993) 32 ILM 289, full text available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/nafta.pdf  
accessed on 12/06/2013. 
196
 Canada signed the Convention on 15
th
 December 2006 but it has not ratified it. 
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Additional Facility Rules or UNCITRAL Rules.
197
 Article 1120 of the NAFTA provides for 
Additional Facility as one of the options available to the parties.
198
  
 
By December 2012, NAFTA provided 4% of all disputes registered at the ICSID Centre.
199
 This 
indicates that the three member states have been effectively utilising the Additional Facility 
Rules.  
 
Apart from NAFTA, the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Community and other 
European countries provides for an option of resolving disputes through the Additional Facility 
avenue.
200
 Article 26 provides for ICSID arbitration and Additional Facility arbitration as options 
available to the parties to the Charter as long as the dispute meets the minimum requirement set 
by the respective rules.
201
 In terms of percentage, the Energy Charter, just like NAFTA, provided 
4% of all disputes filed at ICSID by the end of 2012.
202
 In the following section, the Additional 
Facility dispute settlement system is discussed. 
 
                                                          
197
 See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M. 36 
(2000); see also Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB (AF) /97/2, 39 I.L.M. 537 
(1999). 
198
 The Article provides that the rules shall apply where either the investor’s home state is a party to the ICSID 
Convention or the Respondent state. 
199
 See Background Information on ICSID – Basis of Consent Invoked to Establish ICSID Jurisdiction as of 31st 
December 2012, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&icsidOve
rview=true&language=English accessed on 11/07/2013. 
200
 The European Energy Charter available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf 
accessed on 15/07/2013. 
201
 See the European Energy Charter Article 26(4)(a). 
202
 See Background Information on ICSID – Basis of Consent Invoked to Establish ICSID Jurisdiction as of 31st 
December 2012, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&icsidOve
rview=true&language=English accessed on 11/07/2013. 
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3.3.1 The jurisdictional requirement under the Additional Facility Rules 
 
As pointed out earlier,
203
 the Additional Facility Rules were formulated as a potential fall back 
where the ICSID Convention could not apply.
204
 The Additional Facility proceedings are 
administered by the ICSID Centre by virtue of Article 2 of the Additional Facility Rules which 
authorises the secretariat of the Centre to administer the Additional Facility disputes. The 
categories of dispute which can be settled at the Centre under the Rules include investment 
disputes to which the Convention does not apply and fact finding proceedings.
205
 
 
It follows therefore that, apart from the investment dispute to which one party is not a member 
state of the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules can be used to resolve investment 
disputes which have not arisen directly out of investment.
206
 Article 4(3) requires the Secretary 
General, before registering the dispute, to be satisfied that the dispute is distinct from a normal 
commercial transaction.
207
 The Administrative Council has described transactions that are 
distinct from ordinary commercial transactions as: 
 
‘Economic transactions which (a) may or may not, depending on their terms, be regarded by the 
parties as investment for the purposes of the Convention, which (b) involve a long – term 
relationship or the commitment of substantial resources on the part of either party, and which (c) 
                                                          
203
 See subheading 3.3 above 
204
 Gantz DA ‘Investor-State Arbitration Under ICSID,  the ICSID Additional Facility and the UNCITRAL Arbitral 
Rules’ US – Vietnam Trade Council Education Forum, available at 
http://www.usvtc.org/trade/other/Gantz/Gantz_ICSID.pdf accessed on 15/07/2012. 
205
 See Article 2(a) – (c) of the Additional Facility Rules. 
206
 Schreuer C et al The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 2 nd.ed (2009) at 141 para 202 - 205. 
207
 Schreuer C et al The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 2 nd.ed (2009) at 141 para 202 - 205. 
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are of special importance to the economy of the state party. Examples of such transactions may be 
found in various forms of industrial cooperation agreements and major civil works contracts.’208 
 
On the basis of the above paragraph it can be said that, for a tribunal to exercise jurisdiction, in a 
situation where it is not clear that there is an investment dispute, the parties’ economic 
relationship must be a long – term one and the transaction must have special importance for the 
state party to the dispute. Therefore the paragraph provides for the features which an ordinary 
commercial transaction will not bear. In other words, the Secretary General will be guided by 
these features to decide whether the transaction qualifies for Additional Facility arbitration or 
not. 
 
3.3.2 Conduct of the arbitration proceedings 
 
Article 19 of the Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules,
209
 requires arbitral proceedings to be 
held in States that are parties to the 1958 UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention),
210
 so as to secure the effectiveness of such 
awards.  
 
                                                          
208
See the Administrative Council Report on Article 4 of Additional Facility Rules, ICSID Report at 220; see also 
Schreuer C et al The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 2nd ed. (2009) at 142 para 203. 
209
 See Schedule C to the Additional Facility Rules, 2006. 
210
 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), June 
10, 1958 Art. III 21 UST 2517, 330 UNTS 3 available at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ accessed on 
02/06/2013. 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
The procedure and steps to be taken regarding a request for arbitration, registration, constitution 
of the tribunal and working of the tribunal are more or less similar to the ICSID arbitration 
procedure above.
211
 Therefore this research will not go into details discussing them here again.  
 
The award rendered under the Rules is final and binding on the parties.
212
 The award is not 
subject to any internal review procedure comparable to annulment found under ICSID system.
213
 
The rule on confidentiality applies to the award unless the parties agree otherwise.
214
 The 
Secretary General is, however, authorised by Article 53(3) to publish excerpts of the legal 
reasoning of the tribunal. For purposes of ensuring smooth enforcement of the awards, the Rules 
require that the hearing must be held in states which are member states of the New York 
Convention, and subject the Additional Facility awards to the review mechanism available under 
the New York Convention.
215
  
 
 
 
                                                          
211
 See Article 1, 6, 13 to 18 of the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) of the ICSID 
Convention , available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid.htm  and Article  2, 13, 21 to 26 of the Arbitration 
(Additional Facility) Rules(Schedule C) of the Additional Facility Rules available 
athttp://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf  accessed on 02/06/2014 
212
 See Article 52(4) of the Additional Facility Rules, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf .   
213
 Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521; see also Tams C ‘An Appealing Option? The Debate 
about an ICSID Appellate Structure’ in C Tams et al (eds.) Essays on Transnational Economic Law1 (2006) at 10. 
214
 See Article 53(3) of the Additional Facility Rules. 
215
 See Article 19 of the Additional Facility Rules. 
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3.3.3 The applicable law 
 
Article 3 of the Additional Facility Rules clearly provides that the ICSID Convention is not 
applicable to Additional Facility disputes. It follows therefore, that the rules on applicable law 
stipulated by Article 42 of the Convention are of no use to the tribunal presiding over Additional 
Facility disputes. Instead, Article 54(1) of the Additional Facility Arbitration Rules is the guiding 
Article. The rule requires the tribunal to apply the rules of law designated by the parties. Where 
the parties made no choice, the tribunal is supposed to apply the conflict of laws rules to 
determine the applicable law. 
 
The conflict of law rules will normally lead to the application of the law of the place of 
arbitration. The Rules, however, require the dispute to be heard only in States which are parties 
to the New York Convention. Therefore the tribunal needs to take into account the requirement 
of Article 20 before choosing a place of arbitration. Article 20 further dictates that the award 
shall be made at the place of arbitration.
216
 It follows therefore that, in the absence of parties’ 
choice, the applicable law in Additional Facility dispute is the law of the place of arbitration and 
the rules of international law the tribunal will consider relevant.
217
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
216
 See Article 20(3) of the Additional Facility Rules. 
217
 See Article 54(1) of the Additional Facility Rules. 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
3.3.4 Recognition and enforcement of Additional Facility award 
 
The award rendered under the Additional Facility Rules can be challenged in the courts of the 
place of arbitration or where the enforcement is sought.
218
 The challenge, however, is limited to 
procedural grounds and not an erroneous interpretation of the law.
219
 Therefore, generally the 
award is final and binding upon the parties. In accordance with the New York Convention,
220
 the 
respondent can ask national courts to refuse recognition under the conditions set out in Article 
V.
221
 There are seven grounds on which the enforcement of a foreign award can be denied. The 
grounds are: (1) the agreement to arbitrate was not valid; (2) the losing party was not given an 
opportunity to defend his case;(3) the award has addressed issues which are beyond its mandate; 
(4) the procedure employed did not comply with the parties’ agreement; (5) the award has been 
set aside and is no longer binding; (6) the matter subject of the arbitration is not subject to 
arbitration according to the laws of the place of enforcement; and lastly (7) enforcement will be 
contrary to public policy.
222
 The last two grounds allow the national court to challenge the 
substance of the award.
223
 This means that the award rendered under the Rules can be challenged 
for failure to meet the requirements of the law of the place of arbitration and the place where the 
                                                          
218
 See Article 1 of the Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules; see also Myjer EPJ ‘ICSID and the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes in Poland’ (1989) 18 Polish Y B Int’l L 143 at 150; Tams C ‘An Appealing Option? The 
Debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure’ (2006) Essays on Transnational Economic Law1 at 11; see also Frank S 
D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521. 
219
 See for example section 33 of South Africa Arbitration Act, 1965 which allow the court to review the award on 
procedural grounds only. 
220
 The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, available at 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ accessed on 02/06/2014. 
221
 Tams C ‘An Appealing Option? The Debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure’ in C Tams et al (eds.) ) Essays 
on Transnational Economic Law (2006) at 11. 
222
 See Article V of the New York Convention, 1958. 
223
 See Article V (2) (b) of the New York Convention, 1958. 
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enforcement is sought.
224
 Therefore the New York Convention sets the limits within which an 
arbitral award can be challenged. The court at the place of enforcement cannot go beyond the 
stipulated limits. While the national court has a wider role in relation to the Additional Facility 
awards when compared to ICSID awards, the involvement is of insignificant effect as the court is 
not allowed to challenge the award on merit whenever it find fit, but has to act within the 
limitation set out by the New York Convention. 
 
3.3.5 Advantages of Additional Facility arbitration 
 
One of the advantages of AF is that it widens the room for foreign investors to sue the host state 
even where one of the states is not a party to the ICSID Convention. This means that in a world 
of 192 countries, of which 150 are member states of the ICSID Convention, the Additional 
Facility Rules is an important fall back for foreign investors to always find an avenue for suing 
host states which are not ICSID members.
225
 
 
Another advantage is that AF arbitrations are conducted and supervised by the Secretary General 
of the ICSID; hence parties benefits from the experience and institutional framework of the 
ICSID system.
226
 
 
                                                          
224
 Tams C ‘An Appealing Option? The Debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure’ (2006) Essays on 
Transnational Economic Law1 at 11. 
225
 ICSID Member states List available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=Mem
berStates_Home  accessed on 02/06/2014. 
226
 See Article 9 of the Additional Facility Rules; also see Gantz DA ‘Investor-State Arbitration Under ICSID, the 
ICSID Additional Facility and the UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules.’ Available at 
http://www.usvtc.org/trade/other/Gantz/Gantz_ICSID.pdf accessed on 02/06/2014. 
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3.3.6 Disadvantages of Additional Facility arbitration 
 
One major disadvantage of Additional Facility arbitration is that it is marred by confidentiality of 
the proceedings and award. All proceedings are to be conducted in camera unless the parties 
agree otherwise.
227
 Just like ICSID awards, the Secretary General is authorised by Article 53(3) 
to publish only excerpts from the legal reasoning of the tribunal.  
 
Another disadvantage is that there is no room for appeal on the merits of the award. The award 
rendered under the Rules is final and binding on the parties.
228
 The award can only be challenged 
on procedural grounds
229
 in the courts of the place of arbitration or where its enforcement is 
sought.
230
  
 
 
 
                                                          
227
 See Article 53(3) of the Additional Facility Rules. 
228
 See Article 52(4) of the Additional Facility Rules. 
229
 See section 33 of South Africa Arbitration Act, 1965 which allow the court to review the award on procedural 
grounds only. 
230
 See Article 1 of the Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules; see also Myjer EPJ ‘ICSID and the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes in Poland’ (1989) 18 Polish Y B Int’l L 143 at 150; Tams C ‘An Appealing Option? The 
Debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure’ (2006) Essays on Transnational Economic Law1 at 11; see also Frank S 
D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521. 
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3.4 Ad hoc arbitration system under the United Nations Commission on International  
       Trade Law Arbitration Rules 
 
 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
 
The second most popular investor – state arbitration, after the ICSID Centre, is the ad hoc 
arbitration conducted under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, 2010.
231
  
 
UNCITRAL was formed in 1966 as an affiliate body of the United Nations. UNCITRAL was 
formed for the purposes of promoting international trade among member states by reducing trade 
barriers.
232
 It was through this mandate that UNCITRAL formulated the Arbitration rules in 
1976. The Rules were primarily designed to help parties to resolve international commercial 
disputes.
233
 The Rules have been hailed as ‘one of the most widely recognised set of rules for 
settlement of disputes arising in the context of international commerce’.234 The Rules operated 
                                                          
231
 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010 available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/arbitration/rules/arb-rules-revised-
2010. (hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules) accessed on 15/07/2013). 
232
 UNCITRAL was established by Resolution 2205(XXI) of 17 December 1966.See UNCITRAL, Origin, Mandate 
and Composition of UNCITRAL (2007) http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html.accessed on 
17/07/2013. 
233
 See the United Nations General Assembly Resolution (UNGA), 31/98 Supplement No. 17 (A/31/17) of 15
th
 
December 1976; also see Van Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 54; see also Levine 
J ‘Current Trends in International Arbitration Practice as Reflected in the Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules’ (2009) 31 Transnational Dispute Management  266; also see Wirth M ‘The Current Revision of the 
UNCITRAL Rules’ in New Developments in International Commercial Arbitration Müller C & Rigozzi A (eds.) 
2008), available at http://www.homburger.ch/fileadmin/publications/UONO26O_01.pdf  accessed on 23/07/2013. 
234
 Wirth M ‘The Current Revision of the UNCITRAL Rules’ in New Developments in International Commercial 
Arbitration Müller C & Rigozzi A (eds.) 2008) at 1, available at 
http://www.homburger.ch/fileadmin/publications/UONO26O_01.pdf  accessed on 23/07/2013. 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
successfully for over 30 years until 2010 when, in a need to enhance efficiency,
235
 the Rules 
were revised and replaced by the current UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010.
236
 UNCITRAL 
Rules are applied in resolving different types of disputes as they have a one size fit all structure. 
  
The Rules, at first, are used in ad hoc international commercial arbitration involving private 
parties who have a clause in their contract providing for ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL 
Rules.
237
 Secondly, the Rules are available to arbitral institutions which have modelled their 
institutional rules on the UNCITRAL Rules. Under these circumstances, the Rules are used not 
on an ad hoc basis but through institutional arbitration.
238
 A number of institutions have been 
using these rules in this manner. The Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, 
the Cairo Regional Centre for International Arbitration, the Swiss Chambers Court of Arbitration 
and Mediation and the Permanent Court of Arbitration are some of the prominent institutions 
utilising the Rules.
239
  
 
Thirdly, and most relevant to this research, is that the Rules can be used in investor – state 
disputes.
240
 Many BITs and other IIAs provide for UNCITRAL Rules arbitration as one of the 
option available to the parties.
241
 The Northern American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the 
                                                          
235
 UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration), Settlement of Commercial Disputes- Revision of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules - Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP145 (2007) UNCITRAL 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working-groups/2Arbitration.html  accessed on 23/07/2013. 
236
 See paragraph 6 of the Preamble to the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
237
 See Article 1 (1) of the UNCITRAL Rules; see also Levine J ‘Current Trends in International Arbitration Practice 
as Reflected in the Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (2009) Transnational Dispute Management 266. 
238
 See Levine J ‘Current Trends in International Arbitration Practice as Reflected in the Revision of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (2009) Transnational Dispute Management 267. 
239
 Levine J ‘Current Trends in International Arbitration Practice as Reflected in the Revision of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules’ (2009) Transnational Dispute Management  267. 
240
 Article 1(1) of the Rules provide for a wide scope of application of the rules. The Article contemplates the 
settlement of any ‘legal dispute’ whether contractual or not.  
241
 See for example Art 7(2) (c) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of 
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Energy Charter of the European Union are some of the IIAs which provide for UNCITRAL 
Arbitration as an option available to the parties.
242
 
 
In terms of popularity, The UNCTAD 2014 World Investment Report indicates that ICSID 
registered 62% of all investor – state disputes, UNCITRAL 28%, and the remaining 10% is 
managed by the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce respectively.
243
 Therefore the Rules come third after ICSID Convention arbitration 
and Additional Facility arbitration. The chart below shows the distribution of Investor – State 
known cases among arbitral institutions/ rules in the year 2013. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27/11/2009 (hereinafter South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT) available at  
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/SA_Zimbabwe.pdf; see also Article 7(4) of An Agreement between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investment  01/09/1999 available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/sweden_tanzania.pdf  (hereinafter Tanzania –Sweden BIT); see also Art. 
8(c) of  the Agreement between the Government of United Republic of Tanzania and  the Government of Italian 
Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investment of  21/08/2001  (hereinafter Tanzania – Italy  BIT)  
available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/italy_tanzania.pdf  and the Agreement between the 
Government of United Republic of Tanzania and  the Government of Republic of Finland on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investment  of 19/06/2001 (hereinafter Tanzania - Finland BIT)  available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/finland_tanzania.pdf all  providing  for UNCITRAL ad hoc Arbitration 
as an option  in case of any dispute.      
242
 See Article 1120 of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA full text available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/nafta.pdf  accessed on 23/07/2013, see also Article 26(4) of the  
the European Energy Charter available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf 
243
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report ‘Investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ [2014] IIA Monitor, No. 1, at 125, U.N.Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2014/3 available 
at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf  accessed on 23/07/2014 
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Source: UNCTAD 2013 World Investment Report. 
 
The statistical data for the last three years indicates that UNCITRAL Rules are used in a quarter 
of all investor – state disputes.244 This shows that the rules command a significant recognition in 
the international investment world. 
 
                                                          
244
 See also the UNCTAD World Investment Report for 2012 which indicates that 34 cases out of 46 cases (73%) 
registered in that year were registered at ICSID Centre, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012_embargoed_en.pdf;  See also the UNCTAD Report for 2011 
which indicates that 25 cases were registered out of which 18 (72%) of them were registered at ICSID, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir2011_embargoed_en.pdf accessed on 08/08/2013. 
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The rules comprehensively cover all relevant aspects of the arbitration process, viz: scope of the 
application, notice and response of arbitration, composition of arbitral tribunal, conduct of the 
arbitration proceeding, and issues relating to awards and challenges to the awards. A discussion 
of these important aspects of UNCITRAL Rules follows. 
  
3.4.1.1 Scope of application of the United Nations Commission on  
               International Trade Law Arbitration Rules 
 
The Rules, in the first place, provide for the recognition of the principle of party autonomy which 
is one of the cornerstones of private arbitration.
245
 That is demonstrated in the very first Article 
of the Rules. Article 1(1) provides that the rules shall apply to any legal dispute where the 
parties, in their agreement, have agreed to use the UNCITRAL Rules. In addition, the Rules 
mandate the parties to make any modifications to the Rules to suit their dispute needs.
246
 The 
Rules came into operation on 15 August 2010 and apply to disputes which arose on that date and 
future disputes to which the parties have designated the rules to apply.
247
  
 
When compared to its earlier version, the current Rules provide for a wider scope of application. 
The older version’s scope of application was confined to disputes arising out of contractual 
arrangement.
248
 The earlier version was not tailored to resolve investor – state disputes or claims 
                                                          
245
 Redfern A & Hunter M Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration 2nd ed. (1991) at 51. 
246
 See Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010, available at 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/arbitration/rules/arb-rules-revised-2010 accessed on 15/02/2013. 
247
 See Rule 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010, available at 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/arbitration/rules/arb-rules-revised-2010 accessed on 15/02/2013. 
248
 See Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,1976 GA 31/98 available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf accessed on 20/06/2013; see also Tuck 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
regarding breach of international customary or treaty law.
249
 The current Rules go beyond this as 
they are meant to apply to ‘any legal relationship whether contractual or not’.250 Therefore, under 
the new Rules investor – state disputes are clearly included. 
 
3.4.1.2 Steps involved in arbitration under the United Nations Commission on  
               International Trade Law Arbitration Rules 
 
 The first step is taken by the claimant by submitting a notice of arbitration to the other party. 
The Rules oblige the claimant to serve of the notice of arbitration.
251
 The service process is 
bilateral without any intervention from a third party.
252
 The notice can be delivered physically or 
by electronic means to the respondent or to his/her business place, habitual residence or mailing 
address.
253
  
 
In order to avoid dilatory tactics by the respondent, the Rules make it clear that the respondent’s 
failure to respond, or lack of sufficient notice to the respondent, shall not hinder the constitution 
of the tribunal and any issue regarding such controversies shall be decided by the tribunal after it 
has been formed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
AP ‘Investor – State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revision and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID 
and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (2007) Law and Business Review of the Americas 885 at 891. 
249
 Tuck AP ‘Investor – State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revision and Proposed Reforms to the 
ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (2007) Law and Business Review of the Americas 885 at 897. 
250
 See Article 1(1) of the Rules.  
251
 See Rule 3 (1) of the Rules. 
252
 Gantz D A ‘The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States—Chile Free Trade 
Agreement’ (2004) 19 American University International Law Review 679 at 684. 
253
 See Article 2 (3) of the Rules. 
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The second step is the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The Rules give the parties the mandate 
to decide the number of arbitrators to preside over their dispute. The parties could do this before 
the dispute arose or after the dispute has arisen.
254
 However, where the parties fail to agree on the 
number of arbitrators, the appointing authority shall have power to appoint one arbitrator to 
preside over the dispute.
255
  
 
Once constituted, the tribunal is given the mandate to conduct the arbitral proceedings in the 
manner it finds fit and appropriate. In exercising this discretionary power, the tribunal is required 
to ensure that both parties are given equal opportunity to present their cases and receive the same 
treatment.
256
 The seat of the tribunal is supposed to be decided by the parties to suit their 
convenience and avoid unnecessary expenses. This is one of the advantages of ad hoc arbitration. 
However, where the parties did not indicate any place, the tribunal is entitled to choose a place 
where the proceedings will take place.
257
 The tribunal is also empowered to rule on its own 
jurisdiction in case any party files any jurisdictional objection.
258
 
 
The next step is rendering of the award. The award is required to be in writing and the reasons 
for reaching such conclusion have to be adduced by the tribunal unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise.
259
 As stated above, the award rendered under the Rules is confidential unless the 
parties agree to its publication.
260
 
  
                                                          
254
 See Article 7(1) of the Rules. 
255
 See Article 7(2) of the Rules. 
256
 See Article 17(1) of the Rules. 
257
 See Article 18 of the Rules. 
258
 See Article 23(1) of the Rules. 
259
 See Article 34(3) of the Rules. 
260
 See Article 34(5) of the Rules. 
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In conclusion, it can be said that there is not much difference, between the Additional Facility 
award and the UNCITRAL Rules award. Both are insulated from public scrutiny and the court 
can only be consulted on procedural matters.  
 
3.4.1.3 Confidentiality of the proceedings 
 
The Rules are very clear with regard to confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings. Article 
28(3) provides that the proceedings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise. 
Originally the UNCITRAL Rules were designed to serve in international commercial 
arbitration.
261
 Therefore it is not surprising to see that confidentiality is given high priority. In 
international commercial arbitration which is private in nature, confidentiality plays a vital role 
in protecting trade secrets. Another reason is that UNCITRAL arbitrations are conducted subject 
to the law of the seat of arbitration. These laws, or most of them, require confidentiality of the 
arbitral proceedings.
262
  
 
There is no public register for the purposes of registering new claims arising under the Rules. 
Therefore even where the dispute involves a State party, the dispute remains confidential and no 
third party is informed about such dispute.  
 
                                                          
261
 See Van Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 54; also see Friedland PD & Martinez 
L ‘ The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary’ (2007) American Journal of International Law 519;see also 
Levine J ‘Current Trends in International Arbitration Practice as Reflected in the Revision of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules’ (2009) Transnational Dispute Management  266. 
262
 See Jagusch S & Sullivan J ‘A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and 
Concern’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 79 – 
110 at 95. 
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Therefore, under UNCITRAL Rules, the proceedings and awards are confidential and there is no 
room for non – disputing parties to submit submissions or attend at the hearing.263 It has been 
held that the purpose of holding the hearing in camera is to exclude non- parties.
264
 This practice 
is contravening the principle of good governance especially where the dispute is of a public 
nature and involves a state party.  
 
After receiving a lot of complaints from stakeholders, the UNCITRAL Commission at its 41
st
 
session in 2008 agreed by consensus on the importance of ensuring transparency in investor – 
state dispute resolution and formed a Working Group to work on the matter.
265
 The Working 
Group’s efforts resulted in the new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration (hereinafter ‘the Transparency Rules’).266 The Rules were adopted on 
11 July 2013. The relevant provisions of the new Transparency Rules are discussed later in 
subheading 3.4.1.6. 
 
  
                                                          
263
 See Articles 28(3) & 34(5) of the UNCITRAL Rules, 2010. 
264
 See Methanex Corporation v United States of America UNCITRAL NAFTA (2001) para 41. 
265
 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 41st session, June 16 – July 3, 2008, para 
314 available at  www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/transparency in investor – state dispute/sessions/41st.html . 
266
 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-release-UNCITRAL-Rules-on-
Transparency.pdf accessed on 27/09/2013. 
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3.4.1.4 The applicable law  
 
The Rules only provide for the applicable procedural law.
267
 The substantive law to govern the 
arbitration, where the parties have not made any choice, will normally be the arbitration law of 
the place of arbitration (lex arbitri).
268
 Article 35(1) provides that the tribunal shall apply the law 
designated by the parties. However, where the parties have not designated any, the tribunal ought 
to apply the appropriate law. In determining the appropriate law, the tribunal is required to take 
into account the trade usage to such transactions.
269
 The Rules do not provide clearly whether 
international law principles can be applied by the tribunal. It is unclear whether at the time of 
determining the appropriate law the tribunal can choose international law over national law of 
the place or apply both laws. For proceedings under ICSID and Additional Facility international 
law is explicitly provided for, but that is not clear with the UNCITRAL Rules.
270
  
 
3.4.1.5 Recognition and enforcement of United Nations Commission on International  
                Trade Law Rules awards 
 
Article 34(2) of UNCITRAL Rules clearly provides that the award shall be final and binding on 
the parties and that the parties are expected to carry out the award without delay. Therefore the 
parties are bound and are expected to live by the terms of the award. As is the case with the 
Additional Facility awards the only available avenues to challenge the award are those stipulated 
                                                          
267
 Gantz DA ‘The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States—Chile Free Trade 
Agreement’ (2004) 19 American University International Law Review 679. 
268
 See Article 18(1) of the Rules; see also Tuck AP ‘Investor – State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the 
Revision and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (2007) Law and Business Review 
of the Americas 885 at 897. 
269
 See Article 35(3) of the Rules. 
270
 See Article 54(1) of the Additional Facility Arbitration Rules and Article 42(1) ICSID Convention respectively. 
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under the New York Convention.
271
 The Convention allows the award to be scrutinised by the 
national court of the place of enforcement on limited procedural grounds.
272
 As at January 2013 
the New York Convention has been ratified by 152 member states.
273
 Therefore, through the 
New York Convention, UNCITRAL awards enjoy worldwide recognition and hence are easily 
enforced. 
 
3.4.1.6 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, 2013. 
 
The adoption of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules is a big step towards increasing the 
legitimacy of the investor – state arbitration system.274 Article 1(1) provides that the Rule shall 
take effect from 1 April 2014. The Rules are meant to apply to all future treaties providing for 
UNCITRAL arbitration unless the parties agree otherwise. The scope of its application therefore 
is in respect of treaties entered into in the future, and does not extend to the existing 3240 BITs 
and IIAs.
275
. The Rules will apply in the current existing BITs only where the parties have opted 
                                                          
271
 The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, available at 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ accessed on 02/06/2014. 
272
 See Article V of the New York Convention, The grounds includes: (1) the agreement to arbitrate was not valid, 
(2) the losing party was not given an opportunity to defend his case, (3) the award has addressed issues which are 
beyond its mandate, (4) the procedure employed did not comply with the parties’ agreement, (5) the award has been 
set aside and is no longer binding, (6) the subject matter of arbitration is not subject to arbitration as per the laws of 
the place of enforcement and lastly (7) enforcement will be contrary to public policy. 
273
 See the List of New York Convention Contracting States available at 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states  accessed on 12/11/2014. 
274
 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-release-UNCITRAL-Rules-on-
Transparency.pdf accessed on 27/09/2013. 
275
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
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in the new Rules or where the State of the claimant and the respondent State have agreed after 1 
April 2014 to their application.
276
  
 
The Rules bar the parties to a dispute from derogating from the application of the Transparency 
Rules when their dispute has arisen from a treaty which provides for the application of the 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules.
277
  
 
Subject to the limitation set under Article 7, the notice of arbitration, the response thereto, 
pleadings, third party submissions, transcripts of hearing, decisions and awards are required to be 
promptly available to the public for inspection.
278
 In addition, the public is allowed to attend any 
hearing except where there is a need to protect confidential information.
279
 A repository is 
established under Article 8 which is responsible for the keeping of the record and publishing the 
required information.  Following the coming into force of the new Rules in April 2014, the 
secretariat has already established a transparency registry which will act as a repository for the 
publication of information and documents in treaty based investor - state arbitration.
280
 
In recognition of the need for confidentiality of some business information, Article 7 requires the 
parties and the tribunal not to disclose information which may harm parties’ trade secrets.  
 
In conclusion, therefore, it can be said that the new Rules have addressed the transparency 
concerns of the international community. The new Rules are important milestone towards 
                                                          
276
 See Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, 2013. 
277
 See Article 1 (3) (a) of the Transparency Rules. 
278
 See Article 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Rules. 
279
 See Article 6 of the Rules. 
280
 See the Transparency Registry at http://www.uncitral.org/transparency-registry/registry/index.jspx accessed on 
03/06/2014. 
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transparency and hence legitimating the investor – state arbitration system. However, the 
efficacy of the rules cannot be predicted due to their narrow scope of application. The Rules are 
not going to apply to the current existing 3240 BITs and IIAs.
281
 This means that the problem of 
confidentiality in the current 3000 BITs and IIAs is still there unless the state parties decide to 
amend their BITs to incorporate the new Rules or the parties to a dispute decide to adopt the new 
Rules for their dispute. 
 
3.4.2 Advantages of arbitration under the United Nations Commission on International 
          Trade Law  
 
One of the proclaimed advantages of UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration is that it gives the parties 
total control of their dispute. Every aspect of the proceedings is determined by the parties 
themselves as there is no administrative body to dictate the procedure and timeframe of the 
dispute.
282
 
 
The second advantage is that the dispute is likely to end quickly as the speed of the proceeding is 
determined by the parties themselves. The fact that there are no institutional timeframes, 
procedures and deadlines to be adhered to, enhances the efficacy if the parties wish to resolve the 
                                                          
281
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
282
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  Dispute Settlement - International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes: selecting the Appropriate Forum 2003 UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.1 at 
26; see also Butler N The state of International Investment Arbitration: The Possibility of Establishing an Appeal 
Mechanism PhD Thesis, University of Leeds 2012 at 54 available at 
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/3361/1/FINAL_CORRECTED_THESIS_%2822_jan_2013%29.pdf accessed on 
12/09/2013. 
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dispute timely.
283
 The parties are at liberty to dispense with the normal adjudication bureaucracy 
which normally causes delay in formal institutional or court hearings.
284
 
 
The third advantage is that it is cheaper when compared to institutional arbitration.
285
 The parties 
in ad hoc arbitration are relieved of the costs relating to administrative fees. In addition, the 
parties are at liberty to choose a cheap and convenient seat of arbitration. This is distinct from 
institutional arbitration where the seats are most of the time in the expensive Western world 
cities.
286
 
  
3.4.3 Disadvantages of the arbitration under the United Nations Commission on  
           International Trade Law 
 
The major weakness of UNCITRAL arbitration is that under the 2010 rules the arbitration is 
conducted with a high level of confidentiality.
287
 Article 28(3) provides that the proceedings 
shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise. Originally, as discussed earlier, the 
UNCITRAL Rules were designed to serve in international commercial arbitration.
288
 In 
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 Butler N The state of International Investment Arbitration: The Possibility of Establishing an Appeal Mechanism 
PhD Thesis, University of Leeds 2012 at 54 available at 
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 See Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules 2010. 
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 Butler N The state of International Investment Arbitration: The Possibility of Establishing an Appeal Mechanism 
PhD Thesis, University of Leeds 2012 at 55 available at 
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 Currently most of the ICSID Proceedings are held in Washington USA and Paris France, See Background 
Information on ICSID: Where are the Proceedings Held?  At 6, available at 
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 See Van Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 54; also see Friedland PD & Martinez 
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international commercial arbitration, which is private in nature, confidentiality plays a vital role 
in protecting trade secrets. The Rules, however, provides for the same confidentiality even in 
investor – state disputes which are public in nature. 
 
Under the Rules there is no room for non – disputing parties to submit submissions or attend at 
the hearing.
289
 The Rules were designed to exclude non- parties to the dispute regardless of the 
nature of the dispute.
290
 This practice goes contrary to the nature of investor – state disputes. 
There is a need for the Rules to adhere to public law value by making the proceedings of the 
investor – state disputes open to the public.291 
 
3.5 The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is the oldest international court in the modern 
adjudicative systems.
292
 It was established in 1899 through the Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes at the first International Peace Conference held in The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in International Arbitration Practice as Reflected in the Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (2009) 
Transnational Dispute Management 266. 
289
 See Articles 28(3) & 34(5) of the UNCITRAL Rules, 2010. 
290
 See Methanex Corporation v United States of America, UNCITRAL NAFTA (2001) para 41. 
291
 This position will change when the new Transparency Rules 2013 come into operation, see Article 3 – 6 of the 
new Transparency Rules which provides for third party submission and public hearing of the investor – state 
dispute. The rules are discussed above under subheading 3.4.1.3.1. 
292
 See the Permanent Court of Arbitration Website, About Us available at  http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1027 accessed on 28/04/2014; see also Mackenzie R et al The Manual on 
International Courts and Tribunals 2nd ed. (2010) at 102; also see UNCTAD ‘Permanent Court of Arbitration’ 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.26 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add26_en.pdf accessed on 
28/04/2014. 
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Hague.
293
 The Convention was revised at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. The 
Convention was established for the purpose of facilitating arbitration, mediation and inquiry 
between states so as to minimise the use of force.
294
 It was established as an optional court to 
which any two disputing States could agree to refer their dispute. Ever since, the PCA has 
developed to become a modern and multi-faceted arbitral institution that links public and private 
international law in the current era which is full of multi - faceted international law disputes. The 
Convention has 115 Member states.
295
 
 
Early case load at the PCA involved inter – state disputes. The Court resolved disputes relating 
to treaty interpretation, state responsibility and territorial sovereignty.
296
 At the time the Court 
played a significant role in the development of public international law.
297
 However the coming 
into being of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1946 overshadowed the PCA and very 
few cases were brought before it.
298
 
 
Since 1992 the PCA has expanded its scope of jurisdiction and currently provides services for 
the resolution of disputes involving various combinations: state – state, state – private party, state 
                                                          
293
 See the Permanent Court of Arbitration Website, About Us available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1027 accessed on 28/04/2014. 
294
 See Article 1&2 of the PCA Convention, 1907 available at 
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/Downloads/1907ENG.pdf accessed on 
28/04/2014. 
295
 See the Permanent Court of Arbitration Website, About Us available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1027 accessed on 28/04/2014. 
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 Merrills JG ‘The contribution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to International Law and the Settlement of 
Disputes by Peaceful Means’ in Hamilton P et al (eds.) The Permanent Court of Arbitration: International 
Arbitration and Dispute Resolution(1999)at 3. 
297 Merrills JG ‘The contribution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to International Law and the Settlement of 
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 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Permanent Court of Arbitration’ 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.26 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add26_en.pdf  at 6 accessed 
on 28/04/2014. 
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entities – private parties and international organizations – private parties.299 Different types of 
rules have been established so as to facilitate multi - faceted dispute resolution at the PCA. The 
rules include: the optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States (Inter – State 
Rules) 1992,
300
 Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of which only One 
is a State (State Non – State Rules) 1993,301 Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for 
Arbitration Involving International Organizations and States (IGO/State Rules) 1996,
302
 just to 
name the relevant ones. Most of these Rules are influenced by the UNCITRAL Rules of 
Arbitration 1976.
303
 
 
3.5.2 The Functioning of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
 
The PCA does not settle disputes but maintains a roster of arbitrators appointed by the State 
parties to the Convention who can be appointed by the disputing parties to resolve their dispute. 
Therefore in reality there is no structure fitting the label ‘International Court of Arbitration’; 
rather, the awards and decision are made by ad hoc arbitral tribunals established under the 
auspices of the PCA.
304
 The PCA works through the Permanent Secretariat known as the 
                                                          
299
 See Permanent Court of Arbitration, Rules of Procedure  available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1188 accessed on 28/04/2014. 
300
 The Inter – state Rules available at 
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/Downloads/2STATENG.pdf accessed on 
28/04/2014. 
301
 State Non – State Rules available at 
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28/04/2014.  
302
 IGO/State Rules available at 
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/Downloads/IGO2ENG.pdf accessed on 
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International Bureau headed by the Secretary - General.
305
 The Bureau is responsible to provide 
the respective arbitral tribunals with all administrative services required. 
 
The Convention requires members of the arbitral tribunal to be persons of known competency in 
questions of international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties 
of arbitrator.
306
 Parties to the dispute determine the number of arbitrators to preside over their 
dispute.
307
 Once the award is rendered, the parties are bound by the decision and no appeal lies 
against such award.
308
 
 
3.5.3 The Court’s jurisdiction in investor – state disputes. 
 
 
As pointed out,
309
 the various optional rules of the PCA adopted since the 1990s have expanded 
the jurisdiction of the Court. The PCA now adjudicates on state – state disputes, state – private 
party disputes and state – international organization disputes, just to name a few.310 As a result, 
the PCA has been involved in providing registry and other services to arbitrations emanating 
from the BITs and IIAs.
311
 The 2008 PCA Annual Report indicates that the PCA acted as a 
                                                          
305
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Permanent Court of Arbitration’ U   
NCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.26 at 9. 
306
 See Article 44 of the PCA Convention 1907 available at 
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/Downloads/1907ENG.pdf accessed on 
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registry for 34 cases out of which 23 cases were investor – state arbitration.312 In 2012 the PCA 
provided the registry service for 88 cases of which 54 were investor - state cases.
313
 One can see 
that the PCA role in investor – state dispute has doubled over the period of only four years.  
Investor – state disputes constituted 61% of all cases registered at the PCA.314 The PCA is 
particularly popular in NAFTA investment disputes and investment disputes conducted under the 
UNCITRAL Rules.
315
 
 
Therefore in conclusion it can be said here that the PCA indeed has and is exercising jurisdiction 
over investor – state disputes. It is an important registry body for almost all disputes filed under 
the UNCITRAL Rules. 
 
3.5.4 Advantages of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
 
The PCA, in recognition of the cost problem facing developing countries, established a Financial 
Assistance Fund for developing countries in 1995.
316
 The Fund is financed through voluntary 
contributions from states, NGOs, international organisations and individuals. For a state to 
benefit from the Fund it needs to meet the following conditions:
317
 (1) the requesting state must 
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th
 Annual Report, 2008 available at http://www.wx4all.net/pca/PCA-annualreport_2008.pdf 
accessed on 28/04/2014. 
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th
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cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1179 accessed on 29/04/2014. 
 
 
 
 
145 
 
be a member of the PCA Convention; (2) the state must have concluded an agreement to refer a 
dispute (or disputes) to the PCA dispute settlement; and (3)the state must be listed on the 
Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC). The International Bureau administers the Fund 
under the external supervision of external Board of Trustees. The Fund has disbursed funds to a 
number of needy states since its inception.
318
 The Fund makes the adjudicative system accessible 
to all stakeholders, poor and rich. In this way the system increases its legitimacy. 
 
3.5.5 Disadvantages of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
 
The fact that the PCA Optional Rules are based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules speaks 
loudly about their unsuitability in adjudicating public interest disputes, including investor – state 
disputes. Public interest disputes are supposed to be heard in open court and the transparency 
principle needs to be observed.
319
 The Rules, however, require disputes to be heard in camera 
and the award remains confidential unless the parties decide otherwise.
320
  
In addition, the Rules provides for party appointed arbitrators.
321
 As discussed elsewhere,
322
 
party appointed arbitrators contravene the cardinal principle of independence and impartiality of 
an adjudication process as they tend to lean to the appointing party interests.
323
 
                                                          
318
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  ‘Permanent Court of Arbitration’ 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.26 available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add26_en.pdf accessed on 
28/04/2014. 
319
 For more discussion on this see Chapter Four of this work under subheading 4.3. 
320
 See Article 25(4) of the State Non /State Rules available at 
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/Downloads/1STATENG.pdf accessed on 
28/04/2014. 
321
 See Article 6 of the State /Non – State Rules. 
322
 For a thorough discussion on this see Chapter Four of this work under subheading 4.4.5. 
323
 See Paulsson J ‘Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution’ (2010) ICSID Review - Foreign Investment 
Law Journal 339; also see Van den Berg AJ ‘Dissenting Opinion by Party Appointed Arbitrators in Investment 
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Lastly, the system does not allow appeal. The award rendered by the tribunal is final and cannot 
be challenged in any court.
324
 As discussed all along, an investor – state arbitration system which 
is mostly public law adjudicative system, need to establish an appellate structure for the purposes 
of developing consistency and predictability. It is submitted here that, apart from the Financial 
Assistance Fund, the PCA System has little to offer to investor – state arbitration system. 
 
3.6 General critical analysis of the investor – state arbitration system 
 
In the following part, the investor – state arbitration system is generally analysed. The main 
issues which put the system into the legitimacy spotlight are clearly identified. The cases which 
have attracted world attention and caught stakeholders’ eyes are well discussed hereunder. This 
part therefore discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the current system. The discussion starts 
with identifying the strengths of the system when compared with its predecessor followed by its 
weaknesses. 
 
3.6.1 General strengths of the current investor – state arbitration system 
 
In the following section, the current system’s strengths are discussed. As pointed out earlier, the 
current system came into being to replace the old regime which was dominated by the use of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Arbitration’ in Arsanjani M et al. (eds.) Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael 
Reisman (2011) 821 – 843 at 824. 
324
 See Article 32(2) of the State /Non – State Rules. 
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diplomatic protection. The strengths of the current system are therefore measured by comparing 
it with its predecessor.  
 
3.6.1.1 Peaceful and civilised mechanism 
 
When compared to its predecessors, the investor – state arbitration system is, by far, a civilised 
and peaceful mechanism. The current system involves settlement of disputes between the host 
state and the foreign investor without involving and engaging the home state. Investment 
disputes have been depoliticised by excluding the investor home state from the dispute.
325
 In the 
previous system dispute settlement involved the use of diplomatic protection. At times states had 
to employ gunboat diplomacy to intimidate the host state in order to secure compliance.
326
 As a 
result, the diplomatic relations between the two nations, at times, soured as a result of use of the 
force. The current system has, to a large extent, helped to improve diplomatic relations among 
nations. 
 
In addition, the current system has helped in creating a fair playing field for even weaker state 
parties.
327
 Diplomatic protection was considered biased towards powerful nations as small 
nations feared to engage in a diplomatic wrangle with big nations for fear of losing loans and 
                                                          
325
 See above a discussion on Article 25 of the ICSID Convention; see Also Schreuer C et al The ICSID Convention: 
A Commentary 2ed. (2009) at 71 – 348; see also Jagusch S & Sullivan J ‘A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL 
Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and Concern’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) The Backlash against Investment 
Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 79 – 110 at 96. 
326
 See International Law Commission, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, (2000) 15, UN Doc. A/CN.4/506. ; 
see also Amerasinghe C F Local Remedies in International Law 2
nd
 ed.(2005)at 44; also see Bjorklund A K 
‘Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims’ (2005) 45 Vanderbilt  Journal 
of  International  Law 1, 12–16; see also Borchard E The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) at 366. 
327
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  Dispute Settlement - International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes: selecting the Appropriate Forum 2003 UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.1 at 
16. 
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foreign aid. Furthermore, by allowing the foreign investor to institute a dispute directly against 
the sovereign, the system has balanced the playing field between the parties by suspending the 
defence of state sovereignty in investment disputes.
328
 During the diplomatic protection era, 
individual investors had no standing and no direct cause of action against a sovereign for a 
violation of international law that adversely affected their investment.
329
 
 
3.6.1.2 Effective enforcement mechanism 
 
One of the biggest challenges facing international law in general is the lack of an effective 
enforcement mechanism for the international tribunal decisions or courts orders.
330
 In situations 
where the State is reluctant or refuses to cooperate, the order is rendered useless. However, in 
investor – state arbitration that is not the case. As pointed out earlier, the ICSID Convention and 
the New York Convention play a significant role to ensure recognition and enforcement of 
awards rendered by the arbitral tribunals.
331
 The two Conventions have been ratified by almost 
80% of all the world’s nations.332 This acceptance of the two Conventions gives investment 
                                                          
328
 Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Rev 1521at 1529; see also Gantz DA The Evolution of FTA 
Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States—Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 American University 
International Law Review 679 at 683. 
329
 Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Rev 1521at 1536. 
330
 See Lowe V The Settlement of Disputes in International Law (1999) 132; see also Brownlie I Principles of Public 
International Law at 677. 
331
 See Article 52 of the ICSID Convention which requires Member State to recognise and enforce the ICSID awards 
as their own court judgements. With regards to UNCITRAL and Additional Facility awards, see Article V of the 
New York Convention which provides for limited grounds upon which an award can be challenged; see also United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  Dispute Settlement - International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes: selecting the Appropriate Forum 2003 UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.1 at 16; 
see also Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521.  
332
 As of January 20, 2013, ICSID had 158 signatory States, and 147 Contracting States had ratified the Convention, 
see the List of Contracting States available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language
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awards the highest rate of enforcement all over the world. It is said that the popularity of the 
investor – state arbitration system is mostly the result of the fact that its awards can be easily 
enforced.
333
 
 
3.6.1.3 Neutral forum and impartial adjudication process 
 
Before the invention of the current investor – state arbitration system, foreign investor disputes 
were settled in the host state court. Foreign investors were very sceptical about this route. They 
feared the lack of impartiality of the local judges. It was felt that local judges would be 
sympathetic to their respective governments. Another concern was that judges would rarely rely 
on international law owing to their limited knowledge of international law.
334
 
 
The current system has, to a large extent, addressed investors’ concerns. Disputes are now settled 
at a neutral forum chosen by the parties to the dispute or by the institution chosen by them. In 
addition, the parties are involved in choosing the arbitrators who will be responsible to 
adjudicate on their dispute.
335
 The Rules require the majority of arbitrators to hail from states 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
=English. Accessed on 26/07/2013. As by January 2013 the New York Convention has been ratified by 148 member 
states see the List of Contracting States available at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-
contracting-states  accessed on 23/07/2013. 
333
 Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Rev 1521at 1536. 
334
 Amerasinghe C F Local Remedies in International Law 2nd ed.(2005) at 22; see also Dodge W ‘Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt  Journal of  Transnational  Law 1 at 6; see also Dolzer R &Chreuer C Principles 
of International Investment Law (2008) at 214; see also Borchard E The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 
(1915) at 817; see also Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) at 5.    
335
 See Article 25 of the ICSID Convention for the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals and Article 36 & 37 for the 
parties’ autonomy on the choice of arbitrators.  
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other than those of the parties to the dispute.
336
 This provision aims at ensuring that the tribunal 
comprises neutral arbitrators.
337
 
 
Therefore, indeed, when compared to its predecessors the current system has managed to address 
foreign investors’ concerns. However, it is submitted here that, while the original idea of 
allowing the parties to choose the arbitrators intended to address impartiality in investor – state 
disputes, the practice indicates that impartiality of party appointed arbitrators is highly 
questionable as they tend to protect the interests of the appointing party. Party appointed 
arbitrator issues are discussed later in this chapter. 
  
3.6.1.4 Finality 
 
Finality of the award is one of the reasons which contributed to the popularity of ICSID 
arbitration.
338
 Under the ICSID Convention, the award is final and cannot be appealed against 
save for few internal rectification opportunities.
339
 With regard to UNCITRAL and Additional 
Facility awards, the New York Convention sets limited grounds upon which the award can be 
challenged.
340
 As earlier stated, the previous system dispute settlement involved the use of 
diplomatic protection. At times states had to employ gunboat diplomacy to intimidate the host 
                                                          
336
 See Article 39 of the ICSID Convention. 
337
 Alvarez GM ‘The ICSID Procedure: Mind the Gap’ (2011) 10 e – Mercatoria 171. 
338
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  Series on International Investment Policies 
for Development at 14 available at 
http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer.asp?docid=13762&intItemID=2340&lang=1&mode=downloads  
accessed on 28 /06/ 2013.   
339
 See Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. 
340
 See Article V of the New York Convention. For a thorough discussion on New York Convention enforcement 
see above at 3.3.4 and 3.4.1.5 on recognition and enforcement of AF and UNCITRAL awards respectively. 
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state so as to secure compliance.
341
 Proponents argue that the finality of awards plays a 
significant role with regard to foreign investors as the business community prefers finality over 
an appellate mechanism. It is said this is so because investors are more interested in resolving the 
dispute as quick as possible so that they can proceed with the execution of the respective 
project.
342
  
 
It is submitted here that, as much as finality is needed, especially in investment disputes which 
normally involve huge amounts of money, insistence on finality of the award without having 
regard to the correctness of the decision made, is affecting the legitimacy of the whole system. 
There is a need to develop the consistency, certainty and predictability of the international 
investment law system. In the long run, investors stand to benefit from a consistent, certain and 
predictable system. 
 
3.6.2 General weaknesses of the current investor – state arbitration system. 
 
Investor – state arbitration has a number of critical systemic weaknesses. These weaknesses have 
sparked legitimacy concerns from all parts of the world. Some commentators have said 
investment arbitration ‘has reached its half-life and is characterized by a kind of boom and bust 
feel’.343 Others say that international investment law and arbitration is a booming branch of 
                                                          
341
 See International Law Commission, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, (2000) 15, UN Doc. A/CN.4/506. ; 
see also Amerasinghe C F Local Remedies in International Law 2
nd
 ed.(2005)at 44; also see Bjorklund A K 
‘Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims’ (2005) 45 Vanderbilt  Journal 
of  International  Law 1, 12–16; see also Borchard E The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) at 366. 
342
 See Tams C ‘An Appealing Option? The Debate about ICSID Appellate Structure’ (2006) 57 Essays on 
Transnational Law 1 at 15; see also Walsh TW ‘Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy 
Sufficient to Compromise Finality’ Berkeley Journal of  International Law 444 at 445; see also Shavell S ‘ The 
Appeal Process as a Means of Error Correction’ (1995) 24 Journal of Legal Studies 379. 
343
 Crawford J ‘Foreword’ in Douglas Z The International Law of the Claims (2009) at xxxii. 
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international law yet it faces challenges that aim at ‘the heart of the matter’.344 The central 
question among scholars is whether the current investment dispute adjudication system is 
appropriate to handle international investment disputes.
345
 The systemic flaws are identified and 
discussed hereunder. 
 
3.6.2.1 Lack of consistency 
 
Lack of consistency in the rendered awards is one of the major critiques levelled against the 
investor – state arbitration systems.346 A number of inconsistent decisions exist in parallel and all 
are regarded as valid and binding upon the parties. This problem was acknowledged by the 
ICSID secretariat in 2004.
347
 The secretariat, in the same year, issued a discussion paper to 
stakeholders which among other things suggested the introduction of an appellate body within 
                                                          
344
 Binder C et al ‘A Preface’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Christopher Schreuer (2009) at v. 
345
 See Mann H ‘Civil Society Perspective: what Do Key Stakeholders Expect from the International Investment 
Regime?’ in Alvarez J and Sauvant K (eds.) The Evolving International Investment Regime (2011) 22-29; Reinisch 
A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: 
Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 - 916; Van Harten G ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural 
Fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Schill S (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 
627 – 658; and Peterson L ‘Out of Order’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: 
Perception and Reality (2010) 483 – 488. These authors are very critical on the way the International Arbitration 
system operates. 
346
 See Reinisch A ‘The proliferation of international Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The threat of fragmentation 
vs. The promise of more effective system? Some reflections from the perspective of investment arbitration’ in  
Buffard  J et al (eds.) International Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation (2008)107 – 126; Franck S ‘The 
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent 
Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521 at 1545 and  Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International 
Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) Investment and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and 
Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 2. 
347
 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper, Possible 
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, 16 (Oct. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/improve-arb.pdf. 
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the ICSID framework.
348
 The proposal did not receive enough support especially from foreign 
investors’ home states and it has never been pursued since. The objectors argued that the creation 
of an appellate structure would be contrary to the very aim of the Convention, which is ensuring 
finality of disputes.
349
 It remains a fact that, although the ICSID secretariat abandoned the idea of 
establishing an appellate structure for lack of support, the inconsistency problem is still growing 
and creating more uncertainty in international investment law.
350
 As discussed hereunder, a 
number of reasons are responsible for the problem of inconsistency of awards in the current 
system. 
 
Essentially, there are three possible scenarios under which inconsistent decisions may arise.
351
 
The first scenario could be where different investment tribunals reach different conclusions 
concerning the same legal issues or principles.
352
 SGS v Pakistan and SGS v Philipines, also 
                                                          
348
 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper, Possible 
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, 16 (Oct. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/improve-arb.pdf.  
349
 See Article 53 of the Convention. 
350
 See for example the interpretation of NPM clause in US – Argentina BIT. The tribunals in CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8 of 20
th
  April 2005 final award  available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0184.pdf,  Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L 
P v Argentine Republic  ICSID ARB/01/3 of  9
th
 May 2007final  award available at  
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf and Sempra Energy International v The 
Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/02/16 of 14
th
 September 2007 final award  available at 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1004 ruled that necessity defence was not applicable to Argentina while the 
other two tribunals in  LG&E Energy Corp  LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic 
ICSID  ARB/02/1 of 9
th
 July 2007 final award available at  http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0462.pdf and Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic Case No ARB/03/9 Decision on 
Jurisdiction (2006) available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf ruled that the 
defence of necessity was applicable to Argentina. 
351
 For more discussion on this see Franck S ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521 at 1545 -1546; see also 
Garcia C ‘All the other dirty little secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America and the necessary evil of investor 
state arbitration’(2004) 16 Florida Journal of  International Law 301 at 348; and Reinisch A ‘The Future of 
Investment Arbitration’ in Christina Binder et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 – 916 at 906. 
352
 Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 
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Maffezini v Spain and Plama v Bulgaria are the cases that can be used to explain this type of 
scenario.
353
 The second possible scenario is where the two or more tribunals arrive at diverging 
conclusions while both are dealing with almost similar facts and are interpreting the same legal 
principles from the same treaty. This scenario can be well explained by using the Argentina cases 
CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic
354
 and LG&E Energy Corp LG&E 
Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic
355
. The last and third possible 
scenario is where there are parallel proceedings on the same facts in different fora involving 
related parties but different treaties. This scenario is well illustrated through Lauder v Czech and 
CME v Czech.
356
 The above cited cases have created a legitimacy crisis in the investor – state 
arbitration system. These inconsistent parallel decisions create uncertainty in investment law and 
contribute to the backlash against the whole system.
357
 
 
The discussion hereunder, shows how the above cited cases in the three scenarios have sparked 
legitimacy concerns in international investment arbitration system.  
 
 
                                                          
353
 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID ARB/01/13 of 6
th
 August 
2003; see also  SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID ARB/02/6 of 24
th
 
January 2004; also see Emilio Augustin Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No 
ARB/97/7, IIC 85 (2000) and Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005. 
354
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8 (2005).  
355
 LG&E Energy Corp  LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic ICSID  ARB/02/1 
(2007).  
356
 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 (2001) & CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic 
ICSID Reports 9(2001). 
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 See Spooreberg F& Vinuales V ‘conflicting decisions in International Arbitration’ Law & Practice of 
International Courts & Tribunals (2009) 91 – 113. 
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3.6.2.1.1 Divergent conclusions on similar facts and legal issues under different treaties 
 
The Tribunals in SGS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan
358
 and SGS v Republic of the Philippines
359
 
were called to determine whether an umbrella clause in a treaty transforms a breach of a contract 
into a breach of a treaty.  
 
SGS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan was the first case and its facts in brief were as follows. The 
case emanated from the pre – shipment inspection agreement entered into in 1994 between SGS 
and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
360
 Two years later, Pakistan decided to terminate the 
contract and notified the claimant of this intention. The contract was dully terminated on 11 
March 1997.
361
  
 
The claimant, SGS, was unhappy with the termination of the contract and filed a case in 
Switzerland. Pakistan successfully objected against the jurisdiction of the Swiss court.
362
 Six 
months after the dismissal of the Swiss case, SGS initiated ICSID proceedings pursuant to the 
Swiss – Pakistan BIT.363 After the constitution of the Tribunal, SGS alleged, among other things, 
violation of Article 11 of the BIT (the umbrella clause). Pakistan vehemently objected to the 
ICSID jurisdiction on the ground that the matter alleged by the claimant was contractual hence 
                                                          
358
 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID ARB/01/13 
359
 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID ARB/02/6. 
360
 SGS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan para. 11. 
361
 SGS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan para 16. 
362
 SGS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan Para 22 – 25. 
363
 SGS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan Para 32. 
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should be handled by the forum chosen by the parties – the Pakistan court.364 On the other hand, 
SGS submitted that contractual claims are also BIT claims.
365
  Therefore the Tribunal was 
required to determine whether contractual claims can be elevated to BIT claims by a BIT. The 
Tribunal agreed with the respondent’s argument and observed that a contractual claim does not 
automatically become a BIT claim. It further ruled that to follow the claimant’s argument would 
be to expand an umbrella clause to an indefinite expansion.
366
 It went further to say that any 
broader interpretation of an umbrella clause would override forum selection clauses in investor 
state conflicts.
367
  
 
However, in SGS v Philippines, the facts of which are more or less similar to the Pakistan case 
the Tribunal came out with a divergent conclusion.
368
  The facts were that, in 1991 Philippines 
entered into a pre - shipment inspection agreement with the claimant.
369
 After nine years of 
service, in 2000, the respondent terminated the contract. In pursuit to recover unpaid money on 
the contract totalling USD 140 million, SGS instituted a case with the ICSID in accordance with 
the Switzerland – Philippines BIT.370 SGS argued that Philippines had breached Articles IV, VI 
and X (2) of the Switzerland – Philippines BIT.371 In its submissions, Philippines contested the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the ground that the claim was contractual, hence should be heard 
by the forum chosen by the parties in their contract – the Philippines court.372 SGS, on the other 
hand, argued in favour of the ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of the presence of an umbrella 
                                                          
364
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365
SGS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan Para 83. 
366
SGS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, para 166. 
367
 SGS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, para168. 
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 See SGS v Islamic Republic Philippines para 12 – 13. 
369
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clause in the BIT. It further submitted that an umbrella clause was designed for the purpose of 
elevating contractual claims to treaty claims.
373
 Ruling in favour of SGS, the Tribunal held that a 
contractual claim can be elevated to BIT claim by virtue of an umbrella clause. It further stated 
that a broad interpretation of the umbrella clause is the right one and contemplated by the BIT.
374
  
 
From the two cases, one can see that the Pakistan tribunal on the same issue of an umbrella 
clause ruled that an umbrella clause does not elevate a contractual claim to a treaty claim while 
the Philippines Tribunal on a similar issue ruled in the positive that a breach of contract elevates 
into a breach of a treaty. The Pakistan Tribunal decision was supported in 2006 by two other 
decisions:  El Paso v Argentina and Pan American v Argentina;
375
  while, on the other hand, the 
Philippines Tribunal received support from Eureko v Poland and Noble Ventures v Romania.
376
  
 
Apart from the umbrella clause, there are also conflicting decisions with regard to the application 
of the Most Favoured Nation principle (MFN) in procedural matters. As discussed earlier, there 
are conflicting positions with regard to whether the MFN principle can be invoked to bypass 
                                                          
373
SGS v Islamic Republic Philippines para 63 – 68. 
374
 SGS v Islamic Republic Philippines para 115. 
375
 El Paso Energy International Co v Argentina ICSID ARB/03/15 2006 of 27
th
 April 2006 decision on jurisdiction 
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0268_0.pdfpara. 82; Pan American Energy 
LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/13 of 27
th
 July 2006, Decision on 
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112–115. 
376
 Eureko BV v Poland, Ad hoc – UNCITRAL Award of 19th August 2005 Partial Award available at 
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158 
 
consent limitations set by the contracting parties in a treaty by invoking another BIT involving 
the respondent state and a third party.
377
  
 
On the one hand, there is Maffezini v Spain
378
 and other cases which support the view that 
procedural or jurisdictional matters are part and parcel of general investors’ guarantees.379 The 
cases are therefore to the effect that a more favourable procedure set in another treaty to which 
the respondent state is a party has to be extended to other treaties to which that state is a party. 
 On the other hand there is Plama v Bulgaria and other cases which opine that the MFN clauses 
are meant to apply to substantive rights and do not extend to procedural and jurisdictional 
matters.
380
 According to this view, dispute settlement clauses are negotiated in specific treaties to 
meet specific ends hence they cannot be transplanted into another treaty unless the parties clearly 
indicate that.
381
 
 
                                                          
377
 See the discussion on ICSID Consent subheading 3.2.2.1 above. 
378
 See Emilio Augustin Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, IIC 85 
(2000). 
379
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Vivendi Universal S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19 and AWG Group Ltd. v The Argentine 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2006. 
380
 Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 
February 2005 para. 223; see also Telenor Mobile Communications AS v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No 
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Kingdom of Jordan ICSID Case No ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 15 November 2004. 
381
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This work supports the second group’s opinion that the MFN clause should not be employed to 
interfere with the contracting state’s intentions. It is submitted here that the position adopted in 
Maffezini case and other supporting cases is contrary to international law as it usurps the 
contracting state’s powers. The tribunal is in essence inserting a clause which was not 
contemplated by the state parties. As stated earlier, the overly expansive interpretation adopted 
by some of the tribunals results in an unnecessary backlash against the international investment 
arbitration system. When the jurisdiction restrictions put in place by the parties are easily eroded 
by the invocation of an MFN clause, the restriction clause is rendered redundant and the parties’ 
agreement is also unjustifiably interfered with, to say the least. 
 
3.6.2.1.2 Divergent conclusions on the same facts and similar legal principle under the same 
treaty 
 
Divergent conclusions on similar facts and similar legal principles are found in cases involving 
the Argentina – US BIT.382 Between 2001 and 2002, Argentina faced a serious economic 
crisis.
383
 In its effort to curb the economic and social collapse, several measures were introduced 
by the government of Argentina. The measures affected the profitability of businesses in the 
country. As a result Argentina was bombarded by a flood of arbitration proceedings from foreign 
                                                          
382
 Treaty between the United States of America and  the Argentina Republic Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment  of 14/11/1991, S Treaty Doc No 103 – 2 (1993); Schneiderman D  
‘Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes’  
(2010) 30 (2) North-western Journal of International Law & Business at 1; see also Burke – White W ‘The 
Argentina Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs  and the legitimacy of the ICSID System’(2008) 3 Asian 
Journal  of WTO & International Health Law & Policy 199. 
383Alvarez J and Khamsi K‘The Argentina crisis and foreign investors: A glimpse into the heart of foreign 
investment’ in Sauvant K (ed.) The Yearbook on International Investment law and Policy (2009) 373. 
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investors.
384
 Over 50 cases have been filed before the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).
385
 Most of these cases were filed in accordance with the US – 
Argentina BIT. Differently constituted tribunals have rendered awards which contradict each 
other. CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic
386
 and LG&E Energy Corp 
LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic
387
 provide examples of 
the opportunity for and consequences of  inconsistent awards. Most surprising is that one 
arbitrator sat in both the CMS and LG& E cases but the two awards contradict each other on 
whether it was appropriate for Argentina to invoke emergency measures and declare the state of 
emergency.
388
 
 
The facts of the two cases are to a large extent identical and arose out of the same emergency 
measures taken by Argentina. To avoid repetition and for the sake of clarity, only the facts of 
CMS v Argentina are discussed. 
 
In 1989 Argentina introduced economic reforms which resulted in the privatisation of state 
corporations.
389
 The reform involved the enactment of several laws including Law No 23.928 on 
currency convertibility of 1991 and Decree No. 2128/91 which fixed the Argentina peso at par 
                                                          
384
 Alvarez J and Khamsi K‘The Argentina crisis and foreign investors: A glimpse into the heart of foreign 
investment’ in Sauvant K (ed.) The Yearbook on International Investment law and Policy (2009) at 374. 
385
 Burke – White W ‘The Argentina Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the legitimacy of the ICSID 
System’ (2008) 3 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law & Policy at 200. 
386
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8.  
387
 LG&E Energy Corp LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic ICSID  ARB/02/1. 
388
 Alvarez J and Khamsi K‘The Argentina crisis and foreign investors: A glimpse into the heart of foreign 
investment’ in Sauvant K (ed.) The Yearbook on International Investment law and Policy (2009) 373explaining in 
footnote 7 that H.E Judge Francesco Rezek sat in CMS and LG& E.  
389
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8. para 53. 
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with the US dollar.
390
  In addition, these laws required the formation of companies which were to 
be jointly owned by the state and the private sector. As a result, TGN was formed as one of the 
state companies for gas transportation in Argentina. CMS’s participation in TGN started in 1995 
through the purchase of 25% of the shares of the company.
391
 Towards the end of 1990s 
Argentina encountered a severe economic crisis which forced the government to call a meeting 
with the representatives of gas companies to negotiate the suspension of the US Producer Price 
Index (PPI) of the gas tariff. It was agreed in the meeting to suspend the PPI for the period of six 
months only. It was further agreed that the affected parties would recoup the loss between July 
2000 and April 2001.
392
 However, the crisis deepened and the government failed to implement 
the agreement, instead, it called for an extension of deferment to June 2002.
393
 In late 2001 the 
crisis deepened further and significant capital flight from Argentina followed resulting into the 
enactment of the Emergency Law No. 25.561 on 6 January 2002 which declared a public 
emergency until 10 Dec 2003.
394
 
 
Most of the cases facing Argentina today emanated from the implementation of the Emergency 
Law. The Argentina currency (peso) was devalued and new exchange rates were applied to 
different transactions. The right of licensees’ of public utilities right to adjust tariffs in 
accordance with the US PPI was terminated as well as the calculation of tariffs in USD.
395
 The 
US PPI was denominated at the rate of one Peso to one USD.  
                                                          
390
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8. para 53. 
391
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8. Para 58. 
392
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8. para 59 & 60. 
393
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8. para 61. 
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 CMS v Argentina Para 64. 
395
 CMS v Argentina Para 65. 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
 
CMS, just like many other foreign companies, instituted a claim against Argentina in accordance 
with the US – Argentina BIT. The claimant argued that it had invested heavily in the project of 
gas transportation to the tune of 1.17 billion USD.
396
 It alleged further that the measures taken by 
the government between 1999 and 2002 had severely affected its investment. It contended that 
its shares had dropped by 92%.
397
 In addition the claimant submitted that the measures taken by 
Argentina were in violation of its commitment to investors and contrary to the US – Argentina 
BIT.
398
 They argued that the measure violated a number of obligations under the BIT.
399
  
 
In its defence, Argentina based its argument on Article 25 of the International Law Commission 
Articles on State Responsibility to argue that its measures were adopted to safeguard essential 
economic interests.  It further relied on Article XI of the BIT (emergency clause) that allowed 
Non - Precluded Measures (NPM) (i.e measures which are necessary for the maintenance of 
public order, restoration of international peace or security, and the protection of its own essential 
security interests). The Tribunal held that the defence of necessity advanced by Argentina was 
not applicable under the circumstances and found Argentina liable.
400
 
 
                                                          
396
 CMS v Argentina Para 68. 
397
CMS v Argentina Para 69. 
398
CMS v Argentina Para 88. 
399
 The claimant alleged Expropriation without compensation contrary to Article IV; fair and equitable treatment 
contrary to Article II (2) (a); arbitrary and discriminatory contrary to Article II (2) (b); and failure to honour an 
umbrella clause contrary to Article II (2) (c).   
400
 CMS v Argentina para 304 -382. 
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The Tribunal further held that the defence of necessity is an exceptional one and needs to be 
invoked only when its preconditions are met.  The Tribunal further held that the state cannot 
invoke the defence of necessity if there are other means available to overcome the difficulties, 
regardless of how costly or less convenient they could be. It further found that Argentina partly 
contributed to the emergency situation and hence could not benefit from its own fault.  
Although the Tribunal agreed that there could have been an emergency situation in Argentina, it 
concluded that the suspension of an obligation ceases when the emergency situation ends, and 
the state becomes liable for what happened during the emergency period.   
On the other hand, the LG&E Tribunal also found that by changing the very legal framework 
which was put in place to attract foreign investors, Argentina was in breach of fair and equitable 
treatment contrary to the US – Argentina BIT.401 However, the Tribunal differed with CMS 
Tribunal as it found that the guarantees provided in the BIT are subject to the existence of the 
member state itself. The Tribunal held that where the guarantees threaten the existence of the 
country itself, such a country has the right to suspend its obligations under the BIT, and any 
international law obligation, if such suspension is necessary for its existence.
402
 
 
 It is submitted here that the CMS Tribunal’s interpretation of the BIT was too narrow and 
rendered the emergency exception futile. The US- Argentina BIT intended to accord to member 
states powers to rely on the exception of a critical situation just like the one in which Argentina 
                                                          
401
 CMS para 275 and 281, see also LG&E para 139. 
402
 LG&E para 124. 
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found itself. On the other hand, one finds that LG&E Tribunal properly accorded considerable 
deference to Argentina’s policy choices and reactions.403  
 
In conclusion, one can say that the above contradictions show that tribunals have no guidance for 
interpretation of the key rights provided in the BITs. Each tribunal use its mandate to come up 
with its own conclusion about the scope of the rights stipulated in a particular BIT. Under the 
current framework, the options for addressing these inconsistent decisions are very limited. 
 
3.6.2.1.3 Divergent conclusions on a similar set of facts, related parties and similar legal  
                   norms 
 
The following two cases provide a spectacular example of opposite decisions by different 
tribunals, concerning the same set of facts, almost identical parties, and nearly identical legal 
norms. 
 
 In Lauder v Czech Republic and CME v Czech Republic a United States investor Ronald Lauder 
submitted two separate but almost identical claims
404
  in respect of a media joint venture project 
in the Czech Republic. One claim was submitted in accordance with the U S - Czech treaty in his 
own name on the basis of his nationality,
405
 and the other claim under the Netherlands-Czech 
                                                          
403
 Burke – White W ‘The Argentina Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the legitimacy of the ICSID 
System’ (2008) 3 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law & Policy at 199 at 201. 
404
 CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic ICSID Reports, para 412. 
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 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 para 142. 
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BIT on behalf of his investment, the Dutch incorporated CME Czech Republic B V.
406
  Though 
legally speaking CME was a separate legal person, Lauder was the majority shareholder of the 
company and hence controlled it. The two claims related to Lauder's contention that the two 
companies (under his control) were squeezed out of a successful and highly profitable 
broadcasting business due to actions and omissions of a state regulatory body called the Czech 
Media Council.
407
 
 
The facts in brief were that in 1991the Czech Republic changed its media law to allow private 
radio and TV broadcasting.
408
 In accordance with the media law, the media council was 
established with the duty, among others, to regulate, issue licences and supervise radio and TV 
broadcasting.
409
 A local company, CET 21, under a local, Mr. Zelezny, entered into an 
agreement with a German company, CEDC, to acquire a TV licence jointly on the basis that 
CEDC would provide capital for the formation of a TV station. CEDC was partly controlled by 
Mr. Lauder, a US citizen. It was further agreed that CET 21 would apply for a licence which 
would be used exclusively by the newly formed TV station jointly owned by the parties.
410
 The 
media council issued a licence to CET 21 on 30 January 1993. At a later stage the parties agreed 
to form a Czech company, CNTS, which would manage the to be formed TV station. The TV 
station was formed as agreed by the parties, named TV Nova, and operated very successfully.
411
 
In 1994 CEDC assigned all its interests in CNTS to CME Media, a Dutch company which was 
                                                          
406
 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 para 143. 
407
 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 para 42. 
408
 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 para 43. 
409
 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 6 Para 44. 
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 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 para 46 – 60. 
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 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports para 69. 
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also controlled by Lauder.
412
 The problem started when the media law was amended barring the 
use of the CET 21 TV licence by CNTS. On 23 May 1996 in a meeting facilitated by the media 
council an agreement was entered into declaring that the licence was to be used by CET 21 and 
not CNTS.
413
 On 23 July 1996, the media council commenced administrative proceedings 
against CNTS alleging that it had contravened the law by continuing to operate a TV station 
without a licence.
414
 All this was perpetuated by CET 21 after the CNTS board decided to 
dismiss Mr Zelezny from the Director General position at CNTS.
415
 The media council revoked 
the CNTS TV programs.
416
 
 
The two disputes started when the government revoked CNTS’s TV licence. Lauder initiated the 
arbitration proceedings against the Czech Republic, in accordance with the US-Czech Republic 
BIT, while CME instituted the arbitration proceedings on the basis of the Netherlands-Czech 
Republic BIT.
417
 Lauder’s interest in both cases is due to the fact that he owned 30% of shares of 
CME - Netherlands which in turn owned the majority of the shares (99%) of a Czech TV 
company (CNTS).
418
 Each claim alleged the same violations of treaty provisions including, but 
not limited to; fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security and expropriation. These 
provisions in the two Treaties were almost identical.
419
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414
Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 para 97. 
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The Lauder final award was rendered on September 3, 2001, ruling in favour of the Czech 
Republic and denying all claims for damages.
420
 The CME award followed ten days later, on 13 
September 13, 2001, with the majority of the panel holding in favour of the claimant. The two 
tribunals reached the same conclusion on whether the Czech Republic through the media council, 
had been arbitrary and discriminatory. This was the only issue on which the two Tribunals had a 
consensus.
421
 On the issue of expropriation the Lauder Tribunal ruled that there was no 
expropriation at any time while the CME Tribunal ruled that there was.
422
 The third issue under 
consideration was whether there was a breach of the requirement for fair and equitable treatment. 
The Lauder Tribunal found no breach, while the CME tribunal found that there was a breach by 
the Czech Republic.
423
 On the last issue, whether the investment was accorded full protection, 
the Lauder Tribunal held that the protection was accorded, while the CME Tribunal found that 
the Czech Republic had breached that obligation.
424
 On 14 March 2003, the CME Tribunal 
issued a substantial total damages award in favour of CME for $354,655,752 USD. 
 
It has been submitted that the contradictory results of the two Lauder cases has primarily had one 
effect: ‘it brings the law into disrepute, it brings arbitration into disrepute - the whole thing is 
                                                          
420
 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports para 222 - 232. 
421
 See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports para 222 and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic 
ICSID Reports para 612. 
422
 See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports r para 201 and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech 
Republic ICSID Reports para 609. 
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highly regrettable.’425 One can easily see that, had the two cases been consolidated and heard by 
a single tribunal, there would not have been two divergent conclusions.  
 
3.6.2.2 Parallel proceedings problem 
 
Another problem with the current arbitration system is that it allows forum shopping which leads 
to parallel proceedings which in turn results in conflicting decisions.
426
 The earlier discussed 
Lauder and CME cases offer a good illustration of this issue.
427
 Investors could have different 
available remedies against host states, both under the contract entered into with the state 
authorities, and under the applicable BIT. Nothing prevents both contract and treaty claims to be 
brought simultaneously by the same investor, in different proceedings.
428
 An investor may 
commence an arbitration proceeding under a contractual arbitration clause providing for 
arbitration under the arbitral rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules against a sovereign,
429
 or decide to utilise the avenue available 
under the BIT and file a case with the ICSID or ICSID Additional Facility.
430
 In both scenarios 
the investor will have the right to do so as the rights have accrued from different instruments. 
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 See D’Agostino J & Jones O ‘Energy Charter Treaty: A Step towards Consistency in International Investment 
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Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania
431
 is another good example to 
illustrate investment parallel proceedings in different fora involving the same parties on matters 
arising out of the same transaction.  
The facts in brief were that in 2003 a British‐German joint venture -  Biwater Gauff Tanzania 
(hereinafter BGT) won a bid from the World Bank to renovate and upgrade the water system in 
the city of Dar es- Salaam, Tanzania.
432
  The management and supply of water in the city 
deteriorated soon after the project started. It was learnt later that BGT was in financial 
difficulties and would not be able to finish the project on time. It then approached the 
government of Tanzania for the purposes of renegotiating the contract.
433
 The government of 
Tanzania refused to negotiate and decided to take charge of the management and the supply of 
water in the city.
434
 BGT was aggrieved by the government move and decided to institute a claim 
at ICSID pursuant to Tanzania – UK BIT alleging Tanzania action were contrary to UK – 
Tanzania BIT.
435
  
 
In another move, BGT through its subsidiary Company, City Water Tanzania Ltd, initiated 
another proceeding under UNCITRAL Rules before a separate tribunal alleging that Tanzania 
breached its obligations under the project contract.
436
 Therefore there were two proceedings 
concurrently running against the same respondent in relation to the same dispute. In December 
2007, the Tribunal under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules rejected BGT’s claim and instead 
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awarded three million Pounds to Tanzania.
437
  A year later the ICSID Tribunal also rendered its 
decision. While no compensation was awarded in the end, the Tribunal held Tanzania liable for 
breaching the BIT but awarded no damages to the claimant.  
 
In this scenario it is likely for multiple inconsistent awards to be rendered and multiple 
enforcement proceedings by the same claimant against the same respondent. Furthermore, under 
the current system there is the possibility of multiple arbitrations and local court proceedings in 
parallel with identical parties. In the Lauder cases discussed above, there were parallel 
arbitration proceedings running under UNCITRAL Rules, at the same time there was another 
arbitration proceeding filed under ICC Rules and other numerous court cases in the Czech 
Republic courts and one in the US pertaining almost the same dispute.
438
 In this scenario it is 
likely for multiple inconsistent awards to be rendered and multiple enforcement proceedings to 
take place. 
 
Under the current structure, where there is no mutual coordination between the respective 
institutions, parallel proceedings problem will not go away. Worse enough, the rules of both 
institutions ICSID and UNCITRAL do not provide for consolidation of proceedings. 
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It is submitted that the multiplicity of avenues for claimants is unfair to the respondent states 
which most of the time turn out to be developing countries.
439
 The consequences of multiplied 
proceedings are dire especially for poor countries. If it loses the cases, it will be required to pay 
costs and damages in both. In addition to that, multiplied proceedings add up to the backlash as a 
result of conflicting decisions.
440
 It is high time now for the system to find ways of avoiding 
these unnecessary complications and uncertainties.
441
 Chapters five and six of this work deals 
with the possible solutions to the above discussed systemic issues. 
 
3.6.2.3 Lack of institutional safeguards for the independence and impartiality of 
adjudicators 
 
The third challenge facing the current investment arbitration system is the lack of institutional 
safeguards for the independence and impartiality of adjudicators.
442
The UNCTAD World 
Investment Report 2012 clearly indicates that among the concerns in investor – state dispute 
settlement is the issue of impartiality and quality of arbitrators.
443
 The Report states that there is 
an emergence of ‘club’ of individuals who serves as counsels in some cases and arbitrators in 
others, often receiving repeated appointments thereby raising concerns about potential conflict of 
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interests.
444
  In addition, studies conducted recently reveal that 12 arbitrators have been 
repeatedly appearing in over 60% of all ICSID cases. This is to say that the ICSID jurisprudence 
is dominated by few select arbitrators. While that can be said to be an advantage for the purpose 
of consistency, it becomes a problem as the same group is appearing as counsels, mostly for the 
state parties in other cases.
445
 The study indicates that 50% of arbitrators on the current ICSID 
roster have appeared as counsel for investors elsewhere.
446
 It is hard to conclude that a person 
who serves both sides can be independent and impartial.
447
  
 
The duo role problem was a hot issue in ICS v Argentina case.
448
  In this UNCITRAL case 
Argentina challenged the claimant’s appointment of Mr Alexandrov on the ground that Mr. 
Alexandrov and his law firm were representing the Argentina adverse party as counsels in 
another pending case Compania de Aguas del Aconqu Se and Vivendi SA v. Argentine 
Republic.
449
 While  admitting that to be the fact Mr Alexandrov refused to resign voluntarily 
from this appointment and stated; 
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‘My firm and I personally are involved in the ICSID case of Compania de Aguas del Aconqu Se 
and Vivendi SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 where my firm and I represent 
Claimants and are adverse to the Argentine Republic. The subject matter of the Vivendi dispute is 
not related to the subject matter of this case…. I do not believe that these circumstances affect my 
impartiality and independence as an arbitrator in this case.’450 
 
The appointing authority upheld Argentina objection and held that the appointed arbitrator was 
in a situation of adversity towards Argentina, a situation that is often a source of justified 
concerns and ought to be avoided.
451
 
 
One can see that, despite of the clear conflict of interest, the appointed arbitrator was ready to 
serve as an arbitrator in this case while at the same time he was counsel for one of the parties in 
another case. This shows how under the current system, some arbitrators are only interested in 
making money and not serving justice.  
 
Another issue is that the investor – state  system uses party appointed arbitrators who are seen as 
leaning on the appointing party’s interests and hence jeopardising impartiality.452 A study 
conducted in 2009 reveals that in 150 cases there were 34 dissenting opinions. All 34 dissenting 
                                                          
450
 ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited v The Republic of Argentina p 2. 
451
 ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited v The Republic of Argentina at p 4. 
452
 See Paulsson J ‘Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution’ (2010) ICSID Review - Foreign Investment 
Law Journal 339; see also Van Harten G ‘A Case for International Investment Court’ Society of International 
Economic Law, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1153424 accessed on 06/09/2013. 
 
 
 
 
174 
 
opinions were from the arbitrators appointed by the losing party in the cases.
453
 The study further 
indicates that the presiding arbitrators rarely dissent. It is astonishing to find that all of the 
dissenting opinion came from the arbitrator appointed by the losing party. It can be concluded 
here that party appointed arbitrators lacks independence and impartiality contrary to the 
requirement of Article 14(1) of the Convention. This trend affects the development of the 
investor – state jurisprudence to a great extent and is contrary to the principles of dispensation of 
justice without fear or favour. 
 
Independence of the judiciary is one of the cornerstones of rule of law in the modern world and it 
helps a lot to legitimise the judiciary in the eyes of the public. Recognising that, many countries 
grant judges security of tenure and emoluments.
454
 It is submitted that the importance of judicial 
independence is also recognised in many courts and tribunals that exist beyond investor - state 
arbitration, including those exercising regulatory powers like international investment 
arbitration.
455
  This is the case at the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of 
Justice and the Inter American Court of Human Rights.
456
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security of tenure for the court of Appeal Justices and Article 145 of the same constitution guaranteeing security of 
emolument to Judges of the High Court and Justices of Appeal that their salaries shall be drawn from the 
consolidated fund, available at http://www.judiciary.go.tz/downloads/constitution.pdf accessed on 20/07/2013; see 
also Section 176 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No 108 of 1996 which guarantee the security of 
tenure and a prohibition on any reduction of the salaries and benefits of judges, available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf accessed on 20/07/2013. 
455
 See also Van Harten ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Schill S (ed.) 
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law(2010) 627 at 641. 
456
 See the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950 Arts. 21(3) and 23(1), Rules of European Court of 
Human Rights 1957, R. 4, 24(2)(e), 26(1) and 27; Code of Conduct of the European Court of Justice, Art. 5; Rules 
of procedure of  the European Court of Justice, Arts 6, 11(b) and 11(c), statute of the Inter American Court of 
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Chapter five and six of this work looks at the possible avenues for improvement of impartiality 
and independence of the system. It is important that justice must not only be done but be seen to 
be done. Therefore it is important for the users of the system to have trust in the system in order 
for it to earn legitimacy. It is submitted here that without ending the conflict of interest of 
arbitrators and ensuring that the safeguards for independence and impartiality are put in place, 
investment arbitration will suffer a serious blow in a near future.   
 
3.6.2.4 Lack of transparency on matters affecting the public interest 
 
Lack of transparency is yet another shortcoming of investment arbitration. The issue of 
transparency has not received the weight it deserves in the existing rules. As seen in the 
discussion hereinabove,
457
 the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 are the most restrictive in 
their provisions on confidentiality. According to Article 28(3) hearings are supposed to be held 
in camera unless the parties agree otherwise. With regard to the award, Article 34(5) provides 
that ‘the award may be made public only with the consent of both parties’. These rules make it 
clear that hearings are open to the public only if there is an agreement of the parties to this effect. 
However, as stated earlier, the new UNCITRAL Transparent Rules have extensively addressed 
the transparency issue.
458
 The Rules are meant to apply to all future treaties providing for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Human Rights, Arts 5, 18 and 25; Rome Statute of International Criminal Court 1998, Arts 36(9)(a), 39(1), 40(2) 
and (3) respectively. 
457
 See the discussion hereinabove under subheading 3.4.3. 
458
 See the discussion on the new rules under subheading 3.4.1.3.1 above 
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UNCITRAL arbitration unless the parties agree otherwise. The scope of application therefore 
extends to treaties entered into from 1 April 2014 and not for the existing 3240 BITs and IIAs.
459
 
The ICSID Convention has, to a certain extent, addressed the issue of transparency. Article 48(5) 
of the ICSID Convention provides: ‘The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent 
of the parties.’ The Arbitration Rules, as amended in 2006, also allow the publication of excerpt 
from the legal reasoning of the tribunal.
460The amendment, however, did not affect the parties’ 
autonomy as regards the publication of the award in full. To date an award cannot be published 
unless the parties agree. 
 
The amendments have also increased the opportunity for third parties to participate by way of 
submissions. This was done in response to the call for more transparency of the hearing. Article 
37(2) allows non - disputing party submission subject to the tribunal discretion. The tribunal is 
left with the mandate to accept or reject the third party submissions.  The amendment covered 
only written submissions. A non - disputing party therefore is not eligible for oral hearing. Rule 
32(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules gives the parties the power to allow or refuse third parties 
to attend or observe the hearings.
461
 
 
                                                          
459
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
460
 See Rule 48(4) of the Arbitration Rules and Article 48(5) of the Convention; see also Asteriti A & Tams CJ 
‘Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ Schill (ed.) International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 788 at 790; see also Mistelis LA ‘Confidentiality and Third 
Party Participation in Investment Arbitration’ (2005) 21 Arbitration International 205 at 221. 
461
 For more discussion see Asteriti A & Tams CJ ‘Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’ Schill S (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 787 
at 794. 
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Currently, the inclusion of non – party submissions has taken place in ICSID arbitration only. 
Other institutions are yet to take the comparable step. With exception of NAFTA arbitration, the 
non-institutional ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules continues to operate with strict 
confidentiality and no admission of third parties to hearing and award.
462
 
 
It is submitted here that confidentiality affects, to a large extent, the striving for legitimisation of 
the investor – state dispute settlement system. As the hearing and the awards are not always 
published, people do not know what cases have been decided and how the law was applied. 
Transparency creates legal certainty in the form of assuring that all cases are treated equally.
463
 It 
thus ensures predictability for its actual and potential users which in turn increases the 
confidence in the system of dispute settlement.
464
 Transparency can also be an important tool 
towards the goal of achieving consistent case law. The relevancy of transparency is even higher 
in investment disputes which regularly concern governmental measures.
465
   
 
Therefore, by looking at these provisions one can see that with the current state of confidentiality 
it is difficult for the current systems to gain public sympathy. It is important that the investor – 
state system should be transparent by allowing public access to relevant documents especially 
                                                          
462
 Asteriti A & Tams CJ ‘Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 
in Schill C (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 787 at 794. 
463
 Choudhury B ‘Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest 
contributing to the Democratic Deficit?’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 775 at 809; see also 
Spooreberg F& Vinuales V ‘conflicting decisions in International Arbitration’ Law & Practice of International 
Courts & Tribunals (2009) 91 – 113 at 107. 
464
 Choudhury B ‘Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest 
contributing to the Democratic Deficit?’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 775 at 810. 
465Knahr C and Reinisch A ‘Transparency v Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration – the Biwater 
Gauff Compromise’ Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals (2007) 97 at 115. 
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when the matter at hand affects public interest. Chapters five and six of this work discuss the 
possible ways of enhancing transparency in the international investment arbitration system. 
 
3.6.2.5 Lack of an appellate body 
 
As stated earlier, the current investment arbitration system does not provide for the right of 
appeal.
466
 The absence of an appellate body charged with rectifying errors made by the tribunal 
puts investment arbitration in a deep legitimacy crisis.
467
 Although the arbitral awards affect 
legislative, judicial and executive decisions, it is not possible to challenge the decision before a 
higher body in the hierarchy.
468
 Under the current system, decisions that are wrong as a matter of 
law are not reversible.
469
 The CMS Annulment Committee, which found an erroneous 
interpretation of Article XI of the BIT (the non - precluded measures clause) still upheld the 
award, noting that it has no standing as a court of appeal and thus could not reconsider the award 
on this ground. The Committee held: 
 
                                                          
466
 See Chapter One of this work under Subheading 1.2. 
467
 See also Reinisch A ‘The proliferation of international Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The threat of 
fragmentation vs. The promise of more effective system? Some reflections from the perspective of investment 
arbitration’ in Buffard et al (eds.) International Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation (2008)107 – 126 at 
119; Spooreberg F& Vinuales V ‘conflicting decisions in International Arbitration’ Law & Practice of International 
Courts & Tribunals (2009) 91 – 113at 95; Franck S ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 at 
1582; Mann H ‘Civil Society Perspective: what Do Key Stakeholders Expect from the International Investment 
Regime?’ in Jose Alvarez and Karl Sauvant (eds.) The Evolving International Investment Regime (2011) 22 – 29; 
Gaiger R ‘Multilateral Approach to Investment’ in Alvarez J and Sauvant K (eds.) The Evolving International 
Investment Regime (2011) 153-173; Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 – 916 at 
483 – 488. 
468
 Mann H ‘Civil Society Perspective: what Do Key Stakeholders Expect from the International Investment 
Regime?’ in Alvarez J and Sauvant K (eds.) The Evolving International Investment Regime (2011) 22-29 at 22. 
469
 See ICSID Art. 53 specifically provide that the decision of the tribunal shall be final and shall not be subjected to 
appeal. 
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‘Notwithstanding the identified errors and lacunas in the Award, it is the case in the end that the 
Tribunal applied Article XI of the Treaty. Although applying it cryptically and defectively, it 
applied it. There is accordingly no manifest excess of powers.’470 
 
In a normal appeal hearing, once the appellate court has concluded as the Annulment Committee 
did, then certainly the decision will be quashed and replaced by the appeal court’s decision. The 
Annulment Committee found errors but could not rectify them as doing so would be going 
beyond its mandate. The Committee expressed the jurisdictional differences which exist between 
an annulment committee and an appellate court. The Committee observed that if it was acting as 
a court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the award on the ground that the Tribunal gave an 
erroneous interpretation to Article XI.
471
 
 
It is submitted here that as these cases often touch upon vital matters of social policy, 
sovereignty and even democracy, and for both sides, millions and sometimes hundreds of 
millions of dollars are at stake, there is a need for a higher body in the hierarchy to rectify errors 
made by tribunals and thereby create certainty in international investment arbitration law. 
Chapters five and six of this work looks at the available appellate options and analyse critically 
which one is suitable for international investment law. 
 
 
 
                                                          
470
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8 (2005) Annulment Committee at 
paras 135-156. 
471
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/8 (2005) para 135. 
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3.6.2.6 Tribunals’ encroachment on government policy making space 
 
While it is the duty of the host state to protect foreign investment, the protection, it is submitted, 
should not hinder the host states wider policy objectives’ interests. There is a need to strike a 
balance between the foreign investor interests and other social values. Foreign investment should 
not be considered as the only means for the host state’s development. Foreign investment rules, 
therefore, should not operate to constrain the state’s ability to regulate both investment matters 
and other social values which also aim at the development of the host state. That is to say, the 
host state in its sovereign capacity should be able to make rules and adopt measures which aim at 
protecting society’s health, human rights and the surrounding environment. By so doing, the state 
will be legally discharging its sovereign duty to exercise public authority.
472
 
 
Unfortunately, however, under the current investor – state dispute settlement system, the state 
has lost the policy space it enjoyed under the principle of state sovereignty. State regulatory 
measures are being questioned by the privately constituted tribunals.
473
 The 2009 and 2010 
Annual Reports of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on the Issues of 
Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises highlight the 
                                                          
472
 See Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law’(2006) European Journal of International Law 121 at 123; see also Spear S ‘ The Quest for Policy Space in a 
New Generation of International Investment Law’(2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 1037 at 1038; 
see also Salacuse J ‘Toward a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand Bargain’ in N. Horn 
(ed.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (2004), at 68–70; see also Mann H ‘The Right of State to Regulate 
and International Investment Law: A Comment’ in UNCTAD The Development Dimensions of FDI: Policy and 
Rule Making Perspective 2003 at 216; see also Waelde T & Kolo A ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment 
Protection and Regulatory Taking in International Law’ (2004) International Comparative Law Quarterly 811 - 848 
at 811; see also  Kingsbury B ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in 
the Public Interest—the Concept of Proportionality’ in Schill S (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative 
Public Law (2010) 76 – 118. 
473
 Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 
European Journal of International Law 121 at 128. 
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implication of the current investor – state dispute settlement system to government ability to 
achieve its legitimate policy objectives. The relevant paragraph reads: 
 
‘[R]ecent experience suggests that some [investment] treaty guarantees and contract provisions 
may unduly constrain the host Government’s ability to achieve its legitimate policy objectives, 
including its international human rights obligations. That is because under threat of binding 
international arbitration, a foreign investor may be able to insulate its business venture from new 
laws and regulations, or seek compensation from the Government for the cost of compliance.’474 
 
Most BITs only provide for the protection of investor interests without addressing other social 
values. Recently a good number of decided cases challenge the host state’s basic regulatory 
functions and sometimes the state’s duty to provide public services for its citizens.475 In some 
cases the main function of the state, viz security and peace, is also challenged.
476
 Furthermore, 
state regulatory measures on environmental issues, health and other service delivery to citizens 
have been declared illegal in favour of foreign investors’ interests.477 Following hereunder is a 
                                                          
474
 Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework A/HRC/11/13, para 30 (2009); See also, Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights: Further 
Steps Towards the Operationalization of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework A/HRC/14/27, paras 20–23 
(2010), the reports can be accessed at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Reports.aspx  accessed on 
9/08/2013. 
475
 Biwater Gauff Tanzania v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22 and Azurix Corp v 
Argentina ICSID ARB/1/12 2006 (both cases concerned governed measures to protect water services). 
476
 See CMS v Argentina, Sempra v Argentina, Enron v Argentina, LG&E v Argentina respectively as discussed 
hereinabove under the sub heading 3.6.2.1.2.  
477
 See Philip Morris Asia Limited  v The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12 in 
which the claimant is suing the government of Australia for enacting a legislation which require plain cigarette 
packaging on public health reasons; See also Vattenfall AB and others v Federal Republic of Germany ICSID Case 
No ARB/12/12. The case is commenced by Vattenfall against Germany as a result of Germany’s nuclear opt-out 
decision to protect the environment and health. 
 
 
 
 
182 
 
discussion of cases in which the arbitral tribunals have encroached on the states’ regulatory 
powers. 
 
There are a number of cases in which the Tribunals have declared or are being asked to declare 
that legitimate state regulatory acts are invalid. One of these cases is Philip Morris Asia Ltd v 
The Commonwealth of Australia.
478
 In June 2011, Philip Morris Asia Limited (based in Hong 
Kong), a manufacturer, importer and distributor of cigarettes, commenced an investment treaty 
claim against Australia alleging that Australia’s plain cigarette packaging legislation, (the Plain 
Packaging Act 2011) contravenes the Australia – Hong Kong BIT.479 
The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 bans the use of cigarette companies’ logos on cigarette 
packets and replaces them with health warnings.
480
  The names of the cigarette companies are 
required to appear in the same font and size as other words on the cigarette packets.  
 
The claimant, Philip Morris Asia Limited, argues that the law is depriving it of the value of its 
investment in trademarks and other intellectual property in Australia and that this is tantamount 
to expropriation.
481
   The claim is essentially based on expropriation of intellectual property 
without compensation under Article 6 of the Australia-Hong Kong BIT and a breach of fair and 
                                                          
478
 Philip Morris Asia Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012 – 12 available at 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/851 accessed on 6/08/2013. 
479
 See Philip Morris Asia Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia para 6 of the  Notice of Claim under the Australia 
– Hong Kong Agreement dated 27/06/2011 available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0664.pdf  accessed on 6/08/2013; see also the  Notice of Arbitration para 1.2 available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0665.pdf accessed on 06/08/2013. 
480
 See Philip Morris Asia Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia, Notice of Arbitration  para 1.5 available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0665.pdf  accessed on 06/08/2013.   
481
 See Philip Morris Asia Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia, Notice of Arbitration para 1.5 – 1.7. 
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equitable treatment under Article 2(2) of the Australia-Hong Kong BIT.
482
 The claimant is 
therefore asking the Tribunal to order Australia to suspend enforcement of the Plain Packaging 
Act and to compensate the claimant for loss suffered through compliance. Alternatively, the 
claimant asks the Tribunal to order Australia to compensate it for loss suffered as a result of the 
enactment and continued application of plain packaging legislation.
483
 
 
The case is still pending and is to be adjudicated in accordance with UNCITRAL Rules 2010.
484
 
As can be gathered from the claimant’s pleadings, the Tribunal is asked to suspend the 
application of the law which was passed in accordance with the state’s regulatory powers. The 
legislation aims at protecting health, and is in line with the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
485
 Therefore Australia is not only protecting its 
citizens’ health but also fulfilling its international obligations. 
 
Another case is Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany.
486
 In May 2012 the 
Swedish energy company Vattenfall filed a request for arbitration at ICSID against the Republic 
of Germany and the Tribunal was dully constituted on 14 December 2013.
487
 The case resulted 
                                                          
482
 Philip Morris Asia Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia, Notice of Arbitration  para 1.5 
483
 See Philip Morris Asia Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia, Notice of Arbitration para 1.7. 
484
 The last Procedural Order regarding Amendment of the Timetable was issued on 31 December 2013 and is 
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1309.pdf  accessed on 06/08/2013. 
485
 See the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, (2003) 42 ILM 3, 518–539, available at 
http://www.fctc.org/about-fca/tobacco-control-treaty accessed on 20/06/2014.  The Treaty came in force on 
27/02/2005 
486
Vattenfall AB and others v Federal Republic of Germany ICSID Case No ARB/12/12 
487
 See the case procedural details available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=ListCases&caseId=C2220&acti
onVal=viewCase accessed on 07/08/2013. 
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from the Germany’s decision to opt out of nuclear energy in which the claimant has a vested 
interest. The Federal Atomic Energy Act was amended in 2011 to give effect to parliament 
decision to abandon the use of nuclear energy by 2018.
488
  
 
The consequence of the amendment of the law is that the Brunsbüttel and Krümmel nuclear 
power plants, for which Vattenfall has operating responsibility and owns 66.7% and 50%, 
respectively, may not be restarted. Vattenfall claims a breach of rights accruing from the EU 
Energy Charter Treaty.
489
 The claimant is requesting the Tribunal for an order to the tune of 
EURO 700 million.
490
 The case is still pending and the last activity on record shows that the 
Tribunal issued the first Order on procedural matters on 17
th
 July 2013.
491
 
 
In another case, Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States,
492
 the Tribunal ordered the 
respondent state, Mexico, to pay compensation amounting to USD 17 million to the claimant US 
Company, Metaclad. The order was a result of the implementation of Mexican laws on land use 
and environment protection. The laws prohibited the claimant from operating a hazardous waste 
facility in the country. The same adverse decision was taken in Santa Elena v Costa Rica.
493
 The 
Tribunal totally ignored the relevancy of a state measure to protect the environment. Dismissing 
                                                          
488
 Bernasconi – Osterwarder N & Hoffman RT ‘The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the Test in International 
Investment Arbitration?’ IISD Briefing Note June 2012 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/german_nuclear_phase_out.pdf  accessed on 07/08/2013. 
489
 The European Energy Charter available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf 
490
 Bernasconi – Osterwarder N & Hoffman RT ‘The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the Test in International 
Investment Arbitration? Background to the New Dispute’ IISD Briefing Note June 2012 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/german_nuclear_phase_out.pdf  accessed on 07/08/2013. 
491
 See the Case Procedural Details available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=ListCases&caseId=C2220&acti
onVal=viewCase accessed on 07/08/2013. 
492
 Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States (Final Award) NAFTA Chapter 11 Panel Case No ARB 
(AF)/97/1 3 August 2000. 
493
 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.ARB/96/1. 
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the respondent state’s submission that the measure was adopted to protect the environment, the 
Tribunal held: 
 
‘Expropriatory environmental measures-no matter how laudable and how beneficial to society as 
a whole-are in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measure that a state may take in 
order to implement its policies… where property is expropriated, even for environmental 
purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation 
remains.’494 
 
The South African government has also faced the adversity of the current investor – state dispute 
settlement system. Piero Foresti and others v. South Africa
495
 was launched in 2007 by the 
Italian investors challenging the South Africa Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act (MPRDA) and the Mining Charter. The claimants were alleging that the Act and the Charter 
contravene the Italy - South African BIT.
496
 The respective laws required mining companies to 
transfer a portion of their shares into the hands of Black investors.
497
 The legislation aims at 
addressing past racial discrimination arising from apartheid in South Africa. It required mining 
companies to divest themselves of a portion of their assets in order to increase indigenous 
ownership. The conditions include selling 26 percent of local mines to black investors by 2014, 
increasing the number of Black managers and improving conditions in mining communities.
498
 
The Claimants argued that giving 26 percent of their ownership is expropriation contrary to 
                                                          
494
 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.ARB/96/1, 2000 paras 
71-72 
495
 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South Africa ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/07/1. 
496
 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South Africa para 57. 
497
 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South Africa para 64. 
498
 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South Africa para 56. 
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Article 5 of the BIT.
499
 The case was discontinued in 2010 after the claimant acquired new 
licences to operate and the government reduced substantially the ownership share that was 
required for divestment.
500
   
 
Therefore, one can see from the above discussed cases that the tension is high between the state’s 
duty to protect investors’ interests and regulate on other social values. The German reaction 
against nuclear energy came as a necessary measure after the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima 
Japan. The German decision seeks to protect the environment and health of the German people. 
One would expect the Tribunal under such circumstances to grant the respective government 
deference. The South African measure, on the other hand, intended to address the economic gap 
caused by the apartheid era. The Mexican measure aimed at addressing environmental issues and 
the Australian measure intended to protect the health of its citizens. All measures are within the 
purview of a state’s power to protect. The tendency to ignore the relevance of other social values, 
environmental, human rights and health standards, undermines the legitimacy of the system and 
adds to the already accumulated backlash against investment arbitration. 
 
3.6.2.7 Expensive adjudication process 
 
The investor – state arbitration system is also condemned by stakeholders for being so 
expensive.
501
 The system is more concerned with awarding damages to the claimant and issuing 
                                                          
499
 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South Africa para 58. 
500
 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South Africa para 133. 
501
 Jagusch S & Sullivan J ‘A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and 
Concern’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 79 – 
110; see also Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International 
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Rev 1521 at 1592;see also Coe JJ ‘Toward a 
Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch’ (2005) University College 
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cost orders to the parties than reconciling the parties and creating a stable jurisprudence.
502
 The 
claims and awards are in millions of dollars. As seen earlier in CME v Czech Republic,
503
 the 
Tribunal issued a substantial total damages award in favour of CME of USD 354,655,752.
504
 
Argentina is currently faced with awards which exceed USD 430 million and pending claims to 
the tune of USD 65 billion.
505
 The amount claimed by the three majority shareholders of the 
former Yukos Oil Company in the ongoing arbitration proceedings against Russia is USD 114 
billion.
506
 
 
In addition, the costs of the proceedings are also excessive. Arbitrator’s charges range from USD 
350 – 700 per hour per arbitrator depending on the claimed dispute amount.507 The total amount 
per case therefore depends on the number of days the tribunal have sat and the complexity of the 
matter. The presiding arbitrator in Chevron and Texaco v Ecuador received USD 936,000.
508
 In 
addition to the arbitrators’ costs, the parties are required to pay their lawyers as well. The cost for 
one case ranges from USD 1 million to 21 million as most of the tribunals consist of three 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 7 at 10; see also United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report (WIR) (2012) at 88 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/WIR2012_WebFlyer.aspx   accessed  on 
14/08/2013. 
502
 Newman LW & Zaslowsky D ‘Assessing Costs in International Arbitration (2010) New York Law Journal 29. 
503
 CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic ICSID Reports 9(2001). 
504
 CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic ICSID Reports para 615. 
505
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2012 at 87; see 
also Peterson LE ‘Argentina by Numbers: Where Things Stands with Investment Treaty Claims Arising out of the 
Argentina Financial Crisis’ available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110201_9 accessed on 05/10/2013; 
see also Merco Press ‘Argentina Faces  65 billion dollars in claim: plans to abandon international litigation court’ 
28
th
 November 2012 available at http://en.mercopress.com/2012/11/28/argentina-faces-65bn-dollars-in-claims-
plans-to-abandon-international-litigations-court accessed on 08/10/2013. 
506
 See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 226; Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 227; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v The 
Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 228. 
507
 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes -ICSID) fees are set at US$3000 a day; see 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&Schedule
dFees=True&year=2012&language=English  accessed on 05/10/2013. 
508
 Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador (2011) UNCITRAL Final Award available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/ChevronEcuadorFinalAward.pdf accessed on 05/10/2013. 
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arbitrators, and there are several lawyers on both sides.
509
 The Czech Republic spent USD 10 
million to defend itself in the two cases, CME v Czech and Lauder v Czech.
510
 The UNCTAD 
World Investment Report 2010 clearly states that the costs of investor – state disputes have 
skyrocketed.
511
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the system, instead of being a tool for facilitating development 
in developing countries, has turned out to be crippling host state development initiatives. The 
awards rendered against Argentina and many other developing countries send a warning message 
to the rest of the world. It is submitted here that the system ought rather to be focussing on 
reconciling the parties than the trend it has followed now which is punitive award oriented. 
Mediation and conciliation could do much in resolving disputes amicably. It is further submitted 
that establishing a permanent adjudicative structure could cut the expenses to a large extent. The 
possible avenues for improving the system will be extensively analysed under chapters five and 
of this work. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
509
 See Franck SD ‘Rationalising Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2011) Washington University Law Review 
769 at 775 ; see also Eberhardt P & Olivert C ‘How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fueling an 
Investment Arbitration Boom’ (2012) Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute available at 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf accessed on 05/10/2013; also see 
Franck S ‘Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2007) North Carolina Law Review 
1 at 77. 
510
 Gottward E ‘Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Centre for Developing Nations in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration?’ American University International Law Review 237 – 75 at 254; see also Tienhaara 
K The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the Expense of Public Policy 
(2009) 149 – 50. 
511
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Investor – State Dispute: Prevention 
and Alternative to Arbitration’ (2010) at 16-18 available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf 
accessed on 05/10/2013. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the current investor – state dispute settlement system in detail. The 
chapter has shown that ICSID when combined with Additional Facility arbitration is the most 
utilised forum as almost two – thirds of all known investor – state disputes are settled at the 
Centre. It has also shown that UNCITRAL Rules also play a significant part as almost ninety 
percent of the remaining one - thirds is conducted under the Rules. The chapter has tried to 
analyse the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three systems under examination: ICSID 
arbitration, Additional Facility arbitration and the ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
Rules. It is evident from the analysis that there are a number of systemic flaws which call for 
immediate attention from the respective authorities. The chapter revealed the main problem in 
the system as: lack of consistency, lack of institutional safeguards for the independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators, tribunals’ encroachment on government policy making space, parallel 
proceedings involving the same parties, lack of transparency, an overly expensive adjudication 
process, and lack of an appellate body. The cases discussed in the chapter indicate the extent to 
which these problems affect the legitimacy of the system as a whole.  The analysis has also 
shown that the ICSID system has to a certain extent addressed some of the problems but that the 
UNCITRAL Rules, on the other hand, are silent on the issues. The chapter concludes that there 
are serious legitimacy issues which need to be addressed as soon as possible in order to save the 
system from the possibility of collapsing. 
The next chapter discusses the ideal features of a legitimate adjudicatory body. The chapter 
discusses the features which are missing in the current investor – state arbitration system. 
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Literature on the subject and other international adjudicative bodies’ instruments are analysed to 
see how they have addressed legitimacy issues in their systems.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
IDEAL FEATURES OF A LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIVE BODY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses and analyses the ideal features of a legitimate adjudicative system. The 
theoretical foundation of the concept ‘legitimacy’ and the steps involved in legitimising an 
adjudicatory system are discussed. It is submitted that the legitimating process requires the 
satisfaction of all parties who are to be affected by the decisions of such adjudicative body. It is 
further submitted that, while the state parties play a significant role in the creation of an 
international adjudicative body, the continuance of the legitimacy of that body depends on it 
being perceived as legitimate by ‘other stakeholders’. The ‘other stakeholders’ perception will 
depend on the adjudicative body’s imbuement of legitimacy values; transparency, impartiality, 
consistency, timeliness and accessibility. In addition, the system must be just and adhere to the 
rule of law principles. The combination of all these values makes the respective adjudicative 
system legitimate. 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section defines the key concepts and analyses 
the key indicators of a legitimate international adjudicative body. Differing scholarly analyses of 
what constitutes legitimacy are examined. The second section, which is the main part, discusses 
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in detail the ideal features/ indicators of a legitimate adjudication system. A comparative analysis 
is done to see the extent to which these indicators have been incorporated in investor – state 
arbitration and other international adjudicative bodies. The third section shows the impact of lack 
of the legitimacy values in the investor – state adjudication system. The section reveals that the 
system is lacking the legitimacy values. The last section concludes the chapter by summing up 
the general discussion and pointing out that reform is inevitable. It is submitted that the current 
system is facing a legitimacy crisis as a result of its failure to give the legitimacy attributes the 
required consideration. 
 
4.2 The meaning, relevance and indicators of legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy is defined as the basis upon which people accept or are willing to accept the legal 
order as they find it and is premised upon the idea that law should be good for, and justly serve, 
the people.
1
 It is, therefore, because the rules are perceived as legitimate that people become 
willing to be bound by them. The legitimacy perception of a rule or a system is vital to the extent 
that without it, the stakeholders will likely lose confidence and trust in the system and this 
consequently may lead to the collapse of the system itself.
2
 The power of legitimacy perception 
                                                          
1
 Hurst JW ‘Problem of Legitimacy in the contemporary legal order’ (1971) 24 Oklahoma Law Review 224 at 225; 
See also Howse R ‘Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law:  The Early Years 
of WTO Jurisprudence’ in Weiler JHH (ed.) Towards a Common Law of International Trade?:  EU, WTO and 
NAFTA (2000) 211 at 218; see also Caron DD ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’ 
(1993) American Journal of International Law 554 at 556.  
2See  Afilalo A ‘Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-)Construction of NAFTA Chapter 11’(2005) 25 
North Western Journal of International Law & Business 279; see also Brower CN ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy,(2002) 
National Law Journal 1; Brower CN et al ‘The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System (2003) 19 
Arbitration International 415; also see Van Harten G  ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the 
Rule of Law’ in Stephan Schill (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 627 – 658;  
Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990); see also Treves T ‘ Aspects of Legitimacy of Decisions 
 
 
 
 
192 
 
becomes even more important in the international arena where there is no strong coercive 
machinery. In international law, adherence to international decisions depends much on whether 
the addressee perceives the institution giving the order as legitimate or not. The relevancy of 
legitimacy in international adjudicative bodies and its indicators are discussed in the section that 
follows. 
 
4.2.1 Relevance of legitimacy in international adjudicative bodies 
 
Legitimacy of domestic adjudicative institutions is among the subjects which have generated a 
mountain of literature. However, the same cannot be said about international adjudicative 
institutions. Until the 1990s, little had been written on the need for legitimacy in international 
adjudicative institutions.
3
 It is contended that the reason for such lack of development was the 
fact that international adjudication institutions did not play a significant adjudicative role which 
would attract attention or catch an international lawyer’s eye.4  
 
However, the trend has changed recently as some of these international adjudicative institutions 
have been rendering decisions which impact on many and sometimes threaten the sovereignty of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of International Courts and Tribunals’ in Wolfrum R & Roben V (eds.) Legitimacy in International Law (2008) 169 
– 188; see also Franck TM ‘The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power Disequilibrium’ (2006) 
American Journal of International Law 88; also see D’amato A ‘On the Legitimacy of International Institutions’ in 
Wolfrum R & Roben V (eds.) Legitimacy in International Law (2008) 83 – 92. 
3
 For an insightful discussion on the historical development of legitimacy of international adjudicatory bodies see 
Bodansky D ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental 
Law’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 596 at 596. 
4
 See Bodansky D ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 596 at 597. 
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independent states.
5
 Awards rendered by these institutions, at times, exceed ten times the annual 
budget of a developing state.
6
 This new authoritative role has subsequently attracted a mountain 
of discussions on the legitimacy of international adjudicative institutions.
7
 Investor – state 
tribunals are among these new bodies which render decisions which carry greater authority and 
award huge amounts of money to investors as damages.
8
 For the purposes of this discussion 
therefore, reference to international adjudicative bodies will entail ICSID, PCA and UNCITRAL 
investor – state arbitral Tribunals.9 
 
                                                          
5
 See the following cases under chapter three of this work CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine 
Republic ICSID ARB/01/8 (final award), Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/02/16 
(final award) and Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L P v Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/3 (final 
award). In these cases Argentina sovereign regulatory decisions is being questioned by the Tribunals; see also Philip 
Morris Asia Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12 in which the claimant 
is suing the government of Australia for enacting a legislation which require plain cigarette packaging on public 
health reasons; The case is commenced by Vattenfall  as a result of Germany’s nuclear opt-out decision to protect 
the environment and public health. 
6
  The amount claimed against Russia by the three majority shareholders of the former Yukos Oil Company in the 
ongoing arbitration proceedings against Russia is USD 114 billion. See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v The 
Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226; Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, 
PCA Case No. AA 227; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 228; 
see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2013 ‘Reform of 
Investor – State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Road Map’ available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf. The figure is a ten years annual budget for the 
government of United Republic of Tanzania. The 2013/2014 Tanzania whole budget was USD 10 billion see the 
budget at http://www.pwc.com/tz/en/pdf/tanzania_budget_speech_2013_2014.pdf  accessed on 29/08/2013. 
7
 See for example Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990); see also Treves T ‘ Aspects of 
Legitimacy of Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals’ in Wolfrum R & Roben V (eds.) Legitimacy in 
International Law (2008) 169 – 188; see also Franck TM ‘The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power 
Disequilibrium’ (2006) American Journal of International Law 596 88; also see D’amato A ‘On the Legitimacy of 
International Institutions’ in Wolfrum R & Roben V (eds.) Legitimacy in International Law (2008) 83 – 92. 
8
 See for example Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The 
Republic of Ecuador ICSID Case No ARB/06/11 Award, 5 October 2012 in which the Tribunal awarded the 
investor USD 1.7 billion.  
9
 There are many other international adjudication bodies for example; the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
established under the Charter of United Nations in 1945 came into operation in April 1946 available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 accessed on 26/08/2013; the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
established by the Rome Statute 1998 came into force in July 2002 available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx accessed on 26/08/2013; the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) established by the Treaty of the European Union in 1952, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7004/ ; the African Court of Justice and Human Rights established by the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in 2006 available at http://www.african-
court.org/en/ accessed on 26/08/2013; the Inter American Court of Human Rights established in 1978  under the 
American Convention of Human Rights 1969, available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/IACHR.html  just to name 
a  few. 
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4.2.2 Indicators of legitimacy 
 
The literature indicates that for an adjudicative system to be considered legitimate, it has to 
comply with a number of criteria or values.  The number of criteria/values differs from one 
author to another. In this section, different authors’ perceptions on what constitute legitimacy, 
and indicators thereof are discussed.  
 
Nienke Grossman in her article ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ has clearly 
defined and stated the relevancy of legitimacy to international adjudicative bodies.
10
 The author 
contends that an international adjudicative body’s legitimacy depends on it being perceived as 
‘justified’ by its stakeholders.11 The author states that the legitimating process of an international 
adjudicative body is achieved through two steps. The first step is for the state to give its consent 
by ratifying the relevant treaty. This is a crucial step in legitimating as it creates the validity of 
the adjudicative body and sets out the jurisdiction of such a body. The second step does not 
evolve until the respective adjudicative body has started performing its powers in accordance 
with the mandating treaty. The second step is therefore performance centred. The adjudicative 
body is scrutinised and evaluated by the stakeholders, and the assessment is made to see whether 
it performs in accordance with the agreed normative values. According to the author, state 
ratification or consent does not in itself guarantee that the respective adjudicative body will be 
                                                          
10
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 
11
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 110. 
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perceived as legitimate by all stakeholders.
12
 According to this author, the second step which 
involves wider stakeholders’ evaluation is more crucial and important than the earlier step which 
involves state parties only. 
 
The author identifies stakeholders of an international adjudicative body to include: groups of 
experts and practitioners, domestic and international NGOs, local political parties, domestic 
policy influential groups and others who have a role to play in evaluating the legitimacy of an 
international adjudicative body. Where the respective body lacks the values which are perceived 
as relevant for the legitimating process by these other stakeholders, the government consent or 
ratification will do little to legitimise the adjudicative body.
13
  
 
The author further contends that the legitimacy perception is subject to change with time. 
Legitimacy, according to the author, is dynamic. As a result of its performance the system can 
gain or lose its legitimacy. The way the adjudicative body conducts its affairs may to a large 
extent affect its legitimacy perception.
14
  
 
                                                          
12
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 116. 
13
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 117; in support of this position see also Leornhardsen EM ‘Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring the 
Proportionality Analysis in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ at 3 available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/areas/intrel/documents/Leonhardsen_PhD-Lunch.pdf accessed on 
24/09/2013; see also Wolfrum R ‘Legitimacy in International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory 
Considerations’ in Wolfrum R & Roben V (eds.) Legitimacy in International Law (2008) 1 – 24 at 17- 20. 
14
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 117. 
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In summary, the events that follow after the state has given consent are crucial in building the 
legitimacy of an adjudicative body.
15
 The outcome of the cases, if made in accordance with the 
normative values and if not at odds with the expectation of stakeholders, will ultimately increase 
the stakeholders’ legitimacy perception of the respective adjudicative body.16  
 
In addition to the legitimating steps, Grossman also discusses the factors which are crucial in 
justifying an international adjudicative body. It is her contention that an adjudicative body is 
perceived as justified, hence legitimate, when it is influenced by the presence of three factors: 
unbiased nature of the adjudicative body, its commitment to interpret the law consistently, and 
being transparent and infused with democratic values: accountability, predictability and 
certainty.
17
 
 
The first factor, fair and unbiased process, is much concerned with the adjudicative process and 
the people involved in that process.
18
 It is concerned with the integrity, qualification, and 
selection process of those who are to be involved in the adjudication process. It is also concerned 
with the manner in which the whole process of adjudication is conducted.  
 
                                                          
15
 Leornhardsen EM ‘Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring the Proportionality Analysis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’ at 4 available at http://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/areas/intrel/documents/Leonhardsen_PhD-
Lunch.pdf accessed on 24/09/2013. 
16
 Leornhardsen EM ‘Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring the Proportionality Analysis in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’ at 9 available at http://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/areas/intrel/documents/Leonhardsen_PhD-
Lunch.pdf accessed on 24/09/2013. 
17
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 110. 
18
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 124. 
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The second factor according to her is the ability to interpret and apply the law consistently in the 
manner expected by the stakeholders.
19
 It is her contention that the basic principles governing the 
particular field of law are supposed to be interpreted and applied consistently so as to bring 
certainty and predictability. Failing this, parties will lose confidence in an adjudicative body 
which produces inconsistent decisions, ultimately leading to the loss of justifiable authority, 
hence collapse of the respective adjudicative body.
20
  
 
The third factor, according to the author, is transparency. The author contends that transparency 
of the process and the availability/access of the decisions to the stakeholders are crucial in 
building the legitimacy of an international adjudicative body.
21
 It is contended further that 
opening up to the stakeholders helps the system to build its own legitimacy. Transparency, it is 
argued, allows domestic constituencies, academics, NGOs and other stakeholders to assess the 
functioning of the adjudicative body and the individual adjudicators.
22
  
 
Thomas Franck is another writer who has extensively discussed the source of power of 
international institutions.
23
 He defines legitimacy as the perception of those addressed by a rule 
or a rule – making institution that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in 
                                                          
19
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 121. 
20
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 144. 
21
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 152. 
22
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 155. 
23
 See Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 49; see also Franck TM ‘The Power of 
Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in the Age of Power Disequilibrium’ (2006) American 
Journal of International Law   88-106. 
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accordance with generally accepted legal process.
24
 According to Franck determinacy, symbolic 
validation, coherence and adherence are the four indicators of legitimacy.
25
 
 
Determinacy as an indicator of legitimacy entails the ability of the rules to convey a clear 
message to the people who are to be affected by it. In other words, determinacy stands for clarity 
of the rules made by that particular body.
26
 It follows therefore that there is a need for the rules to 
be transparent to such an extent that people are able to foresee the outcome. According to Franck 
once there is clarity in the rule, the person affected by such a rule or decision will normally be 
inclined to follow the rule. The international adjudicative bodies therefore will only be 
considered as having determinacy if they render decisions which are clear and in accordance 
with the rules. Clarity will give such decisions the authority to be followed.
27
 
 
The second indicator of legitimacy, according to Franck, is symbolic validation.
28
 It is contended 
that people who are to be affected by any decision of a particular adjudicative body, will only 
accept to be so bound if they regard that body and its decision to be authentic.
29
 The authenticity 
of the respective body is drawn from the signals and cues of its authority. The cues of an 
adjudicative body are evidenced by the presence of the unbiased adjudicators, impartiality and 
                                                          
24
 See Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 19. 
25
 See Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 49; see also Franck TM ‘The Power of 
Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in the Age of Power Disequilibrium’ (2006) American 
Journal of International Law 88-106. 
26
 Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 84. 
27
 Franck TM Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995) at 30 – 31. 
28
 Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 91. 
29
 Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 91. 
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openness of the process.  It follows therefore that the symbolic validation of the adjudicative 
body is evidenced by these cues in its rulings and awards.  
 
The third indicator of legitimacy is coherence.
30
 Coherence essentially requires that like cases 
should be treated alike. Therefore for a rule to be considered legitimate it ought to be applied 
consistently. There should not be room for parallel conflicting decisions when the same rule is 
applied. The parties should be able to predict the outcome in instances where the case at hand has 
issues and facts similar to those of an earlier decided case. Stressing the importance of coherence 
in legitimating the rule Franck says: 
 
‘The legitimacy of a rule is determined in part by the degree to which that rule is practiced 
coherently; conversely, the degree to which a rule is applied coherently in practice will depend in 
part on the degree to which it is perceived as legitimate by those applying it.’31   
 
The last indicator of legitimacy, according to Franck, is adherence. Adherence simply requires 
that the respective adjudicative body should conduct its affairs in accordance with the 
establishing instruments.
32
 That is to say, where the institution is a creature of a treaty then it 
must follow the treaty rules in its adjudication process. An adjudicative body is therefore more 
likely to be obeyed if it operates within the framework of an organized normative hierarchy. For 
                                                          
30
 Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 142. 
31
 Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 142. 
32
 Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 184. 
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it to be considered legitimate, it is pertinent that the body should not operate beyond its 
mandate
33
  
 
In summary, Franck considers that clarity of the rules and the consistent application of the rules 
play a significant part in the legitimation of any adjudicative system. Where the rules are 
considered lacking States may withdraw from the use of the system as a whole and ultimately 
may lead to the collapse of the system itself.  
 
Daniel Bodansky has also discussed the relevance of legitimacy in international adjudicative 
bodies.
34
  The author defines legitimacy as the justification of authority.
35
 He argues that the 
authority is justified by tradition, rationality, legality, democracy and the like values. The author 
further argues that legitimacy has both sociological and normative dimensions.  
 
With regard to the sociological dimension, the author contends that an adjudicative system will 
receive more legitimacy perception if its addressees have confidence in it. It is argued that an 
international adjudicative body will need to be positively perceived by the state parties and the 
other stakeholders who are to be affected by its decisions or orders.
36
   
                                                          
33
 Franck TM The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (1990) at 184. 
34
 Bodansky DM ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance:  A coming Challenge for International 
environmental Law’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 596. 
35
 Bodansky DM ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance:  A coming Challenge for International 
environmental Law’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 596 at 601. 
36
 Bodansky DM ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance:  A coming Challenge for International 
environmental Law’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 596 at 601; see also Tyler TR ‘The psychology 
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As regard the normative dimension, Bodansky submits that where the system is founded on 
legitimacy values people will automatically support its claim of authority. Lack of such values 
renders such a body illegitimate.
37
 In other words, the system needs values in order to persuade 
people to comply with its authority. Normative legitimacy values include: impartiality, 
predictability, and legality.
38
  The author further asserts that, the transparency of the process 
involved in reaching a particular decision plays a significant role in determining whether the 
decision rendered is legitimate or not.
39
 
 
In summary, it can be said that Bodansky considers addressees’ perception of a particular system 
is crucial in building its legitimacy. He further considers the embodiment of normative values in 
the system; impartiality, transparency, legality and predictability, as pertinent for attainment of 
legitimacy. The author insists that the success of the system depends on its embodiment of 
legitimacy values.  
 
Hefter and Slaughter in their work, Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 
have also discussed the values which are necessary for a legitimate adjudicative body.
40
 In this 
work, the authors argue that legitimacy is a tool which gives the adjudicative body the ability to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of legitimacy: A relational perspective on voluntary deference to authorities’ (1997)Personality and Social 
Psychology Review  at 323. 
37
 Bodansky DM ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance:  A coming Challenge for International 
environmental Law’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 596 at 601; see also Brower CH ‘Structure, 
Legitimacy and NAFTA Investment Chapter’ (2003) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 37 at 52. 
38
 Bodansky DM ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance:  A coming Challenge for International 
environmental Law’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 596 at 602. 
39
 Bodansky DM ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance:  A coming Challenge for International 
environmental Law’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 596 at 602. 
40
 Hefter LR & Slaughter A ‘Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) Yale Law Journal 
273 – 391. 
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command acceptance and support from the community without applying force or coercive 
machinery.
41
 They argue that legitimacy is made up of impartiality, principled decision making, 
reasoned decision making and consistency of judicial decisions over time. It is further contended 
that the abovementioned values are not meant to be exhaustive but represent the necessary 
minimum values that underpin the compliance pull.
42
 The role of non - state actors in enhancing 
the legitimacy of an adjudicative system is also highlighted in this work. It is submitted that 
individuals, groups, corporations and voluntary organisations are crucial in legitimating an 
international adjudicatory body.
43
 
 
4.2.2.1 Evaluation of scholars’ arguments on legitimacy values 
 
In summary, it can be said here that, while the scholars used different terminologies, the values 
discussed are more alike than different. It can be gathered from the discussion, that there is a 
consensus among these scholars that legitimacy goes hand in hand with the imbuement of the 
normative values and the proper institutional application of the authority. According to them, it is 
the presence and embodiment of these values that gives legitimacy to an international 
adjudicative system. 
 
                                                          
41
 Hefter LR & Slaughter A ‘Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) Yale Law Journal 
273 at 284. 
42
 Hefter LR & Slaughter A ‘Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) Yale Law Journal 
273 at 284. 
43
 Hefter LR & Slaughter A ‘Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) Yale Law Journal 
273 at 288. 
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With regard to differences, it can be concluded here that the above authors’ scope of analysis on 
the legitimation process and values have some differences but the differences are hardly 
significant. Grossman is of the opinion that legitimacy is a two - step process which involves 
having the rules in place followed by the respective institution applying the rules in a manner 
that the stakeholders perceive as appropriate, and thus are ready to be bound by the institution’s 
authority. Franck, on the other hand, has a narrow definition of legitimacy. According to him 
legitimacy is mainly centred on the clarity and consistency of the application of the rules. 
Therefore, Franck’s legitimacy is centred on clarity of the rules. On the other hand, and in 
agreement with Grossmann, Bodansky argues that legitimacy is based on two processes: the 
rationality of the rules and the performance of the respective institution. To him the attitude of 
the stakeholders, which depends on the proper application of the values, plays a central role in 
the legitimation process. Hefter and Slaughter are also, to a large extent, in agreement with 
Grossmann and Bodansky that the existence of values and the performance of the institution, 
over time, are at the centre of the legitimation process. However, Hefter and Slaughter in their 
work go further and state that impartiality, reasoned decision making and consistency of judicial 
decisions are not meant to be exhaustive but represent the necessary minimum values that 
underpin the compliance pull. Therefore it can be concluded here that Hefter and Slaughter 
opens up a room for the existence of other legitimacy values. 
 
This research is in agreement with Hefter and Slaughter that consistency, transparency and 
impartiality are not the only legitimacy values which need to be embodied in an international 
adjudicative body. It is submitted here that the works discussed above have not been exhaustive 
enough and have left out other important legitimacy values. This research submits that in 
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addition to the discussed values, cost efficiency and timeliness constitute other important 
legitimacy values. For an adjudicative system to be perceived as legitimate, it also needs to be 
accessible and affordable to all stakeholders, rich and poor. The costs of filing a case and 
adjudicating the same should be reasonable and should not be a deterring factor to the poor.
44
 In 
addition, the adjudicative system needs also to develop a timeframe within which the dispute has 
to be resolved. It is important that the dispute should not drag on in the adjudication machinery 
for years. Parties will perceive a system as legitimate where they can predict or know beforehand 
how long the dispute will take.
45
 
 
Therefore, in conclusion, it can be said here that, in addition to transparency, consistency and 
impartiality, the adjudicative system’s legitimacy also depends on it being accessible in terms of 
costs and having a convenient timeframe for resolving disputes. The latter two factors increase 
the legitimacy of an adjudicative system as much as consistency, transparency and independent 
and impartial adjudicators do. These values will be discussed further at a later stage of this 
chapter to see how they have been incorporated in the current investor – state arbitration system. 
In the section that follows the relationship between legitimacy, justice and the rule of law is 
discussed. 
 
                                                          
44
 For the same argument see also Coe JJ Jr ‘Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim 
Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, (2003)36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1381. 
45
 For more on this see Raviv A ‘Achieving a Faster ICSID’ (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute Management at 1 
available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2066  accessed on 26/03/2014; see 
also see also Sinclair A et al ‘ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?’ Global Arbitration Review available at 
http://www.goldreserveinc.com/documents/ICSID%20arbitration%20%20How%20long%20does%20it%20take.pdf  
accessed on 18/07/2013. 
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4.2.3 The relationship between legitimacy, justice and the rule of law 
 
The above discussion has revealed that for an adjudicative system to be considered legitimate, it 
requires to possess basic values: consistency, transparency, impartiality, cost efficiency and 
timeliness. The same values stands for justice and the rule of law. The relationship can be 
evidenced by a number of international instruments. 
 
The Preamble to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires adjudicators to settle 
disputes in accordance with the minimum standard of justice.
46
 The Convention however does 
not define what constitutes ‘minimum standard of justice’.  
 
Another international instrument, the UN Charter, demands an adjudication process to adhere to 
the principles of justice.
47
 Article 1(1) of the Charter requires collective measures from member 
states to ensure that disputes are settled in accordance to the principles of justice. In addition, 
Article 2 (3) demands international disputes to be settled in the manner that do not endanger 
international peace, security and justice.
48
 
 
                                                          
46
 See paragraph 5 of the Preamble to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 UNTS Vol 1155/2005. 
The Convention is available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3
&lang=en accessed on 06/10/2013. 
47
 See Charter of the United Nations 1945 available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ accessed on 
06/10/2013. 
48
 See Articles 1(1) and 2(3) of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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It is submitted here that ‘minimum standard of justice’ and the ‘principles of justice’ entail 
adhering to rule of law principles viz; hearing both parties, impartiality of the adjudicators, 
resolving the dispute within a reasonable timeframe, transparency of the adjudication process, 
cost efficient adjudication process, certainty and consistency of the outcome on alike cases.  
 
It follows therefore that values defining legitimacy and justice are similar and complement each 
other and both emanate from the principles of rule of law. Rule of law, as a concept, has received 
contested interpretation.
49
 For the purposes of this work the UN Security Council definition will 
be the working definition. The UN Security Council has defined the concept the rule of law as 
follows: 
 
‘For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to 
ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-
making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.’50 
 
                                                          
49
  See Dicey AV Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 2ed. (1959) 181 – 205; see also Fallon RH 
‘The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) Columbia L. Rev 1 at 1; but see Fuller LL The 
Morality of Law (1964) 42 – 44; see also Waldron J ‘Kanti’s Legal Positivism’ (1996) Harvard Law Review 1535 at 
1536 – 1538. 
50
 See UNSC the Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies S /2004/616 of 23/08/2004 available at http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/ accessed on 26/08/2013.  
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From the definition above, it can be concluded that an adjudicative body will be considered 
legitimate and within the rule of law if it is transparent, consistent, presided over by independent 
and impartial adjudicators, cost efficient and resolves disputes within a reasonable timeframe. As 
discussed earlier, these are the same values which are core in defining justice and legitimating an 
adjudicative system. 
 
In the section that follows, these values are extensively discussed. An analysis is made to see the 
extent to which these values are incorporated in investor – state arbitration and other 
international adjudicative bodies. It is concluded that in order to improve the legitimacy 
perception there is a need to enhance the incorporation of these values in the investor – state 
adjudication system. 
 
4.3 Transparency 
 
Transparency, as pointed out above, plays a significant role in legitimating public law 
adjudication machinery.  As early as 1790, Jeremy Bentham, a great philosopher, had this to say 
about the danger of confidentiality in public disputes: 
 
‘In the darkness of secrecy, sinister and evil in every shape shall have full swing ... Where there is 
no publicity, there is no justice. Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to 
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exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself, while trying, 
under trial.’51 
 
In 1924, the Chief Justice of England in  Rex v. Sussex Justices, in the same spirit of advocating 
transparency in dispute settlement, introduced a very famous legal principle which states: 
‘Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’52 
Eight decades later in 2001, The New York Times ran an article which contained the following 
famous paragraph against confidentiality in the sphere of investor – state arbitration: 
 
‘Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown. The decisions they reach need 
not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a small group of international tribunal’s handles disputes 
between investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being revoked, justice 
systems questioned and environmental regulations challenged. And it is all in the name of 
protecting the rights of foreign investors under the North American Free Trade Agreement.’53 
 
                                                          
51
 As quoted in Marshall F ‘Defining New Institutional Options for Investor – State Dispute Settlement’ (2009) 
International Institute for Sustainable Development at 22 available at 
http://www.iisd.org%Fdefining_new_institutional_options.pdf accessed on 28/08/2013. 
52
 (1924)1KB 256 at 259. 
53
 De Palma A ‘NAFTA Powerful Little Secrets: Obscure Tribunal Settle Dispute but Go Too Far Critics Say’ The 
New York Times 11/03/2001 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-
obscure-tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm accessed on 28/08/2013; see also 
Van Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 160. 
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In the same year, the Tribunal in Methanex v United States, recognising the importance of 
transparency over confidentiality, observed that the arbitral process has more to gain by opening 
up to the public than remaining secretive.
54
 
 
From the foregoing, it can be said that there is a need for transparency in public interest dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Transparency as a principle requires the public to have access to the 
whole process of adjudication especially when the adjudication involves public law or regulatory 
powers.
55
 It is through transparency that parties to a dispute are able to determine and assess 
whether the adjudicative body exercised fairness to both parties. Parties will only be able to trust 
the system when they are able to evaluate its operations.
56
 Transparency is also a principle which 
can be used in assessing good governance and accountability of a public adjudicative body. It 
requires the hearing to be conducted in the presence of the public subject to specific exceptions 
which may be relevant to protect the interests of the parties. It is contended that ‘transparency is 
a precondition of both accountability and independence in adjudication’.57 
 
                                                          
54
 Methanex Corporation v. United States UNCITRAL Rules Decision of the Tribunal on petitions from third 
persons to intervene as amici curiae 15 January 2001 p. 22, para 49 available at http://italaw.com/cases/683 
accessed on 28/08/2013. 
55
 See also Van Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 159; see also Knahr C & Reinisch 
A ‘Transparency v Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration – the Biwater Gauff Compromise’ (2007) 
Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 97 – 118 at 110; see also Asteriti A & Tams CJ ‘Transparency 
and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Schill (ed.) International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 787 – 815. 
56
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 156. 
57
 Van Harten G Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 159; see also Meron T ‘Judicial 
Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals’ (2005) American Journal of International 
Law359 at 360. 
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The need for transparency in investor – state disputes is even greater for a number of reasons: 
The first reason is that the mere fact that one of the parties to the dispute is a state renders the 
dispute public. The general public is entitled to know how the state is operating and discharging 
its public powers. The second reason is that an investor – state dispute mainly touches upon 
crucial economic sectors such as mining, energy, transportation, and the like. These sectors 
attract huge sums from the national budget; it is therefore understandable that the public need to 
be well informed about the proceedings and the outcome of the disputes which touch upon vital 
economic sectors. The third and last reason is that international investment law, as a branch of 
public international law, needs to be developed in a systematic way by being certain and 
predictable. This goal cannot be achieved in a system which is grounded in confidentiality.  
Certainty and predictability will only be achieved where the tribunals have access to previously 
decided cases; hence being able to develop consistency which would ultimately create certainty 
and predictability.  
 
There are different ways which can be used to enhance transparency in any adjudicatory system. 
The first way is by making public the documents of the arbitral proceedings. The tribunal can 
make available for public inspection the names of litigants and arbitrators, the pleadings of each 
party, and the award and reasoning of the tribunal.
58
Another possible way of increasing 
transparency is by allowing an amicus curiae in a dispute. The amicus curiae could be 
                                                          
58
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 155. 
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incorporated so as to represent the interests of third parties to the dispute. Alternatively the 
adjudicatory body could allow third parties to participate directly in the open hearing.
59
 
 
While it may be argued that total transparency may be detrimental to the foreign investor’s trade 
secrets, it is submitted here that transparency can be achieved without compromising the 
business or trade interests of the foreign investors. The system, while transparent, can still 
provide for the necessity of protecting specific trade secrets.
60
 
 
The advantages of transparency are many and beneficial to the system as a whole. Transparency 
acts as a controlling tool for adjudicators’ behaviour.61 The fact that arbitrators are aware that the 
public has access to their decisions and are able to scrutinise each arbitrator’s reasoning will 
ultimately increases the quality of the awards. Arbitrators will be assiduous enough before 
rendering the award in order to avoid public humiliation resulting from poorly reasoned awards. 
 
In addition, transparency helps the masses to evaluate the conduct of their governments through 
the pleadings and other court submissions. Through submissions, awards and other court 
proceedings, the public will be better informed about the conduct of their government; hence 
capable to decide whether to extend the tenure of that government or not. 
                                                          
59
 Marshall F ‘Defining New Institutional Options for Investor – State Dispute Settlement’ (2009) International 
Institute for Sustainable Development at 22 available at 
http://www.iisd.org%Fdefining_new_institutional_options.pdf accessed on 28/08/2013. 
60
 See Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty based Investor – State Arbitration, 2013 which 
specifically bars publication of certain business information. 
61
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 155. 
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Furthermore, transparency results in public confidence in the respective adjudicatory system. 
Through transparent processes the system will be able to build itself, as the parties using it will 
be aware of the procedure applied consistently in all disputes.
62
 
 
Another advantage of transparency is that it can be used as a deterring mechanism against 
frivolous claims from the potential claimants.
63
 The potential claimant will not be willing to 
institute a claim in an open and transparent forum before weighing the consequences thereof. 
The foreign investor in that matter will only bring a dispute if it has a genuine claim and finds 
that trade secrets protection is not as advantageous as the claim in an open court or forum. 
 
Lastly, transparency is a very useful tool for achieving consistency by the respective adjudicatory 
body. The availability of prior decided cases which have a similarity with the new ones could be 
very helpful for the presiding tribunal to arrive at more or less similar conclusions; hence 
enhancing certainty and predictability in the investor – state dispute settlement system.64 
 
 
                                                          
62
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 156. 
63
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 155. 
64
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 159. 
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4.3.1 Transparency in the current investor – state adjudicative system 
 
Lack of transparency is one of the shortcomings of investor - state arbitration. The issue of 
transparency has not received the weight it deserves in the existing rules. As seen in the 
discussion in chapter three of this work,
65
 the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 are the most 
restrictive in their provisions on confidentiality.
66
 Article 28(3) requires the hearings to be held 
in camera unless the parties agree otherwise. With regard to the award, article 34(5) provides that 
‘the award may be made public only with the consent of both parties’. These rules make clear 
that hearings are open to the public only if there is an agreement of the parties to this effect. 
Therefore, the UNCITRAL Rules are clearly against transparency as they do not allow disclosure 
of the existence of the proceedings, disclosure of the pleadings and other documents filed in the 
proceedings, open hearings and disclosure of the awards.
67
 
 
It should be noted however that, with the coming into force of the new UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules 2013 in April 2014, the stated above issues will no longer be a problem for 
disputes which will arise from the future negotiated treaties. The new Rules are meant to apply to 
future treaties which will designate UNCITRAL Rules for dispute settlement.
68
 The current 
existing 3240 BITs and IIAs
69
 will not be affected that much unless the parties to a dispute 
                                                          
65
 See sub heading 3.5.2.4 of Chapter three of this work. 
66
 See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010 available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/arbitration/rules/arb-rules-revised-
2010 accessed on 15/07/2013. 
67
 See Article 28(3) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010. 
68
 See Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, 2013. 
69
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
 
 
 
 
214 
 
decide to opt for the new Rules.
70
 Without such choice by the parties, the UNCITRAL 2010 
Rules will continue to apply to all disputes emanating from treaties signed before 1April 2014. 
Therefore in conclusion it can be said that while the new rules have to a large extent addressed 
the transparency issue, the problem is not yet solved for the current existing 3240 BITs and 
IIAs.
71
 
 
The ICSID Convention, on the other hand, as discussed earlier,
72
 has to a large extent addressed 
the issue of transparency. Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention provides: ‘The Centre shall not 
publish the award without the consent of the parties.’73 The Arbitration Rules, as amended in 
2006, also allow the publication of excerpts from the legal reasoning of the tribunal.
74
However, 
as pointed out earlier,
75
 the amendment did not affect the parties’ autonomy with regard to the 
publication of the award in full. To date an award cannot be published unless the parties agree. 
 
The amendments have also increased the opportunities for third parties to participate by way of 
submissions. This was done in response to the call for more transparency to the hearing. Article 
37(2) allows non - disputing party submission subject to the tribunal’s discretion. The tribunal 
                                                          
70
 For a thorough discussion on the new Transparency Rules see Subheading 3.4.1.3.1 of chapter three of this work. 
71
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
72
 See Chapter Three of this research under subheading 3.6.2.4. 
73
 The Washington Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and the Nationals of  Other 
Contracting States, 1965 hereinafter referred “the ICSID Convention”  read together with the Rules of  Procedure 
for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings (hereinafter ICSID Rules)  available at  
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid.htm   accessed on 21/05/2013. 
74
 See Rule 48(4) of the Arbitration Rules and Article 48(5) of the Convention; see also Asteriti A & Tams CJ 
‘Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ Schill (ed.) International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 788 at 790; see also Mistelis LA ‘Confidentiality and Third 
Party Participation in Investment Arbitration’ (2005) 21 Arbitration International 205 at 221. 
75
 See Chapter Three of this research under subheading 3.6.2.4. 
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has the mandate to accept or reject the third party submissions.  The amendment covered only 
written submissions. A non - disputing party therefore is not eligible for oral hearing. Rule 32(2) 
of the ICSID Arbitration Rules gives the parties the power to allow or refuse third parties to the 
hearing of the proceedings.
76
 
 
Therefore, by looking at the ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules it can be said that more transparency 
is required. The amendments, while they are considered a step forward, have not addressed the 
problem entirely. There is still a need to have the investor – state awards accessible by the 
general public as soon as they are rendered. Also, there is a need to allow the public to attend the 
hearing of the disputes involving public interests.  
 
4.3.2 The trend towards transparency in other international institutions and instruments 
 
As noted in the preceding discussion, transparency is vital where the dispute involves public 
interests. In an effort to enhance transparency some BITs and some IIAs have been reviewed to 
incorporate the transparency principle. The section below discusses the initiatives taken by 
countries and regional blocks in an effort to enhance transparency in their investor – state 
adjudicative processes. 
 
                                                          
76
 For more discussion see Asteriti A & Tams CJ ‘Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’ Schill (ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 787 at 
794. 
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4.3.2.1 Transparency under the Northern America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
 
The State parties to the Northern America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were the first trade 
block to introduce transparency in their investment disputes. Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is silent 
on the issue of transparency of investment disputes as there is no provision which requires the 
parties to make public the proceedings and the award.
77
 This resulted to the public and civil 
societies’ reaction against NAFTA.78 As a result, the NAFTA state parties in 2001 through the 
Free Trade Commission (FTC) issued a Statement of Interpretation regarding proceedings under 
NAFTA. The Commission’s Statement allows the parties to any NAFTA proceeding to provide 
access to documents issued by, or submitted to, the tribunal. In addition, the Statement requires 
the documents to be in the public domain as soon as possible.
79
 The interpretative note, while 
receiving a mixed reaction from stakeholders, has helped a lot in increasing transparency in 
NAFTA arbitrations.
80
  
 
                                                          
77
 See the NAFTA Text at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/nafta.pdf accessed on 9/08/2013. 
78
 See the Public Citizen publications against NAFTA Chapter Eleven at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.PDF. ; see also De Palma A ‘NAFTA Powerful Little Secrets: Obscure 
Tribunal Settle Dispute but Go Too Far Critics Say’ The New York Times 11/03/2001 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-obscure-tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-
too-far.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm accessed on 28/08/2013. 
79
 See the NAFTA Free Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation of 31
st
 July 2001, para 1(a) & (b) available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/NAFTA-
Interpr.aspx  accessed on 28/08/2013. 
80
 See the positive Tribunal’s reaction on the FTC Note in ADF Group Inc. v. United States ICSID No. ARB 
(AF)/00/1(2003) para 177; but see the negative reaction by the Tribunal in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada para. 11 – 
16 & 47 (NAFTA Ch. 11 May 31, 2002), 41 ILM 1347 (2002); see also Roberts A ‘Powers and Persuasions in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Dual Roles of States’ (2010) The American Journal of International Law 179 at 
180- 81; also see Brower CH ‘Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA 
Article 1105’(2006) Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 347; also see Weiler T ‘NAFTA Investment Law in 
2001: As the Legal Order Starts to Settle, the Bureaucrats Strike Back’ (2002) 36 International Law  345 at 346–48. 
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As a result of the Interpretative Statement the Tribunal in ADF Group Inc v United States
81
  read 
in the interpretative note and concluded that disputes under Chapter 11 of NAFTA can be held in 
open court and that the treaty parties can provide public access to documents submitted to or 
issued by a Chapter 11 tribunal.
82
 In addition, in Methanex v United States,
83
  the tribunal allowed 
the amicus curiae brief and stated that the arbitral process has more to gain by opening up to the 
public than remaining secretive.
84
 
 
4.3.2.2 Transparency under the United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
The United States is one of the few countries that have taken steps to enhance the transparency 
principle in their model BITs. The US 2004 Model BIT requires the host state to publicise 
pleadings, orders, awards and any preliminary decision rendered by the presiding tribunal. The 
Model BIT also requires the hearing to be conducted in an open court and arrangements to be 
made to secure confidential business information.
85
 The New US Model BIT 2012 also provides 
for transparency of the arbitral proceedings. Article 29 requires the respondent state to publish 
the notice of arbitration, parties’ pleadings, memorials decisions and awards. The provision 
further requires the proceedings to be conducted in an open court.
86
 With regard to an amicus 
                                                          
81
 ADF Group Inc v United States ICSID No. ARB (AF)/00/1. 
82
 See ADF Group Inc v United States ICSID No ARB (AF)/00/1(2003) para 177. 
83
 Methanex Corporation v United States UNCITRAL Rules available at http://italaw.com/cases/683 accessed on 
28/08/2013. 
84
 Methanex Corporation v United States UNCITRAL Rules Decision of the Tribunal on petitions from third 
persons to intervene as amici curiae 15 January 2001 p. 22, para 49 available at http://italaw.com/cases/683 
accessed on 28/08/2013. 
85
 See the US Model BIT 2004 article 29(1) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/Section_Index.html  accessed on 28/08/2013. 
86
 See the US Model BIT 2012 article 29(2) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf accessed on 
28/08/2013. 
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curiae submission, Article 28(3) clearly provides that the Tribunal shall have the authority to 
accept submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.
87
 
 
As a result of the Model BITs, the Dominican Republic – Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA),
88
 the US - Australia Free Trade Agreement,
89
 the US - Chile Free Trade 
Agreement,
90
 and  the recent agreements with Colombia, Korea, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru, 
Rwanda and  Singapore all provides for transparency of investor – state disputes.91 
 
4.3.2.3 Transparency under the Canadian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
 
Canada, as well, has incorporated the principle of transparency in its Model BIT. The 2004 
Canadian Model BIT makes it mandatory that the hearing should be conducted in a public place 
saves for some measures which can be taken to protect confidential business information.
92
 All 
documents submitted to, or issued by, the tribunal need to be publicly available, unless the 
disputing parties agree otherwise.
93
 Non - disputing party submissions are allowed under Article 
39(1). The non -disputing party is required to apply for leave to file a submission. The tribunal is 
                                                          
87
 See Article 28(3) of the US Model BIT 2012. 
88
 See the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement of 05/08/2004 available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-
fta/final-text accessed on 26/02/2014. 
89
 See the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 01/01/2005 available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text accessed on 26/02/2014. 
90
 See the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement of 01/01/2004 available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta accessed on 26/02/2014.    
91
 See these FTAs at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements accessed on 26/02/2014. 
92
 See Article 38(1) of the Canadian Model BIT 2004 available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf.accessed on 28/08/2013. 
9393
 See Article 38 (3) of the Canadian Model BIT 2004. 
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required to grant permission unless it is of the view that the submission will disrupt the hearing 
or unnecessarily burden or prejudice one of the parties.
94
 
 
The Model BIT’s intentions have been reflected in many trade agreements that Canada has 
entered into with other countries. The Canadian agreements with Colombia
95
, Peru,
96
 Panama
97
 
and Jordan
98
 all provides for transparency in investor – state disputes. The recently concluded 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada also 
provide for transparency.
99
 Rule 39 of the CETA Rules of Procedure and Code of Conduct 
clearly provide that hearing shall be open to the public.
100
 
 
In conclusion, it can be submitted here that very few of the existing BITs and IIAs provide for 
the requirement of transparency in disputes proceedings and awards. Only a few states have 
taken steps to rectify this anomaly. The arbitral institutional rules are, as well, not properly 
addressing this important aspect. As seen above, the UNCITRAL and ICSID Rules mandate the 
parties to decide whether their dispute should be public or not. While the state may be willing to 
go public, that desire most of the time is blocked by the investor who normally prefers 
                                                          
94
 See Article 39(5) of the Canadian Model BIT 2004. 
95
 See the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement of  21/11/2008 came into force on 15/08/2011 available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca accessed on 26/02/2014 
96
 See the Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments came into force 01/08/2009 available at http://www.international.gc.ca. 
accessed on 26/02/2014. 
97
 See the Free Trade agreement between Canada and Panama  available at http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-
texte.aspx?id=105128&lang=eng accessed on 26/02/2014. 
98
 See the Agreement Between Canada and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments of 28/06/2009 came into force on 01/10/2012 available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca accessed on 26/02/2014. 
99
 See  the EU – Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf accessed on 11/11/2014. 
100
 See CETA, Rules of Procedure and Code of Conduct made under Article 14:15 of the CETA available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf accessed on 12/11/2014. 
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confidentiality of the proceedings. If transparency is to be achieved there is a need for a 
deliberate move towards renegotiating the current BITs and the institutional rules so as to include 
transparency aspects. The current situation where only few states, such as, the US and Canada 
have taken such steps will not help much in building a legitimate investor – state adjudicatory 
system. 
4.4 Independence and impartiality 
4.4.1 The Meaning of the concepts independence and impartiality 
 
For adjudication purposes, the term ‘independence’ refers to the absence of improper 
connections with either party while impartiality refers to lack of prejudgment on the matter 
before hand.
101
 The requirement for independent and impartial adjudicators stems from one of 
the cardinal principles of natural justice: the rule against bias. The rule requires that no one 
should preside over any matter where he/she has an interest in the outcome.
102
 The essence of the 
rule against bias, therefore, is to eliminate all possible doubts in the adjudication process. It is 
just logical to conclude that even an independent adjudicator is not expected to be impartial in a 
situation where his interests are at stake.
103
 The rule is essentially concerned with appearance and 
                                                          
101
 See Park WW ‘Arbitrator Integrity’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: 
Perception and Reality (2010)189 -251 at 194; see also Malintopi L ‘ Remarks on Arbitrators Independence, 
Impartiality and Duty of Disclosure’ (2008) Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 351 at 353; also 
see Sheppard A ‘Arbitrator Independence in ICSID Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment 
Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christopher Schreuer (2009) 131 – 156 at 131. 
102
 For a thorough discussion on this principle see Herling D& Lyon A The Briefcase on Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 4ed. (2004) at 149; see also Stott D& Felix A Principles of Administrative Law (1997) at 142; 
see also Barnet H Constitutional and Administrative Law 4ed. (2002) at 898; also see Alder J General Principles of 
Constitutional and Administrative Law 4ed. (2002) at 393; see also Hawke N & Parpworth N Introduction to 
Administrative Law (1998) at 165. 
103
 See Scheuer C The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001) at 57. 
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no proof of actual bias is required. This is in accordance with the old adage which requires that 
justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.
104
  
 
The appearance of bias can be drawn by applying two tests: the real likelihood test and the 
reasonable suspicion test.
105
 The reasonable suspicion test is much concerned with the 
appearance of bias in the context of public perception. On the other hand, the real likelihood test 
is concerned with whether bias is likely in light of all the circumstances.
106
  
 
It follows therefore that the mere presence of financial or personal interest, even where it does 
not result in actual bias but may present the appearance of bias, is sufficient to disqualify the 
adjudicator from presiding over the matter.
107
 The aim of this rule is to build confidence in the 
integrity of the decision making process.
108
 The rule against bias, therefore, operates against a 
direct personal financial interest, personal connection with a party and prior expressed personal 
opinion on the belief or conduct of one of the parties.
109
 
 
4.4.2 Independent and impartial adjudicators in the international adjudicative systems 
 
As stated in the introduction of this part, having independent and impartial adjudicators is 
another key element of a legitimate adjudication system. Independence and impartiality of the 
                                                          
104
 See R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy (1924) Kings Bench p 259. 
105
 See Herling D& Lyon A The Briefcase on Constitutional and Administrative Law 4ed. (2004) at 149; also see 
Barnet H Constitutional and Administrative Law 4ed. (2002) at 898. 
106
 See Alder J General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law 4ed. (2002) at 395. 
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 Barnet H Constitutional and Administrative Law 4ed. (2002) at 899; see also Stott D& Felix A Principles of 
Administrative Law (1997) at 144. 
108
 See Alder J General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law 4ed.(2002) at 393 
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 Park WW ‘Arbitrator Integrity’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perception 
and Reality (2010)189 -251 at 195. 
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people involved in settling the dispute are crucial for the legitimacy of the system itself. In all 
modern constitutional democracies, independence and impartiality of adjudicators is guaranteed 
by the independence of the judiciary.
110
 It follows therefore that an adjudicative system which 
lacks independence and impartiality of its adjudicators among its basic values will hardly be 
regarded as legitimate.
111
 To guarantee independence and impartiality of adjudicators there are a 
number of safeguards which the adjudication system needs to embody. These include the 
safeguards for the tenure of adjudicators and guarantee of adjudicators’ emoluments and 
remunerations.
112
  
 
The presence of these safeguards ensures the independence and impartiality of adjudicators in 
different ways. Because of the security of tenure, adjudicators are expected to adjudicate matters 
without fear or favour as their employment is already secure. It is further expected that as their 
emoluments and remuneration are already determined and not subjected to alteration, they will 
be impartial as they have nothing to lose financially. 
 
                                                          
110
 See  Van Harten G ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Schill S (ed.) 
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 627 at 640; also see Sheppard A ‘Arbitrator 
Independence in ICSID Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: 
Essays in Honour of Christopher Schreuer (2009) 131- 156 at 131;see also Van Harten ‘Five justifications for 
investment treaties: A critical discussion’ (2008) Trade Law & Development 1; see also Van Harten G Investment 
Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 167 – 168; see also Bernasconi – Osterwalder N et al ‘Arbitrator 
Independence and Impartiality: Examining the dual role of arbitrator and counsel’(2010) International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) at pp 1 – 2 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_arbitrator_independence.pdf accessed on 11/08/2013. 
111
 Van Harten G ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Stephan Schill (ed.) 
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 627 at 640. 
112
 See Article 2 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary UNGA Res 40/32 (1985) available 
at http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?d=2248  accessed on 02/09/2013; see also Van Harten G ‘Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Schill S (ed.) International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (2010) 627 at 641. 
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To establish the neutrality of the adjudicator may not be easily achieved. The International Bar 
Association (IBA) has developed guidelines for assessing the neutrality of the adjudicators. The 
Guidelines are not mandatory but they are very useful to assess the impartiality and 
independence of adjudicators.
113
 In the following section the Guidelines are discussed 
thoroughly. 
4.4.3 The International Bar Association (IBA) guidelines on conflict of interest in  
           international arbitration.  
 
Responding to the growing concerns about impartiality in international arbitration, in 2002 the 
International Bar Association (IBA) formed a working group to formulate the Guidelines on 
Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration. The Guidelines were adopted in May 2004.
114
 
The Guidelines were designed to apply in international arbitration. They may be used by any 
institution involved in international arbitration.
115
 
 
The Guidelines aim at ensuring that arbitrators who preside in international disputes are ethical 
and neutral. The Guidelines contain two main parts. The first part contains the general standards 
regarding impartiality, independence and duty to disclose, and their respective explanations.
116
 
The second part contains possible situations in which the arbitrator may find himself/herself 
when approached for appointment. 
                                                          
113
 See Scherer M ‘The IBA guidelines on conflicts of interest in international arbitration: The first five years 2004–
2009’ (2010) Dispute Resolution Journal at 28–29; also see Sheppard A ‘Arbitrator Independence in ICSID 
Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of 
Christopher Schreuer (2009) 131 – 156 at 136.   
114
 The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 2004 available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#conflictsofinterest accessed 
on 04/09/2013. 
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 See Wijnen OW et al ‘Background Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration’ Business Law International 5 (2004) 433 at 433.  
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In the first part, General Standard 1 provides for the fundamental requirement that an arbitrator 
must be independent and impartial from the time of appointment up until the dispute comes to an 
end. This requirement is unconditional and the arbitrator is obliged to ensure that he remains so 
for the whole period of the dispute. Therefore, any doubt about independence and impartiality 
needs to be addressed as soon as it emerges. The arbitrator needs to do a personal assessment as 
to whether there are any circumstances which create a doubt or doubts about his impartiality or 
independence.
117
 Upon such assessment the arbitrator is required to disclose immediately any 
justifiable doubt about his/her impartiality and independence.
118
 Failure to make such a 
disclosure will entitle the appointing authority or the parties to disqualify such arbitrator.
119
 It 
follows therefore that the duty to disclose any doubt is absolute. General Standard 4 to 7 all 
stress the importance of disclosure and the consequences of lack thereof. All in all the General 
Standards expound the importance of the adjudicators to be as independent and impartial as 
possible. 
 
The second part of the Guidelines, as earlier stated, contains possible situations in which the 
arbitrator may find himself/herself when approached for appointment. These situations are 
divided into three categories: red, orange and green. The green category represents situations in 
which the potential arbitrator is free from any possible doubt and therefore he/she is a perfect 
candidate for the job. The orange category lists situations where the parties may cast some doubt 
on the independence and impartiality of the prospective arbitrator. The red category which is 
divided into: waiveable and non - waiveable situations, lists situations which, on the face of it, 
                                                          
117
 See General Standard 2(a). 
118
 See General Standard 3(a) & (d). 
119
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indicate that the prospective arbitrator cannot be independent and impartial.
120
 The practical 
implication of the categories is that in a non - waiveable situation the prospective arbitrator must 
decline the appointment. The red category’s waiveable and the orange category situations, on the 
other hand, require the potential arbitrator to disclose a relationship so as to allow the parties to 
ascertain the risks involved.
121
 The main difference between the red category’s waivable 
situations and orange category situations is that the former require the parties to make an express 
waiver while the latter give the parties the right to raise an objection to the appointment within 
30 days. 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that although the IBA Guidelines are not binding, they could be an 
important tool in ensuring the independence and impartiality of adjudicators if they are borrowed 
and applied. The Guidelines can help a lot in curing the problem of dual roles of arbitrators and 
counsel in investor – state arbitrations. Duality would be considered to create a justifiable doubt 
as per General Standard 2 and be placed in a red category situation. However the fact that the 
Guidelines are optional limits its applicability and effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
120
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Arbitration’ Business Law International 5 (2004) 433 at 434 – 435; see also Bernasconi – Osterwalder N et al 
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Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) at 29 available at 
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4.4.4 Independence and impartiality in the investor – state arbitration system 
 
Under the current system independence and impartiality are not guaranteed.
122
 The safeguard for 
security of tenure and emoluments is seriously undermined by the fact that arbitrators are 
presiding over disputes on ad hoc basis. The ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules 
and the UNCITRAL Rules all provide for ad hoc appointment of adjudicators.
123
 This means that 
the adjudicators in investor – state arbitration are not certain about their tenure. As a result, 
adjudicators play dual roles as adjudicators and counsel in different cases.
124
  There are no rules 
of etiquette to bar arbitrators from switching sides. Despite this anomaly the ICSID Convention 
and the Rules place a higher burden of proof on a party challenging the impartiality of the 
arbitrator. Article 57 empowers either party to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator. A 
party can challenge the appointed arbitrator on the basis of any fact indicating a ‘manifest lack of 
the quality’ as stipulated under Article 14(1).125  
 
The demand for ‘manifest lack of quality’ puts the challenging party in a very difficult position 
as he needs to prove or provide a clear doubt about the appearance of impartiality of the 
respective arbitrator.
126
 Other institutional rules just require such a challenging party to raise 
                                                          
122
 See subheading 3.6.2.3 of chapter three of this work. 
123
 See Article 37 (1) and Rule 1(1) of ICSID Arbitration Rules, see also Article 10 of the Additional Facility 
Arbitration Rules, and also see Article 8 of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
124
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2012 ‘Towards a 
New Generation of Investment Policies’ at 88. 
125
 See Article 57 of the Convention. 
126
 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17)(2008) para. 29; see also Compana de Aguas del Aconquija & Vivendi Universal v. 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3)(2001) para. 25; also see Sheppard A ‘Arbitrator Independence in 
ICSID Arbitration’ in Binder C et al (eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of 
Christopher Schreuer (2009) 132 at 133 – 134; see also Bernasconi – Osterwalder N et al ‘Arbitrator Independence 
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‘justifiable doubts’.127 The ‘manifest lack of quality’ threshold is too high and many challenges 
fail to meet the requirement.
128
 It has been held that ‘manifest lack of quality’ requires more than 
mere speculation or inference of partiality and the relationship challenged must be more than 
trivial.
129
 
 
Another issue is that there is no provision in the Convention which imposes an obligation on the 
arbitrator to be impartial.  Article 14 of the ICSID Convention requires arbitrators to be of high 
moral character, competent in law and able to exercise independent judgment. The Convention 
does not mention impartiality as one of the requirements. It is submitted here that the omission is 
grave because a person who is capable of exercising independent judgment will not necessarily 
be impartial in a dispute in which they have an interest. Therefore, there is a need to include, in 
addition to the requirement of independent judgment; the requirement of impartiality of 
arbitrators as stipulated in other arbitration rules.
130
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Impartiality: Examining the dual role of arbitrator and counsel’ (2010) International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) at 12. 
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 See Article 11 and 12 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010; see also Article 15 of the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce Arbitration Rules, 2010 available at 
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(2009) 132 at 133 – 134; see also Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A commentary (2001) 1200 para 16; See also 
Bernasconi – Osterwalder N et al ‘Arbitrator Independence and Impartiality: Examining the dual role of arbitrator 
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4.5 Consistency/coherence 
 
 Consistent application and interpretation of the rules is another important value for building 
legitimacy. Consistency simply requires that in similar situations similar rules should be applied 
and should, as much as possible, arrive at a similar conclusion.
131
 Consistent application of the 
rules brings certainty, predictability and reliability of the system; hence enhancing its 
legitimacy.
132
 It is submitted that coherence or consistency legitimates a rule by providing a 
connection between the respective rule and its main purpose. It follows therefore that if the court 
or the tribunal fails to apply the same rule consistently or applies the same rule differently in 
different cases, it renders the adjudicative system unpredictable.
133
 According to Franck, 
consistency and predictability are very important in the rule of law and without which, human 
beings may not anticipate how to comply with the law.
134
 
 
In an endeavour to achieve consistency a number of measures can be employed by the 
adjudicative body. The measures include the use of the doctrine of precedent, use of referencing 
system, consolidation of related proceedings and having a higher appellate structure with the 
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 See Van Harten Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) at 164; see also Peerenboom R ‘Let One 
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mandate to rectify errors from first instance tribunals. These measures or factors are briefly 
explained in the paragraphs that follow below. 
 
The doctrine of precedent simply means: let us stand by what has been decided.
135
 A particular 
decided case is considered a precedent when it furnishes a basis upon which future cases with 
similar facts and issues are determined. The doctrine is considered to be the most effective 
adjudicative technique of avoiding inconsistent decisions.
136
 The doctrine is a common feature in 
almost all countries which have adopted the English common law legal system. The aim of the 
doctrine is to create predictability of the rules by interpreting the rules consistently by following 
alike previously decided cases. 
 
A reference procedure, on the other hand, is a technique used to enhance consistency whereby 
the matter is referred to the higher designated reference authority. The interpretation given by 
such higher authority becomes binding on all future queries on the subject at hand. Reference is 
regarded as one of the best tools which has contributed to the uniform application of European 
Community law.
137
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Consolidation entails the merging of two or more related disputes into one that is conducted or 
handled by the consolidation tribunal upon agreement of the parties.
138
 For the claims to qualify 
for consolidation they need to have a common question of law or fact which arose out of the 
same event or circumstances. The aim of consolidation is to save the cost of running two 
tribunals and to avoid parallel proceedings which in turn could lead to conflicting decisions. 
 
The last measure or technique is the use of an appellate structure. The appellate court harmonises 
the case law when it pronounces the true position of law which needs to be followed in situations 
where there are conflicting decisions. An appellate structure helps in creating accuracy in the 
decisions as ‘the more generous the scope for challenging decisions by appeal or review the 
greater the chance of eliminating error’.139 The hope for accuracy comes from the expectations 
that the appellate structure will be presided over by more experienced and more competent 
personnel. 
 
4.5.1 Consistency in the investor – state arbitration system 
 
The investor – state arbitration system does not give high regard to the factors/techniques which 
contribute to consistency. The Convention and the UNCITRAL Rules neither provide for the 
                                                          
138
 Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr et al (eds.) Investment 
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doctrine of precedent, nor for the consolidation principle. The Convention and the UNCITRAL 
Rules are also silent on an appellate structure and a reference system.  As a result, as extensively 
discussed in Chapter Three,
140
 lack of consistency is one of the identifying features of the 
system.
141
 A number of inconsistent decisions exist in parallel and all are regarded as valid and 
binding upon the parties.  
 
This problem was acknowledged by the ICSID Secretariat in 2004. The Secretariat, in the same 
year, issued a discussion paper to stakeholders which among other things suggested the 
introduction of an appellate body within the ICSID framework.
142
 The proposal did not receive 
enough support especially from foreign investors’ home states and it has never been pursued 
since. The objectors argued that the creation of an appellate structure will be going contrary to 
the very aim of the Convention, which is ensuring finality of disputes.
143
 It remains a fact that, 
although the ICSID Secretariat abandoned the idea of establishing an appellate structure for lack 
of support, the inconsistency problem is still growing and creating more uncertainty in 
international investment law.
144
  It is submitted here that establishing an appellate court for all 
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investor – state disputes remains the best option available for consistent, affordable, predictable 
and independent investor – state adjudication processes. 
 
4.6 Cost efficiency 
 
As pointed out earlier, for an adjudicative system to be perceived as legitimate, it also needs to 
be accessible and affordable to all stakeholders, rich and poor. The costs of filing a case and 
adjudicating the same should be reasonable and should not be a deterring factor to the poor.
145
 
This means that where the system is not cost efficient, small investors and poor states may shy 
away from using the system.
146
 The legitimate adjudicative systems always ensure that they are 
accessible to all stakeholders by making the litigation costs reasonable and thus affordable for all 
stakeholders.
147
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/02/16 of 14
th
 September 2007 final award  available at 
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th
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4.6.1 Cost efficiency in the investor – state arbitration system 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three of this research, exorbitant litigation costs is one of the main 
issues haunting an investor – state arbitration system.148 Costs act as a hurdle to the poor host 
states and less fortunate foreign investors. The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010 clearly 
states that the costs in investor – state disputes have skyrocketed.149 Arbitrators’ charges range 
from USD 350 – 700 per hour per arbitrator depending on the claimed dispute amount.150 The 
total cost per case therefore depends on the number of days the Tribunal have sat and the 
complexity of the matter.  It was further revealed that the cost for one case ranges from USD 1 
million to 21 million as most of the Tribunals are constituted by three arbitrators and several 
lawyers for both sides and take months before the dispute is put to rest.
151
 The amount claimed 
against Russia by the three majority shareholders of the former Yukos Oil Company in the 
ongoing arbitration proceedings against Russia is USD 114 billion.
152
The exorbitant costs at 
                                                          
148
 See Chapter Three under Subheading 3.6.2.7. 
149
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report ‘Investor – 
State Dispute: Prevention and Alternative to Arbitration’ (2010) at 16-18 available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf accessed on 05/10/2013. 
150
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) fees are set at US$3000 a day 
see https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&Sche
duledFees=True&year=2012&language=Englishaccessed on 05/10/2013. 
151
 See Franck SD ‘Rationalising Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2011) Washington University Law Review 
769 at 775 ; see also Eberhardt P & Olivert C ‘How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fueling an 
Investment Arbitration Boom’ (2012) Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute available at 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf accessed on 05/10/2013; also see 
Franck S ‘Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration’(2007) North Carolina Law Review 
1 at 77. 
152
 See Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 226; Yukos Universal 
Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 227; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v The 
Russian Federation, PCA Case No AA 228. 
 
 
 
 
234 
 
times intimidate poor developing countries from litigating and thus they decide to give in to the 
foreign investor’s demands thereby forfeiting their right to be heard.153 
 
4.7 Effective time frame 
 
Lastly, a legitimate adjudicative system needs also to develop a time frame within which the 
dispute has to be resolved. It is important that the dispute should not drag on in the adjudication 
machinery for years. Parties will perceive a system as legitimate where they can predict or know 
beforehand how long the dispute will take.
154
 With a time frame in hand, parties will be able to 
estimate or budget for the case. Therefore, any adjudicative system which lacks a reasonable 
timeframe and takes a number of years before resolving a dispute will hardly be positively 
perceived by its stakeholders.
155
 
 
 
                                                          
153
 See the Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework A/HRC/11/13, para 30 (2009); See also, Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights: 
Further Steps Towards the Operationalization of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework A/HRC/14/27, 
paras 20–23 (2010), the reports can be accessed at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Reports.aspx  
accessed on 9/03/2014. 
154
 For more on this see Raviv A ‘Achieving a Faster ICSID’ (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute Management at 1 
available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2066  accessed on 26/03/2014; see 
also see also Sinclair A et al ‘ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?’ Global Arbitration Review available at 
http://www.goldreserveinc.com/documents/ICSID%20arbitration%20%20How%20long%20does%20it%20take.pdf  
accessed on 18/07/2013. 
155
 Franck SD ‘Rationalising Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2011) Washington University Law Review 
769. 
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4.7.1 Effective timeframe in the investor – state arbitration system 
 
The lack of a strict timeframe within which the dispute has to be resolved is another nagging 
problem in the investor – state arbitration system. As discussed under chapter three of this work, 
disputes drag for years before coming to a conclusion.
156
 The ICSID process is referred as ‘an 
indisputably slow process, with many arbitrations taking 4-5 years or longer before a decision is 
delivered’.157 A lot of stakeholders have written on the length of the ICSID dispute settlement 
process.
158
 A research on disputes resolved in 2012 indicates that the dispute resolution 
timeframe ranges from 47 months (almost 4 years) to 138 months (over 11 years).
159
 
 
The annulment process is also timeframe insensitive. The annulment process takes up to six 
years before it is put to rest.
160
 Even worse the parties are not limited to one annulment 
application, some cases have gone through several annulment process.
161
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the current investor state arbitration system has failed to observe 
timeframe. No wonder that the system is facing backlash from stakeholders. 
                                                          
156
  See Chapter Three under Subheading 3.2.3.4. 
157
 Raviv A ‘Achieving a Faster ICSID’ (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute Management at 1. 
158
 See Parra AR The History of ICSID (2012) at 187; see also Kapoor VJ ‘Wearing Hats and Walking the Line: 
How Arbitrators Reconcile Outside Activities and Judicial Duties’ (2011)24 Georgia Journal of Legal Ethics 625 at 
626; see also Sinclair A et al ‘ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?’ (2009) Global Arbitration Review at 5. 
159
 See Raviv A ‘Achieving a Faster ICSID’ (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute Management at 4 available at 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2066  accessed on 26/03/2014. 
160
 See for example Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia Case No. ARB/81/I award rendered on 1984 and the 
final Annulment order was issued 1992; KlocknerIndustrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon Case 
No. ARB/81/2 award rendered in 1983 and the last decision on Annulment was issued in 1990; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. 
Arab Republic of Egypt Case No. ARB/98/4 award rendered in 2000 and the final annulment order issued in 2005 
161
 Amco v Indonesia and Klockner v Cameroon both underwent two annulment processes. 
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4.8 Consequences of lack of legitimacy values in the current investor – state arbitration 
      system 
 
In reaction to the lack of legitimacy values, some stakeholders have started running away from 
the investor – state arbitration system. Latin America countries, such as, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela, have led the way by withdrawing from the ICSID Convention.
162
 In a more adverse 
step against the awards, some countries have reacted by refusing to honour or declaring not to 
honour any future investment arbitral awards rendered against them.
163
 Argentina, for example, 
has refused to pay the awards rendered against it in Azurix Corp v Argentina
164
 and CMS v 
Argentina.
165
  In Azurix, the Tribunal awarded USD 162.5 million to the claimant for Argentina’s 
failure to accord fair and equitable treatment and for the lack of full protection and security to the 
foreign investor contrary to the Argentina – US BIT. In the second case, CMS v Argentina, the 
Tribunal awarded USD 133.2 million for the respondent state’s failure to provide fair and 
equitable treatment to the foreign investor.
166
 As a result of the Argentinian government’s 
reaction against the awards, on 28 May 2012 the US government suspended Argentina from the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) which exempts tariffs on imports from developing 
                                                          
162
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2012 ‘Towards a 
New Generation of Investment Policies’ at 88.  
163
 See CNN (Jan. 9, 2012) Chavez Says He Won’t Respect World Bank Panel’s Decision, available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/09/business/venezuela-exxon/index.html accessed on 20/09/2013; see also Peterson 
LE ‘How Many States Are Not Paying Awards under Investment Treaties?’(2010) Investment Arbitration Reporter 
available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20100507_3 citing Russia, Krygstan and Thailand as defiant states; 
see also Goodman LC ‘Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina’ (2007) 
28 Journal of International Economic Law 449; also see Rosenberg CB ‘The Intersection of International Trade and 
International Arbitration: The Use of Trade Benefits to Secure Compliance with Arbitral Awards’ (2013) 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 503. 
164
 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award of 14
th
 July 2006. 
165
 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award of 12
th
 May 2005. 
166
 For a thorough discussion on these cases see Chapter three of this Work. 
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countries.
167
 Apart from Argentina, also Zimbabwe,
168
 Liberia,
169
 Russia,
170
 Thailand,
171
 
Senegal,
172
 Kyrgyzstan
173
 and Venezuela
174
 have shown dissatisfaction with the ICSID system 
and refused to pay the awards issued against them.
175
 
 
In March 2014, Indonesia, after facing a number of treaty based claims in recent years, has 
decided to terminate the BIT with The Netherlands.
176
 In a more serious move the Indonesian 
government has indicated that it intends to terminate all 67 BITs entered into with other 
countries.
177
 
 
                                                          
167
 See the Presidential Proclamation No. 8788, 77 Fed. Reg 18, 899 of Mar. 29, 2012 on Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP), Office of the US Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-
development/preference-programs/generalized-systempreference-gsp. accessed on 20/10/2013.  
168
 Funnekotter v Republic of Zimbabwe ICSID Case No ARB/05/6, Award (2009) 
http://italaw.com/documents/ZimbabweAward.pdf accessed on 20/10/2013.  
169
 Liberian Eastern Timber Corp v Republic of Liberia ICSID Case No ARB/83/2, Award 2 ICSID Rep. 346 (1994) 
accessed on 20/10/2013. 
170
 Sedelmayer v Russian Federation, Arbitration Award (ad hoc arbitration under the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce arbitration rules July 7, 1998), http://italaw.com/documents/investment_sedelmayer_v_ru.pdf. accessed 
on 20/10/2013. 
171
 Walter Bau AG (in liquidation) v Kingdom of Thailand, Award (UNCITRAL Arbitration July 1, 2009), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0067.pdf  accessed on 20/10/2013. 
172
 Socie´te´ Ouest Africaine des Be´tons Industriels v Senegal, ICSID Case No ARB/82/1, Award, 2 ICSID Rep 190 
(1994) accessed on 20/10/2013. 
173
 Petrobart Ltd. v Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitration No 126/2003, Award II (Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce Mar. 29, 2005), 13 ICSID Rep. 387 (2008) accessed on 20/10/2013. 
174
 Mobil Corp v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 10, 
2010), https://icsid.worldbank.org accessed on 20/10/2013; see also CNN (Jan. 9, 2012) Chavez Says He Won’t 
Respect World Bank Panel’s Decision, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/09/business/venezuela-
exxon/index.html accessed on 20/10/2013  
175
 For more on this see Peterson LE & Hepburn J ‘ Payment Round Up New Reporting on ICSID Award Debts of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Bangladesh’(2011) Investment Arbitration Reporter available at 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20111231_7 ; see also Baldwin E ‘Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards’ 
(2006) 23 Journal of International Arbitration 1at 7;see also Peterson LE ‘Zimbabwe Not Paying ICSID Award’ 
(2010) Investment Arbitration Reporter http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20100507_5  accessed on 21/10/2013.  
176
 See Indonesia Statement on  Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue  at 16 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf 
177
 See the Dutch Ministry Statement on Indonesia Termination of BIT at 
http://indonesia.nlembassy.org/news/2014/03/bilateral-investment-treaty%5B2%5D.html  accessed on 16/05/2014 
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Australia, on the other hand, in an effort to seek more policy space in April 2011 issued a trade 
policy statement announcing that it would stop including investor – state dispute settlement 
clause in its future IIAs.
178
 However, it should be noted that with the change of government in 
2013, the new Australia- Korea FTA which includes an investment chapter has incorporated 
investor-state arbitration.
179
 The Korea – Australia FTA provide for an exception provision 
which grant the host state more space to regulate on human right, labour, environmental, health, 
animal and plant life.
180
  
 
The United State, has also revised its Model BIT in order to constrain the expansive 
interpretations by tribunals. The revised Model BIT more empowers the US government to 
regulate on different issues: health, safety, environment, and the promotion of internationally 
recognized labour rights without interference from the investor – state tribunals.181 In addition to 
that, the US 2012 Model BIT mandates the Parties to ‘consider’ whether arbitral awards under 
the BIT should be subject to any new appellate mechanism to be introduced in the future.
182
  
 
                                                          
178
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity, April 2011 
available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.html accessed 
on 25
th
  January 2013. 
179
 Lester S ‘Improving Investment Treaties through General Exceptions Provisions: The Australian Example’ 
Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf accessed on 16/05/2014. 
180
 See Lester S ‘Improving Investment Treaties through General Exceptions Provisions: The Australian Example’ 
Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf accessed on 16/05/2014. 
181
 The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012), Art.12 available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_ 6897.pdf  accessed on 
20/08/2013. 
182
 2012 U S Model BIT Art. 28(10).  
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South Africa has also shown its dissatisfaction with the current dispute settlement system.
183
 The 
government in 2009 issued a policy statement with regards to BITs. In an effort to find the 
balance between the interests of the host state and foreign investors, the government has 
denounced a number of BITs with European countries and is pushing for utilisation of host state 
courts in case of any dispute between South Africa and foreign investors.
184
 In another move, the 
South African government in November 2013 published its draft Promotion and Protection of 
Investment Bill 2013 in the Government Gazette for public comment.
185
 The bill provides for 
domestic litigation, domestic arbitration and mediation of investment disputes.
186
 Therefore if the 
bill becomes law, investment disputes in South Africa will be settled locally through court 
litigation, mediation or arbitration under the South African Arbitration Act.
187
 
 
In March 2014, Germany also announced its dissatisfaction with the investor – state arbitration 
system and is opposing the inclusion of the system in the EU – US trade pact which is currently 
under negotiation.
188
 Germany is taking the same stance on the recently concluded 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between EU and Canada.
189
 Germany 
is advancing the idea of adjudicating investor – state disputes in the host state courts. According 
                                                          
183
 The Department of Trade and Industry Republic of South Africa’s Government Position Paper on Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review, June 2009, available at  http://www.thedti.gov.za/ads/bi-
lateral_policy.pdf  accessed on 7
th
 February 2013.   
184
 See the Speech delivered by the Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa  Dr Rob Davies at the South 
African launch of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Investment Policy 
Framework for sustainable development at the University of The Witwatersrand on 26
th
 July 2012 available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=29391&tid=77861  accessed on 7
th
 March 2013. 
185
 See the Draft Bill on Promotion and Protection of Investment, 2013 available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/11/Promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-2013-Invitation-for-public-
comment.pdf accessed on 07/03/2014. 
186
 See Article 11 of the Bill. 
187
 Arbitration Act 1965 (Act No. 42 of 1965). 
188
 See the Germany Ministry Announcement in Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue  at 16 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf  
189
 See  the EU – Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf accessed on 11/11/2014. 
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to the Financial Times, the Junior Minister of Economy, Brigitte Zypries, believes that foreign 
investors ‘have sufficient legal protection in the national courts.’190  
It is submitted here that this new stance of Germany, which was the first country to pioneer  
BITs and signed the first BIT with Pakistan in 1959, shows that the dispute settlement provision 
in the BITs indeed has problems. 
 
Apart from countries, other stakeholders have also shown concern about the current dispute 
settlement mechanism. The Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament, on 22 
March 2011 issued a Report on the future of International Investment Policy of the European 
Union.
191
 The report highlighted the problems relating to: different interpretations of investment 
principles by different tribunals which lead to conflict between private interests and the 
regulatory tasks of public authorities;
192
 the existence of BITs which put the interests of investors 
alone and disregard the host state interests in regulating for other development goals;
193
and the 
lack of the model BIT for member states which can enhance certainty and consistency of 
interpretation.
194
 In addition, the Report raises concerns about the wide discretionary powers 
granted to arbitrators in the interpretation of investment principles.
195
 The report raises more 
concerns on the lack of transparency on the current system, lack of an appellate option and the 
                                                          
190
 Financial Times quoted in Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue  at 16 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf 
191
 European Union Parliament Report on the Future European International Investment Policy, A7-0070/2011 of 
22 March 2011 available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-
2011-0070+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN  (hereinafter European Parliament Report on investment) accessed on 15
th
 
February 2013. 
192
 See the European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para G. 
193
 See the European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para J (1) and para 25. 
194
 See the European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para J (4) and (10). 
195
 The European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para 17. 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
absence of the requirement for exhaustion of local remedies before resorting to international 
arbitration.
196
 
 
Law professors, also, from different parts of the world, in 2010 issued a public statement 
condemning the current investment arbitration system.
197
 The concerns raised in the public 
statement include: the need to have an independent judicial system responsible for investment 
disputes; recognition of the state’s fundamental right to regulate on behalf of public welfare; the 
need for arbitrators to consider the public interest in their interpretation of investment principles; 
and that the current adjudication system is not a fair, independent and balanced system for 
settlement of investor - state disputes.
198
 
 
From the stakeholders’ reactions noted above, it is submitted here that it is evident that the 
system is experiencing a legitimacy crisis. There is a need to review the system as a whole before 
it loses the little remaining legitimacy it currently enjoys.  
 
 
 
                                                          
196
 The European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para 31. 
197
 Van Harten G et al. ‘Public Statement on International Investment Regime’ available at 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/documents/Public%20Statement%20(June%202011).pdf accessed on 
06/09/2013. 
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 See Van Harten G et al ‘Public Statement on International Investment Regime’ (2010) paras 1 – 8. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
 
The discussion in this chapter reveals that legitimacy is an important aspect of any adjudicative 
system which aspires or adheres to the principle of the rule of law. The chapter has also revealed 
that the rule of law, justice and legitimacy are inseparable. For an adjudicative system to be 
considered legitimate, it requires to possess basic values: consistency, transparency, cost 
efficiency, timeliness and impartiality. The presence of these values renders the system just.
199
 It 
is concluded that the investor – state arbitration system is lacking in some of these important 
values. As a result, the chapter has shown the extent to which the stakeholders are dissatisfied 
with the system.  
In the following chapter, a critical discussion of different stakeholders’ proposed solutions to the 
investor – state arbitration system is made. In addition to that, the chapter analyses and discusses 
this research ‘alternative’ suggested solutions.  
.
                                                          
199
 See Bodansky DM ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance:  A coming Challenge for International 
environmental Law’ (1999) American Journal of International Law 596 and Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and 
International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law Review 107. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE INVESTOR – 
STATE ARBITRATION SYSTEM 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As it can be gathered from the preceding chapters, it is evidently clear that there are a number of 
legitimacy issues haunting the investor – state arbitration system.1  The issues includes lack of 
consistency in the rendered awards, lack of institutional safeguards for independence and 
impartiality of adjudicators, lack of transparency on matters of public interests, encroachment on 
government policy making space, lack of an appellate structure to rectify errors, expensive 
adjudication process and the possibility of parallel proceedings involving same parties in 
different fora. These issues have been identified and discussed extensively in different fora by 
different stakeholders and institutions.
2
 The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013 has, for 
                                                          
1
 See Chapter Three of this work for a thorough discussion on the systemic issues under subheading 3.6.2 – 3.6.2.7. 
2
 See Gaukrodger D and Gordon K ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy 
Community’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2012/3 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf accessed on 03/02/2014; also see Eberhardt P 
&Olivet C ‘Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fuelling an Investment 
Arbitration Boom” (Corporate Europe Observatory and Transnational Institute, 2012), available at 
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf.; See also Afilalo A 
‘Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-)Construction of NAFTA Chapter 11’(2005) 25 North-western 
Journal of International Law & Business 279 at 282; Afilalo A’ Towards a Common Law of International 
Investment: How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis’ (2004) 17 Georgia 
International Environmental  Law Review 51; Brower CN ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy,(2002) National Law Journal  at 
9; Brower CN et al ‘The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System (2003) 19 Arbitration International 415 
at 417; Mann H ‘Civil Society Perspective: what Do Key Stakeholders Expect from the International Investment 
Regime?’ in Alvarez J and Sauvant K (eds.) The Evolving International Investment Regime (2011) 22-29; Gaiger R 
‘Multilateral Approach to Investment’ in Alvarez J and Sauvant K (eds.) The Evolving International Investment 
Regime (2011) 153-173; Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Christina Binder et al (eds.) 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 - 916; Van 
Harten G ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Stephan Schill (ed.) 
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 627 – 658; Peterson L ‘Out of Order’ in Michael 
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example, recognised and identified that inconsistency of awards, expensive adjudication process 
and lack of transparency are, among others, the most unresolved and troubling issues in the 
investor – state arbitration system.3 Likewise in 2009 the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) pointed out that the investor – state arbitration system is experiencing ‘a 
crisis of legitimacy’ as a result of lack of transparency, lack of coherence, lack of independent 
and impartial adjudication process and Tribunals’ encroachment on government policy making 
space.
4
 
 
In addition, as discussed in Chapter Four of this work,
5
 in 2011 the Committee on International 
Trade of the European Parliament issued a report on the future of International Investment Policy 
of the European Union.
6
 The report points out more shortcomings in investor – state arbitration 
system. Such shortcomings include: lack of transparency on the current system; lack of an 
appellate option; and the absence of the precondition for exhaustion of local remedies before 
resorting to international arbitration.
7
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Waibel et al (eds.) The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 483 – 488; Reinisch 
A ‘The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible Solutions’ in Michael Waibel et al (eds.)  The Backlash 
Against Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 113- 126. 
3
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report: ‘Reform of 
Investor –state Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Road Map’ 26th June 2013, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf   at pp 3 - 4, accessed on 03/02/2014. 
4
 See Marshall F ‘Defining New Institutional Options for Investor – State Dispute Settlement’ International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2009 at p. 5 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/defining_new_institutional_options.pdf accessed on 03/02/2014. 
5
 See Chapter Four of this Work under Subheading 4.8. 
6
 European Union Parliament Report on the Future European International Investment Policy, A7-0070/2011 of  22 
March 2011 available at  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-
2011-0070+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN  (hereinafter European Parliament Report on investment) (accessed on 15
th
 
February 2013). 
7
 The European Parliament Report on Investment 2011 para 31. 
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In the efforts to address the problems, the stakeholders have put forward a number of solutions to 
address the shortcomings identified above. In 2013 UNCTAD, for example, issued a Paper 
suggesting five solutions to curb the investor – state dispute settlement systemic problems.8 The 
suggested solutions include: promoting alternative dispute resolution; tailoring the existing 
system through individual investment agreements; limiting investor access to dispute settlement; 
introducing an appeals facility; and creating a standing international investment court.
9
  
 
Other stakeholders have also suggested a number of solutions in addition to what has been 
suggested by UNCTAD. The most cited solutions include: invoking res judicata and lis pendens 
principles; adopting  the doctrine of precedents; applying the fork in the road principle; adopting 
the margin of appreciation standard in interpretation of BITs, creating an appellate structure at 
ICSID and creating a treaty to treaty appellate body.
10
  
                                                          
8
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report: ‘Reform of Investor 
–state Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Road Map’ 26th June 2013, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf   at pp 3 - 4, accessed on 03/02/2014. 
9
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report: ‘Reform of Investor 
–state Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Road Map’ 26th June 2013, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf   at pp 3 - 4, accessed on 03/02/2014. 
10
 See Greason E ‘International Arbitral Appeal, What are we so afraid of?’(2007)7 Pepperdine Law Journal 269 at 
287; See for example Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Christina 
Knahr et al (eds.) Investment and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 2. 
(Suggesting that consolidation of related proceedings could help to curb the problem of parallel proceedings); See 
also Reinisch A ‘The proliferation of international Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The threat of fragmentation vs. 
The promise of more effective system? Some reflections from the perspective of investment arbitration’ in I Buffard 
et al (eds.) International Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation (2008)107 – 126 (suggesting for multiple 
solutions including appellate body, a preliminary reference system, consolidation and strengthening the power of 
precedents); See also Spooreberg F and Vinuales A ‘conflicting decisions in International Arbitration’ in Frank 
Spoorenberg et al (eds.) The Law and Practice of International Courts  and Tribunals (2009) 91 – 113 at 93 
(suggesting for increase of transparency);  Also  see Burke – White W & Von Staden A ‘The Need for Public Law 
Standards of Review in Investor –State Arbitration’ in Stephan Schill International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law 2010, 689 at 712 ( suggesting the application of public law standard of review in 
investment arbitration); Reinisch A ‘The use and limits of res judicata and lis pendens as procedural tools to avoid 
conflicting dispute settlement outcomes’(2004) 3 The Law and Practice of International Courts  and Tribunals 37( 
suggesting that the principles of res judicata and lis pendens could be used to curb parallel proceedings); See also 
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This chapter therefore provides a critical discussion of the proposed solutions to the investor – 
state arbitration system. It is the purpose of this chapter to critically discuss and analyse the 
viability of these solutions. In addition, the chapter unveil this research’s ‘alternative’ solutions. 
The authors’ suggested solutions are referred to as ‘alternative’ because the author strongly 
believes that establishing a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which provides for the 
establishment of an international Investment Court followed up by an International Investment 
Appellate Court at apex stands to be the best solution to the legitimacy crisis of the current 
investor – state dispute settlement system.  
  
The research’s ‘alternative’ solutions include: establishment of the investor – state dispute 
adjudication Centre; effective utilisation of host state courts; mandatory publication of all 
awards; effective use of member state interpretative statement; and lastly, form a working group 
on investment to define the scope of the basic investment principles.  
 
It should be clearly understood here that these ‘alternative’ solutions are only relevant where the 
establishment of the MAI and the international investment courts and appellate court thereof 
have proven futile. These suggested solutions will have no relevance where the proposed 
international investment judicial system is established. Therefore these solutions intend to 
maintain the status quo by improving the existing investor – state arbitration system. As it will be 
seen in the course of the discussion, internal modification of the current system will be difficult 
and do little to legitimise and strengthen the international investment law. However, their little 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Gantz D ‘An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor- State Disputes: Prospects and 
Challenges’ (2006)39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 39. 
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potentials are worth being analysed as interim solutions pending the establishment of the MAI. 
The ‘alternative’ solutions discussion follows after an analysis of other stakeholders suggested 
solutions. 
 
5.2 Solutions suggested by other stakeholders 
 
As stated in the introduction above, a number of solutions have been identified and suggested by 
different stakeholders. These solutions intend to achieve different results. Some call for systemic 
overhaul while others require modest improvements to the existing system. As mentioned in the 
introduction above, the most often cited solutions includes introducing an appeal facility, 
establishing an international investment court, limiting investor access to the ISDS, adopting of 
the consolidation principle in investment disputes, invoking res judicata and lis pendens 
principles, adopting the doctrine of precedents, applying the fork in the road principle, adopting 
the margin of appreciation standard in interpretation of BITs and establishing an appellate 
structure at ICSID, establishing of a treaty to treaty appellate structure. This section provides a 
critical appraisal of all the solutions mentioned above. 
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5.2.1 Consolidation of related disputes and the principle of ‘fork in the road’ 
 
Christina Knahr proposes consolidation of related proceedings as a means of curbing inconsistent 
decisions.
11
 She argues that in order to avoid duplication of proceedings and conflicting 
outcomes, parties should consolidate related proceedings which have a common question of fact 
or law for the purposes of minimising costs but also avoiding inconsistent decisions. August 
Reinisch and Crivellaro also support this suggestion.
12
 It is contended that the US 2004 and 2012 
Model BITs provides for consolidation of related proceedings.
13
 The US Model BIT empowers 
any party to seek a consolidation order in accordance with Article 33. The US Model BIT 
intentions have been reflected in the recent US - Rwanda BIT.
14
 Canadian Model BIT also 
provides for consolidation.
15
 The Canadian Model BIT intentions are reflected in the Canada –
Tanzania BIT which came into force on 09 December 2013.
16
 Article 27 of Canada – Tanzania 
BIT empowers the tribunal to consolidate related disputes where it is of the view that there are 
                                                          
11
 Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) Investment 
and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 2. 
12
 Reinisch A ‘The proliferation of international Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The threat of fragmentation vs. 
The promise of more effective system? Some reflections from the perspective of investment arbitration’ in  Buffard  
J et al (eds.) International Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation (2008)107 – 126; See also Crivellaro A 
‘Consolidation of Arbitral and Court Proceedings in Investment Disputes’  (2005) 4 Law & Practice of International 
Courts & Tribunals 371 at 371. 
13
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2004 &2012 Art. 33(1) available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_ 6897.pdf  and 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf respectively accessed on 
20/06/2013.  
14
 See for example Article 33 of the US – Rwanda BIT, 2008 which came in force 2012 available at 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/pdf-agreements/RwandaBIT.pdf accessed on 
19/05/2014. 
15
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada’s Model Foreign Investment Protection 
Agreement, 2004 Art. 32(2) (hereinafter Canada Model BIT) available at 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf  accessed on 20/01/2014. 
16
 See the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania 
for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/tanzania-text-tanzanie.aspx?lang=eng accessed on 
19/05/2014. 
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similar questions of law or fact involved.
17
 Consolidation is also provided for and has been 
applied under NAFTA Chapter 11.
18
 Article 1126(2) of NAFTA chapter 11 provides that: 
 
‘Where a Tribunal established under this Article is satisfied that claims have been submitted to 
arbitration under Article 1120 that have a question of law or fact in common, the Tribunal may, in 
the interests of fair and efficient resolution of the claims, and after hearing the disputing parties, 
by order: 
(a) Assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine together, all or part of the claims; or 
(b) Assume jurisdiction over, and hear and determine one or more of the claims, the 
determination of which it believes would assist in the resolution of the others.’ 
 
The right to form a consolidated tribunal accrues where either party has requested for 
consolidation and the dispute has a common question of law or fact and it will be in the interest 
of fair and efficient resolution of the dispute by way of consolidation.
19
 In Canfor Corp. v. 
United States
20
  the Tribunal held that in consolidating the claims all parties’ interests should be 
balanced and each party should be accorded the same level of due process. The discretion 
therefore lies with the arbitral tribunal to determine whether consolidation of claims will achieve 
fairness and efficiency to all parties.  
 
                                                          
17
 See Article 27 of the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic 
of Tanzania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/tanzania-text-
tanzanie.aspx?lang=eng accessed on 19/05/2014. 
18
 Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) Investment 
and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 4. 
19
 See Article 1126 of NAFTA. 
20
 Canfor Corp v United States, Tembec et al v United States, and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v United States, 
Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, 7 September 2005, available at 
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Softwood/Softwood-ConOrder.pdf.  
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In instances where formal consolidation is impossible, parties may still agree to form same 
arbitrators’ tribunals to handle their matter. This method has been used in cases involving the 
Argentinian’s government privatisation of the gas industry.21 Reinisch argues that if 
consolidation is done properly, it can provide very effective remedies against inconsistent 
decisions.
22
  For example, it is submitted that had the Lauder and CME cases been consolidated, 
the problem of inconsistency would have been allayed.
23
 
 
Parallel to consolidation, is the principle of fork in the road or waiver provisions.
24
 This is a 
treaty principle that limits the investors’ venues for institution of cases.25 According to this 
principle, once the investor decides to institute his claim with the local court, he is forbidden 
from seeking arbitration with ICSID or any other arbitration institution.
26
 The aim of these 
provisions is to prevent parallel proceedings.
27
 For that matter, waiver provisions intend to 
achieve the same goal as consolidation does.
28
 
 
                                                          
21
 See Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic ARB/01/3 and Sempra Energy International v. Argentine 
Republic, ARB/02/16. 
22
 Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Christina Binder et al (eds.) International Investment Law 
for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 - 916’ at 912. 
23
 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 award of  03/09/ 2001  and CME Czech Republic BV v The 
Czech Republic  9 ICSID Reports Partial Award of 13/ 09/ 2001respectively. 
24
 Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) Investment 
and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 4. 
25
 See for example Art. 7(3) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of 
27/11/2009 (hereinafter South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT) available at  
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/south africa_zimbabwe.pdf providing for the fork in the road provision. 
26
 Schreuer C ‘Travelling the BIT route: of waiting periods, umbrella clauses and forks in the road’(2004) The 
Journal of World Investment and Trade 231 at 232. 
27
 Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Christina Binder et al (eds.) International Investment Law 
for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 - 916 at 908 
28
 Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Christina Binder et al (eds.) International Investment Law 
for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 - 916’ at 912. 
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The problem with this suggested solution is that there are currently very few BITs which allow 
consolidation of proceedings. The majority of existing BITs do not provide for consolidation of 
related proceedings.
29
 For consolidation to occur parties need to consent.
30
 In addition, an order 
for consolidation will only be granted where it is established that it is in the interest of ‘fair’ and 
‘efficient’ resolution of the claim.  At times, consolidation can operate as a dilatory tool where 
the two cases under consideration are in different stages of resolution. It may also happen that 
consolidation becomes more expensive than dealing with separate claim especially when the 
cases were in different stages before the formation of the consolidation tribunal.  In Canfor Corp. 
v. United States
31
  it was held that consolidation should not be ordered where the cost of 
consolidation becomes ‘excessive’.32 Therefore, while consolidating the disputes can be 
beneficial to one party; it might as well be disadvantageous to the other party hence inefficient 
and unfair.
33
  
 
                                                          
29
 See for example the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of 
the Republic of Zimbabwe for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of 27/11/2009 (hereinafter 
South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT) available at   http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/south africa_zimbabwe.pdf. 
see also An Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United 
Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investment  01/09/1999 available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/tanzania_sweden.pdf;   (hereinafter Tanzania –Sweden BIT); see also 
the Agreement between the Government of United Republic of Tanzania and  the Government of Italian Republic on 
the Promotion and Protection of Investment of  21/08/2001  (hereinafter Tanzania – Italy  BIT)  available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/tanzania_italy.pdf    and the Agreement between the Government of 
United Republic of Tanzania and  the Government of Republic of Finland on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investment  of 19/06/2001 (hereinafter Tanzania - Finland BIT)  available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/tanzania_finland.pdf. All these BITs have no provision for consolidation 
of proceedings.  
30
 See NAFTA Article 1126. 
31
 Canfor Corp v United States, Tembec et al v United States, and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v United States, 
Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, 7 September 2005, available at 
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Softwood/Softwood-ConOrder.pdf.  
32
 Canfor Corp v United States. 
33
 Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) Investment 
and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 11. 
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In addition, it is submitted here that the current system under ICSID and UNCITRAL are not 
conducive for consolidation as there are no consolidation provisions under both rules. As a 
result, consolidation may not yield the expected results of curbing the inconsistency problem.  
 
It is further submitted here that consolidation cannot be a panacea to all problems relating to 
inconsistency in international investment dispute settlement system as it only applies to same 
treaty disputes. Under the current system with 3240 BITs and IIAs,
34
 consolidation will only cure 
a small portion of the problems. In addition, it will be submitted here that consolidation can only 
be a useful tool where all disputes are settled under one institution. Under the current system, 
consolidation of proceedings at ICSID will not help to bring consistency if there is a similar case 
but adjudicated at LCIA or ICC under the UNCITRAL Rules. It is further submitted here that 
under the current system it will be almost impossible for one tribunal to know the existence of 
another case with similar facts at another institution. Even where that fact is known, 
consolidation may not be possible because each institution is autonomous and is not obligated to 
consolidate or cooperate with another tribunal formed under another institution’s rules.  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded here that, although consolidation can be a useful tool for disputes 
emanating from the same treaty, it will do very little to solve the inconsistency problem in the 
present situation where there are about three thousands autonomous BITs which have no 
consolidation provision. Worse enough, the ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules are also silent on the 
                                                          
34
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
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matter. Unless the rules are amended to that end consolidation stand a small chance of curbing 
inconsistency in investor – state arbitration system. 
 
5.2.2 Adoption of the doctrine of precedent 
 
Kaufmann – Kohler and other authors suggest that in order to cure the problem of inconsistency 
in investor – state arbitration there is a need to adhere to the English common law doctrine of 
precedent.
35
 The doctrine requires the court to stand by its previous decisions.
36
 That is to say, 
when a matter before a court of law has similar facts with another matter previously decided, 
then such a court is bound to follow the ruling of the previous case.
37
 The level of adhering to 
previous decisions differs from one jurisdiction to another and sometimes from one court to 
another.  
 
As per this doctrine, the higher courts in the judicial hierarchy are allowed to depart from their 
previous decisions when the development of the law so requires.
38
 In many common law 
countries the doctrine of precedent has been enshrined as one of the cornerstones which ensure 
                                                          
35
 Kaufman – Kohler G ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity of Excuse? – The 2006 Freshfield Lecture’ (2007) 23 
Arbitration International at 378; see also Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ (2009) at 915; see also 
Spooreberg F & Vinuales J ‘conflicting decisions in International Arbitration’ Law & Practice of International 
Courts & Tribunals (2009) 91 – 113; see also Dennis J ‘Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the 
Evaluation of Judicial Precedent’ (1994) 54 Louisiana Law Review 1 at 3. 
36
 Kaufman – Kohler G ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity of Excuse? – The 2006 Freshfield Lecture’ (2007) 
Arbitration International at 359; see also Dennis J ‘Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the 
Evaluation of Judicial Precedent’ (1994) 54 Louisiana Law Review 1 at 3. 
37
 Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ (2009) at 915; see also Kaufman – Kohler G ‘Arbitral 
Precedent’ (2007) at 358. 
38
 As per Lord Denning in Packer v Packer [1954] at 22. 
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legal certainty and consistency.
39
  While the doctrine is highly regarded in common law 
countries, it does not hold the same status in civil law countries.
40
  
 
It should be borne in mind that in international law the doctrine has not been formally 
recognised. Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) clearly exclude 
the application of the doctrine of precedent by providing that the court decision is only binding 
on the parties to the dispute.
41
 However, in practice the ICJ has been utilising the doctrine. In 
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
42
 the Court expressed its 
recognition of the relevancy of considering prior decided cases and stated that: 
 
‘[I]t is not a question of holding [the parties in the instant case] to decisions reached by the court 
in previous cases. The real question is whether in this case, there is cause not to follow the 
reasoning and conclusions of earlier case.’43 
 
 The WTO Appellate Body has also insisted the relevancy of following previously decided cases 
despite the fact that the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding does not recognise the doctrine 
of precedent.
44
 The Appellate Body in Shrimp Turtle II and Alcoholic Beverages 
45
 held that:  
                                                          
39
 ‘Common law Countries’ signifies countries which were colonies of the United Kingdom and follows the UK 
legal system. 
40
 Kaufman – Kohler G ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity of Excuse? – The 2006 Freshfield Lecture’ (2007) 23 
Arbitration International at 359. 
41
 See Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0& accessed on 29/03/2014. 
42
 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Preliminary Objections Judgment) [1998] ICJ 
Rep. 275, para. 28. 
43
 See para 28. For a thorough discussion on the role of the Doctrine of Precedent in International Law see Chapter 
Four of this work under Subheading 4.4. 
44
 See the WTO DSU available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf accessed on 23/03/2014. 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
 
‘..adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT because they create legitimate 
expectations among WTO Members and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are 
relevant to any dispute.’46  
 
Some investment tribunals, as well, have been following previous decisions in the course of their 
adjudication process. The annulment Committee in Amco v Indonesia
47
  held that it is not bound 
by the precedent established by other ICSID tribunals but admitted that it is instructive to 
consider their interpretation.
48
 It is on the basis of this background that it is argued by the 
proponents of the doctrine of precedent that although the doctrine is not formally recognised in 
international law, its adoption will help in curbing the legitimacy crisis facing international 
investment arbitration.
49
  
 
Although this seems to be a good solution, there are a number of obstacles in its way. The first 
obstacle is that, the doctrine is not recognised in international law and amongst countries 
following the civil law system. Therefore its application may not receive a worldwide 
acceptance.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
45
United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Appellate Body Report, 12 
October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R para. 108; see also Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Appellate Body 
Report, 4 October 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, at 15.  
46
 See United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products para 108. 
47
 Amco v Indonesia, ICSID ARB/81/l (1990) at para 121. 
48
 Amco v Indonesia ICSID ARB/81/l (1990) para 144. 
49
  See Reinisch A ‘The proliferation of international Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The threat of fragmentation 
vs The promise of more effective system? Some reflections from the perspective of investment arbitration’ in  
Buffard  J et al (eds.) International Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation (2008)107 – 126 at122; see also 
Spooreberg F & Vinuales J ‘conflicting decisions in International Arbitration’ Law & Practice of International 
Courts & Tribunals (2009) 91 – 113 at 102. 
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The second obstacle is that, for the doctrine to work well, it also needs to have disputes settled 
under one roof/institution. The doctrine of precedent works where there is a hierarchical dispute 
settlement system. With the current system where each tribunal is autonomous, the doctrine of 
precedent will not help much as no tribunal is under obligation to follow decisions handed down 
by another tribunal. 
  
Furthermore, precedent requires availability of previous decided cases to the presiding tribunal. 
Under the current system awards are confidential unless the parties decide to publish it. 
Therefore the doctrine of precedent cannot function well where confidentiality is at the centre of 
the system. It follows therefore that until when publication of awards becomes mandatory the 
doctrine of precedent has little to offer to the current investor – state arbitration system. 
 
5.2.3 Effective application of res judicata and lis pendens principles 
 
Another suggested solution is the application of the principles of res judicata and lis pendens.
50
  
Res judicata means that the matter has already been determined by another competent body 
hence it cannot be adjudicated upon again while lis pendens means that the matter is being 
                                                          
50
 See Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Christina Binder et al (eds.) International Investment 
Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 - 916’ at 912; Reinisch A ‘The Issues 
Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible Solutions’ in Michael Waibel et al (eds.)  The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 113- 126 at 113; Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in 
International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) Investment and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities 
and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 4; Reinisch A ‘The use and limits of res judicata and lis pendens as procedural tools 
to avoid conflicting dispute settlement outcomes’(2004) 3 Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 37; 
Spooreberg F & Vinuales J ‘conflicting decisions in International Arbitration’ Law & Practice of International 
Courts & Tribunals (2009) 91 – 113at 98. 
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adjudicated in another competent court.
51
 In order to apply these two principles it must be proved 
that the matters before the two courts are the same and involve same parties. Res judicata and lis 
pendens are very useful and are frequently applied in many countries in civil litigation and they 
help a lot to avoid parallel proceedings and inconsistent results.
52
  
 
The principle of res judicata has its roots in Roman law.
53
 The principle aims to serve three 
purposes. At first, it aims at bringing to an end of a legal dispute. It is used to ensure that no 
defendant is tried twice on the same case. Secondly, the rule intends to serve judicial economic 
interest as it aims at preventing re-litigation of a previously decided case. Thirdly, the rule aims 
at ensuring legal certainty by preventing the possibility of having divergent conclusions on cases 
of the same nature and facts.
54
 
 
Lis pendens, on the other hand, aims at barring initiation of a new proceeding where there is 
another proceeding pending in another competent court involving same parties and same subject 
matter. The principle serves or aims at achieving the same goals as res judicata. It aims to bring 
judicial economy by preventing costly parallel proceedings and ensuring legal certainty by 
avoiding parallel conflicting decisions. 
 
In international law, the two principles are regarded as general principles of law. In Charzow 
Factory Case, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Anzilloti opined that res judicata is ‘one of the 
                                                          
51
 Reinisch A ‘The use and limits of res judicata and lis pendens as procedural tools to avoid conflicting dispute 
settlement outcomes’(2004) 3 Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 37 at 43. 
52
 Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) Investment 
and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 4. 
53
 Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) Investment 
and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 4. 
54
 Reinisch A ‘The use and limits of res judicata and lis pendens as procedural tools to avoid conflicting dispute 
settlement outcomes’(2004) 3 Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 37 at 43. 
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general principles of law recognized by civilised nations’.55 The ICJ, as well, in the UN 
Administrative Tribunal Case observed that res judicata is a well-established and generally 
accepted principle of law.
56
  With regard to lis pendens, Article 35 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (ECHR) clearly provides that the 
court shall not determine any matter which is pending in another body and which has no new 
information.
57
 
 
It is from the above, that stakeholders find that res judicata and lis pendens can be effectively 
applied in investor –state dispute system. Reinisch submits that for the two principles to have 
meaning in international investment arbitration, the tribunals are supposed to focus on the issues 
and facts of a dispute rather than on the parties and causes of actions when applying the identity 
test.
58
 It is contended that this will help tribunals to identify the same parties appearing in 
different claims hence stop the rest of the claims on the basis of lis pendens. At the same time, 
future tribunals by using the same test will be able to know that the matter before it is res 
judicata.
59
 It is contended further that had the Lauder and CME cases applied these principles, 
the likelihood of inconsistent decisions would be almost impossible.
60
 Proponents concludes that 
under the current system where corporations’ window shop for favourable nationality for 
                                                          
55
 Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 & 8 Concerning the Case of the Factory at Chorzow, 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 
11, at 27 (Dec. 16) (dissenting opinion of Judge Anzilotti). 
56
 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, LC.J Reports 1954, 47, at 
53. 
57
 See Article 35(2) (b) European Convention on Human Rights. 
58
 Reinisch A ‘The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible Solutions’ in Michael Waibel et al (eds.)  The 
Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 113- 126 at 117. 
59
 Reinisch A ‘The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible Solutions’ in Michael Waibel et al (eds.)  The 
Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 113- 126. 
60
 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports 66 award of  03/09/ 2001  and CME Czech Republic BV v The 
Czech Republic  9 ICSID Reports Partial Award of 13/ 09/ 2001respectively. See a thorough discussion on the two 
cases on sub heading 3.5.2.1.3 of Chapter three of this work. 
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institution of investment disputes, there will be many cases in the future carrying the Lauder and 
CME features.
61
 
 
While the arguments put forward in favour of res judicata and lis pendens are to a large extent, 
overwhelmingly convincing, there are a number of obstacle on its way. The preconditions for the 
applicability of res judicata and les pendens pose a great challenge for the two principles to be 
applied successfully in investor – state arbitration.  
The first challenge is that the two principles require that both the parties and the subject matter 
be the same in both proceedings and the dispute has to arise in the same legal setting. In investor 
– state dispute these requirements may not be easily met as most of the time Corporations and 
shareholders are considered different legal entities hence capable of suing on their own names.  
In addition, at times Corporations forms subsidiary companies to operate in the respondent state 
country and such companies can sue or be sued without necessarily involving the parent 
corporation.  
 
Furthermore, different disputes could be filed in different legal settings each with autonomous 
jurisdiction. This could be the case where one dispute is filed in the local court while the other at 
an international adjudicative body. Neither body between the two will have the mandate in the 
circumstances to order res judicata or lis pendens over the other.  
 
                                                          
61
 Reinisch A ‘The use and limits of res judicata and lis pendens as procedural tools to avoid conflicting dispute 
settlement outcomes’(2004) 3 Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 37 at 41. 
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Therefore, while the subject matter could be the same, the disputes may fail to meet the res 
judicata and lis pendens requirements due to the lack of same or identical parties to the dispute. 
These scenarios can be well elaborated by the previously discussed cases,
62
 CME V Czech 
Republic and Lauder v Czech Republic.
63
 In CME V Czech Republic and Lauder v Czech 
Republic the facts and the respondent state were the same except that the claimants were 
different. In the former Mr. Lauder sued Czech Republic through a company he controlled while 
in the later he sued the same Respondent State in his own capacity as an investor in the Czech 
Republic.  
Furthermore, there is the possibility of multiple arbitrations and local court proceedings in 
parallel with different seats, different institutional or ad hoc rules, different substantive and 
procedural laws and identical parties. In the Lauder cases, there were parallel arbitration 
proceedings running under UNCITRAL Rules, at the same time there was another arbitration 
proceeding filed under ICC Rules and other numerous court cases in the Czech Republic courts 
and one in the US pertaining almost the same dispute.
64
  The principles of res judicata and lis 
pendens could not be applied because the disputes emanated from different autonomous legal 
settings as well as different parties.
65
 A dispute at ICSID is not a bar to another dispute under the 
UNCITRAL Rules or even other proceedings in a local court. Under this scenario multiple 
inconsistent awards may be rendered and multiple enforcement proceedings may take place. 
 
                                                          
62
 For a thorough discussion on these cases see Chapter Three of this work under 3.6.2.1. 
63
 Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID 66 (2001) and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic  9 ICSID 
Reports ( 2001) respectively. See a thorough discussion on the two cases on sub heading 3.6.2.1.3 of Chapter three 
of this work. 
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 See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID 66 para 143. 
65
 Reinisch A ‘The use and limits of res judicata and lis pendens as procedural tools to avoid conflicting dispute 
settlement outcomes’(2004) 3 Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 37 at 52. 
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Another possible hindrance to the application of the two principles could be the difficulty of 
establishing same cause of action. Investors could have different available remedies against host 
states, one under the contract entered with the state authorities and another under the applicable 
BIT. Nothing prevents both the contract and the treaty claims to be brought simultaneously by 
the same investor, in different proceedings and forums.
66
  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three of this research,
67
 this issue can be well elaborated through 
Biwater Gauff v Tanzania.
68
   In this case, a British‐German joint venture Biwater Gauff 
Tanzania (hereinafter “BGT’’) won a bid from the World Bank to renovate and upgrade the 
water system in the city of Dar es Salaam Tanzania.
69
 The firm miscalculated the cost for the 
project when bidding. As a result, after 18 months the firm was in deep financial difficulties. The 
water supply services in Dar es Salaam deteriorated as a result. The government of Tanzania 
decided to take charge of the management and the supply of water in the city.
70
 BGT was 
aggrieved by the government move and decided to institute a claim at ICSID pursuant to the 
Tanzania – UK BIT alleging breach on expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, full protection 
and security, discrimination and unrestricted transfer of capital guarantees.
71
 BGT also, through 
its subsidiary company incorporated under Tanzanian Law, DAWASCO, initiated a parallel 
                                                          
66
 Cremades BM and Madalena I ‘Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration, (2008) 24 
Arbitration International 509. 
67
 See Chapter Three of this work under Subheading 3.6.2.2. 
68
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69
 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, (2008)(Final Award) 
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proceeding under UNCITRAL Rules before a separate tribunal and alleged Tanzania breached its 
obligations under the project contract.
72
  
 
That is to say, there were two proceedings concurrently running against the same respondent in 
relation to the same dispute. In December 2007, that tribunal under UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules rejected BGT’s claim and instead awarded 3 million Pounds to Tanzania.73  A year later the 
ICSID tribunal also rendered its decision. While no compensation was awarded in the end the 
arbitrators held Tanzania liable for breaching the BIT but awarded no damages to the claimant. 
This shows that under the current investor – state dispute system multiple inconsistent awards 
could be rendered and multiple enforcement proceedings by the same claimant against the same 
respondent can also occur. This only occurred because there were two different cause of action; 
rights accruing from the contract and the other accruing from the BIT. It can be said that the 
parties were different. Therefore under the strict application of the principles of res judicata and 
lis pendens, these two cases cannot qualify for the defences. 
 
It can be concluded that, with such multiple nationalities of individual investors and corporations 
the principle of res judicata and lis pendens will hardly find room of application in investor – 
state arbitration.  
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5.2.4 Use of mediation/conciliation techniques 
 
This is another suggestion which has received attention and could be vital in enhancing the 
legitimacy of the investor – state system. The ICSID system provides for two alternate 
mechanisms for settlement of investor – state disputes.74 The dispute can be settled by way of 
conciliation or arbitration.
75
 Currently, conciliation is almost redundant in investor - state dispute 
settlement. For the last twenty years, only seven cases have been resolved through conciliation.
76
 
It is argued that the redundancy is caused by the fact that the mechanism lacks mandatory force 
and is mostly considered informal.
77
 Mediation and conciliation are normally used 
interchangeably and they both mean a dispute resolution technique under which the 
mediator/conciliator attempts to bring the parties to agreement using many different styles and 
techniques to facilitate settlement.
78
 In mediation or conciliation, the mediator’s role is to bring 
the parties to their own agreed decision. In many jurisdictions today, mediation precedes any 
litigation or arbitration. It is only when the parties are unable to settle their dispute through 
mediation that the matter is referred to the court for litigation. 
 
                                                          
74
 See Article 1(2) of the ICSID Convention. 
75
 Articles 28 – 35 of the Convention provides for conciliation proceedings while Article 36 – 55 provide for 
arbitration proceedings. 
76
 Between 1982 and 2011 see the Background Information on the ICSID, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&icsidOve
rview=true&language=English accessed on 11/07/2013. 
77
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Dispute Settlement - International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes: selecting the Appropriate Forum 2003 UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.1 at 13. 
78
 Sussman E ‘Investor State Dispute Mediation: The Benefits and Obstacles’ The Fordham Papers 2009 available 
at 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F
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09.doc&ei=HNsdU9O8Ou2X7QbNq4G4Cw&usg=AFQjCNHS89xsEukJCylO2Y0RYPvh6UQUQQ&bvm=bv.62578
216,d.ZGU accessed on 10/03/2014. 
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UNCTAD in 2009 considered the use of Mediation and Conciliation as an alternative in 
resolving investor – state disputes.79 The Report suggests that with the surge of investor – state 
claims annually, mediation may be used a tool to reduce such a rapid increase of claims. It is 
further argued that the longevity of arbitration disputes which leads to costly inconsistent awards 
may be avoided if the parties turn to mediation instead.
80
 
 
In a 2010 Joint Symposium on Investment and Alternative Dispute Resolution organised by 
UNCTAD and Washington and Lee University School of Law, stakeholders discussed the ways 
in which ADR could help to improve the investor – state legitimacy. The symposium resulted in 
the UNCTAD ADR Resolution.
81
 
 
A number of advantages exist in mediation over arbitration and litigation. The first advantage is 
that mediation is speedier than litigation and arbitration. As noted in the previous chapters, 
arbitration proceedings are lengthy and can take up to three years excluding annulment 
proceedings.
82
 It is argued that mediation can hardly take a year before the parties reach an 
agreement.
83
 Another advantage associated with mediation is that it costs less when compared 
with arbitration or litigation. As discussed in chapter three of this work,
84
 the investor – state 
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 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Latest Developments in Investor– State Dispute 
Settlement, IIA Issues Note n. 1 (2010) at 1 available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf  accessed on 
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80
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(2007) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 138. 
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arbitration system is so expensive.
85
 Argentina is currently faced with awards which run over 
USD 430 million and pending claims to the tune of 65 billion USD.
86
 The amount claimed 
against Russia by the three majority shareholders of the former Yukos Oil Company in the 
ongoing arbitration proceedings is USD 114 billion.
87
 It is submitted that mediation proceedings 
would not lead to such costs as the parties resolve the dispute amicably and within a short time 
frame agreed by the parties themselves.  
 
The third advantage is that the dispute ends amicably as the parties engages the mediator as a 
facilitator of the discussion and not an adjudicator. The parties, in other words, control the 
resolution of their dispute as a result they leave the negotiation sessions as friends and not 
antagonists as it would turn out in arbitration proceedings. Therefore considering the fact that the 
parties in investor – state disputes normally need each other to ensure the project ends well, with 
future re - engagement, mediation serve both parties’ interests and their relationship may even 
improve due to the parties ‘engagement’ in the mediation process. 
 
                                                          
85
 See Jagusch S & Sullivan J ‘A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and 
Concern’ in Waibel M et al (eds.) The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perception and Reality (2010) 79 – 
110; see also Frank S D ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International 
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Rev 1521 at 1592;see also Coe JJ ‘Toward a 
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14/08/2013. 
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20/07/2013; see also Peterson LE ‘Argentina by Numbers: Where Things Stands with Investment Treaty Claims 
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As in the previously discussed solutions, mediation also has flaws. The first practical issue is that 
normally parties go for arbitration after trying to resolve the dispute with the host state in 
amicable ways and when those amicable ways have failed. Therefore mediation or negotiations 
as many BITs requires ought to have been exhausted and proved futile before an investor 
approaches ICSID. Therefore asking the parties to go for mediation would seem like a waste of 
time.
88
 
 
Another flaw is that mediation, as a technique, is based on the principle of confidentiality of the 
proceedings. The modern approach in resolving investor – state dispute is to resolve the dispute 
in a transparent manner which allows the citizens and other interested parties to fully participate 
in the adjudication of public interest disputes.  Therefore mediation can be seen, by today’s 
standards, as obsolete in resolving public interest disputes. 
 
Lastly is that mediation does not result in a binding final award or decision. Therefore it becomes 
difficult for either party to enforce what is agreed to in mediation. In other words, mediation does 
not always resolve the dispute once and for all. That may attract the unscrupulous party to resist 
the resolution after time and resources have been spent on mediation. 
 
5.2.5 Margin of appreciation standard in the interpretation of bilateral investment treaties 
 
It is contended by some that narrow scope in interpretation of treaty provisions which is based on 
private law principles is another hurdle in developing a stable international investment law 
                                                          
88
 Salacuse JW ‘Is There A Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor State Dispute Resolution’ 
(2007) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 141. 
 
 
 
 
267 
 
regime.
89
 It is argued that despite the fact that much broader variety of regulatory matters are 
adjudicated by the investor - state Tribunals, the line of reasoning is still based on law of contract 
principles.
90
 It is therefore suggested that there is a need of adopting a new standard of reasoning 
grounded in public international law and investment law rather than private contract law.
91
  
 
It is on the basis of these grounds that the recommendations are made to change the way of 
thinking of investor – state arbitrators. The standard of review suggested is the margin of 
appreciation standard which has been developed in the international human rights sphere.
92
  
 
Margin of appreciation is a deference the court is willing to grant to the national decision makers 
and recognises that the normative requirement articulated in the convention text can often be 
legitimately met by a range of different measures that may strike different but still normative 
acceptable balance between individual rights and government interests.
93
  The margin also 
recognises that some state measures against any international convention obligation are 
justifiable to protect national interests such as security, public health, public morals and order. In 
applying the margin, the respective court is required to make a preliminary assessment of the 
respective social needs.
94
 It will be upon the court thereafter to review the preliminary 
assessment to determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authority justify the breach 
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of its obligations under the international convention. In other words the margin of appreciation 
permits the Court to show the proper degree of respect for the objectives that a Contracting Party 
may wish to pursue, and the trade-offs that it wants to make while at the same time preventing 
unnecessary restrictions on the fullness of the protection which the Convention can provide.
95
  
According to this standard, the state’s identification of a legitimate aim in pursuit of social and 
economic policies is rarely reviewed and the burden of proof showing that an initiative does not 
pursue a legitimate aim falls upon the applicant.
96
 The scope of the margin to be accorded to the 
state authority depends on the extent to which the measure intends to address the public interest 
at issue. The Court in so doing acknowledges the fact that state authorities because of their closer 
proximity to social reality are better placed to know what constitutes public interest.
97
 
 
Burke White submits that other international dispute settlement bodies, including the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), the WTO, and the Inter American Court of Human Rights have been 
applying margin of appreciation standard of review.
98
 It is argued by these proponents that had 
this standard been applied by the tribunals in CMS,
99
 Enron
100
 and Sempra
101
 the decisions 
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would have been different as Argentinian measures would have been considered necessary for 
pursuing legitimate aims for the advancement of social and economic policies.
102
  
 
While the adoption of this solution would help to widen the reasoning and create a balance 
between the public interests and the private investor interests in investor – state disputes, still 
there are obstacles in making this option successful.  
 
The first obstacle could be the fact that the current rules of ICSID, UNCITRAL SCC and the rest 
provide for party appointed tribunals. With the current rules in place, the margin of appreciation 
principle cannot be consistently applied as some of the presiding arbitrators are not aware of the 
principles requirement as they do not have a public law or international investment law 
background.  
As discussed in Chapter Three of this research,
103
 ICSID, maintains a list of potential arbitrators 
who to a large extent have the private law background. A recent report reveals that only 40% of 
the current arbitrators in the ICSID roster have public law background and the remaining 60% 
comprises of lawyers with commercial law background.
104
  The report further reveals that 12 
arbitrators have been repeatedly appearing in over 60% of all ICSID cases. This is to say the 
ICSID jurisprudence is dominated by few selected arbitrators with contract law background. In 
addition, the study indicates that 50% of arbitrators on the current ICSID roster have appeared as 
                                                          
102
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103
 See Chapter Three of this work under Subheading 3.6.2.3. 
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counsel for investors elsewhere.
105
 This signifies that there is, to a large extent, a rotation of 
same private law reasoning in the current investor – state arbitration. With the current dominance 
of commercial law Arbitrators, the margin of appreciation principle will hardly find a way to 
prosper.   
 
It is the opinion of this research that the margin of appreciation doctrine would easily prosper in 
a permanent court structure which is constituted by adjudicators with international investment 
law background or a hybrid of  public law and international trade law background. It is submitted 
here that adjudicators involved in the WTO system are better placed to understand the margin of 
appreciation doctrine which is more or less similar to the GATT Article XX provision which 
requires the WTO AB to consider non – trade measures.106 Under the WTO system, the AB has 
successfully managed to balance between trade and other public interests. Trade interests have 
been on a number of occasions been put on balance with other government policy objectives. For 
example, under Article XX of the GATT a range of government measures are considered valid if 
they are  not arbitrary and unjustifiable and meant for protection of public morals; human, 
animals, or plant life or health; labour; cultural value and exhaustible natural resources.  The 
WTO Appellate Body by recognising the importance of other policy objectives has managed to 
create a stable jurisprudence on Article XX. In US v Gasoline
107
 case the US measure to regulate 
the composition and emission effects of gasoline in order to reduce air pollution was held valid 
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despite the fact that it interfered with trade. Again, in European Communities—Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
108
 the court decided to uphold French non 
trade objective (health) over Canada trade objectives. Also in Brazil – Re-treaded Tyres109 the 
AB affirmed the relevancy of non – trade policies by holding that the import ban on re-treaded 
tyres was apt to produce a material contribution to the achievement of its objective i.e. the 
reduction in waste tyre volumes.
110
 In summary, under the WTO non – trade policy objectives 
are given equal treatment.  
It is submitted here therefore that recruiting adjudicators with WTO background to serve in the 
investor – state adjudication system may help to develop a balanced jurisprudence. 
 
5.2.6 The establishment of an appellate court under the International Centre for Settlement  
           of Investment Disputes 
 
There is yet another suggestion of introducing an appellate facility under the ICSID 
Convention.
111
 Advocates for this argue that in order to avoid the requirement of creating a new 
convention, the appellate body can be established under the ICSID Appeals Facility Rules which 
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Investment Regime?’ in Alvarez J and Sauvant K (eds.) The Evolving International Investment Regime (2011) 22-
29; Gaiger R ‘Multilateral Approach to Investment’ in Alvarez J and Sauvant K (eds.) The Evolving International 
Investment Regime (2011) 153-173; Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Christina Binder et al 
(eds.) International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 - 916; 
 
 
 
 
272 
 
can be easily adopted by the Administrative Council of ICSID without the requirement of 
approval from all member states.
112
  
 
This suggestion has been widely considered. The ICSID Secretariat in 2004 circulated a 
Discussion Paper to stakeholders seeking opinion on how best the appellate structure could be 
introduced under the ICSID Convention.
113
 The Discussion Paper acknowledged the fact that 
there are inconsistent decisions existing in parallel and that the development of international 
investment law is jeopardised by such inconsistencies. While acknowledging the existence of 
inconsistency, the Secretariat was of the opinion that inconsistency was not the general feature of 
ICSID jurisprudence but the exception.
114
  The Secretariat was sceptical about the introduction of 
an appellate structure. It opined that introducing the structure might affect more the legitimacy of 
the system as appellate structure may cause delay and interfere with the finality of the award. 
Proponents argue that in order to maintain finality of proceedings, which is the key concept at 
ICSID; time limits could be stipulated within which the appellate body has to deliver its 
decisions.
115
  The proposal was not pursued further and was abandoned in 2005 as some 
stakeholders viewed that the establishment of the structure was prematurely conceived.
116
 
 
It is submitted here that establishing the Appellate structure under the ICSID without 
incorporating other institutions involved in the investor – state adjudication system will do very 
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little in solving the problem of inconsistency of decisions. Currently the arbitrations conducted 
under the UNCITRAL Rules, SCC or ICC has no connection with ICSID.  As stated earlier,
117
 
the UNCTAD 2014 World Investment Report indicates that ICSID registered 62% of all investor 
– state disputes, UNCITRAL 28%, and the remaining 10% is managed by the London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA), and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
118
 Therefore even 
after the formation of such a structure at ICSID 38% of investor – state disputes will be left out 
and these other institutions will still have the autonomy of rendering awards without necessarily 
subjecting them to the ICSID appellate body.  
 
Therefore while this proposal may benefit ICSID awards, it will do little to benefit the investor – 
state arbitration system as a whole. Creating an appellate system under ICSID will entail leaving 
out disputes settled outside the ICSID system. It is submitted therefore that this suggestion is not 
as unifying as it ought to be. 
 
5.2.7 Treaty based appellate body 
 
Due to the existence of many BITs in place so far, it is argued by some that establishment of an 
appellate body for all BITs would be difficult and unrealistic.
119
 Therefore it is proposed that 
new BITs should have a clause providing for the establishment of an appellate tribunal. This 
proposal has received attention from some few countries. The Central America Free Trade 
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Agreement (CAFTA)
120
 provides for the establishment of this kind of Appellate Body.
121
 The US 
under its recent BITs provides for the establishment of an appellate body. The US Trade 
Promotion Authority Act suggests that, when negotiating future investment treaties, the U.S. will 
consider an appellate body for each treaty.
122
 This practice is said to be increasing because of the 
unavailability of an appellate mechanism under the ICSID Convention.
123
  
 
This suggestion however does not provide a solution on how under the prevailing circumstances 
where there are 3240 BITs and IIAs can a treaty based appellate body bring consistency in 
international investment regime.
124
  It is therefore submitted here that the proposal to establish an 
appellate structure based on treaty to treaty is a non-starter and heavily flawed.  
 
5.3 Author’s ‘alternative’ solutions for improving the current system. 
 
In the discussion above, several solutions suggested by different stakeholders have been 
considered. It is undoubtedly clear that some of the suggested solutions are quite convincing and 
provide the way forward on how to rescue the impending collapse of the investor – state 
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281 at 282. 
124
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014 
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arbitration system. However, it has also been noted that some of the solutions suggested are 
accompanied with obstacles or disadvantages which as a result overshadows their effectiveness.  
 
As stated elsewhere, it is the opinion of this research that creating the international investment 
court together with its appellate structure is the most realistic and goal achieving solution. 
However, in the event that the establishment does not materialise for any reason, this research 
puts forward the following alternative solutions. The suggested solutions includes establishment 
of investor – state dispute management centre, effective utilisation of host state Supreme Courts, 
mandatory publication of all awards, effective use of member state interpretative statement and 
lastly the formation of a working group to provide common interpretation to the international 
investment basic principles.  
 
5.3.1 Investor – state dispute management centre 
 
This research recommends the establishment of an investor – state dispute management centre. 
The Centre should be charged with the duty to provide legal assistance to poor developing 
countries which are not able to engage expensive lawyers from the developed world.
125
 The fact 
that developing countries have been the majority respondent in the current investor – state 
arbitration strengthens the relevance of this proposal. The UNCTAD 2012 report indicates that 
46 disputes were filled in 2011 and 80% of them (38 cases) were filed against developing 
                                                          
125
 For more discussion on WTO Centre see Gottwald E ‘Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal 
Assistance Centre for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?’ (2007) 22(2) American University 
International Law Review 237 at 252. 
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countries.
126
 On the other hand, UNCTAD 2013 Report indicates that 58 new cases were filed in 
2012 out of which 66% (37 cases) involved developing states as respondents.
127
  In addition, the 
latest UNCTAD Report, WIR 2014, indicates that 85% of new cases were instituted by investors 
from the developed world against developing countries in the year ending December 2013.
128
 
Therefore, it is evidently clear that developing countries are the majority respondents in investor 
– state disputes.  
 
The WTO, for example, through some of its member countries,  introduced the Advisory Centre 
on WTO Law for the same purposes and it has been very helpful to developing countries.
129
 The 
WTO Centre provides legal aid to developing countries and least developed countries.  The 
Centre is based in Geneva and has a status of inter- governmental organisation independent from 
the WTO.  The Centre is co – owned by both the developed and the developing countries.  
Despite the fact that it is co – owned, the Centre only provide legal assistance to  least 
                                                          
126
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘Latest Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement’ 11AU.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IT/2012 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf accessed on 05/03/2014. 
127
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  ‘Recent Development in Investor – 
State Dispute Settlement’, Issue Note IIA, 28 – 29th May 2013 at 3 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf accessed on 05/03/2014. 
128
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report ‘Investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ [2014] IIA Monitor, No. 1, at 125, U.N.Doc.UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2014/3 available 
at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 23/07/2014. 
129
 The Centre was established in 2001 through the Agreement Establishing the WTO Advisory Centre on the WTO 
Law available at http://www.acwl.ch/e/documents/agreement_estab_e.pdf accessed on 04/03/2014; For more on the 
working modality of the Centre see Gottwald E ‘Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance centre 
for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?’ (2007) 22(2) American University International Law 
Review 237; see also Sauvant KP & Ortino F ‘Improving the International Investment Law and Policy Regime: 
Options for the future’ Background report prepared for the Seminar on Improving the International Investment 
Regime, Helsinki, April 10-11, 2013 available at 
file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/Improving%20the%20International%20Investment%20Law%20and%20Policy%20
Regime%20%20Options%20for%20the%20Future%20-pdf accessed on 04/03/2014. 
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developing countries, developing countries and the economy in transition countries.
130
 Article 
2(1) of the Agreement Establishing the WTO Advisory Centre (ACWL) provides that the main 
objectives of the Centre is to provide legal advice to member states on WTO law, support the 
parties in legal proceedings and facilitate training to government officials through internships 
and seminars.  With regard to legal assistance in proceedings, the Centre engages in assisting the 
respective countries in different stages of the disputes. The Centre represents the respondent 
states at a discounted price but at times, the service is rendered for free if the respective 
respondent state is a least developed country.
131
 For the purposes of ensuring that it meets the 
demand of representing developing states whenever required, the Centre has a roster of external 
counsels who would chip in to assist when the Centre is running out of counsels or the Centre 
lacks personnel with a particular expertise required in a particular case.
132
 
 
Learning from the above WTO example, it is suggested here that the Centre once established 
should focus on providing affordable access to legal services to developing countries. It is quite 
clear that the competency and sometimes experience of a lawyer is crucial in achieving a 
favourable outcome of any legal proceeding. The relevancy of expertise and experience becomes 
even more vital in specialised fields like the international investment law. Currently, the legal 
services is monopolised by few firms and lawyers from the Western world who charge exorbitant 
fees which can bankrupt a poor country coffer from charges of a single case.
133
 As earlier 
                                                          
130
 See the Advisory Centre on WTO Law - About Us available at  http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/about-e.aspx 
accessed on 04/03/2014 
131
 For more information on the working of the Centre see http://www.acwl.ch accessed on 04/03/2014. 
132
 See the Advisory Centre on WTO Law - Roster of External Legal Counsel available at 
http://www.acwl.ch/e/dispute/counsel-e.aspx accessed on 04/03/2014. 
133
 As discussed earlier under Chapter Three Subheading 3.5.2.3 a few group of lawyers, 12 arbitrators, appears in 
more than 60% percent of all ICSID cases; see also Gaukrodger D and Gordon K ‘Investor-State Dispute 
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discussed,
134
 a single case can cost US$8 million and in some cases exceed US$30 million.
135
  
The Czech Republic in addition to the damages of US$ 354,655,752 spent an extra US$ 10 
million as legal fees
136
 in Lauder v The Czech Republic and CME Czech Republic BV v The 
Czech Republic.
137
 The impact of these cases on the economy of a development country is dire 
and may immensely affect development programmes of that country.
138
 From these statistical 
data on costs one can see that legal aid services will help a lot in ensuring that developing 
countries get quality legal support when involved in investor – state arbitration.  
 
The Centre may also offer preliminary legal opinion after evaluating the strengths and 
weaknesses of cases in which the developing countries are involved before the dispute is filed for 
arbitral adjudication. The advantage of preliminary evaluation of the case is that where the 
claimant has a strong case it will be better and for the benefit of the respondent state to sit down 
with the investor and settle the case amicably. Through that, the state would have avoided 
litigation and other related costs.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community’ OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment, No. 2012/3 at 44.  
134
 For a thorough discussion on costs in the current investor – state arbitration see Chapter Three of this work under 
Subheading 3.6.2.7. 
135
 See Gaukrodger D and Gordon K ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy 
Community’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2012/3 at 19 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf accessed on 20/06/2013. 
136
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Communication on Investment, 
Technology & Related Financial Issues, Investor- State Disputes and Policy Implications, at 14, U.N. Doc. 
TB/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 14,2005)  available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d62-en.pdf  accessed on 05/03/2014. 
137
 See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports (2003) and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic 
ICSID Reports (2003). 
138
 For a thorough discussion on the impact of these cases to the sovereignty of the host state see Chapter Three of 
this work under Subheading 3.5.2.6; see also UNCTAD, Communication on Investment, Technology & Related 
Financial Issues, Investor- State Disputes and Policy Implications, at 7 - 8, U.N. Doc. TB/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 
14,2005)  available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d62-en.pdf  accessed on 05/03/2014. 
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It is further submitted here that the Centre, if well equipped with experts in the field, could also 
be helpful in assisting developing states at the negotiation stage of the BITs. As it can be noted 
from the previous discussions,
139
 a BIT which is well framed and encompasses non - investment 
policy objectives can limit the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and provide deference to the host 
states. Apart from encompassing non - investment policy objectives, the BIT may provide for 
member states’ rights to form a Committee which will be mandated to issue interpretative 
statements in case of conflict decisions on a particular principle.
140
 Therefore the Centre can 
prepare a Model BIT which encompasses non - investment policy objectives but also 
safeguarding host states interests to be adopted by developing states.  
 
There are a number of advantages which comes with the introduction of the legal aid Centre for 
developing countries. The main advantage is that, apart from rescuing poor countries from 
paying exorbitant fees to expensive Western world firms and lawyers, the Centre shall increase 
the legitimacy of the whole investor – state arbitration system. Poor countries will feel free to use 
the system in same manner the developed world does. Through the Centre the developing world 
will receive the same level of representation to that of rich foreign investors hence justice will be 
expected to be dispensed in an even manner. Therefore until when legal representation is 
balanced the legitimacy of investor – state arbitration system will continue to be perceived as 
                                                          
139
See the discussion on Chapter Four under Subheading 4.3.2.4 and 4.3.2.5; see also Canadian Model BIT, 2004 
available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf and the US Model BIT 2012 available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf both accessed on 
25/02/2014 accessed on 25/02/2014. 
140
  See for example Article 1131(2) and Article 2001 of NAFTA; for a thorough discussion on the NAFTA 
Interpretative Statements, see Marshall F ‘Defining New Institutional Options for Investor – State Dispute 
Settlement’ International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2009 at p. 38 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/defining_new_institutional_options.pdf accessed on 03/02/2014 
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leaning towards the interests of foreign investors who are able to higher expensive legal firms to 
argue their cases. 
 
Therefore as it can be learnt from the WTO experience, the Centre for assistance to developing 
countries can play a significant role in creating a balanced adjudicative system in investor – state 
arbitration and ultimately increase the legitimacy of the system as a whole. It should also be 
noted here that, for the Centre to be successful, it does not need to compete with the big law 
firms in terms of resources but should focus on providing the developing world with the well 
informed legal advice and necessary training for the in-house counsels. With time the in house 
counsels will be able to defend their countries after gaining enough experience. 
 
Alongside that, it is submitted here that there should be established an institute which shall be 
responsible in ensuring ethics of investment arbitrators. The institute should be responsible with 
the training and establishing of ethics to govern investor – state arbitration. In order to achieve 
that successfully, the institute needs to be a sole and an independent appointing authority for 
adjudicators to all matters relating to investor – state disputes. This practice has been done by 
other different international adjudicative systems. For example as discussed in Chapter Four,
141
 
the International Bar Association (IBA) and the International Law Association (ILA) have 
developed the guidelines for assessing the neutrality of the adjudicators.  
 
                                                          
141
 See Chapter Four of this work under Subheading 4.4.3 & 4.4.4. 
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The institute as an independent organ should be mandated to prepare a roster of Arbitrators from 
all parts of the world with expertise on public law. Therefore the appointment of credible 
arbitrators with public law background to the roster will be managed and done by the institute 
after the respective potential arbitrators have passed a qualifying test. That is to say, rules of 
etiquette of Investor – state arbitration need to be formulated specifically demanding the 
appointment of arbitrators with public law background. For the purposes of maintaining 
impartiality and independence of arbitrators, the rules should strictly prohibit arbitrators on the 
roster to serve as counsels in other investment disputes. The celebrated independence of the 
judiciary principles should be strictly observed and used by the Centre as an appointing 
authority.   
 
One of the issues would be where should this Centre and the institute be hosted and who should 
be responsible for its management and funding. As discussed elsewhere, the legitimacy issues in 
the current investor – state system itches a lot of stakeholders, UNCTAD being one of them. The 
recent UNCTAD World Investment Reports have identified the issue of exorbitant costs as one 
of the issues haunting investor – state adjudication system.142 Therefore it is submitted here that, 
UNCTAD as a UN affiliate with the mandate to organise the World Investment Forum, which 
brings together major players from the international investment community to discuss challenges 
and opportunities and to promote investment policies and partnerships for sustainable 
development and equitable growth, need to take up the matter and establish the centre and the 
                                                          
142
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report, ‘Reform of 
Investor –state Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Road’ Map 26th June 2013, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf   at pp 3 - 4, accessed on 03/02/2014; see also 
UNCTAD World Investment Report (WIR) (2012) at 88 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/WIR2012_WebFlyer.aspx   accessed  on 
14/08/2013. 
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institute.
143
 The fact that it is the leading institution on global economic issues, UNCTAD stands 
to be the best institution to establish the Centre and the institute. The two organs can be 
established and hosted at the Division of Investment and Enterprise of the UNCTAD. The 
Division is recognised as ‘a global centre of excellence on issues related to investment and 
enterprise for sustainable development’.144 The division also provides technical support to over 
150 world economies. It is submitted here that establishing the legal aid Centre and the institute 
should be considered as falling within its mandate of providing technical assistance.
145
 
 
5.3.2 Limiting investor – state arbitration by using host state courts  
 
The effective utilisation of the host state courts also deserves an attention and has not been given 
the value it deserves. Some countries are considering an option of using local courts in their 
modern BITs. The UNCTAD 2013 World Investment Report as well suggests that limiting the 
foreign investor from the investor – state arbitration could be one of the solutions to curb the 
current legitimacy issues.
146
  
 
It is submitted here that conducting hearings in the host state could indeed be an effective means 
to address legitimacy issues as long as the judicial system in that country is just and adheres to 
                                                          
143
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘about Us’, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/AboutUs.aspx accessed on 26/05/2014. 
144
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘Investment and Enterprise Division’ 
available at http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/DIAE.aspx accessed on 26/05/2014. 
145
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘Investment and Enterprise Division’ 
available at http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/DIAE.aspx accessed on 26/05/2014. 
146
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report ‘Reform of 
Investor –state Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Road Map’ 26th June 2013, at 7 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf.accessed on 04/03/2014. 
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the basic principles of independence of the judiciary. In countries like South Africa and Australia 
where the independence of the judiciary is firmly protected by the constitution, such an option 
may work quite effectively. For this proposal to be successful and to avoid backlog of cases in 
the normal judicial duties, a special division could be formed which will be responsible for 
handling investment disputes. For those countries which have investment dispute divisions in 
their court structure, the disputes could be directed to such division registry. This means that 
renegotiation of the current BITs is needed if these suggestions are to have any meaningful 
impact. Some countries have shown their intention of re-negotiating the first generation BITs 
which create legitimacy concerns.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four of this research,
147
 a number of countries have reacted against the 
current investor – state system and calls for the use of host state courts. South Africa, for 
example, has cancelled a number of treaties with European countries and has clearly stated that 
the protection will be provided in the local legislation.
148
 It first issued a cancellation notice to its 
European BIT partners involving Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany and 
Switzerland.
149
  In another move, the South African government in November 2013, published 
its draft Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 2013 in the Government Gazette for public 
comment.
150
 The bill provides for domestic litigation, domestic arbitration and mediation of 
                                                          
147
 See Chapter Four of this Work under subheading 4.8. 
148
 The Department of Trade and Industry Republic of South Africa’s Government Position Paper on Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review, June 2009, available at  http://www.thedti.gov.za/ads/bi-
lateral_policy.pdf  (accessed on 7
th
 February 2013).   
149
South Africa Pushes Phase-out of Early Bilateral Investment Treaties after at least Two Separate Brushes with 
Investor-State Arbitration, Investment Arbitration Reporter, September 23, 2012, available online at 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20120924_1   accessed on 04/03/2014.  
150
 See the Draft Bill on Promotion and Protection of Investment, 2013 available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/11/Promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-2013-Invitation-for-public-
comment.pdf accessed on 07/03/2014. 
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investment disputes.
151
 Therefore if the Bill becomes law, investment disputes in South Africa 
will be settled locally through court litigation, mediation or arbitration under the South African 
Arbitration Act.
152
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four of this research, In March 2014, Germany also announced its 
dissatisfaction with the investor – state arbitration system and is opposing the inclusion of the 
system in the EU – US trade pact which is currently under negotiations.153 Germany is taking the 
same stance on the recently concluded Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
between EU and Canada.
154
 Germany is advancing the idea of adjudicating investor – state 
dispute in the host state courts.
155
 According to the Financial Times, the Junior Minister of 
Economy, Brigitte Zypries, believes that foreign investors ‘have sufficient legal protection in the 
national courts.’156 It is submitted here that this new Germany stance, which was the first country 
to pioneer for  BITs and signed the first BIT with Pakistan in 1959, strengthens further the 
argument that dispute settlement provision in the BITs indeed has problems. 
 
                                                          
151
 See Article 11 of the Bill. 
152
 Arbitration Act 1965 (Act No. 42 of 1965). 
153
 See the Germany Ministry Announcement in Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue  at 16 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf  
154
 See  the EU – Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf accessed on 11/11/2014. 
155
 See Chapter Four of this Work under subheading 4.8. 
156
 Financial Times quoted in Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue  at 16 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf 
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Australia has also omitted ISDS provisions in some of its BITs including the FTA with USA.
157
 
In 2011, the former government stated that it will not include investor – state dispute settlement 
in its future BITs.
158
 However, as discussed earlier,
159
 with the change of government in 2013, 
the new Australia- Korea FTA which includes an investment chapter has incorporated investor-
state arbitration.
160
 With the aim of addressing the host state policy making space, the new FTA 
comes with the ‘general exception’ to investment obligations which parallel WTO exception 
provisions such as GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV.
161
 
 
It is submitted here that, the utilisation of host state courts will have a number of advantages. 
Firstly, forum shopping will no longer be an issue once host state courts utilisation is given 
priority. Under the current settings investors choose nationalities which will provide them with 
more avenues for instituting investment claims. Furthermore, under the current system investors 
may institute a claim with more than one arbitral institution requiring the respondent state to 
defend the same claim in different autonomous forums. Therefore, by requiring national courts to 
                                                          
157
 See the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 01/01/2005 available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text accessed on 26/02/2014. 
158
 See Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity, Australian 
Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, April 2011, available online at 
http://www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/Gillard-Government-Trade- 
Policy-Statement.aspxhttp://www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/Gillard- 
Government-Trade-Policy-Statement.aspx   accessed on 04/03/2014. 
159
 See Chapter Four of this work under Subheading 4.8. 
160
 Lester S ‘Improving Investment Treaties through General Exceptions Provisions: The Australian Example’ 
Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf accessed on 16/05/2014. 
161
 Lester S ‘Improving Investment Treaties through General Exceptions Provisions: The Australian Example’ 
Investment Treaty News, May 2014 Issue available at 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd_itn_may_2014_en.pdf accessed on 16/05/2014. 
 
 
 
 
286 
 
hear the case at first instance will bar foreign investors from forum shopping as the lis pendens 
and res judicata principles will be squarely applied against such applications.
162
  
 
Secondly, the use of host state courts will help in reducing the costs of the proceedings. As 
discussed under Chapter Three of this research, costs in investor – state disputes are extremely 
high as parties are required to travel to the seat of arbitration but also pay hefty amount to 
lawyers and arbitrators.
163
 Legal costs in investor-state disputes average over US$8 million per 
case and in some cases exceed US$30 million.
164
 With host state courts there will not be any 
institutional costs or inflated arbitrators fees as the judges and the operation of the case are 
normally funded by the state. Therefore a successful effort to reduce cost by using the host state 
court will be a milestone towards enhancing the system legitimacy. 
 
Thirdly, host state court utilisation will help the system to regain the trust it lost as a result of the 
use of party appointed arbitrators. The current system uses party appointed arbitrators who, in 
many occasions, tends to lean on the appointing party interests.
165
 A study conducted in 2009 
reveals that in 150 cases there were 34 dissenting opinions. All 34 dissenting opinions were from 
                                                          
162
 For a thorough analysis on lis pendens and res judicata see above under subheading 5.2.3. 
163
  For an insightful discussion on costs see Chapter Three of this work under subheading 3.6.2.7. 
164Gaukrodger D and Gordon K ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy 
Community’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2012/3 at 19.  
165
 See Paulsson J ‘Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution’ (2010) ICSID Review - Foreign Investment 
Law Journal 339; see also Van Harten G ‘A Case for International Investment Court’ Society of International 
Economic Law, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1153424 accessed on 06/09/2013. 
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the arbitrators appointed by the losing party in the cases.
166
 This has, to a large extent, damaged 
the image of the investor – state arbitration system.167  
 
 Fourthly, the use of host state court will help to increase transparency in investor – state disputes 
settlement system. As discussed in Chapter Three of this work,
168
 it is unfortunate that the 
current system inherited the confidentiality principle from international commercial arbitration 
despite the fact that it deals with public interest disputes. Therefore, once the host state is 
mandated to hear investor – state cases, the general practice of the court which is public hearing 
is expected to be followed as well in investor – state dispute hence eliminating the problem of 
lack of transparency. 
 
Another advantage is that, local court judges are better placed to know the host states’ other 
policy objectives hence provide them with deference necessary for such a state to implement 
those objectives. Under the current investor – state arbitration, there is a public outcry that the 
system operates without taking into account other important policy objectives.
169
 It is argued that 
in the current system arbitrators constrains sovereign states’ ability to make rules and adopt 
measures which aim at protecting the society’s health, human rights, culture, labour and the 
surrounding environment.
170
 Judges’ knowledge on the local circumstances may help them at 
                                                          
166
 Van den Berg AJ ‘Dissenting Opinion by Party Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration’ in Arsanjani M 
et al. (eds.) Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honour of W. Michael Reisman (2011) 821 – 843 
at 824. 
167
 For an insightful discussion on impartiality see Chapter Three of this work under subheading 3.6.2.3. 
168
 See Chapter Three of this work under subheading 3.6.2.4. 
169
 For an insightful discussion on impartiality see Chapter Three of this work under subheading 3.6.2.6. 
170
 See for example Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2006) European Journal of International Law 121 at 128; also see Report of the SRSG, 
Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework 
A/HRC/11/13, para 30 (2009); See also, Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Towards 
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reaching a fairer judgment which takes into consideration both parties interests than 
commercially trained arbitrators sitting in Washington discussing the South Africa Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) and the Mining Charter which aims at 
addressing past racial discrimination arising from apartheid in South Africa. 
 
It is concluded here that, the use of host state courts can help in addressing legitimacy issues as 
stated herein above. However, the use of host state court must be approached with caution. In 
countries which lack independent judiciary, the use of host state court may be disadvantageous to 
foreign investors. It should be borne in mind that the reason for the growth of the current investor 
– state arbitration system was the perception among foreign investors that host state court were 
leaning to their government interests when adjudicating international investment disputes. 
Therefore this could be a solution to foreign investors and host states which have independent 
judiciary. 
 
5.3.3 Mandatory publication of investor – state awards 
 
Timely availability of the award for public scrutiny on matters of public nature is vital in any 
system which cherishes accountability and transparency. It is the opinion of the researcher that 
all public interest disputes should be published in full as soon as possible. As discussed in 
Chapter Three and Four of this research,
171
 lack of transparency is one of the shortcomings of 
investment arbitration.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Operationalization of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework A/HRC/14/27, paras 20–23 (2010), the 
reports can be accessed at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Reports.aspx  accessed on 9/08/2013. 
171
 See Chapter Three under Subheading 3.6.2.4 and Chapter Four under Subheading 4.3.1 for a thorough discussion 
on the issue of Transparency in the current investor – state arbitration system. 
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Proceedings conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010 are conducted under the 
high level of confidentiality.
172
 Article 28(3) demands the disputes to be held in camera unless 
the parties agree otherwise. On the other hand, Article 34(5) of the Rules extends confidentiality 
with regards to the award. The award is also meant to be confidential unless the parties agree 
otherwise. 
 
The ICSID Convention also maintains the parties’ choice with regards to publication of the 
award in full but relaxes the rules with regards to the hearing and publication of excerpts. Article 
48(5) of the ICSID Convention provides that; ‘The Centre shall not publish the award without 
the consent of the parties’. The Arbitration Rules, as amended in 2006, also allow the publication 
of excerpt on the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.
173
 With regard to hearing, Rule 37(2) of the 
ICSID Rules enlarged the door for interested third parties to participate in the proceedings by 
way of submissions. 
 
Transparency, as discussed earlier,
174
 has a number of advantages to the investor – state 
arbitration system as a whole. Firstly, international investment law, as a branch of public 
international law, needs to be developed in a systematic way by being certain and predictable. 
This goal cannot be achieved in a system which is grounded on confidentiality.  Certainty and 
predictability will only be achieved where the tribunals have access to previously decided cases 
                                                          
172
 See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2010 available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/arbitration/rules/arb-rules-revised-
2010 accessed on 15/07/2013. 
173
 See Rule 48(4) of the Arbitration Rules and Article 48(5) of the Convention; see also Asteriti A & Tams CJ 
‘Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ Schill (ed.) International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 788 at 790; see also Mistelis LA ‘Confidentiality and Third 
Party Participation in Investment Arbitration’ (2005) 21 Arbitration International 205 at 221. 
174
 See Chapter Four of this work under subheading 4.3. 
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hence being able to develop consistency which would ultimately create certainty and 
predictability. The availability of prior decided cases which have similarity with the new ones 
could be very helpful for the presiding tribunal to arrive at more or less similar conclusions 
hence enhancing certainty and predictability in investor – state dispute settlement system.175 
 
Secondly, transparency acts as a controlling tool for adjudicators’ behaviour.176 The fact that 
arbitrators are aware that the public has access to their decisions and are able to scrutinise each 
arbitrator’s reasoning would ultimately increase the quality of the awards. Arbitrators will be 
keen enough before rendering the award in order to avoid public humiliation resulting from 
poorly reasoned awards. In other words, transparency acts as a check and balancing tool. 
 
Thirdly, transparency brings public confidence over the respective adjudicatory system. Through 
transparent process the system will be able to build itself as the stakeholders will be aware of the 
procedures which are to be applied consistently in all disputes.
177
 
 
Therefore, in order to increase transparency in investor –state arbitration system it is proposed 
here for the immediate publication of the investment arbitration awards online. This will only be 
possible if the respective institutional rules are amended to that end.  The parties to the future 
                                                          
175
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 159. 
176
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 155. 
177
 Grossman N ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’ (2009) George Washington International Law 
Review 107 at 156. 
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disputes would be automatically subjected to the amended version of the Rules of ICSID. With 
regards to UNCITRAL, parties wishing to use the new 2013 Rules are at liberty to opt in the 
UNCITRAL 2013 Rules which provides for transparency of the proceedings and publication of 
the awards.
178
 Once the state parties to the ICSID so decides, future users of the rules will be 
required to adhere to the new state parties’ wishes. A unit should be established under 
UNCITRAL or ICSID to deal with updating the investment dispute website. All newly decided 
cases, with public interest aspects, should be uploaded timely for the benefit of the public at large 
and the tribunals. It is submitted here that considering the public nature of the disputes with their 
impact to third parties, there is no need to bring the principles of confidentiality in international 
investment disputes. Therefore, where the state parties to the BIT decides to amend the Rules to 
bring more legitimacy values, foreign investors will have to adhere to the new rules. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four of this work, the move towards transparency has been slowly 
taking place by individual countries, arbitration institutions and some multilateral treaties.
179
 The 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 2007 Investment Agreement, for 
example, recognises the importance of transparency in public interest disputes.
180
 The 
Agreement requires proceedings to be conducted in an open court.
181
 The NAFTA state parties, 
as well, in 2001 through the Free Trade Commission (FTC) issued a Statement of Interpretation 
regarding proceedings under NAFTA. The Commission Statement allows the parties to any 
                                                          
178
 See the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-release-UNCITRAL-Rules-on-
Transparency.pdf accessed on 27/09/2013. 
179
 For a thorough discussion on the state of transparency in different Agreements see Chapter Four under 
Subheading 4.3.2. 
180
 COMESA Investment Agreement available at 
http://vi.unctad.org/files/wksp/iiawksp08/docs/wednesday/Exercise%20Materials/invagreecomesa.pdf accessed on 
28/08/2013. 
181
 See Article 28(5) & (6) of the COMESA Investment Agreement and Article 9(1) & (2) of Annex A to the 
Agreement 
 
 
 
 
292 
 
NAFTA proceeding to provide access to documents issued by, or submitted to, the Tribunal. In 
addition, the statement requires the documents to be in the public domain as soon as possible.
182
 
The US Model BITs 2004 and 2012 also provide for transparency in investor – state proceedings. 
The two Model BITs provide under Article 29 respectively for the proceedings to be conducted 
in an open court.
183
 Canada Model BIT 2004 also requires all documents submitted to, or issued 
by, the Tribunal to be publicly available, unless the disputing parties otherwise agree.
184
 
 
At arbitration institutional level, as discussed in the preceding chapters,
185
 in 2013 the 
UNCITRAL adopted the new Transparency Rules for investor – state arbitration.186 The rules are 
meant to apply to all future treaties providing for UNCITRAL arbitration unless the parties agree 
otherwise. The scope of application therefore is subjected to the future entered treaties and not 
for the existing 3240 BITs and IIAs.
187
 The Rules will apply in the current existing BITs only 
where the parties have opted in the new Rules.
188
 Subject to the limitation set under Article 7 the 
notice of arbitration, the response thereof, pleadings, third party submissions, transcripts of 
hearing, hearing decisions and awards are required to be promptly available to the public for 
                                                          
182
 See the NAFTA Free Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation of 31
st
 July 2001, para 1(a) & (b) available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/NAFTA-
Interpr.aspx  accessed on 28/08/2013. 
183
 See the US Model BIT 2012 article 29(2) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf accessed on 
28/08/2013. 
184
See Article 38 (3) of the Canadian Model BIT 2004. 
185
 For a thorough discussion on the new Transparency Rules see Subheading 3.4.1.3.1 of chapter three of this work. 
186
 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-release-UNCITRAL-Rules-on-
Transparency.pdf accessed on 27/09/2013. 
187
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
188
 See Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, 2013. 
 
 
 
 
293 
 
inspection.
189
 A repository is established under Article 8 which is responsible with the keeping of 
the record and publishing the required information. 
 
It is submitted here that, while the move by the UNCITRAL, NAFTA, COMESA, the US and 
Canada has many advantages, it will remain a desire unless the parties to the ICSID Convention 
and the current existing 3240 BITS and IIAs decide to make this solution a reality.
190
 The current 
move which involves only few countries will not help much towards achieving transparency. 
There is still a mountain to climb to make this solution work. The patchwork of current BITs and 
IIAs renegotiation will take hundreds of years if at all the bilateral partners will agree to 
renegotiate. Therefore it can be concluded here that bilateral efforts may not help much in 
building a transparent adjudication process. The world community efforts are needed if this 
option is to have an impact in creating a consistent and transparent adjudication system. It 
remains therefore a fact that creation of a standing investment court through a multilateral 
investment treaty is the only hope to achieve consistent and predictable international investment 
jurisprudence.  
 
5.3.4 Enhance the use of member states interpretative guidelines/statements 
 
It is surprising to see that not many stakeholders have considered the importance of establishing 
guidelines to the interpretation of BITs general principles.  This research argue that, the fact that 
                                                          
189
 See Article 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Rules. 
190
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
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a BIT is a creature of the respective state parties’ consent, there is a need for the respective state 
parties to have the mandate to provide the intended meaning to each principle in a BIT.
191
  
 
The Permanent Court of International Justice once held that the right of giving an authoritative 
interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify or 
suppress it.
192
 In other words, the PCIJ was rightly saying that the contracting states retain the 
power to clarify the language/meaning of a treaty through an authoritative interpretation.
193
The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well, in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia)
194
 
insisted that state parties to a treaty have a significant role to play in the interpretation of the 
treaty provisions.
195
  
 
It is submitted here that such interpretative notes will play a significant role in guiding the 
tribunal on the intention of the parties with regards to the relevant BIT. Tribunals will no longer 
be at loss on whether the parties intended to provide the deference to the parties on matters of 
social concerns like environmental, cultural, health and other matters of peculiar interest to the 
member states.
196
  
 
                                                          
191
 see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report, 
2011‘Interpretation of IIAs: What State can Do’ December 2011, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia2011d10_en.pdf  accessed on 03/03/2014; see also See UNCTAD IIA Issues 
Note ‘Reform of Investor – State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap’ 26th June 2013 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf. ; accessed on 03/03/2014. 
192
 See Permanent Court of International Justice, Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 8, p. 
37. 
193
 Anthea R ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States’ (2010) 104 
American Journal of International Law 225. 
194
 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) Judgement [13 Dec 1999] ICJ/594. 
195
 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), para 63. 
196
 On the current state of affair on this matter see Chapter Three of this work under Subheading 3.5.2.6. 
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Such a move will be in line with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
which provides for the general rules of interpretation of treaties. The Article provides that: 
 
‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance to the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’197 
 
Sub article 31(3) (a) provides further guidance as it requires that the interpretation of a treaty has 
to take into account ‘any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions’.198 Therefore, it is submitted here that the object 
and purpose of the treaty is well understood by the parties themselves. Hence, any interpretative 
statement by the state members will be vitally important for the tribunal to ascertain the meaning 
of any provision from the respective BIT. As Article 31(3) (a) provides, the parties may decide at 
any future date to enter into an agreement pertaining the interpretation of their BIT. This means 
that the state members, in order to avoid any wrong interpretation by the tribunal, can issue an 
interpretative statement to guide future tribunals on the meaning and scope of the provisions in 
their BIT. Through this practice, consistency and coherence may easily develop. If, for example, 
an interpretative statement has been issued which requires tribunals to take into account 
environmental, human rights, cultural rights in the course of interpretation of the treaty, tribunals 
will have no option but to adhere to such a guideline. 
 
                                                          
197
 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf accessed on 24/02/2014. 
198
 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf accessed on 24/02/2014. 
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As a result, tribunals’ discretionary power will be contained to the level intended by the state 
parties. In other words, the Tribunal will not be in a position to encroach on matters to which the 
state parties has set the limitation otherwise the principle of ultra vires will be readily applied 
against such a tribunal. With such guidelines, the consistent jurisprudence on the meaning and 
scope of investment principles will ultimately emerge and solidify. It should be noted that while 
the BIT provisions differ in wording, they mostly intend to provide for the same protection to all 
investors.
199
 The so called ‘first generation Bits’ all affords, to a large extent, protection to 
foreign investors without assigning them any duties. Therefore in such situations, state parties 
instead of cancelling the BIT, may decide to make guidelines on the investors’ obligations in the 
host state country. The Guidelines could go as far as stipulating the investors’ duty to observe 
environmental, health, cultural regulations. The Guidelines may as well elaborate the scope of 
the controversial principles which have sparked debate like the meaning of investment, umbrella 
clause, Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and Non Precluded Measure clauses (NPM).
200
 With the 
guidelines in place, the current legitimacy crisis caused by inconsistent decisions on 
interpretation of same principle would have been avoided. 
 
After all, the creation of guidelines is not a novel idea in international law. It has been used 
successfully in other international law bodies.  
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well, through the Marrakesh Agreement empowers the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council to adopt interpretations of the WTO 
                                                          
199
 Schill S W Multilateralisation of International Investment Law (2009) at 394; see also Garcia CG ‘All the Other 
Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America and the Necessary Evil of Investor – State Arbitration’ 
(2004)16 Florida Journal of International Law 301 at 309. 
200
 For a thorough discussion on the inconsistency decisions on these principles see Chapter Three of this Work 
under Subheading 3.5.2.1 – 3.5.2.1.3. 
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Agreements.
201
 The Appellate Body has ruled that these powers are meant to give the Ministerial 
Conference the powers to clarify the meaning of the existing Agreements.
202
  
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also on numerous occasions utilized the 
interpretative note to clarify issues between the Fund and member states or among member 
states. Article XXIX of the IMF provides that ‘Any question of interpretation of the provisions of 
this Agreement arising between any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund 
shall be submitted to the Executive Board for its decision’.203 This means that the Articles place 
the interpretation mandate to the Executive Board of the IMF. Records indicate that the Board 
has used these powers in ten different occasions.
204
The World Bank, also, in 1992 established the 
Guidelines on the treatment of Foreign Direct Investment.
205
  
 
In international investment law sphere, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
can provide a vast experience on how the interpretative guidelines can be of great help to 
ascertain the contracting parties’ intentions. Under its structure, NAFTA has established the Free 
Trade Commission constituted by the Trade Ministers from member states which is responsible 
for, among other things, issuance of binding interpretative statements.
206
 The statement issued by 
                                                          
201
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. 
202
 See EC—Bananas II (Article 21.5—US), para 383. 
203
 See Article XXIX of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF 2011 available at 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/index.htm#artxxix accessed on 26/02/2014. 
204
 For more on this see Kaufmann- Kohler G ‘Interpretative Powers of the Free Trade Commission and the Rule of 
Law’ in Fifteen Years of NAFTA Chapter 11 (2011)  at p 180 available at http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/1/13571335953400/interpretive_powers_of_the_free_trade_commission_and_the_rule_of_law_kauf
mann-kohler.pdf accessed on 26/02/2014. 
205
 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992 available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf  accessed on 19/05/2013. 
206
 See Article 1131(2) and Article 2001 of NAFTA; for a thorough discussion on the NAFTA Interpretative 
Statements, see Marshall F ‘Defining New Institutional Options for Investor – State Dispute Settlement’ 
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the commission is binding upon any future Tribunal interpreting the provisions of the NAFTA.
207
 
In its Interpretative Note issued on 31
st
 July 2001, the Commission sought to provide 
clarification on the meaning of two concepts; fair and equitable treatment and full of protection 
and security as provided under Article 1105 of NAFTA. The Interpretative Note was necessitated 
by the divergent decision on the meaning of the concept fair and equitable treatment. The 
Tribunal in S D Myers Inc v Canada,
208
 Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States
209
 and 
Pope Talbot Inc v Canada
210
 produced contradictory decisions on the concept.
211
 In S D Myers 
Inc v Canada,
212
  the Tribunal interpreting article 1105(1) of NAFTA ruled that the phrase ‘fair 
and equitable’ should not be read in isolation but must be read in conjunction with the 
introductory phrase ‘treatment in accordance with international law’.213  
 
However in Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States,
214
 the Tribunal held the opposite as 
it found that ‘fair and equitable treatment’ is an independent right from the customary law 
principle.
215
 In Pope & Talbot, Inc v Canada,
216
  the tribunal was also faced with the task of 
interpreting Art.1105 of NAFTA. It concluded that the fair and equitable treatment standard in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2009 at p. 38 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/defining_new_institutional_options.pdf accessed on 03/02/2014. 
207
 See Article 1131(2) of NAFTA available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/index.aspx?lang=eng accessed on 24/02/2014.  
208
 S D Myers Inc v Canada UNCITRAL/NAFTA 40 ILM 1408 (2001). 
209
 Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/97/1 (2000). 
210
 Pope Talbot Inc v Canada 7 ICSID Reports 148 (2001). 
211
 Franck SD ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521 at 1576 – 1580; see also Garcia CG ‘All the Other Dirty 
Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America and the Necessary Evil of Investor – State Arbitration’ (2004)16 
Florida Journal of International Law 301 at 349. 
212
 See S D Myers Inc v Canada UNCITRAL/NAFTA 40 ILM 1408 (2001). 
213
 See S D Myers Inc v Canada para 224 -264. 
214
 Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States ICSID Review 16. 
215
 As cited in Franck SD ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International 
Law through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521 at 1576 – 1581. 
216
 Pope Talbot Inc v Canada 7 ICSID Reports 148. 
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article 1105 was not a concept considered within a sovereign’s obligations to provide minimum 
standards of treatment under international law; but it was an additive standard in addition to 
minimum guarantees under international law.
217
  It further rejected the reasoning in Myers case 
above. The tribunal explained that NAFTA parties could not possibly have intended to agree to a 
minimum standard of treatment that would provide investors from other BITs with better 
treatment than investors from BITs in which NAFTA parties were members.
218
 As a result of 
these contradicting decisions, the Free Trade Commission issued the statement providing for the 
scope of the concept ‘fair and equitable treatment’. The interpretative note limited the scope of 
the concept ‘fair and equal treatment’ equating it to the minimum standard of aliens as 
understood under customary international law.
219
 In cases which have been decided after the 
interpretative note, Tribunals have inclined to follow the interpretative statement. In 2005, the 
Tribunal constituted to adjudicate in Methanex v United States
220
 which was also considering the 
scope of Article 1105 of NAFTA rightly  concluded that the interpretative note issued in 2001 
was binding hence the Tribunal did not have to consider it further.
221
 In ADF Group Inc. v. 
United States of America
222
 the Tribunal acknowledged the legitimacy of the interpretative 
statement and held: 
 
                                                          
217
 Pope Talbot Inc v Canada para 110. 
218
 Franck SD ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521 at 1576 – 1580. 
219
 See Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Trade Negotiations and Agreements, 
available at http://www.dfait-maec.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-en.asp accessed on 24/02/2014. Garcia CG ‘All the Other 
Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America and the Necessary Evil of Investor – State Arbitration’ 
(2004)16 Florida Journal of International Law 301 at 349. 
220
Methanex v. United States, Award, 3 August 2005 http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf 
accessed on 25/02/2014. 
221
 Methanex v United States, Award, 3 August 2005, Part II Chapter H para 23. 
222
 ADF Group Inc v United States of America, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/1, Award, Jan. 9, 2003. 
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‘…through the FTC, all three NAFTA parties were speaking to the arbitral tribunal and that there 
could be [n]o more authentic and authoritative source of instruction on what the Parties intended 
to convey in a particular provision of NAFTA.’223 
 
 
The success of interpretative statement at NAFTA has influenced some states to consider 
interpretative statement provisions in their Model BITs. The United States and Canada, model 
BITs, for obvious reasons, have incorporated interpretative statement provisions.
224
 The 
Canadian Model BIT under Article 40 (2) establishes a Commission constituted by Cabinet - 
level representatives from the BIT member States.
225
 The Article further provides that the 
interpretative note shall be binding on the Tribunal and any award shall be required to conform 
to the interpretative statement.
226
 The model BIT intentions has been reflected in many Trade 
Agreements Canada has entered with other countries. Article 28 of the Free Trade Agreement 
between Canada and the States of the European Free Trade Association which constitute Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland provide for the establishment of the interpretative 
                                                          
223
 ADF Group Inc v United States of America para 177. 
224
 It is not surprising to see that these two countries which are member states to NAFTA have considered the 
interpretative statement in their Model BITS. 
225
 Canadian Model BIT, 2004 available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf accessed 
on 25/02/2014. 
226
 See Article 40(2) of the Canadian Model BIT, 2004 available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf accessed on 25/02/2014. 
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commission.
227
 The same is provided for in the Canadian agreements with Colombia
228
, Peru,
229
 
Chile,
230
 Costa Rica,
231
 Jordan
232
 and Israel.
233
 
 
In the same spirit, the US Model BIT 2004, while does not establish a Commission as its 
counterpart Canada, it takes recognition of the member state parties’ joint interpretation on any 
provision of the BIT.
234
 The Model BIT considers such interpretation binding on a Tribunal and 
the award rendered thereby has to be in line with the joint interpretative statement.
235
 The same 
provision is reproduced in the new US Model BIT 2012 under Article 30(3). The Article in the 
New Model BIT provides: 
 
‘A joint decision of the Parties, each acting through its representative designated for purposes of 
this Article, declaring their interpretation of a provision of this Treaty shall be binding on a 
                                                          
227
 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the States of the European Free Trade Association available at 
http://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/free-trade-relations/canada/EFTA-
Canada%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement%20EN.pdf accessed on 26/02/2014. 
228
 See Article 832 of the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement of  21/11/2008 available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca accessed on 26/02/2014 
229
 See Article 50 of the Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments available at http://www.international.gc.ca accessed on 26/02/2014. 
230
 See Art. N-01 of the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement of 05/07/1997 available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca accessed on 26/02/2014. 
231
 See Art. XIII.1, of the Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement of 01/11/2002 available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca accessed on 26/02/2014. 
232
 See Article 40 of the Agreement Between Canada and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments of 28/06/2009 available at http://www.international.gc.ca accessed on 
26/02/2014. 
233
 See Article 8(2) of the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement of 01/01/1997 available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca accessed on 26/02/2014. 
234
 See Article 30(3) of the Us Model BIT, 2004 available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf accessed on 25/02/2014. 
235
 See Article 30(3) of the Us Model BIT, 2004. 
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tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint 
decision.’236 
 
As a result of the Model BITs, the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 
Agreements (CAFTA),
237
 the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement,
238
 the U.S.-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement,
239
 and  the recent agreements with Colombia, Korea, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru, 
Rwanda and  Singapore all provides for the establishment of an interpretative statement by 
member states representatives.
240
 
 
Therefore, one can see that some individual countries are starting to realise the importance of 
coming together and spelling out their intentions in a BIT for the purposes of eliminating any 
form of contradictory interpretation by the future Tribunals. This is a positive move towards 
achieving greater consistency on the meaning of international investment law principles. The 
interpretative statements, apart from increasing consistency, it helps in fostering rule of law as it 
increases the predictability of the norms. However, the intended goal of achieving consistency 
and predictability through interpretative statements may not be achieved if the interpretative 
statements are to be issued by countries in individual BITs. The UNCTAD world investment 
                                                          
236
 See Article 30(3) of the US Model BIT 2012 available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf accessed on 25/02/2014. 
237
 See the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement of 05/08/2004 available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-
fta/final-text accessed on 26/02/2014. 
238
 See the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 01/01/2005 available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/final-text accessed on 26/02/2014. 
239
 See the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement of 01/01/2004 available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta accessed on 26/02/2014.    
240
 See these FTAs at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements accessed on 26/02/2014. 
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Report 2014 indicates that by the end of 2013 there are 3240 BITs and IIAs in the world.
241
 It is 
submitted here that in order to avoid the fragmentation, the most effective way of achieving the 
intended result of consistency and coherence is to establish guidelines which will be applicable 
to the whole investor – state Tribunals. To do that, will require the endorsement from all 
countries involved in BITs arbitration. It is therefore suggested here that the easiest way is to 
have the guidelines established as a protocol to the ICSID Convention which so far has a 
significant number of world’s countries. The fact that the ICSID is signed by more than 155 
member states will, to a large extent, give power to the guidelines and help in achieving 
consistency within a short period of time.
242
  
 
5.3.5 Form a working group to provide interpretation to basic international investment  
           principles 
 
As seen in the discussion above,
243
 the ILC has been widely involved in encouraging and the 
progressive development of international law and its codification since 1946.
244
 The substantive 
work of the ILC today includes the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of the State for 
International Wrongful Act 
245
and the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection of 2006.
246
 While 
                                                          
241
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2014 ‘Investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
242
 As of January 20, 2013, ICSID had 158 signatory States, and 147 Contracting States had ratified the Convention, 
see the List of Contracting States available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language
=English  accessed on 26/07/2013. For the advantages of ICSID Arbitration see Chapter Three of this Work under 
Subheading 3.2.3.3. 
243
 See Subheading 5.3.4 above. 
244
 See Article 13, paragraph 1 (a) of the United Nations Charter available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf accessed on 03/03/2014. 
245
 The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf accessed on 12/02/2014.   
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the ILC is commended for doing its job of codifying and interpreting the International law, little 
has been done by the Commission in codification and interpretation of the international 
investment law principles save for the interpretation of the most favoured nation principle in 
1978.
247
 
 
This research therefore suggests for the formation of the International Investment Working 
Group which will be responsible with the interpretation of the basic international investment law 
principles. The working group will need to be constituted of expert members from all 
stakeholders and interested groups. The conference discussed above can be used to recommend 
and later approve the names of expert members to be involved in forming the Working Group. 
The Working Group will be required to focus on providing clear interpretation on the meaning of 
controversial international investment law principles which have sparked the legitimacy crisis.
248
 
Among the controversial principles which resulted into inconsistent decisions and need to be 
given a clear interpretation includes; the meaning of the term investment,
249
 the scope of an 
umbrella clause,
250
 the application of Most Favoured Nations (MFN) principle to a third party on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
246
 The ILC Draft Article on Diplomatic Protection, 2006 available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_8_2006.pdf accessed on 12/02/2014.   
247
 See the ILC Draft Articles on Most Favoured Nations, 1978 available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_3_1978.pdf accessed on 03/03/2014. 
248
 For a thorough discussion on these cases and the inconsistency caused see Chapter Three of this work under 
Subheading 3.5.2.1. 
249
 See Salini Costruttori SpA v Kingdom of Morocco ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 (2001), Jan de Nul Nv v Islamic 
Republic of Egypt ICSID Case ARB/04/13 (2006), Mitchell v Congo ICSID Case No. ARB 99/7 (2007) Decision on 
Annulment, and Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia ICSID Case No ARB/05/10 (2007) Award on 
Jurisdiction. For a different view see CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic Annulment 
Committee (2007) para 71 – 72; see also Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22 (2008); also see MCI Power Group, LCand New Turbine, Inc v Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/6, Award, 31 July 2007 and Giovanna a Beccara and Others v. Argentine Republic, (also known as Abaclat 
et al v. Argentina), ICSID Case No ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 4 August 2011. 
250
See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID ARB/01/13, El Paso Energy 
International Co v Argentina ICSID ARB/03/15 and Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration 
Company v Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/13  on one hand and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Republic of 
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procedural matters,
251
 the application of the defence of necessity and Non-Precluded Measures 
(NPM) during emergency situations,
252
the scope of the principle of expropriation,
253
the meaning 
of fair and equitable treatment (FET),
254
 and lastly the meaning of full protection and security.
255
 
 
As one can see from the list of these cases, there is a conflicting decision on almost every 
principle governing international investment law. With this kind of confusion, it is important that 
a specialised Working Group should be formed as quickly as possible so as to guide the Tribunal 
on the purpose of BITs and the scope of each principle in BITs. It will also be vital for the 
Working Group to pronounce clearly the scope of protection needed to be accorded to foreign 
investors/ investment and the obligation of the foreign investors to the host state. Recently there 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Philippines, ICSID ARB/02/6, Noble Ventures Inc v Romania, ICSID ARB/01/11 of  12
th
 October 2005 on 
arbitral jurisdiction available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0565.pdf  , and  Eureko 
BV v Poland, Ad hoc – UNCITRAL Award of 19th August 2005 Partial award available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0308_0.pdf   on the other. 
251
 In favour of the extension of the application of MFN to procedural matters see Emilio Augustin Maffezini v 
Kingdom of Spain, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, IIC 85 (2000); for similar opinion also see 
Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/10, Decision on Preliminary Questions on 
Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005; Camuzzi International S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/2, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 May 2005; National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 20 June 2006; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19 and AWG Group Ltd. v The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2006. However this position is disputed in other cases; see for example Plama 
Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005 
para. 223; see also Telenor Mobile Communications AS v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/04/15, Award, 
13 September 2006; see also Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
ICSID Case No ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 15 November 2004; also see Wintershall Aktiengellschaft v 
Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/04/14 Award December 8 2008. 
252
 See CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8 on one hand and LG&E 
Energy Corp LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/02/1 on the other. 
253
 See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports r para 201 and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech 
Republic ICSID Reports para 609. 
254
 See S D Myers Inc v Canada UNCITRAL/NAFTA 40 ILM 1408 (2001) but also see Metalclad Corporation v 
United Mexican States ICSID Review 16 for a different views on the scope of Fair and Equitable Treatment 
principle; see also See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports para 293 and CME Czech Republic BV v The 
Czech Republic ICSID Reports para 611. 
255
 See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports para 309 and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic 
ICSID Reports para 613. 
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has arisen a trend in some BITs where the host states clearly limits the scope of the BIT and the 
powers of the Tribunal with regards to health, environment, labour and cultural issues.
256
  
 
Unfortunately however, many old generation BITs still do not provide for protection of health, 
environment, labour and cultural issues. Most of these BITs guarantee rights to investors without 
addressing other social values.
257
 Therefore it is important for the working Group to address the 
importance of bringing in other social values in the course of adjudicating investor – state 
disputes. It should be clearly stated that the purpose of a BIT is to protect the foreign investment 
but also should be a vehicle which contribute to the development of the host state in different 
ways. To put it more clearly, the Working Group will be required to provide an interpretation 
which considers sustainable development as one of the key pillar which must be addressed in the 
interpretation of BITs and IIAs.
258
  To make it easier for the future tribunals, the Working Group 
may find it necessary to develop a checklist which will be used to assess whether a particular 
venture by the foreign investor is sustainable in nature and hence be considered an investment as 
per the BIT. The checklist will therefore help in clarifying what constitute an investment but at 
the same time help in assessing whether such a venture is sustainable hence deserving protection 
guaranteed under the ICSID and the respective BIT. 
                                                          
256
 See the Canadian Model BIT, 2004 available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf 
accessed on 25/02/2014 and the Us Model BIT, 2004 & 2012 available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf accessed on 25/02/2014. 
257
 See the Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights, ‘Towards Operationalizing the ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework’ A/HRC/11/13, para 30 (2009); See also, Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights, 
‘Further Steps Towards the Operationalization of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework’ A/HRC/14/27, 
paras 20–23 (2010), the reports can be accessed at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Reports.aspx  
accessed on 9/08/2013. 
258
 This will be in accordance to the interpretation provided in Salini Costruttori SpA v Kingdom of Morocco ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/4 (2001), Jan de Nul NV v Islamic Republic of Egypt ICSID Case ARB/04/13 (2006), Mitchell v 
Congo ICSID Case No ARB 99/7 (2007). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the possible solutions to the issues facing investor – state adjudicative 
system. Different stakeholders suggested solutions have been critically analysed.  
The chapter also has discussed this research’s ‘alternative solutions’ these alternative solutions 
are only meant to be interim solutions pending the major reform of introducing the MAI and its 
court structure to the investor – state adjudicative system. 
The chapter concludes that, while the suggested solutions have potential and aims at remedying 
the situation, they do not help much as they do not provide a solution which would address all 
issues cumulatively. In the chapter that follows, this research call for the establishment of the 
MAI and its court structure. This research submits that it is only through the MAI which provide 
for the international investment court and the international investment court of appeal that the 
issues discussed in the previous chapters will be holistically addressed.
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
A CALL FOR MAJOR REFORM: CREATION OF A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT 
ON INVESTMENT, AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COURT AND AN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT APPELLATE COURT 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has discussed the possible solutions suggested by different stakeholders on 
issues haunting the investor – state adjudicative system. The strengths and weaknesses of each of 
the suggested solution were clearly identified. From the previous chapter’s discussion, it can be 
learnt that the suggested solutions do not address the legitimacy issues in a holistic manner and 
leaves a lot of issues unaddressed. As a result the suggested solutions cannot eliminate the 
backlashes against investor – state arbitration system. 
  
Due to deficiencies noted in the previous chapter, this chapter argues that there is a need to 
establish a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which will provide for the 
establishment of an International Investment Court together with an International Investment 
Appellate Court. The two courts will help in achieving justice for all parties and all of the current 
problems could be remedied by this move. While there are some concerns about some negative 
impact of the new court structure, this work submits that upon weighing the pros and cons one 
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will find that establishment of the court will be more beneficial than continuing to operate in the 
current setting. 
  
The chapter starts with the succinct historical perspective of the MAI. It submits that the MAI 
and the courts stand a good chance of succeeding this time as the reasons for the previous failure 
are no longer valid.  
 
The chapter comprehensively discusses the reasons for the call of the MAI, the organ to host the 
MAI, the required basic content of the MAI and how to phase out the current investor – state 
arbitration system. In addition, the chapter analyses the two tier court system to be introduced as 
a replacement to the current arbitration system. The jurisdiction and functioning of the courts are 
clearly and carefully discussed.  
 
6.2 Historical perspective of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two of this research, for decades now the world community, through 
different bodies; the League of Nations, the UN, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (hereinafter the OECD), the World Bank and recently the World Trade 
Organisation (hereinafter the WTO), have been involved in efforts to establish a multilateral 
investment regulating body.
1
 These efforts include the 1995 OECD negotiations on Multilateral 
Investment Agreement (MIA)
2
 which failed due to, among other reasons, conflicting interests 
                                                          
1
 For an insightful discussion on this aspect see Chapter Two of this work under Subheadings 2.3.1 – 2.3.12.   
2
 The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment Draft available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng971r2e.pdf accessed on 24th May 2013. 
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between developed and developing countries.
3
 The MAI was seen as an instrument to protect 
foreign investors from the Western world without assigning them any obligations.
4
  
 
Another notable effort was taken by the WTO. As discussed under Chapter Two of this work,
5
 
the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measure (TRIMS), the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) partly addresses the protection of foreign investments.
6
 As a result, the WTO in 
2001, at the Doha Ministerial Conference recommended the introduction of new negotiations for 
the purpose of establishing a multilateral investment Treaty.
7
 These efforts however stumbled 
after it faced the North – South divide. The negotiations were officially discontinued in 2004 and 
has never been a WTO priority ever since.
8
 
 
As stated in the introduction above, this research submits that the creation of a MAI with 
provisions which provides for the establishment of an international investment court and an 
appellate court structure will help a lot to curb and address holistically the legitimacy issues in 
the current international investment dispute settlement system. 
                                                          
3
 See Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 7; see also Newcombe A 
&Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties(2009) at 13; see also Salacuse J ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 Int’l  
Law  655 at  659; see also Dodge W ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections 
on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of  Transnational  Law 1 at 5-8; 
see also Van Harten G  Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) 14-15. 
4
Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 41. 
5
 See Chapter Two of this work under Subheading 2.3.12. 
6
 See WTO - The Uruguay Round on Multilateral Trade available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm accessed on 25/05/2013. 
7
 The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO, Work Programme: Implementation related Issues, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm accessed on 25/05/2013. 
8
Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 52. 
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6.2.1 Argument against the creation of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment  
 
Kennedy argues that the time is not ripe for the call of a MAI.
9
 He argues that when the time for 
the MAI comes, foreign investors will pressurise their home government to negotiate the MAI. 
In essence Kennedy is of the view that as long as foreign investors are happy and benefitting 
from the current BIT trend, the negotiation of a MAI is unnecessary.  
 
It is submitted here that the author ignores one important fact that the system need to be working 
in favour of both players: investors and host states. The reason which motivates the host state to 
sign a BIT is to promote its own development through foreign investment. Therefore, the BIT 
system which tends to favour foreign investors only and leaves the host state interests at stake 
cannot be left without being rectified. 
 
Karl also joins hands with the previous author by arguing that the recent statistics from 
UNCTAD indicates that FDI is booming and that is to be taken as a sign that things are well.
10
 It 
is further contended that the existing over 3240 BITs provide enough protection to the foreign 
investors hence there is no need to fix something that is not broken.
11
 
 
                                                          
9
 Kennedy K ‘A WTO agreement on investment: a solution in search of a problem?’ (2003) 24 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 77.   
10
 Karl J ‘On the way to multilateral investment rules- some recent policy issues’ (2002) 17(2) ICSID Review 293 at 
300. 
11
 Karl J ‘On the way to multilateral investment rules- some recent policy issues’ (2002) 17(2) ICSID Review 293 at 
300. 
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This research finds the argument less convincing and submits that the system is broken and 
needs immediate attention before it collapses. The author is not taking into account the fact that 
the investor – state arbitration system is overwhelmed with the BITs system as a result it is 
facing a legitimacy crisis.  The author fails to acknowledge the fact that the spaghetti bowl of 
BITs has created an inconsistent and unpredictable international investment law regime leading 
to the withdrawal and refusals to use the systems by a number of countries today. It is further 
submitted here that the author should have considered the increase of FDI as a reason for the 
need of a MAI which will address FDI at global level. 
 
Amarasinha and Kokott argue that a MAI will hinder host states flexibility of regulating foreign 
investments which exist in the current BIT system.
12
 They contend that the flexibility helps host 
states to implement other domestic policy objectives. 
 
It is submitted here that the authors fail to acknowledge the fact that currently states do not enjoy 
flexibility as portrayed. In the BIT system states hands are tied and foreign investors have the 
right to institute claims against almost any state measure regardless of the importance of such a 
measure to the state interests. The Principle of fair and equitable treatment has been interpreted 
inconsistently by the Tribunals leaving states uncertain as to whether they have the mandate to 
regulate on other policy objectives. It is submitted here that the MAI will address this situation 
by providing clearly for a sovereign policy space exception just like the WTO GATT exceptions 
                                                          
12
 Amarasinha A & Kokott J ‘Multilateral investment rules revisited’ in Muschlinski P et al Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (2008). 
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under Article XX and GATS Article XVI. In the part that follows this research will provide 
reasons as to why the creation of a MAI is required. 
 
6.2.2 A Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
 
As seen in the discussion above, some commentators are against the creation of the MAI. A 
number of reasons have been advanced in favour of their arguments. It is submitted here that the 
need for the multilateral treaty is there and even more ripe now than before. It is further 
submitted here that in order to address the legitimacy crisis in the international investment 
dispute settlement system there is a need to establish a MAI which will provide for the 
establishment of a permanent International Investment Court followed by the Appellate Court. In 
the following section the reasons for the call of MAI are clearly identified. 
 
6.2.2.1 The fading away of the North – South divide in Foreign Direct Investment 
distribution  
 
It is evidently clear that the old trend where foreign investors always hailed from the developed 
world and invested in developing countries is withering away. Currently, foreign investors from 
developing countries are reciprocally investing in the developed world. The stigma against FDI 
which existed among developing countries in the 1990s has abated as many countries have 
liberalised their economies and learnt the advantages which come with FDI.
13
 The UNCTAD 
                                                          
13
 Draper P et al ‘Towards Global Governance of FDI Issues on Getting to Multilateral Approach’ in Foreign Direct 
Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Prosperity and Growth: The Case for A Multilateral Agreement on 
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World Investment Report 2013 and 2014 attest to this fact as they provide that the North- South 
divide is fading away as developing countries are becoming foreign investors in the developed 
world.
14
 The 2013 Report indicates that developing economies generated almost one third of 
global FDI outflows and reached $426 billion, a record 31 % of the world total and received 52% 
of the World investment inflow.
15
 The report indicates further that Asian countries, led by China 
which became the third largest investor in the world, are now the leading FDI outflow from the 
developing world. Furthermore the Report indicates that African FDI outflow tripled in the same 
year.
16
 The Report further reveals that the BRICS
17
 are holding 10% of the world total FDI. 
 
The most recent report, UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014 indicates that developing 
countries maintained their lead in Foreign Direct Investment in the year 2013.
18
 The developing 
countries FDI outflow increased by 8% recording 39% beating the last year’s 31%.19 The report 
further indicates that transnational corporations from developing countries are busy acquiring 
interests in foreign companies from the developed world. In addition, the report indicates that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Investment WEF 2013 Pp 29 – 31 at 29 available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf accessed on 
18/02/2014. 
14
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
15
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at xii available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
16
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at xii available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
17
BRICS is an acronym for five states: Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa. 
18
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
19
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at ix available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
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developing and transition economies now constitute half of the top 20 countries ranked by FDI 
inflows.
20
  
 It is clear from these statistics that, developing countries which are now investors in the 
developed world need the legal framework which ensures their investment abroad adequate 
protection as much as developed countries does. As a result of the withering away of the North -
South divide, which was one of the major sources of the failure of the previous MAI 
negotiations, there is no doubt that new MAI negotiations stand a great chance of succeeding. 
The fact that developing countries constitutes 31% of the world investment outflow and 52% of 
world investment inflow speaks volumes on the need to involve the developing world in any 
future MAI negotiations. Therefore this research believes that both sides, developed and 
developing countries, need to ensure that a MAI is created which balances interests of foreign 
investors and that of the host state. 
 
6.2.2.2 The increase of Foreign Direct Investment stock 
 
As stated in the introduction of this research,
21
 in 1982 the global total of FDI was only USD 27 
billion. However, two and a half decades later the FDI Stock steadily increased and reached a 
peak of USD 2.2 trillion by the year 2007.
22
   The 2009 world economic meltdown affected the 
FDI development as it dwindled by 50% and reached USD 1.2 trillion in 2010 followed by a 
                                                          
20
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at ix available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
21
 See Chapter One of this research under subheading 1.3. 
22
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 2008 available 
at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2008_en.pdf accessed on 22/05/2014. 
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modest recovery up to USD 1.35 trillion in 2012 and the same figure for 2013.
23
 The UNCTAD 
2014 indicates that in 2013 the FDI stock grew to 1.45 trillion and is projecting that the stock 
will be 1.6 trillion by the end of 2014.
24
  It is submitted here that despite the meltdown, the FDI 
stock as it stands contribute hugely to the world development in a number of ways including but 
not limited to job creation, innovation, competition and technology transfer.
25
  It should also be 
noted here that the current FDI flows crosses both directions between developed and developing 
countries, with MNCs hailing from all parts of the world. This geographical diversity of FDI 
strengthens even further the call for a MAI as a tool for streamlining the principles governing 
international investment law.
26
 As discussed above, UNCTAD 2013 and 2014 reports indicate 
that FDI inflow and outflow between developed and developing countries are almost equal. In 
2012 developing economies generated one third of global FDI outflows and reached $426 
billion, a record 31 % of the world total and received 52% of the World investment inflow.
27
  In 
2013 developing countries generated 39% of the world total global FDI outflow and 54% of FDI 
inflow.
28
 
 
                                                          
23
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at ix available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
24
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at ix available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
25
 Amarasinha A & Kokott J ‘Multilateral investment rules revisited’ in Muschlinski P et al Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (2008). 
26
 Aslund A ‘The World need a Multilateral Investment Agreement’ Policy Brief Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, January 2013 at 2 available at http://stfrnik.piie.com/publications/pb/pb13-1.pdf accessed on 
21/05/2014. 
27
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at xii available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
28
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at ix available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
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It is submitted here that the FDI stock is too huge to be left governed through a patchwork of 
BITS. With equal distribution of FDI between the developed and developing worlds, now the 
time is ripe to push for a balanced disputes settlement system which will benefit both parties. It is 
time that the MAI is created which will help in addressing the fragmented nature of international 
investment law and bring about consistency, certainty, independent and impartial adjudication 
process, cost efficient adjudication process and balanced dispute settlement system. 
 
6.2.2.3 The recent increase of regional agreements and decline of Bilateral Investment  
                Treaties 
 
Recent UNCTAD World Investment Reports indicate that the number of BITs is falling while 
the number of regional agreements is increasing. The UNCTAD 2013 Report indicates that 2012 
recorded the lowest annual number of only 20 BITs in a quarter century.
29
  The Report further 
indicates that 10 IIAs were concluded in 2012 and eight of them were regional agreements.
30
 
However, UNCTAD 2014 report indicates the revival of BITs signing as it recorder 44 new BITs 
being signed in 2013 making the world BITs and IIAs to a new record of 3240.
31
 The Report 
further indicates that by 2013, 110 countries were involved in 22 regional negotiations. The 
negotiations include the ASEAN
32
 negotiations with Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand 
                                                          
29
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at 101 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
30
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at 101 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
31
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiii available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed 
on 30/06/2014. 
32
 Stands for Association of Southern Asian Nations, see http://www.asean.org/ accessed on 21/05/2014. 
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and the Republic of Korea on a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 
(RCEP).
33
 Another negotiation involves Latin America countries: Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru in which a framework agreement was signed that establishes the Pacific Alliance as a deep 
integration area.
34
 Another negotiation involves African states. The Tripartite Trade Negotiation 
Forum towards creating a FTA between the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) took shape in 2012.
35
 In this African Tripartite Trade Negotiations, 
investment chapter talks were scheduled to commence in the latter half of 2014. If these talks 
become successful, it will replace several hundred BITs signed by the African States into a single 
Tripartite FTA with an investment protection chapter. 
 
In Europe, the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union in 2009, gives the 
European Commission the mandate to negotiate Investment agreements on behalf of all 27 
Member states. This means that many BITs between individual EU countries will be replaced by 
common EU treaties hence tremendously cutting down the number of BITs.
36
 On 30 September 
                                                          
33
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at 103 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014; see also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 
2014 ‘investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiv available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 30/06/2014.  
34
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at 103 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014; see also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 
2014 ‘investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiv available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 30/06/2014. 
35
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at 103 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
36
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2012 ‘Towards a 
New Generation of Investment Policies’ at 84 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/WIR2012_WebFlyer.aspx accessed on 
21/05/2014. 
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2014 the EU finalised a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada.
37
 
The Agreement aims at incorporating a substantive investment protection chapter as per the 
Lisbon Treaty requirements.
38
 The CETA is not binding yet and will only become so after the 
completion of the ratification process. In addition to that the EU is involved in a Japan – EU 
agreement with substantive investment protection chapters.
39
 
 
Apart from the above, there is an interregional negotiations underway named Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) Agreement involving Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. The Agreement includes 
a fully-fledged investment chapter.
40
 
 
Another important negotiation underway is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) which involves the European Commission and the United States.
41
 The negotiation took 
off in March 2013 and the negotiation is ongoing.  
 
                                                          
37
 See  the EU – Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf accessed on 11/11/2014. 
38
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global 
and regional investment trends’ at 104 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed 
on 20/05/2014. 
39
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at 104 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014. 
40
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at 105 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014; also see UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxv 
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 30/06/2014.  
41
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global 
and regional investment trends’ at 104 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed 
on 20/05/2014. 
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All these efforts cements the submission that the world community is moving towards 
consolidation of BITS.
42
 It is submitted here that in the near future the number of BITs is 
eventually going to decline but the coverage of protection of foreign investment is going to 
spread through regional agreements. With this trend towards regional agreements the MAI 
creation become even more realistic as it will help in achieving a more unified investment 
protection regime.  
 
In conclusion it can be said here that, the above statistical data reveals that there is a need to 
create a MAI. There is no doubt that a multilateral treaty which provide for a balanced 
playground for both,  the foreign investor and the host state will be received with open hands by 
all stakeholders. Such a treaty will also help to strengthen and harmonise international 
investment law and bring consistency and predictability to the investment regime. 
 
6.2.2.4 Continuous annual increase of investor – state disputes 
 
The recent statistics indicates that investor – state disputes are on the rise. This is the case despite 
the fact that many countries and other stakeholders are unhappy with it. UNCTAD World 
Investment Report for 2013 indicates that 58 new cases were registered in 2012, the highest 
number to be recorded in a year.
43
 The Report further indicates that, 34 cases were registered in 
                                                          
42
 Aslund A ‘The World need a Multilateral Investment Agreement’ Policy Brief Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, January 2013 at 4 available at http://stfrnik.piie.com/publications/pb/pb13-1.pdf accessed on 
21/05/2014. 
43
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report ‘Towards a New 
Generation of International Investment Policies: UNCTAD’s Fresh Approach to Multilateral Investment Policy-
Making’ available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d6_en.pdf accessed on 27/05/2014. 
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2010, while 49 cases were registered in 2011 and 58 cases where registered in 2012.
44
 The year 
2013 recorded the second highest number of investor – state dispute by registering 56 new 
cases.
45
 According to UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014, by the end of 2013, the total 
number of known treaty based ICSID cases had reached 568 in which 98 countries were 
involved. Out of the total, 257 cases have been concluded.
46
  
 
This figure is merely indicative as cases decided under institutions other than ICSID are 
confidential. This means that, more and more governments – from developed countries, 
developing countries and economies in transition – are potential respondents’ in future 
substantial claims. As discussed before, huge amount of money are awarded as damages in these 
cases.
47
 
 
It follows therefore that, the call for the establishment of the MAI which will develop an 
adjudicative system which will be consistent, predictable and cost efficient will receive positive 
response from these states. It is submitted here that all countries, rich and poor, will support the 
move for the MAI as they equally stand to benefit from a fair and impartial adjudicative system. 
 
                                                          
44
 See the report at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 27/05/2014. 
45
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at 125 available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
46
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at 125 available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
47
 See Chapter Three of this work under subheading 3.6.2.7. 
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6.2.3 General advantages of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
 
The creation of a MAI comes with a number of advantages. One of the advantages is that a MAI 
will harmonise the regulation of international investment law.
48
 The increase of BITs and FTAs 
calls for the immediate harmonisation of international investments rules into a MAI which will 
provide standard treatment to all.  
 
In addition to the above, the MAI will help in harmonising the international investment 
principles which are of now scattered in customary international law principles and BITs.
49
 
Furthermore, the treaty will also help in curbing the problem of inconsistency decision as all 
principles will be provided for in one treaty and not scattered in BITs as it is the case at the 
moment.
50
 
 
More importantly, the MAI will be an important vehicle towards attracting foreign investment 
from the developed world to developing countries.
51
 It is submitted here that the treaty will likely 
enhance transparency and predictability of outcomes in investor – state dispute adjudication 
                                                          
48
 See also Draper P et al ‘Towards Global Governance of FDI Issues on Getting to Multilateral Approach’ in 
Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Prosperity and Growth: The Case for A Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment WEF 2013 Pp 29 – 31 at 29 available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf accessed on 
18/02/2014. 
49
 Subedi S International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 196.   
50
 See also Subedi S International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 197. 
51
 See also Kennedy K ‘A WTO agreement on investment: a solution in search of a problem?’ (2003) 24 University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 77.   
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process.
52
  As a result of transparency, coherence to the existing ‘spaghetti bowl’ of BITs will 
increase. 
 
Another advantage is that a multilateral treaty will help in developing a coherent international 
investment policy to all member states.
53
 In turn consistent interpretation of the basic investment 
principles will be achieved across the board.
54
 
 
Furthermore, it is submitted here that global issues like international foreign investment need to 
be governed globally so that the linkage with other related international agendas such as 
environment and human rights can be found. This research believes that the MAI as a global 
instrument will ultimately provide a political forum for the world community to discuss 
investment related issues collectively. 
 
Last but not least, the transparent MAI negotiation will allow closer scrutiny from all 
stakeholders: NGOs, civil societies and the general public which in turn will increase the 
legitimacy of the international investment law generally. 
 
                                                          
52
 Kennedy K ‘A WTO agreement on investment: a solution in search of a problem?’ (2003) 24 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 77.   
53
 Qureshi A & Ziegler A International Economic Law 3rd Ed. (2011) at 380-391. 
 
 
54
 Qureshi A & Ziegler A International Economic Law 3rd Ed. (2011) at 380-391. 
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6.3 A case for the court structured dispute settlement system 
 
As discussed before, the current investor – state arbitration system is facing a number of 
challenges and it has failed to develop a coherent, predictable and consistent international 
investment law. International investment principles are inconsistently interpreted leading to 
uncertainty and unpredictability of international investment law. It is submitted here that once 
established, the MAI must ensure that it creates a dispute settlement system which will address 
these issues. This research advocates for the establishment of the judicial arm in the MAI which 
will be responsible to settle international investment disputes as done by other international 
economic dispute settlement bodies. As discussed earlier, the time is ripe for the establishment of 
an independent international investment court which will be charged with the jurisdiction to hear 
all investor – state disputes.55 In addition to the international investment court, this research calls 
for the establishment of an appellate court which will be the final court in hierarchy. The two 
courts must be concerned with the legitimacy of the system as a whole and need to adhere to the 
basic principles of independence of the judiciary and rule of law.
56
  
 
6.3.1. Advantages of establishing an International Investment Court 
 
It is submitted here that one of the advantages of establishing the permanent court would be to 
reduce the litigation costs. Under the current investor – state adjudicative system the cost for 
                                                          
55
 See also Franck SD ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 at 1618. 
56
 See also Franck S ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 at 1618; see also Dimsey D The Resolution 
of International Investment Disputes: International Commerce and Arbitration (2008) at 180 – 184.   
 
 
 
 
326 
 
litigating in one case is too high. The UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010 clearly state that 
the costs in investor – state disputes have skyrocketed.57 As demonstrated in Chapter Three of 
this work,
58
 arbitrators’ charges range from USD 350 – 700 per hour per arbitrator depending on 
the claimed dispute amount.
59
 These exorbitant costs at times intimidate  poor developing 
countries from litigating hence decides to give in to the foreign investor demands even where 
doing so interferes with its other policy objectives.
60
  
 
It is submitted here that, with a permanent court structure presided by fully employed judges, 
costs for litigation will go down as the court members are normally paid by the establishing 
institution and not the parties. The WTO serves a good example on this. At panel and appellate 
stage the parties to the dispute are exonerated from paying costs for the Appellate Body 
presiding members. Article 8(11) and 17 (8) of the DSU respectively provides that ‘the expenses 
of persons serving on the panel and Appellate Body, including travel and subsistence allowance, 
shall be met from the WTO budget in accordance with criteria to be adopted by the General 
Council, based on recommendations of the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration’.61 
                                                          
57
 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Investor – State Dispute: 
Prevention and Alternative to Arbitration’ (2010) at 16-18 available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf accessed on 05/10/2013. 
58
 See Chapter Three of this work under Subheading 3.6.2.7. 
59
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes -ICSID) fees are set at US$3000 a day 
see https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&Sche
duledFees=True&year=2012&language=Englishaccessed on 05/10/2013. 
60
 See the Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing the ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework A/HRC/11/13, para 30 (2009); See also, Report of the SRSG, Business and Human Rights: 
Further Steps Towards the Operationalization of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework A/HRC/14/27, 
paras 20–23 (2010), the reports can be accessed at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Reports.aspx  
accessed on 9/03/2014. 
61
See Article 8(11) and 17(8) of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm accessed on 24/03/2014. 
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Another advantage of the court system is the possibility of establishing a strict timeframe for 
settling disputes. A recent study indicates that at ICSID a dispute takes up to an average of four 
to 5 years.
62
 In fact, there are cases which have been dragging at ICSID for over 11 years. 
Antoine Goetz v. Burundi,
63
 for example, was filed in December 2000 and ended in June 
2012,
64
(over 11 years);EDF International S.A. v. Argentina
65
 was filed in June 2003 and ended 
in June 2012 (over 9 years), just to mention a few. Again the WTO permanent system has 
addressed the issue of timeframe appropriately. The WTO DSU clearly provides for the 
timeframe within which the dispute is supposed to be resolved. Article 20 of the DSU clearly set 
out the timeframe of settling WTO disputes at a panel stage to be nine months where no appeal 
lies to the AB and 12 months where there was an appeal. This means that the dispute at Panel 
level takes nine months while at AB it takes three months.
66
 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that there are valid and strong reasons for the call of a new court to 
deal with international investment disputes. The court will help in achieving justice for all 
parties, consistency and predictability of the system and many other problems could be remedied 
by this move. While there some concerns about some negative impact of the new court, this work 
submits that upon weighing the pros and cons one will find that establishment of the court will 
                                                          
62
 Raviv A ‘Achieving a Faster ICSID’ (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute Management at 4 available at 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2066  accessed on 26/03/2014. 
63
 ICSID Case No ARB/01/2. 
64
See List of ICSID Cases, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases  accessed on 23/03/2014. 
65
 ICSID Case No ARB/03/23. 
66
 See Article 20 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm accessed on 24/03/2014. 
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be more beneficial than continuing to operate in the current setting. Careful consideration of the 
available options will be needed so as to create a stable and sustainable court. 
 
6.3.2 Advantages of establishing an Appellate Court 
 
The appellate structure is expected to act as a corrective body for legal and factual errors 
committed by the court of first instance.
67
 This is very important due to the fact that the basic 
aim of any adjudicative system is to ensure that the system reaches a correct decision as many 
times as possible.
68
 The importance of correct decisions cannot be underestimated in investor – 
state arbitration where the tribunals adjudicate on public interest issues and most of the time a 
huge amount of money is involved.  In addition, it is contended that the investor – state 
arbitration, which is public in nature, need to place more emphasis on achieving correct decisions 
over finality of disputes. It is a fact that tribunals had previously been more concerned with 
finality of disputes at the expense of correctness of decisions.
69
 This wrong approach which was 
borrowed from the international commercial arbitration system has negatively affected the 
development of international investment law as flawed and poorly reasoned awards have been 
enforced and resulted in the current backlash against the investor – state arbitration system.  
 
                                                          
67
 Subedi S International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 207.   
68
 See Qureshi A ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ in Muchlinski P et al (eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008) at 1157. 
69
 Yannaca-Small K ‘Improving the system of investor-state dispute settlement: an overview’ (2006) 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/59/36052284.pdf  accessed 16 /02/ 2014.   
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In addition to the above, an appellate structure will help to make the investor – state machinery 
sustainable.
70
 It is only when the system provides clear principles which meets the expectations 
of its stakeholders that the system will be able to be trusted hence making itself sustainable. Lack 
of trust from stakeholders will ultimately lead to members’ withdrawal from using it hence the 
collapse of the same. The current investor - state arbitration system is not sustainable because it 
is not consistent and lacks predictability. As a result, some members have already shown 
discomfort and have withdrawn or indicated they would do so.
71
 The adoption of an appellate 
structure therefore, is expected to bring sustainability of the system as the structure will be 
mandated to bring about consistency.  
 
Alongside this advantage, the appellate structure is expected to bring predictability as well.
72
 The 
relevance of predictability cannot be overlooked.  First of all, predictability is crucial as it allows 
the parties to understand the permissible and non-permissible acts hence capable of putting their 
houses in order when they deal with one another.
73
 Secondly, predictability is important because 
it helps the parties to understand from the beginning as to whether they have a winnable case or 
not. This helps the parties to abstain from instituting frivolous claims hence save costs and time. 
Predictability therefore, will ultimately help to develop the doctrine of precedent in investor – 
                                                          
70
 Qureshi A ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ in Muchlinski P et al (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (2008) at 1157. 
71
 Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Australia have withdrawn from using the ICSID system. See Chapter Four of 
this work under Subheading 4.6 for a thorough discussion. For more on this see also Peterson LE & Hepburn J ‘ 
Payment Round Up New Reporting on ICSID Award Debts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Bangladesh’(2011) 
Investment Arbitration Reporter available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20111231_7 ; see also Baldwin E 
‘Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards’ (2006) 23 Journal of International Arbitration 1at 7;see also Peterson LE 
‘Zimbabwe Not Paying ICSID Award’ (2010) Investment Arbitration Reporter 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20100507_5  accessed on 21/10/2013. 
72
 Qureshi A ‘An appellate system in international investment arbitration?’ in Muchlinski P et al (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (2008) at 1157. 
73
 Franck S ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 at 1619. 
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state arbitration system. A single permanent appellate structure will easily be able to develop its 
own jurisprudence on all the principles governing international investment law. 
 
In furtherance of the above, it is also expected that an independent and impartial permanent 
appellate body will create a balanced structure in which all parties’ interests will be given the 
same weight and adjudicated impartially. In the current system where parties choose the 
arbitrators, evidence shows that each arbitrator tends to protect the interest of the appointing 
party.
74
 A balanced adjudicative structure will be expected to take into account the host state’s 
other policy objectives hence enable a deference to the host state on human rights, environmental 
protection, labour rights and other social values.
75
  
 
It is hoped therefore that, a permanent appellate structure which is not party based will create a 
stable and balanced jurisprudence in which government policy making space is protected and the 
foreign investors’ interests are also taken into account. In line with the foregoing, it is also hoped 
                                                          
74
 For a thorough discussion on this see Chapter Three of this work under Subheading 3.5.2.3; also see Paulsson J 
‘Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution’ (2010) ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 339; 
see also Van Harten G ‘A Case for International Investment Court’ Society of International Economic Law, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1153424 accessed on 06/09/2013. 
75
 For the status of other social values in the current investor – state arbitration system see Chapter Three of this 
work under Subheading 3.5.2.6; see also See Van Harten G & Loughlin M ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a 
Species of Global Administrative Law’(2006) European Journal of International Law 121 at 123; see also Spear S ‘ 
The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Law’(2010) 13 Journal of 
International Economic Law 1037 at 1038; see also Salacuse J ‘Toward a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The 
Search for a Grand Bargain’ in N. Horn (ed.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (2004), at 68–70; see also 
Mann H ‘The Right of State to Regulate and International Investment Law: A Comment’ in UNCTAD The 
Development Dimensions of FDI: Policy and Rule Making Perspective 2003 at 216; see also Waelde T & Kolo A 
‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and Regulatory Taking in International Law’ (2004) 
International Comparative Law Quarterly 811 - 848 at 811; see also  Kingsbury B Public Law Concepts to Balance 
Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest—the Concept of Proportionality in Schill S 
(ed.) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 76 – 118. 
 
 
 
 
331 
 
that the permanent appellate structure which is not party – appointment based will help to 
increase objectivity in the system. 
 
6.3.3 Argument against the court system and the response thereto 
 
The defenders of the status quo are downplaying the legitimacy crisis by suggesting that the 
system is just experiencing growing pains and is working relatively fine.
76
 They argue that the 
conflicting decisions in the system are not unique to investment arbitration as there are also 
conflicting decisions in other adjudication systems.
77
 With regards to establishment of an 
appellate facility, it is argued that Article 53 of the ICSID Convention does not allow for such a 
facility, hence, it would require all member states to consent to amending the convention.
78
 
Therefore, they conclude, it will not be feasible to establish such a structure as consent from all 
member states might not be acquired.
79
 On top of that, it is argued that the appeal process will 
compromise the primary aim of the convention which is finality of the award, cost efficiency and 
timeliness.
80
  
 
                                                          
76
  See Wälde T ‘Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation and Investment Disputes: Competition and 
Choice as the Path to Quality and Legitimacy’ (2009)  Year Book  on International Investment  Law & Policy 505 at 
506; see also Franck S ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2009) 50 Harvard 
International Law Journal 435 at 440 
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 Brower C N & Schill S ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment 
Law?’(2009) 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 471(hereinafter Brower & Schill ‘Is arbitration a threat’) 
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 Tams C ‘An appealing Option? The debate about an ICSID Appellate Structure’ (2006) 57 Essays on 
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 It is submitted here that the existence of conflicting decisions in other adjudication bodies 
should not be applied to justify this legitimacy crisis in international investment law. Conflicting 
decisions in international commercial arbitration, for example, may have no serious 
consequences to many as the decision affects the parties only. However, that is not the case with 
international investment arbitration where the tribunal decision may affect development projects 
the respondent state may have planned to execute or it may affect the regulatory powers of the 
state on environmental issues, health or any other service delivery to the citizens.
81
 Therefore, 
with such wide ranging consequences, it is very important to have an   appellate body to review 
the dispute. 
 
In addition, defenders of the status quo argues that the establishment of an appellate structure 
will be costly, will compromise finality and lengthen adjudication process.
82
 This research 
submits that the existing annulment process under ICSID is the longest review process that has 
ever existed. Cases which have been sent for annulment have taken five years and more.
83
 In 
contrast the WTO appellate body timeframe for rendering an appellate decision is only three 
months.
84
 It is therefore submitted here that the argument that appeal shall lengthen the process is 
                                                          
81
See  Aguas del Tunari S A v Bolivia ICSID ARB/02/3 2005 (decision on jurisdiction), Azurix Corp v Argentina 
ICSID ARB/1/12 2006 (final award), CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8 
(final award ), Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/02/16 (final award)  and  Enron 
Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L P v Argentine Republic  ICSID ARB/01/3 (final  award), Philip Morris Asia 
Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, and PCA Case No. 2012-12 and Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall 
Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v. Federal Republic of Germany, (Award) ICSID Case No ARB/09/6. 
82
 See Tams C ‘An Appealing option’ (2006) 57 at 42. 
83
 See Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, (Decision on 
Annulment), ( the annulment application was filed in 1986 but the award was rendered 6 years later in 1992)    ; see 
also Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v. United Republic of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des 
Engrais, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, (Decision on Annulment,) (filed in 1985 but award on annulment rendered five 
years later in 1990).  
84
 WTO, Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes 1869 UNTS 401 (1994) 
Art.17 (5).  
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unfounded. A timeframe could be established within which the appellate body has to render its 
decision. With regard to finality, this research argues that as long as the appellate body decides 
on the appeal within the timeframe stipulated, the award shall remain to be final immediately 
after the appellate body has rendered its decision. In short, the current annulment process which 
takes up to six years cannot be said to be in favour of finality and timeliness. 
 
Conclusively, it is submitted here that the suggestion put forward by different stakeholders are 
very valid and intends to address the legitimacy crisis facing investor – state arbitration system. 
This work has tried to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of each of the suggested 
solutions. While the author agrees that the invocation of the principle of consolidation, the 
doctrine of precedent, the principles of lis pendens and res judicata and the application of margin 
of appreciation principles could play a great part in the course of reducing consistency, there are 
a number of obstacles which hinders their full potential. Therefore, the suggested solutions 
cannot eliminate the backlashes against the investor – state arbitration system. It is submitted 
here that establishing an independent international investment court and an appellate structure is 
a good move which need serious consideration. It is through the court or the appellate structure 
that consistency and predictability can be achieved. 
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6.4 Jurisdiction of an International investment Court  
 
As discussed earlier, the establishment of a permanent international investment court and the 
international investment appellate court through the MAI stands to be the best option available 
for the reform. In the following section the jurisdiction and structure of the two courts are 
discussed. This research calls for enactment of the International Investment Court and 
International investment Appellate Court Rules. The Rules should provide, among other things: 
the nature of the courts, the jurisdiction of the courts and the appointment and qualification of 
judges. In addition, the Rules should address dispute settlement timeframe and litigation costs at 
the two courts. In the following section these issues are discussed. 
 
6.4.1 Nature of an International investment Court 
 
As discussed earlier, this research recommends that the international investment court need to be 
a permanent litigation court which discharges its duties akin to a normal national court.  The 
court should be presided by permanent judges and parties should be allowed to hire counsels 
who would appear before this court. The fact that it hears public interest disputes and its mandate 
emanates from a MAI, the court will need to be as transparent as possible. As foreign investors 
and host states are going to be the major parties involved in disputes, the court will need to have 
jurisdiction on foreign investor – state disputes and state – state disputes respectively.  
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6.4.2 Jurisdiction of an International Investment Court 
 
The international investment court will need to have different types of jurisdiction. First of all, 
the court should have original jurisdiction in all investor - state disputes at international level. As 
stated before, by signing the MAI, state parties will have relinquished their right to institute 
investment disputes to any other international adjudicative body. The same applies to their 
citizens. 
 
However, in order to avoid backlog of cases, the court will need to have a provision in its Rules 
which allow the parties to dispute to institute investor – state dispute at the host state court if they 
so desire. This will address the issue of costs but also will boost the court legitimacy as state 
parties will feel that their national courts have not been bypassed. Allowing national courts to 
entertain investment disputes will also help to filter frivolous claims. It is only when the parties 
decide to use the international forum that they will be obliged to file their dispute only with the 
international investment court. 
 
For the purpose of avoiding parallel proceedings, the rules should clearly stipulate that while a 
dispute is pending at a national court of their choosing, the claimant will not be allowed to file 
another case with the international investment court. In situations where the respective country 
national court is unnecessarily delaying to hear the case or there are possibilities of lack of 
independence of the judiciary, the international investment court Rules should have a provision 
which allow the respective investor to suspend such proceeding and file it at the international 
 
 
 
 
336 
 
investment court. A notice of suspension should be attached to such a claim as a proof that a 
dispute in a national court is indeed suspended. Such a provision is important to ensure that 
foreign investors are not left out in the cold while the national courts are unable to hear their 
case.   
 
In addition, the international investment court will need to have reference jurisdiction. That is to 
say, any national court hearing investor – state dispute should be able to approach the 
international investment court for any interpretation issue of any MAI provision. This will help 
to secure uniformity of application and legal order in all member states and it will help national 
courts by providing them with the clarification when encountered with difficulty of interpreting 
the MAI provisions. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
85
 has successfully used 
referencing system to create consistency in the adjudicative system.
86
 
 
Thirdly, the international investment court will need to have appellate jurisdiction to all disputes 
emanating from the national courts exercising jurisdiction on investor – state disputes. In order to 
encourage and to create trust in the local courts, the international investment court should be able 
to receive appeal from a party aggrieved by a decision of a national court of a member state to 
the MAI. While the appeal is pending at the court, the national court will be required to suspend 
enforcement of its order pending the outcome of the international investment court. In a long run, 
                                                          
85
 Established by Protocol No. 3 on the European Court of Justice available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:265:FULL:EN:PDFaccessed on 14/04/2014 
86
 On CJEU referencing system see Weiler J ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court and Its Interlocutors’ (1994) 
26 Comparative Political Studies pp. 510-534; See also Henry J ‘The Referral Procedure; The Jurisdiction, Duties 
and Obligations of the European Court of Justice and Member States under Article234E.C’ (2005)1  Elsa Spel pp. 
57-65; see also Storey H ‘Preliminary references to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’ available at 
http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/lisbon_sep_2010/storey.pdf  accessed on 16/04/2014. 
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this practice will help to reduce the backlog of cases at the international investment court 
registry.  
 
Fourthly, the international investment court will need to have original jurisdiction on state – state 
disputes for the interpretation of the MAI. Where any state party feels that another member state 
is infringing its nationals’ rights, contrary to the MAI, such state should be able to seek 
interpretation of such a provision from the Court. Therefore under such circumstance, the Court 
will be exercising original jurisdiction and its decision can be appealed against at the 
International Investment Appellate court. 
 
It can be concluded here that, it will be illusory to think that all investor state disputes will be 
settled at the International investment court. With the current pace of registering 56 new cases 
annually, the courts will not be able to manage such a backlog alone.
87
 Therefore resolving 
disputes at national court and using the international investment court as a referencing court and 
appellate court respectively will ultimately help to address the backlog of cases and hence allow 
it to build a consistent jurisprudence by way of reference and appeal.  
 
 
 
                                                          
87
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at 125 available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
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6.4.3 Qualifications and appointment of Judges 
 
Lack of independence and impartiality of adjudicators is one of the major issues haunting the 
current investor – state adjudicative system.88  Studies have indicated that ad hoc party appointed 
arbitrators lacks impartiality as they serve the interests of the appointing party.
89
 To address this 
issue, this research recommend for permanent salaried judges. 
 
The judges for the international investment court will need to be people with sufficient 
knowledge on public international law, investment law and business law generally. As 
recommended earlier,
90
 there should be established an institute at UNCTAD which shall be 
responsible with the training and establishing of ethics to govern investor – state adjudication.  
The Rules should strictly require that any person aspiring for the judgeship position will need to 
undergo training at the institute and only after successful completion and acquiring the certificate 
he/she will be eligible to apply for the post. The Rules of the court should also require the judges 
to be independent and of high moral character with qualifications which would enable them to be 
appointed judges in their home countries or having recognised competence in international law.
91
 
 
With regard to appointment, this research recommends that the state parties should have a role in 
the appointment of judges. As stated above, only people with the qualifications should be eligible 
for appointment. However in order to get political legitimacy, the judges need to come from all 
                                                          
88
 See chapter Three of this work under Subheading 3.6.2.3 
89
 Bernasconi – Osterwalder N et al ‘Arbitrator Independence and Impartiality: Examining the dual role of arbitrator 
and counsel’ (2010) International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) at 1 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_arbitrator_independence.pdf accessed on 11/08/2013. 
90
 See Chapter Five of this work under Subheading 5.3.1. 
91
 See for example Article 2 of the Statute of International Court of Justice available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf accessed on 08/04/2014. 
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regions of the world. This research recommends that the Rules should provide that each region 
will appoint 3 judges hence making a total of 18 standing judges.
92
 The Rules should further 
provide that a dispute will be settled in chambers constituting of 3 judges.
93
 This will allow the 
court to have at least 6 sessions at one time. 
 
Once elected, the judges should be barred from exercising any other professional activities, 
political or administrative functions.
94
 Security of tenure should be guaranteed and the Rules 
should prohibit dismissal of any kind unless other members of the court unanimously have voted 
that the respective member is incapable of fulfilling the required conditions. With regards to 
remunerations, the Rules should ensure that judges are entitled to the tax free annual salary and 
which may not be decreased during the term of office.
95
 
 
6.4.4 Dispute settlement timeframe 
 
The Court will need to have a strict timeframe within which a dispute will have to be resolved. In 
the current system disputes takes too long to be resolved. A recent study indicates that at ICSID a 
dispute takes up to an average of 4 – 5 years.96 This research recommends that a dispute once 
filed at the court should be resolved within 6 months. As discussed above, 18 judges with 
permanent tenure should be able to preside in 6 cases at one time. The recent UNCTAD report 
                                                          
92
 The world consists of six active continents: Africa, Asia, Australia/Oceania, Europe, North America, and South 
America, information available at http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/continents.htm accessed on 12/11/2014. 
93
See Article 26(1) of the ICJ Statute 
94
 See Article 16&17 of the ICJ Statute. 
95
 See Article 32(8) of the ICJ Statute. 
96
 Raviv A ‘Achieving a Faster ICSID’ (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute Management at 4 available at 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2066  accessed on 26/03/2014. 
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indicates that 56 investor – state cases where filed in 2013.97 This means that, on average, 4.6 
cases were filed in every month. Therefore with six chambers in the Court it means only five 
chambers would be required to preside on each month. At MERCUSOR, a tribunal is required to 
render its decision within 60 days counted from the date of the communication from the 
Administrative Secretariat to the parties and the other arbitrators.
98
 At WTO, the timeframe of 
settling a dispute is 9 months where no appeal lies to the Appellate Body and 12 months where 
there was an appeal.
99
 It is submitted here that the investor – state caseload is manageable and 
the 6 months timeframe is even more relaxed. 
 
6.4.5 Litigation Costs 
 
The court will need to address the issue of cost of litigation in investor – state disputes. This 
research recommends that the Rules should limit the litigation costs at the international 
investment court by allowing the parties to litigate through video conferencing. This will reduce 
the costs of travelling and accommodation to the parties and their counsels. In addition, the Rules 
should allow parties to make their submissions online and the hearing should only be called after 
                                                          
97
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at 125 available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 
30/06/2014. 
98
 See Article 16 of the Olivos Protocol of the Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine 
Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, available 
at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/mercosurfta.pdf accessed on 30/04/2014. 
99
 See Article 20 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htmaccessed on 24/03/2014. 
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all the documentations are ready. This practice was recently successfully used at the International 
Criminal Court in Kenyatta v ICC.
100
  
 
In addition, the Rules should clearly provide that the expenses of the judges including travel and 
subsistence allowance shall be met from the UNCTAD budget. This will also reduce the 
litigation costs to the parties. A Trust Fund should be established that will be used to carter for 
litigation costs where one of the parties is a developing country. The MAI should stipulate that 
all member states to the MAI should contribute to the Fund on annual basis. This move will 
make the adjudicative system accessible to poor and rich hence enhance the court legitimacy.  
 
6.5 The nature and Jurisdiction of an International Investment Appellate Court 
 
As stated earlier, this research recommends the establishment of an international investment 
appellate court which will be the highest court in hierarchy. This court will have appellate and 
reference jurisdiction over decision made by the international investment court. 
  
When exercising the appellate powers the court will be concerned with the validity of the 
procedure involved in reaching at a particular decision and the correctness of the decision itself. 
As discussed earlier, appeal focuses on higher level of scrutiny to obtain greater accuracy in the 
                                                          
100
 See the Videoconference proceedings at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fClAkRSrogQ accessed on 
12/11/2014. 
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legal reasoning.
101
 The appellate court is an important structure and will help a lot in building 
consistency, predictability and certainty of international investment law. 
 
As stated above, the court will also need to have reference jurisdiction for purposes of providing 
a binding opinion on the meaning of the provisions of the MAI when requested by any member 
state or the international investment court chambers. 
 
On judges qualifications, in addition to the qualifications of a judge of the international 
investment court, the Rules should provide that the judges of the court of appeal will need to 
have at least 5 years’ experience of working as a judge in an international court or tribunal. It is 
submitted here that experience is needed as the court will be the final body in hierarchy and its 
decision are final. Therefore there is a need to ensure that those who preside over are indeed 
competent people who can pronounce the true position of the international investment law. 
 
With regard to appointment, this research believes that member states should be involved in the 
appointment of the court of appeal judges. The Rules should require that the Court of Appeal 
should be constituted by at least two members from each continent hence a total number of 12 
judges. In order to get an odd number, the Rules should empower member states to unanimously 
appoint one judge of the International Court of Justice who has sufficient international law 
expertise to be the chairman of the court hence making the number of judges to a total of 13 
                                                          
101
 Yannaca-Small K ‘Annulment of ICSID awards: limited scope but is there potential?’ in Yannaca-Small K (ed.) 
Arbitration under International Investment Agreements (2010) 51. 
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judges. In hearing an appeal involving state – state dispute, the Rules should require that a full 
bench of 13 judges should preside while in a normal investor – state dispute a bench of 7 judges 
should be mandated to hear the appeal. 
 
Similar to the international investment court, the court of appeal judges needs to be employed on 
permanent basis of 6 years with a possibility of renewal. To ensure Security of tenure, the Rules 
of the court should prohibit dismissal of any kind unless other members of the court unanimously 
have voted that the respective member is incapable of fulfilling the required conditions. With 
regards to remunerations, the Rules should ensure that judges are entitled to the tax free annual 
salary and which may not be decreased during the term of office. The salaries and other 
emoluments should come from member state annual contribution. 
 
The Courts Rules must also provide for the appellate court dispute settlement timeframe. It is 
pertinent that this court should be able to render its decision within a short period of time in order 
to serve time and reduce the costs of litigation. This research suggests that the rules should 
provide that within 60 days the appellate court should render its decision. 
 
With regard to costs, the appellate court need to follow the procedure identified in the 
international investment court section. The court should allow videoconferencing and online 
submission by the parties. 
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In conclusion, it can be said here that creating the international investment court and the 
international investment appellate court is inevitable and very timely. The two courts once 
established will address all legitimacy issues and provide the stakeholders with a reliable 
international investment adjudicative system. 
 
6.6 Creating a Multilateral Agreement on Investment: The way forward 
 
6.6.1 Call for stakeholders’ Conference 
 
In order to get a legitimate MAI, there is a need to involve all stakeholders in its making. This 
research calls for a stakeholders’ conference on international investment which would provide a 
platform for charting the way forward. The fact that there are different stakeholders’ interests 
and concerns at stake, it is only through meeting together that each group’s concerns may be 
addressed and appropriate measures which considers other stakeholders interests, could be 
suggested for a better and inclusive MAI. Major stakeholders for the purposes of investor – state 
arbitration includes; governments, foreign investors, civil society organisations, NGOs, 
academia, law firms, arbitrators and other institutions involved or interested in the development 
of the investor – state adjudication system. To garner support, the conference would require 
collection of opinion from eminent scholars/ experts from all parts of the world representing 
different parties’ interests. It is submitted here that through such a forum, members may come to 
a conclusion of forming a task force which could be mandated to draft a proposal for the 
purposes of encouraging states to agree on a multilateral investment agreement which takes on 
board all stakeholders concerns. The fact that the previous efforts failed mainly because only a 
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few stakeholders were involved makes this idea even more realistic.
102
 At the outset, the forum 
should assess the need of having the system, the reform required, and the purpose of the new 
reformed system. 
 
It is further submitted here that such a report from the conference could help much to iron out the 
differences between different groups and widen the transparency of investor – state adjudication 
system and put at the table the possible inclusive solutions to the legitimacy issues haunting the 
system at the moment. 
 
6.6.1.1 Possible obstacles 
 
While the conception of this idea is attractive and compelling, it will require much dedication 
and commitment for it to be realised. Among the challenges could be to find an organiser/ 
organisation which enjoy worldwide recognition and respect from all stakeholders involved. The 
organisers should not be viewed as leaning towards the interests of either group among the 
stakeholders but a neutral body which can balance the interests of both parties. 
  
Another challenge towards achieving a fruitful conference could be mobilisation of funds for the 
conference. It is obvious that if the conference is to be successful all stakeholders must have their 
say and be present at the conference. To achieve that, financial resources will be of vital 
                                                          
102
 See Chapter Two Subheading 2.3.10 and Chapter Six under Subheading 6.2. of this work both discussing the 
reasons for the failure of MAI 1998. 
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importance for the organisation, publication, accessibility, accommodation, transportation, and 
feeding of all conference members. While government and business entities representatives may 
be able to garner resources from their own internal sources, the same cannot be guaranteed of 
civil societies and NGOs representatives. Also financial resources may be required for the 
experts from different interested groups who would be asked to present their opinion at the 
conference. The task of finding eminent scholars on international investment law to analyse the 
areas of concerns may not be that difficult as Professors from different parts of the world in 2010 
issued a statement regarding the investor – state arbitration system.103 A few of them may be 
selected to present their views on how the system should move forward. 
 
 It is submitted here that, considering the fact that the investor - state systemic issues affects 
everyone involved, including developed states, the organisers may not find it very difficult to 
raise funds from big nations which so far have also indicated that they would prefer the system to 
change.
104
 In addition to that the organisers may also seek assistance from other stakeholders 
including the World Bank, the IMF, and TNCs which are vital stakeholders in the development 
of international investment law.  In the section that follows, this research suggests what should 
be contained in the MAI for it to address all the legitimacy issues in the current system. 
 
                                                          
103
 Van Harten G et al. ‘Public Statement on International Investment Regime’ available at 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/documents/Public%20Statement%20(June%202011).pdf accessed on 
06/09/2013. 
104
 As discussed under Chapter Four of this work under Subheading 4.8, USA, Australia, South Africa and other 
countries have registered their concerns on the operation of the Investor – state arbitration system. 
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6.7 The Minimum Content of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
 
For the future MAI to be successful, it needs to address legitimacy issues which are haunting the 
current investor – state arbitration system. The MAI need to balance the interest of both parties: 
foreign investors and that of the host state. As earlier discussed, one of the reason for the failure 
of the previous MAI is that it protected foreign investors without assigning them any duties.
105
 
The future MAI needs to have provisions which clearly define the rights and duties of the 
competing parties.  
 
In addition, the MAI needs to be clear in as far as its objectives are concerned.  The preamble 
must clearly provide that the objective of the MAI is to encourage foreign investments which 
will contribute to the development objectives of the host state. In the section that follows this 
research suggests the minimum contents of the MAI. The minimum content discussed hereunder 
will be an addition to the existing pre and post foreign investors’ rights.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105
 See Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 7; see also Newcombe 
A &Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties(2009) at 13; see also Salacuse J ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 Int’l  
Law  655 at  659; see also Dodge W ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections 
on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of  Transnational  Law 1 at 5-8; 
see also Van Harten G  Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007) 14-15. 
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6.7.1 The need for clear definition and scope of basic investment principles 
 
One of the major issues in the current BITs and IIAs is that the basic international investment 
principles are receiving contradictory interpretations by the tribunals.
106
 Some tribunals are 
giving these principles narrow scope while others are widening their scope as much as possible. 
This has resulted in uncertainty and unpredictability of the law. Among the principles which 
need to be given a clear interpretation includes: the meaning of the term investment;
107
 the scope 
of an umbrella clause;
108
 the application of the Most Favoured Nations (MFN) principle to a 
third party on procedural matters;
109
 the application of the defence of necessity and Non-
Precluded Measures (NPM) during emergency situations;
110
 the scope of the principle of 
                                                          
106
 See Chapter Five of this work under Subheading 5.3.5. 
107
 See Salini Costruttori SpA v Kingdom of Morocco ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 (2001), Jan de Nul NV v Islamic 
Republic of Egypt ICSID Case ARB/04/13 (2006), Mitchell v Congo ICSID Case No. ARB 99/7 (2007) Decision on 
Annulment, and Malaysian Historical Salvors v Malaysia ICSID Case No ARB/05/10 (2007) Award on 
Jurisdiction. For a different view see CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic Annulment 
Committee (2007) para 71 – 72; see also Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22 (2008); also see MCI Power Group, LCand New Turbine, Inc v Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/6, Award, 31 July 2007 and Giovanna a Beccara and Others v. Argentine Republic, (also known as Abaclat 
et al v. Argentina), ICSID Case No ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 4 August 2011. 
108
See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID ARB/01/13, El Paso Energy 
International Co v Argentina ICSID ARB/03/15 and Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration 
Company v Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/13  on one hand and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S A v Republic of 
the Philippines, ICSID ARB/02/6, Noble Ventures Inc v Romania, ICSID ARB/01/11 of  12
th
 October 2005 on 
arbitral jurisdiction available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0565.pdf  , and  Eureko 
BV v Poland, Ad hoc – UNCITRAL Award of 19th August 2005 Partial award available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0308_0.pdf   on the other. 
109
 In favour of the extension of the application of MFN to procedural matters see Emilio Augustin Maffezini v 
Kingdom of Spain, Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, IIC 85 (2000); for similar opinion also see 
Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/10, (2005)Decision on Preliminary Questions on 
Jurisdiction; Camuzzi International S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/2,(2005) Decision on 
Jurisdiction; National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, (2006)Decision on Jurisdiction; Suez, 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No ARB/03/19 and AWG Group Ltd. v The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL,(2006) Decision on Jurisdiction. 
However this position is disputed in other cases; see for example Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, 
ICSID Case No ARB/03/24 (2005) Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 223; see also Telenor Mobile Communications AS 
v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/04/15 (2006), Award; see also Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade 
S.p.A v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ICSID Case No ARB/02/13 (2004), Decision on Jurisdiction; also see 
Wintershall Aktiengellschaft v Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/04/14 (2008)Award. 
110
 See CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic ICSID ARB/01/8 (2005) on one hand and 
LG&E Energy Corp LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic ICSID 
ARB/02/1(2007) on the other. 
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expropriation;
111
 the meaning of fair and equitable treatment (FET);
112
 and lastly the meaning of 
full protection and security.
113
 The MAI must provide balanced definitions which will address 
the foreign investors’ interests and those of the host state and that of third parties where 
necessary. As suggested before,
114
 there is a need to form an international investment Working 
Group which will, among other thing, recommend the definitions and scope of the basic 
international investment law principles to be adopted in the MAI. 
 
6.7.2 The need for a provision on Common duties of foreign investor and the host state 
 
The MAI also must stipulate the common duties of both parties. The common duties should 
include, but not limited to; parties observance of minimum standards for human rights, parties 
observance of environment and labour law and the duty not to engage in corruption activities. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Three,
115
 TNC often infringe human rights, labour and 
environmental standards in the countries in which they operate. Therefore the MAI has to have a 
provision which strictly demands that both parties are obligated to ensure that the human rights, 
labour and environmental core values are protected and respected by both; the host state and the 
foreign investor. 
 
                                                          
111
 See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports r para 201 and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech 
Republic ICSID Reports para 609. 
112
 See S D Myers Inc v Canada UNCITRAL/NAFTA 40 ILM 1408 (2001) but also see Metalclad Corporation v 
United Mexican States ICSID Review 16(2000) for a different views on the scope of Fair and Equitable Treatment 
principle; see also See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports (2001) para 293 and CME Czech Republic 
BV v The Czech Republic ICSID Reports (2001) para 611. 
113
 See Lauder v The Czech Republic, 9 ICSID Reports (2001) para 309 and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech 
Republic ICSID Reports (2001) para 613. 
114
 See chapter Five of this work under subheading 5.3.5. 
115
 See Chapter Three under Subheading 3.6.2.6 for a thorough discussion on this issue. 
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It is through such an inclusive MAI with balanced parties’ interests provisions that the court to 
be established will be able to create a consistent international investment law jurisprudence 
which takes on board other social values. 
 
6.7.3 The need for a provision on the rights of the host state 
 
While it is clear from customary international law and other general principles of international 
law that the host state has the right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure that 
development in its territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable 
development and with other legitimate social and economic policy objectives, many of the 
existing BITs and IIAs do not stipulate this. As a result, tribunals do not consider this right 
seriously. The MAI therefore must recognise and provide for specific right of the host State.  
The inclusion of this provision will help to create a balance between the host state’s interests and 
those of the foreign investor. As discussed elsewhere lack of balanced investment instruments 
has been one of the sources to the legitimacy crisis in investor – state arbitration system. A clear 
stipulation in the MAI about the host state right to regulate will help the court in determining 
whether the particular state action was an infringement of foreign investor interest or falls within 
the state power to regulate. 
 
In addition, the MAI will need to include a provision which, under special circumstances, 
empowers or guarantees the host state the right to pursue development goals in a manner that 
suits its interest most even if the measure may include discriminatory actions. While this 
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provision may seem unfair to foreign investors, it will prove to be important especially to 
countries which have historical economic injustices and discrepancies to address. The provision 
will play a crucial role in motivating developing countries to join the MAI. 
 
6.7.4 The need for a provision limiting forums for dispute settlement  
 
It is pertinent that the MAI should also limit the forums for settling investment disputes. The 
international investment court should be the only international forum available for settling 
international investment dispute for state parties and foreign investors from state parties. The 
principle of fork in the road or waiver provisions needs to be incorporated.
116
 As discussed 
before,
117
 this is a treaty principle that limits the investors’ venues for institution of cases.118 
According to this principle, once the investor decides to institute his claim with the particular 
forum he/she becomes ineligible from instituting another claim with another body on the same 
subject matter.
119
  
 
                                                          
116
 Knahr C ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in International Investment Arbitration’ in Knahr C et al (eds.) 
Investment and Commercial Arbitration – Similarities and Divergences (2010) 1-19 at 4. 
117
 See Chapter Five of this work under Subheading 5.2.1. 
118
 See for example Art. 7(3) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of 
27/11/2009 (hereinafter South Africa – Zimbabwe BIT) available at  
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/south africa_zimbabwe.pdf providing for the fork in the road provision. 
119
 Schreuer C ‘Travelling the BIT route: of waiting periods, umbrella clauses and forks in the road’ (2004) The 
Journal of World Investment and Trade 231 at 232. 
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With this provision, it will mean that by signing on to the MAI state parties are waiving their 
rights to institute disputes in other international fora. This move will address the problem of 
forum shopping which results into conflicting decisions.
120
 
 
6.7.5 The need for a provision on the qualification of the Judges 
 
As thoroughly discussed in Chapter Three, lack of institutional safeguards for independence and 
impartiality of adjudicators, is one of the major issues haunting the investor – state arbitration 
system. For the MAI to address this problem there is a need to have provisions which would 
clearly stipulate the required qualifications for those aspiring to be judges of these courts. The 
provision should require the judges to have knowledge in international law, business law and 
public law field. As earlier suggested, the MAI may also provide for the establishment of the 
training institute which will be issuing certificates to aspirants upon successful completion of the 
course.   
 
6.7.6 The need for a provision on litigation funding 
 
As pointed out earlier, costs in investor – state arbitration is so high.121 The court will need to 
address this issue and ensure that all stakeholders, poor and rich, have equal access. The MAI 
therefore, through a specific provision, must mandate UNCTAD to set up a litigation fund which 
                                                          
120
 Reinisch A ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Christina Binder et al (eds.) International Investment Law 
for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009) 894 - 916 at 908 
121
 See Chapter Three under subheading 3.6.2.7 
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will be financed through state parties’ annual contributions. The fund may also accept voluntary 
contributions from interested stakeholders including multinational corporations.  
 
Establishment of such a fund will not be a novel idea. At the International Tribunal on the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS) a party who is unable to bear its own costs can apply for legal assistance 
from the Trust Fund.
122
 The Fund was established in 2000 through General Assembly Resolution 
55/7.
123
 It is specifically meant to assist state parties on disputes submitted or about to be 
submitted at ITLOS.
124
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Permanent Court of Arbitration has also established a Trust 
Fund to carter for litigation costs.
125
 In recognition of the cost problem facing developing 
countries the PCA established a Financial Assistance Fund for developing countries in 1995.
126
 
The Fund is financed through voluntary contributions from States, NGOs, International 
Organisations and individuals. For a state to benefit from the Fund it needs to meet the 
conditions which are:
127
 (1) the requesting state must be a member to the PCA Convention; (2) 
the state must have concluded an agreement to refer a dispute (or disputes) to PCA dispute 
settlement; and (3) the state must be listed on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
                                                          
122
 ITLOS established through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10/12/1982, UN Doc A/CONF 
62/122(1982) available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf accessed 
on22/04/2014 
123
 See Article 19(1) of the ITLOS Statute. 
124
Mackenzie R et al The Manual on International Courts and Tribunals 2nd ed. (2010) at 54. 
125
 See Chapter Three under subheading 3.5.4. 
126
 The Conditions and eligibility criteria can be found at http://www.pca-cpa.org/BD/torfundenglish.htm accessed 
on 29/04/2014. 
127
 See the PCA Website, Financial Assistance Fund available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1179 accessed on 29/04/2014. 
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The International Bureau administers the Fund under the external supervision of external Board 
of Trustees. The fund has disbursed funds to a number of needy states since its inception.
128
  
 
This provision will be akin to the WTO Advisory Centre which has been specifically established 
for the purposes of rendering legal assistance to developing countries.
129
 It is submitted here that, 
through this kind of provision in the MAI legal costs impediment will diminish and ultimately 
create a balanced investor – state adjudicative system. 
 
6.7.7 The need for a provision on transparency in the adjudication process 
 
As discussed before, investor – state disputes are public in nature hence needs to be adjudicated 
in a transparent manner. Confidentiality of proceedings affects the effort of legitimisation of the 
investor – state dispute settlement system. Due to the fact that the awards are not always 
published, people do not know what cases have been decided and how the law was applied.
130
  
 
The MAI will therefore need to ensure that transparency is given high priority in investor -state 
disputes so as to boost its legitimacy. The whole adjudication processes need to be open to the 
public. That is to say; the claimant statement of claim, the response thereof, pleadings, third 
                                                          
128
 UNCTAD ‘Permanent Court of Arbitration’ UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.26 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add26_en.pdf accessed on 28/04/2014. 
129
 See Chapter five of this work for a thorough discussion on this under Subheading 5.4.1. 
130
 Choudhury B ‘Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest 
contributing to the Democratic Deficit?’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 775 at 809; see also 
Spooreberg F& Vinuales V ‘conflicting decisions in International Arbitration’ Law & Practice of International 
Courts & Tribunals (2009) 91 – 113 at 107. 
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party submissions, transcripts of hearing, decisions and awards should be promptly available to 
the public for inspection.
131
 In addition, the public should be allowed to attend any hearing 
except where there is a need to protect confidential information.
132
 A repository needs to be 
established at UNCTAD which will be responsible with the keeping of the record and publishing 
all the required information.   
It is submitted here that a MAI which clearly provide for transparency will boost its own 
legitimacy and that of the courts established thereunder. 
 
6.7.8 The need for a provision on enforcement  
 
Any adjudicative system whose decisions are incapable of being enforced, or lack enforcement 
power stands a poor chance of prospering. As enforcement of international courts’ or tribunals’ 
decisions is meant to be sought in the national court of the state parties, it is always important 
that the adjudicative system is perceived as just and fair. The MAI therefore, while needing 
strong provisions which guarantee enforcement of the rendered decisions, it will also need to 
gain trust and perception that it is just and fair.
133
 Once so perceived, its decision will be 
considered legitimate and will become easily enforceable.  
 
                                                          
131
 See for example Article 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-release-
UNCITRAL-Rules-on-Transparency.pdf accessed on 27/09/2013. 
132
 See for example Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-release-UNCITRAL-
Rules-on-Transparency.pdf accessed on 27/09/2013. 
133
 For a thorough discussion on the relevancy of legitimacy perception in international adjudicative bodies see 
Chapter Four of this work under Subheading 4.2.1. 
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The current trend at ICSID speaks volume on the relevancy of legitimacy perception of an 
adjudicative system. Argentina and many other countries have refused to recognise and enforce 
awards rendered by ICSID tribunals on grounds that tribunals were unfair against states. For 
about 10 years now, Argentina has been involved in a battle with US investors on awards 
rendered against it in Azurix Corp v Argentina
134
 and CMS v Argentina.
135
  Argentina is 
contesting the awards and the claimants have not been able to enforce the same.  
 
Apart from Argentina, Zimbabwe,
136
 Liberia,
137
 Russia,
138
 Thailand,
139
 Senegal,
140
 Kyrgyzstan
141
 
and Venezuela
142
 have shown dissatisfaction with the ICSID system and refused to pay the 
awards issued against them.
143
 
 
                                                          
134
 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award of 14
th
 July 2006. 
135
 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award of 12
th
 May 2005. 
136
 Funnekotter v Republic of Zimbabwe ICSID Case No ARB/05/6, Award (2009) 
http://italaw.com/documents/ZimbabweAward.pdf accessed on 20/10/2013.  
137
 Liberian Eastern Timber Corp v Republic of Liberia ICSID Case No ARB/83/2, Award 2 ICSID Rep. 346 (1994) 
accessed on 20/10/2013. 
138
 Sedelmayer v Russian Federation, Arbitration Award (ad hoc arbitration under the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce arbitration rules July 7, 1998), http://italaw.com/documents/investment_sedelmayer_v_ru.pdf, accessed 
on 20/10/2013. 
139
 Walter Bau AG (in liquidation) v Kingdom of Thailand, Award (UNCITRAL Arbitration July 1, 2009), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0067.pdf  accessed on 20/10/2013. 
140
 Socie´te´ Ouest Africaine des Be´tons Industriels v Senegal, ICSID Case No ARB/82/1, Award, 2 ICSID Rep 190 
(1994) accessed on 20/10/2013. 
141
 Petrobart Ltd. v Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitration No 126/2003, Award II (Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce Mar. 29, 2005), 13 ICSID Rep. 387 (2008) accessed on 20/10/2013. 
142
 Mobil Corp v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 10, 
2010), https://icsid.worldbank.org accessed on 20/10/2013; see also CNN (Jan. 9, 2012) Chavez Says He Won’t 
Respect World Bank Panel’s Decision, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/09/business/venezuela-
exxon/index.html accessed on 20/10/2013  
143
 For more on this see Peterson LE & Hepburn J ‘ Payment Round Up New Reporting on ICSID Award Debts of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Bangladesh’(2011) Investment Arbitration Reporter available at 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20111231_7 ; see also Baldwin E ‘Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards’ 
(2006) 23 Journal of International Arbitration 1at 7;see also Peterson LE ‘Zimbabwe Not Paying ICSID Award’ 
(2010) Investment Arbitration Reporter http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20100507_5  accessed on 21/10/2013.  
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Difficulties in enforcement at ICSID have been possible despite the existence of Article 53 and 
54 the ICSID Convention which squarely guarantees enforcement of awards. It is submitted here 
that for the MAI to have its courts decisions easily enforceable, it will need to operate in a 
manner that is perceived just and fair to both parties.  
 
In conclusion, it can be said here that a MAI which addresses all the above issues stands a 
chance of being a successful multilateral investment agreement.  
 
6.8 Institution to host the Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Courts 
 
The WTO and UNCTAD are bodies which in one way or the other have more connection with 
the international investment law. As previously stated, on several occasions the WTO had been 
involved in talks of forming the MAI under its auspice. UNCTAD is also another giant 
institution involved on international investment matters for over three decades now. In this 
section the potentialities of these two bodies to host the MAI are discussed. 
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6.8.1 The case for the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
 
The WTO is often referred as a viable institution which can host the MAI and the courts.
144
  
Proponents argue that the WTO dispute settlement system has worked well and has shown 
maturity and emerged strong despite the current global economic crisis.
145
 Proponents further 
argue that the WTO DSB and AB could be used as courts for international investment 
disputes.
146
 In addition, the WTO Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and 
Investment established in 2002 called for the integration of investor – state dispute system into 
the WTO DSB.
147
 
 
However, the proposal calling for the WTO to host the MAI and the courts is not free of 
obstacles. The first obstacle is that, as pointed out before, the Doha Ministerial Conference in 
2001 proposed for the introduction of negotiations to establish a multilateral investment treaty at 
                                                          
144
 Aslund A ‘The World need a Multilateral Investment Agreement’ Policy Brief Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, January 2013 at 2 available at http://stfrnik.piie.com/publications/pb/pb13-1.pdf accessed on 
21/05/2014; see also Draper P et al ‘Towards Global Governance of FDI Issues on Getting to Multilateral Approach’ 
in Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Prosperity and Growth: The Case for A Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment WEF 2013 Pp 29 – 31 at 29 available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf accessed on 
18/02/2014; also see Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 209. 
145
 Draper P et al ‘Towards Global Governance of FDI Issues on Getting to Multilateral Approach’ in Foreign 
Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Prosperity and Growth: The Case for A Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment WEF 2013 p 29. 
146
 Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) at 209. 
147
 Report of the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment to the General Council of the 
WTO’ WT/WGTI/6 (2002) 
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%28+%40meta%5FSymbol+%28WT%FCWGTI%F
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accessed on 26/05/2014. 
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the WTO to no avail.
148
 The negotiations were officially discontinued in 2004 and Multilateral 
Investment Agreement has never been a WTO priority ever since.
149
 Therefore it will require a 
lot of efforts to convince the WTO to pick the matter on board again while they already have 
many internal unresolved issues.  
 
The second obstacle is that the WTO DSU is a state – state dispute settlement system which does 
not allow private parties to appear before the DSU and AB. As a result this system cannot be 
suitable to the MAI and the courts system which will need to allow individual foreign investors 
to appear before the courts. 
 
6.8.2 The case for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
 
Another body which can be considered to host the MAI and the courts is UNCTAD.
150
 It is 
submitted here that considering the previous reluctance of the WTO to host the MAI, UNCTAD 
is the best possible option remaining. UNCTAD has shown interest in international investment 
law development and is the leading institution to publish the World Investment Reports on 
annual basis for several decades now. In 2012, with the view of encouraging a multilateral 
                                                          
148
 The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO, Work Programme: Implementation related Issues, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm accessed on 25/05/2013. 
149
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investment framework, UNCTAD launched the Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development (IPFSD).
151
 The Framework is hosted by the Division for Investment and 
Enterprise.
152
  The Framework was launched because UNCTAD believes that ‘there is a 
compelling need for a multilateral mechanism that deals with today’s investment policy-making 
challenges at different levels.’153 
 
Therefore this research submits that, UNCTAD as a UN affiliate with the mandate to organise 
the World Investment Forum, which brings together major players from the international 
investment community to discuss challenges and opportunities and to promote investment 
policies and partnerships for sustainable development and equitable growth, is better positioned 
to initiate the MAI negotiations and host the MAI and the relevant courts.
154
 The MAI and the 
Courts can be established and hosted at the Division for Investment and Enterprise of UNCTAD. 
The Division is recognised as ‘a global centre of excellence on issues related to investment and 
enterprise for sustainable development’.155 As earlier stated, the division also provides technical 
support to over 150 world economies. This research strongly advises that hosting the dispute 
                                                          
151
 UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD) available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2012d6_en.pdf accessed on 27/05/2014. 
152
 UNCTAD, Division of Investment and Enterprises available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2012d6_en.pdf accessed on 27/05/2014. 
153
 UNCTAD World Investment Report ‘Towards a New Generation of International Investment Policies: 
UNCTAD’s Fresh Approach to Multilateral Investment Policy-Making’ available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d6_en.pdf accessed on 27/05/2014. 
154
 UNCTAD about Us available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/AboutUs.aspx accessed on 26/05/2014. 
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 UNCTAD Investment and Enterprise Division available at http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/DIAE.aspx accessed 
on 26/05/2014. 
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settlement system should be considered as technical assistance to the international investment 
regime.
156
 
 
6.9 Phasing out investor- state arbitration in favour of the court structure 
  
Once the court system is established, the current system will be allowed to phase out through the 
member states act of signing the new MAI system. The MAI may remain silent on the matter 
leaving the Vienna Convention rules on successive Treaties to take its course.
157
 Article 59 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for circumstances under which a Treaty may 
come to an end. The Article provides as follows: 
 
‘1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating 
to the same subject matter and: 
(a) it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the 
matter should be governed by that treaty.’ 
 
Therefore upon both member states signing to the new MAI and signifying their intention to 
terminate the BIT, Article 59 of the Vienna Convention could be invoked to terminate the BIT in 
favour of the MAI. It is submitted here that through such international practice, the new system 
will develop quickly.  
                                                          
156
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Alternatively, the MAI may provide clearly that it replaces the BITs involving the respective 
member states. The Central America–Mexico FTA158 provide a good example as it clearly 
provides that it replaces the FTAs between Mexico and Costa Rica (1994), Mexico and El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (2000), and Mexico and Nicaragua (1997).
159
  As earlier 
stated, in Europe also, the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union in 
2009, gives the European Commission the mandate to negotiate investment agreements on behalf 
of all 27 Member states.
160
 This means that many BITs between individual EU countries will be 
replaced by common EU treaties hence tremendously cutting down the number of BITs.
161
  The 
European Union Regulations 1219/2012 provides how the EU Member states BITs with third 
states will come to an end.
162
 The Regulations, which entered into force on January 9, 2013, 
provide that the member states BITs with third states will remain in force until progressively 
replaced by an investment agreement between the European Union and the third state in 
question.
163
 Therefore, the inclusion of such a provision in the MAI will not be an isolated 
incident. The MAI may have a similar provision directing that all BITs to which both parties are 
MAI member states shall automatically come to an end by parties signing to the MAI or shall be 
progressively replaced with the MAI when its lifespan comes to an end. After all, the good news 
is that many of the old BITs are coming to an end, member states to the MAI will be encouraged 
                                                          
158
 The Central America–Mexico FTA 2011 available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/CACM_MEX/CACM_MEX_e.asp accessed on 31/05/2014. 
159
 The Central America–Mexico FTA (2011) replaces the FTAs between Mexico and Costa Rica (1994), Mexico 
and El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (2000), and Mexico and Nicaragua (1997). 
160
 See Art. 207(4) of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/BG/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN accessed on 02/06/2014.  
161
 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012 ‘Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies’ at 84 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/WIR2012_WebFlyer.aspx accessed on 
21/05/2014. 
162
 Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012, OJ L 351/40, 20.12.2012 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:351:0040:0046:En:PDF  accessed on 02/06/2014. 
163
 See the EU Regulations Arts. 3 and 5 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:351:0040:0046:En:PDF  accessed on 02/06/2014. 
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to phase out the old BITs and become members of the MAI court structured dispute settlement 
system.
164
  
 
6.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the time is ripe for the establishment of a MAI and the courts. It is 
suggested that the MAI and the courts be hosted at UNCTAD. A number of reasons are given to 
support the proposal. In addition, the chapter has discussed the reasons as to why it is important 
to consider the establishment of these institutions now. In the last part, the chapter has suggested 
the minimum content which the MAI must embody if it has to be successful in addressing the 
legitimacy crisis. The chapter concludes that the case for the reform is made. The chapter that 
follows concludes and summarises the recommendations of the whole research.
                                                          
164
 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2013 indicates 
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Report 2013 Global and regional investment trends, available at 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter summarises the findings and recommendations made in the preceding chapters. The 
chapter submits that there are a number of issues which need immediate attention to be fixed in 
order to rescue the investor – state adjudicative system from collapsing. These issues, as 
discussed earlier, includes lack of consistency in the rendered awards, lack of institutional 
safeguards for independence and impartiality of adjudicators, lack of transparency on matters of 
public interests, encroachment on government policy making space, lack of an appellate structure 
to rectify errors, expensive adjudication process and lack of strict timeframe for settling disputes. 
In the section that follows a conclusion is made followed by a summary of recommendations. 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
 
The discussion in the previous chapters has shown that the investor – state arbitration system 
which deal with public interest disputes is not living up to the expectations of many 
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stakeholders.
1
 The system lacks the necessary values/tenets required to be observed by any 
adjudicative body endowed with powers to handle public interest disputes.
2
  
 
The discussion has also demonstrated that each of these issues has received a considerable 
number of possible solutions from different stakeholders. The most cited solutions include; 
invoking res judicata and lis pendens principles; adopting  the doctrine of precedents; applying 
the fork in the road principle; adopting the margin of appreciation standard in interpretation of 
BITs, creating an appellate structure at ICSID and creating a treaty to treaty appellate body.
3
 The 
discussion has further revealed that the suggested solutions do not address the legitimacy issues 
in a holistic manner and leave a lot of issues unaddressed. As a result the suggested solutions 
cannot eliminate the backlash against investor – state arbitration system. 
  
This research concludes that time is ripe to establish the MAI and the courts because the 
obstacles which caused previous MAI negotiations to fail have withered away. The research has 
demonstrated that currently foreign investors from developing countries are reciprocally 
investing in the developed world.
4
 The stigma against FDI which existed among developing 
countries in the 1990s has abated as most of them have liberalised their economies and learnt the 
advantages which come with FDI. It is clear now that developing countries which are now 
investors in the developed world need the legal framework which ensures their investment 
abroad adequate protection as much as developed countries does.  
                                                          
1
 See Chapter Three of this work under Subheading 3.6.2. 
2
 See Chapter Four of this work under Subheadings 4.3 – 4.8 
3
 See Chapter Five of this work under Subheading 5.1. 
4
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.2.2.1 – 6.2.2.4. 
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The research further submits that the time is ripe because the amount of FDI has tremendously 
increased in the last two decades to be left governed by a patchwork of BITs. The research 
concludes that the time is ripe for the MAI to be established which will provide security and 
protection of this important field of world economy.  
 
In addition, this research finds the time is ripe as the world today is moving towards forming 
regional agreements in replacement of BITs. The Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement (RCEP), the Southern African Tripartite Trade Negotiation, the Trans - 
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
agreements speaks volume about the world community’s desire to have a single international 
investment governing body.
5
 
 
As demonstrated earlier, the Advantages of the MAI are many.
6
 First of all, the MAI will help in 
harmonising the international investment principles which are currently scattered in customary 
international law principles and BITs. Furthermore, a multilateral treaty will help in developing a 
coherent international investment policy for all member states. It is further believed that the MAI 
will enhance transparency and predictability of outcomes in investor – state process. Through the 
MAI, the linkage with other related international agenda such as environment and human rights 
can be found as the whole world community will be part of the negotiation and implementation 
of this global instrument. 
                                                          
5
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  World Investment Report 2013 ‘Global and 
regional investment trends’ at 103 available at http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf accessed on 
20/05/2014; see also UNCTAD World Investment Report 2014 ‘investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan’ at xxiv 
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf accessed on 30/06/2014.  
6
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.2.3. 
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With regard to the establishment of the courts, this research also concludes that the time is ripe 
for the establishment of an independent international investment court and the appellate court 
thereto which will be charged with the jurisdiction to hear all investor – state disputes at 
international level.
7
 First of all, the court will help to address the problem of costs in investor – 
state adjudication process. With a permanent court structure presided by fully employed judges’ 
the costs for litigation will definitely go down as the court members are normally paid by the 
establishing institution and not the parties. Secondly, the court will address the issue of dispute 
settlement timeframe. The rules of the court will stipulate the timeframe within which a dispute 
needs to be resolved. Thirdly, it is expected that the investment court which is permanent and not 
party based will create a stable and balanced jurisprudence in which government policy making 
space is protected and the foreign investors’ interests are also taken into account 
 
The appellate court on the other hand, will benefit the system by being a corrective body for 
legal and factual errors committed by the international investment court. In addition, the 
appellate structure is expected to bring predictability and consistency as well. It is submitted here 
that consistency and predictability will ultimately help to develop the doctrine of precedent in 
investor – state adjudicative system.   
 
Conclusively, it is submitted here that, in consideration of all of the above, the time is indeed ripe 
to establish the MAI and its court to address the legitimacy crisis in investor – state adjudication 
process. The merits of so doing by far outweigh any demerits. 
 
                                                          
7
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.3. 
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7.2 Summary of recommendations 
 
This research is making two categories of recommendations.
8
 The first category contains 
‘alternative’ solutions aimed at improving the existing investor – state arbitration system. The 
second category calls for the enacting the MAI which will provide for the establishment of the 
international investment court with an appellate structure. These recommendations are 
summarised herein below. 
 
7.2.1 Interim/alternative recommendations 
 
The first recommendation is that there is a need to establish the investor – state Dispute 
Management Centre which will be charged with the duty to provide legal assistance to poor 
developing countries.
9
 The Centre will be an important tool to address the issue of expensive 
adjudication process. It is submitted that the centre will increase the legitimacy of the whole 
investor – state arbitration system as poor countries will receive the same level of representation 
and access before the tribunals without fear of litigation costs. 
 
The second recommended measure is to use the host state courts to settle investor- state 
disputes.
10
 This will help avoid tribunals’ encroachment on government policy making space. 
This research believes that local court judges are better placed to know the host states other 
                                                          
8
 For interim or alternative recommendations see Chapter Five of this work under Subheadings 5.3.1 – 5.3.5. 
9
 See Chapter Five of this work under Subheadings 5.3.1. 
10
 See Chapter Five of this work under Subheadings 5.3.2. 
 
 
 
 
369 
 
policy objectives hence well positioned to grant deference necessary for such a state to 
implement those objectives.  In addition, the use of host state will enhance transparency in the 
system as a court of law normally conducts their proceedings in open court. 
 
Thirdly, this research proposes that, publication of investor – state awards be mandatory.11 This 
will increase transparency, predictability, certainty and consistency. The availability of prior 
decided cases which have similarity with the new ones could be very helpful for the presiding 
tribunal to arrive at more or less similar conclusions hence enhancing certainty and predictability 
in investor – state dispute settlement system. Publication of awards will also increase the quality 
of future awards.  It is submitted here that before rendering the award arbitrators will be diligent 
in order to avoid public humiliation resulting from poorly reasoned awards. In other words, 
transparency acts as a check and balancing tool. 
 
Fourthly, this research recommends for the enhancement the use of member states interpretative 
guidelines/statements.
12
 The fact that a BIT is a creature of the respective state parties, it is 
imperative that state parties should be mandated to provide the guidelines on the scope of a 
particular BIT provisions. This research submits that the object and purpose of the treaty is well 
understood by the parties themselves. Hence any interpretative statement by the state members 
will be important to the tribunal in ascertaining the meaning of a provision from a respective 
BIT. It follows therefore that tribunals’ discretionary power will be contained to the level 
intended by the state parties. In other words, the Tribunal will not be in a position to encroach on 
                                                          
11
 See Chapter Five of this work under Subheadings 5.3.3. 
12
 See Chapter Five of this work under Subheadings 5.3.4. 
 
 
 
 
370 
 
matters to which the state parties has set the limitation otherwise the principle of ultra vires will 
be readily applied against such a tribunal. In addition, the guidelines will help to solidify and 
ultimately create a consistent jurisprudence on the meaning and scope of investment principles. 
 
Lastly, this research recommends for the formation of a working group which should be 
entrusted to provide interpretation to basic international investment principles.
13
 It is 
recommended here that the working group should focus on providing clear interpretation on the 
meaning of controversial international investment law principles which have sparked the 
legitimacy crisis. The principles to be interpreted includes but are not limited to: the term 
investment, the scope of an umbrella clause, the application of Most Favoured Nations (MFN) 
principle to a third party on procedural matters, the application of the defence of necessity and 
Non Precluded Measures (NPM) during emergency situations, the scope of the principle of 
expropriation, the meaning of fair and equitable treatment (FET), and lastly the meaning of full 
protection and security. 
 
It is submitted here that, these interim measures do not address the legitimacy issues 
cumulatively hence their potentiality is limited to the specific issue they address. It should be 
further noted that, for some of these measures to be realised, it will require amendments to the 
respective BITs and the institutional rules. It is submitted therefore that, the implementation of 
these alternative solutions may not be realised easily.  It is on that basis that this research calls 
for a lasting solution which is the creation of the MAI and the courts. 
                                                          
13
 See Chapter Five of this work under subheadings 5.3.5. 
 
 
 
 
371 
 
7.2.2 Major Recommendation 
 
This research has made one major recommendation which is the call for the establishment of the 
MAI and two courts: an international investment court and an international investment appellate 
court.
14
 The research believes that once all disputes are settled under one roof then all the issues 
will be properly addressed. The problem of inconsistency will be eliminated easily by the 
establishment of the court structure which will ensure that the court of first instance as well the 
appellate court embraces the doctrine of precedent, res judicata, lis pendens and have rules which 
provides for consolidation of related disputes. In addition, it is recommended for establishment 
of an appellate court which will have power by way of appeal, to provide the final interpretation 
to the basic international investment principles. It is submitted that the court will play a 
significant role in creating consistency, certainty and predictability in the respective dispute 
settlement system.
15
 
 
With regard to the lack of institutional safeguard for independence and impartiality of 
adjudicators, this research still finds that a MAI is the appropriate instrument to address the 
issue. The MAI once created will have to address how the adjudicators in its courts will be 
appointed and how long will they serve in the courts.
16
 This means that the MAI as the governing 
instrument will stipulate the qualifications of its judges, tenure of the judges and their 
remunerations and emoluments.  The MAI may also clearly provide that only applicants who 
passed the institute exam can serve in the court or appear as counsel before court. This can be 
                                                          
14
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.2.2. 
15
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.3.2. 
16
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.5.5. 
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stipulated in the MAI itself or protocols to the MAI. The inspiration on how the independence 
and impartiality can be guaranteed through the MAI can be gathered from the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding,
17
 the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union
18
  and the 
statute of the International Court of Justice.
19
 In order to address this issue it would be expected 
that the MAI will require the aspiring judges of the court to possess experience and adequate 
knowledge on public law, international law and investment law. With such kind of a bench it is 
submitted that all parties to the investor – state disputes will develop confidence in the 
adjudication process. 
 
On the issue of lack of transparency in public interest disputes, again, this research still believes 
that establishing a MAI with a provision which makes the hearing process in investor – state 
dispute to be open for all.
20
 The provision should demand that the notice of dispute, the response 
thereof, pleadings, third party submissions, transcripts of hearing and decisions are to be 
promptly available to the public for inspection. In addition, it is recommended that the rules 
should allow the public to attend any hearing except where there is a need to protect confidential 
information. With this kind of rules in the international investment court, the issue of lack of 
transparency will be squarely addressed. 
 
On the issue of encroachment on government policy making space, the research recommends 
that the MAI should have a provision guaranteeing the host state the right to regulate and to 
                                                          
17
 The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htmaccessed on 24/03/2014. 
18
 Protocol No. 3 on the European Court of Justice available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:265:FULL:EN:PDFaccessed on 14/04/2014. 
19
 See the Statute of International Court of Justice all available at available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf accessed on 08/04/2014. 
20
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheading 6.5.7 
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pursue development goals in a manner that suits its interest.
21
 Furthermore, the research finds 
that the UNCTAD which will be hosting the MAI, is in a better position to coordinate the 
establishment of an institute which will be responsible for the training for aspirants of the posts 
of judges in the international investment court and the international investment appellate court. 
This research believes that judges who are trained on international investment law are in a better 
position of interpreting the basic principles in a manner that strikes a balance between the 
interests of foreign investors and that of the host state. 
 
This research also finds that establishment of the MAI and the court is the best option to address 
the problem of parallel proceedings.
22
 Once the disputes are settled under one roof, the 
application of the principles of fork in the road principle, res judicata and lis pendens becomes 
even more realistic. It is only when the disputes are settled under one roof that the parties and the 
bench will be able to know about the existence of another dispute pending or resolved with same 
parties and cause of action. 
 
In addition, this research believes that through the MAI and courts, the litigation costs can easily 
be controlled.
23
 It is recommended for a permanent court which will be presided by salaried 
permanent judges. This will reduce the litigation costs to a large extent. Furthermore this 
research recommends that a Trust Fund be established that will be used to carter for litigation 
costs where one of the parties is a developing country. The MAI should stipulate that all member 
states to the MAI should contribute to the Fund on annual basis. This Fund if established will 
boost the legitimacy of the system as the courts will be accessible to both, poor and rich litigants. 
                                                          
21
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.5.3. 
22
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.3.1. 
23
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.3.1. 
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In furtherance of the above, this research finds the UNCTAD which brings together major 
players from the international investment community to discuss challenges and opportunities and 
to promote investment policies and partnerships for sustainable development and equitable 
growth, is better positioned to initiate the MAI negotiations and host the MAI and the relevant 
courts.
24
 It is recommended that the MAI and the Courts be established and hosted at the 
Division for Investment and Enterprise of the UNCTAD. The Division is recognised as ‘a global 
centre of excellence on issues related to investment and enterprise for sustainable 
development’.25 The division also provides technical support to over 150 world economy. This 
research strongly advises that hosting the dispute settlement system should be considered as 
technical assistance to the international investment regime. 
 
Conclusively, it is submitted here that the time is ripe for the establishment of the MAI and the 
courts for the sake of developing the international investment law in a proper manner and in 
accordance to the rule of law principles. It is through the MAI and the courts that international 
investment law will become a consistent, predictable, certain, transparent, cost efficient, timely 
and balanced adjudicative system. 
WORD COUNT:  text:  73,475. 
                     Footnotes:  41,416 
TOTAL 115,274 
                                                          
24
 See Chapter Six of this work under Subheadings 6.6.2. 
25
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investment and Enterprise Division available 
at http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/DIAE.aspx accessed on 26/05/2014. 
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